July 10, 1914; that it paid to the city of East St. Louis $75,000, which was retained by the city and which has been expended and disbursed for various municipal purposes, and that it has since been, and now is, operating its plant in the city of East St. Louis under said ordinance. The answer further averred that on August 17, 1914, the city council directed the mayor to file a complaint on behalf of the city against the water company before the State Public Utilities Commission with a view to modifying the rates, charges and practices theretofore in force as specified in schedules on file with the utilities commission, and asking that the said utilities commission require a reduction of the rate charged per 1000 gallons for water and make some other changes in the customs and practices of the water company in the exercise of its license; that the water company, the city of East St. Louis and a committee of citizens representing a citizen's organization of said city reached an agreement as to all the matters in controversy, made and filed a schedule with the utilities commission of rates, charges, etc., which schedule was approved by said commission and is now in force and on file as required by law. The answer averred that by reason of the facts (set out in much more extensive detail than we have stated them) the city of East St. Louis, and every citizen and tax-payer of said city, are estopped from complaining that the ordinance is invalid. The answer further averred that in October, 1914, the city passed an ordinance (No. 1983) purporting to repeal the license ordinance (No. 1972.) Thereupon the water company filed its bill in the United States district court for the eastern district of Illinois to enjoin the city of East St. Louis from disregarding and treating ordinance No. 1972 as repealed, from interfering with the water company's rights under said ordinance, and asking that the repealing ordinance be declared void. The city of East St. Louis, the only defendant to the bill, did not answer and was defaulted. A decree was entered by the United States district court ad

judging and declaring the repealing ordinance (No. 1983) unconstitutional, illegal and void, and enjoining the city of East St. Louis, its officers, agents and servants, from doing any act or thing in violation of the provisions of the contract between the parties as contained in ordinance No. 1972, from treating said ordinance as invalid or repealed, and from any action, by ordinance or resolution, to repeal or interfere with the validity of said ordinance No. 1972. The bill, the ordinances and the decree of the United States district court are set out in full in the answer, and the decree is relied upon as a bar to this action. The trial court, after the hearing, dismissed the bill for want of equity, and certified that the validity of an ordinance was involved and the public interest required it to be passed upon by this court, and complainant has sued out this writ of error.

The four principal questions raised by the pleadings and argued in the briefs are: (1) Whether a suit of this kind can be maintained on behalf of and in the name of one individual tax-payer; (2) whether the ordinance No. 1972 was legally passed; (3) whether, upon equitable grounds and principles, the city, and the tax-payers residing therein, are now estopped to question the validity of the ordinance; (4) whether the decree of the Federal court pleaded is res judicata of the issues here involved.

The first three propositions we shall not discuss or determine, as it seems certain that the decree of the Federal court is conclusive against complainant here. Complainant was not personally made a party defendant to the bill in the suit in the Federal court, and on that ground, as well as upon the contention that the validity of ordinance No. 1972 was not necessarily involved in and decided by that case, it is insisted the decree is not binding upon the complainant.

The power of the city to adopt the ordinance is not questioned, and no facts pleaded show the city or its inhabitants have suffered any wrong or injury, other than the

allegation that the ordinance was not legally adopted. If it was a valid ordinance, its acceptance by the water company made a valid and binding contract between it and the city and imposed the duty upon the city of performing its part of the obligation. After the ordinance was accepted and acted upon by the water company the city denied it was bound by it and passed an ordinance purporting to repeal it. The suit in the Federal court involved the question whether the city was bound by ordinance No. 1972, and the decision of that question depended upon whether it was a legal ordinance and whether it had the power to repudiate and repeal it. This was a matter of general interest to all the tax-payers of the city, and though complainant was not personally made a party to that suit, his rights as a taxpayer will be deemed to have been as effectually presented and protected as if he had been personally present. The issues in that case involved the right of the tax-payers to be relieved of the obligations imposed by the ordinance, which is the same question involved in this case. It is not claimed complainant has sustained or will sustain any wrong or injury different from that sustained by the tax-payers of the city generally. The precise questions raised in this case were or might have been adjudicated in the case in the Federal court. Complainant was a party to that suit by representation and the decree is binding upon him. Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122; Hale v. Hale, 146 id. 227; McCampbell v. Mason, 151 id. 500; County of DeWitt v. Leeper, 209 id. 133; Healy v. Deering, 231 id. 423; Ward v. Field Museum, 241 id. 496; People v. Harrison, 253 id. 625.

As this conclusion renders necessary an affirmance of the decree, the other questions raised will not be discussed. Decree affirmed.

The decree is affirmed.

JAMES T. KEARNEY et al. Appellees, vs. THE CITY OF CANTON et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed June 22, 1916.

1. ORDINANCES-courts of law have jurisdiction to determine validity of ordinance. Whether a city has exceeded its power in adopting an ordinance upon a subject which it is authorized to legislate about is a legal question which courts of law have jurisdiction to determine in a suit brought to enforce the provisions of the ordinance; and a court of equity will not enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the ground it is invalid, except when necessary to prevent irreparable injury or a multiplicity of suits.

2. SAME what not ground for enjoining enforcement of ordinance. In order to give a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits it should appear that the complainants and others are affected alike by the ordinance; and the mere fact that some may be affected by one section of the ordinance and others by various other sections is not sufficient, where it is not alleged in the bill that the ordinance has been violated by any of the complainants or that any suits have been begun against them.

3. SAME―mere fact that ordinance is void is not, alone, ground for enjoining its enforcement. Under no circumstances will a court of equity entertain a bill to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance on the ground, alone, that it is void, but those seeking to enjoin its enforcement must allege facts showing that their interests are affected by it.

4. SAME when equity will not take jurisdiction on ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Courts of equity are reluctant to take jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance upon a subject which the municipality has the power to legislate about, and will not do so on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits unless the ordinance affects a right or interest common to all the complainants. (Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, and Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 id. 444, distinguished.)

APPEAL from the City Court of Canton; the Hon. HARRY C. MORAN, Judge, presiding.

FLOYD F. PUTMAN, for appellants.

O. J. BOYER, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by the city of Canton from a decree of the city court of that city holding a certain ordinance of the municipality null and void and enjoining its enforcement. The court certified the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved and that the public interest required the appeal be taken direct to this court. The record is therefore brought directly here by appeal for review.

The bill was filed by eight complainants, who alleged therein that they were actual, bona fide residents of the city of Canton; that four of them named "have been engaged in the business of retailing ades or carbonated or aerated drinks and other like drinks" in said city; that another complainant named "has been engaged in the manufacture and wholesale of ades or carbonated and aerated drinks and like drinks" in said city; that another complainant named is the owner of a certain building "equipped with screens, shades, blinds and booths in such a manner that a view from the street is more or less obstructed;" that the building and its equipment are of the value of $10,000, and to remodel and change it so that the screens, blinds, shades and booths would not obstruct a view of the interior would subject the owner to a large expense. The bill alleged all of complainants are of a social character and turn of mind, and desire the right, when entertaining friends at their homes, to indulge in the moderate drinking of spirituous, vinous, malt or fermented liquors and to give such friends a drink. The ordinance is set out in full in the bill as a part thereof and is as follows:

"Sec. 1. That whoever shall by himself or another, either as principal, clerk or servant, within the corporate limits of the city of Canton, directly or indirectly sell, keep for sale, barter, exchange, give away or in any manner dispose of, or take an order or make an agreement for sale or delivery of any intoxicating liquor, or spirituous, vinous, malt or fermented liquor, or any mixture of any said liq