The conclusion heretofore stated, that the valuation given in its schedule as to the railroad track and right of way returned to the Auditor for the year 1913 must bind the company, applies as to the value of the intangible personal property. The evidence in the record tends to show that these returns were made on forms prepared by the State Auditor, and included much property, especially intangible personal property, that did not belong to the charter lines. Similar returns had been made for some seven years previous on the same forms by the company to the State Auditor and the State taxes levied by that officer in accordance with said returns. Even though it be a fact that the company included in this schedule property that did not belong to the charter lines, that fact cannot alter the rule of law as to the binding effect in this case upon the company of the values fixed in the schedule for the assessment of the State tax for the year in question. The valuation given to the intangible personal property in the company's schedule for 1913, namely, $70,728,290.49, is binding upon the company, and should be the total aggregate cash value of this item of the company's property for the purpose of levying the State tax.

Both counsel in their briefs and arguments have discussed at length various points which we have not deemed it necessary to consider. Having in mind the fact that there is another cause in litigation wherein the question is involved as to a proper accounting between the State and the company under the rules laid down by this court in State v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 246 Ill. 188, counsel have stated in their briefs that they do not desire the court, without fully considering its bearing on the litigation for an accounting, to say anything in this opinion that would, directly or indirectly, affect a decision in that case, and they have argued here at some length questions that arise only

It is proper to state here that the aggregate value of all the property and assets of the company as returned by it in its schedules to the State Auditor for the various years from 1906 to 1912, inclusive, and which the State Auditor took as a basis in fixing the assessment for the State tax in accordance with the rules laid down herein, varies in these different years from $155,016,656.50 to $182,067,092.55.

In view of the conclusions that we have reached, the total aggregate cash value of the property of the company to be assessed as of March 31, 1913, should be in accordance with the figures set forth in the last column of the table given above, that is, $191,020,034.03. The Auditor of Public Accounts, in assessing the tax thereon for State purposes, must proceed in accordance with the views set forth in this opinion. He must equalize its value on the same basis as has been applied to the other property throughout the State for assessing the taxes for the year 1913,—that is, to 70 per cent of said aggregate cash value, making such equalized value $133,714,023.82. In harmony with the general Revenue law of this State and under the reasoning of this opinion, only one-third of said total equalized value,— that is, $44,571,341.27,—should be taken by the Auditor as the value upon which said State taxes against the company should be assessed, and said State taxes should be assessed at the rate fixed by the State for other State taxes for that year, that is, seventy cents on each $100 of valuation. The clerk of this court will certify to the Auditor of Public Accounts the aggregate cash value as found by this court, that is, $191,020,034.03.

Ordered certified accordingly.

MORRIS R. CABLE, Trustee, Appellee, vs. HENRY R. HOFFMAN, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 20, 1916-Rehearing denied June 9, 1916.

I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-court cannot require a party to do more than he has agreed to do. In decreeing specific performance of a contract the court has no power to order the defendant to do more than he has agreed to do.

2. SAME-complainant must show readiness, ability and willingness to perform. Before the complainant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract he must show that he is ready, able and willing to perform the contract on his part.

3. SAME when a defendant should not be required to pay purchase money to a trust company. If the complainant in a bill for specific performance has agreed to furnish a title guaranty policy but the trust company which is to furnish the policy refuses to issue one before the consideration for the conveyance has been deposited with it, the defendant cannot be required to pay the money to the trust company, where the contract does not so require, the trust company is not a party to the suit and there is no assurance that the defendant will receive the policy if he pays the money.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS G. WINDES, Judge, presiding.

ANDERSON E. MARTIN, and ALVAH T. MARTIN, (NewTON WYETH, of counsel,) for appellant.

MAURICE ALSCHULER, (MENZ I. ROSENBAUM, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Morris R. Cable, as trustee, appellee, entered into a written contract with Henry R. Hoffman, appellant, October 26, 1914, whereby appellant agreed to purchase for the sum of $31,000 a lot 50 by 125 feet, being the northwest corner of Forty-second court and Grenshaw street, in the city of Chicago, subject to a trust deed for $21,000. Appellant paid $500 at the time the contract was executed, and agreed

to pay, within five days after the title had been examined and found good, the further sum of $9500 at the office of Martin & Martin, in the city of Chicago, provided a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying to appellant a good title to the premises should then be ready for delivery. It was further agreed that a complete merchantable abstract brought down to date or a merchantable title guaranty policy should be furnished within a reasonable time, and if upon examination the title be found defective within ten days after the abstract was furnished, then, unless the material defects be corrected within sixty days after written notice thereof, the $500 earnest money should be refunded and the contract become inoperative. An abstract of title was furnished and numerous objections to the title were made. On February 1, 1915, appellee filed his bill in the circuit court of Cook county for the specific performance of the contract and for other relief. Appellant and certain lien claimants were made parties defendant. On July 15, 1915, a decree was entered authorizing, directing and empowering appellee to comply with the terms and provisions of the contract and to convey the premises to appellant. Other relief prayed for was granted by this decree but no obligation to act was imposed upon appellant. On October 30, 1915, appellee moved for an order requiring appellant to specifically perform the terms of the contract of October 26, 1914, and consummate the same in accordance with the order of July 15, 1915. In support of this motion appellee presented affidavits showing that upon the entry of the order of July 15, 1915, appellee executed a quit-claim deed and deposited the same with the Chicago Title and Trust Company, which company agreed to issue its guaranty policy to appellant showing a clear fee simple title in appellant provided appellant would pay to the trust company the balance of the purchase price under said contract, so that the title might be brought down and shown in appellant, and that appellant had refused to do so. Affidavits were also filed on behalf