court what lands, in addition to those embraced within the proposed district, will be benefited by the proposed work is to furnish the basis for an order including such lands within the proposed district. Lands already embraced in a legally organized drainage district cannot be included in the organization of another drainage district, (People v. Baldridge, 267 Ill. 190,) and it would be a useless formality for the commissioners, in their report, to give a description and the names of the owners of any such lands. The commissioners reported that the proposed district would embrace all the lands that will be benefited by the proposed work except lands already embraced in other legally organized drainage districts. This was a sufficient compliance with the statute. The order of the county court is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. Moses BROWN, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed April 20, 1916.

1. LOCAL OPTION-legal consequence of conviction not limited to a connected period when town is "dry." The fact that a town votes to cease to be anti-saloon territory does not amount to a repeal of the Local Option law nor nullify the legal consequences of a conviction for selling liquor in anti-saloon territory, and when the town again votes to become anti-saloon territory the offense committed during the former "dry" period may be alleged as a former conviction when the same offender is thereafter prosecuted.

2. SAME when certified copy of an internal revenue special tax stamp is properly admitted. In a prosecution for the sale of intoxicating liquor in anti-saloon territory a certified copy of an internal revenue special tax stamp issued to the defendant as a retail dealer in malt liquor at a certain address is admissible in evidence, under section 41 of the Local Option law, as prima facie evidence of the sale of intoxicating liquor at the place mentioned in the stamp or at any place of business where the stamp is posted, and if there has been evidence of sales the copy is properly admitted to show the character of the liquor sold, even though there is no evidence that the stamp was posted at the place alleged in the indictment.

3. SAME when it is not error to admit cases of beer in evidence. Two cases of beer taken from the basement of the home of a witness are properly admitted in evidence where the witness has testified that he ordered two cases of beer from the defendant, even though he testifies that he did not see who brought them to the house but first saw them when they were taken out by a policeman, where there is also evidence that the defendant peddled blank orders for beer about the city and delivered the cases to customers.

4. SAME-receipts for shipments of beer are admissible in evidence. In the prosecution of one Moses Brown for selling intoxicating liquor in anti-saloon territory, receipts for large shipments of beer to Moses Brown, M. Brown, Moses Brown Express Company, and Moses Brown, care of Moses Brown Express Company, are admissible, where the receipts on the way-bills are proved to be in the handwriting of the defendant.

5. CRIMINAL LAW-in prosecution for misdemeanor the verdict may be received in absence of defendant. In a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor in anti-saloon territory it is not error to receive the verdict of guilty in the absence of the defendant.

6. SAME-defendant cannot complain that nolle prosequi as to certain counts is entered after verdict of guilty. The rule that the State's attorney or prosecuting officer cannot enter a nolle prosequi as to any count of the indictment without the consent of the defendant after the jury has been empaneled and sworn does not prevent a nolle prosequi as to certain counts after a verdict of guilty on all the counts and a motion by the defendant for a new trial.

7. SAME-when verdict is not a finding of guilty as to a single offense. A verdict in a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor in anti-saloon territory which finds the defendant guilty, in manner and form as charged in the indictment, upon "the following counts: all the counts in the indictment," is equivalent to a finding of guilty upon every count, and authorizes a penalty being imposed on each count and not merely for a single offense.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Second District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. MAZZINI Slusser, Judge, presiding.

JAMES W. CLIFFE, for plaintiff in error.

P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, LOWELL B. SMITH, State's Attorney, and GEO. P. RAMSEY, (E. M. BURST, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

The plaintiff in error, Moses Brown, was indicted in the circuit court of DeKalb county for violations of the Local Option law of 1907. (Laws of 1907, p. 297.) The indictment contained thirteen counts, numbered consecutively, and those numbered from 1 to 12, inclusive, charged him with sales of liquor in 1914 in the town of DeKalb, which was then anti-saloon territory, and alleged a previous conviction for violating the same act. The count numbered 13 charged him with maintaining a common nuisance by keeping a place in the town where he unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor. The former conviction alleged was in 1908, and he first filed a plea in abatement, alleging that in May, 1910, the town ceased to be anti-saloon territory and again became anti-saloon territory in May, 1914, and that there was a period between the former conviction and the alleged violation of the law in 1914 when the law was not in force in the town. The court held the plea insufficient. There was a trial, at which the jury found the defendant guilty on all of the counts of the indictment. A motion for a new trial being made, the State's attorney entered a nolle prosequi as to the counts numbered 9, 10, 11 and 12, and the motion was overruled. The court sentenced the defendant to pay a fine of $75 on each of the first eight counts and a fine of $100 on the thirteenth count, and also to confinement in the county jail fifteen days on each of the first eight counts, the terms to follow in immediate succession in the order named in the judgment, and fifty days on the thirteenth count, to follow the term of imprisonment on the eighth count. A writ of error was sued out from the Appellate Court for the Second District, and one of the judges of that court having received the verdict of the jury, took no part. The other judges were of the opinion that no error was committed in receiving the verdict but were divided in opinion on other errors assigned and the judgment was affirmed by op

eration of law. A writ of error was sued out of this court to review the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The first assignment of error is that the court erred in holding the plea in abatement insufficient, because the Local Option law under which the defendant was convicted was repealed by the vote of the people in 1910 so far as the town of DeKalb was concerned and was as though it never had been and the repeal was a remission of all penalties under the law. If it should be assumed that the vote in 1910 amounted to a repeal of the act in the town of DeKalb, section 4 of chapter 131 of the Revised Statutes of 1874 provides that even in the case of an express repeal no new law shall be construed to repeal a former one as to any offense committed against the former law or as to any act done or penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred under the former law, and that statute makes the decisions in other jurisdictions inapplicable here. The vote, however, was not a repeal of the Local Option law, which does not delegate any legislative function to the people of any locality. The law continued in force, but by its provisions it is operative or not in particular localities, depending upon the decision of the voters in the locality. The former conviction was not annulled or its legal consequences in any way affected by the vote of 1910. The court did not err in ruling on the plea in abatement.

It is contended that the court erred in permitting the State's attorney to ask leading questions. The witnesses were not Americans and were acquainted only with the language of their nativity and testified through an interpreter. There was some difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers, and some of the questions in terms directed attention to the subject matter concerning which they were called to testify. We do not find any question which indicated the answer desired, and the rulings were evidently for the purpose of expediting the trial. The matter was largely in the discretion of the court, and there was no im

proper ruling. Maguire v. People, 219 Ill. 16; McCann v. People, 226 id. 562.

The court admitted in evidence a certified copy of an internal revenue special tax stamp issued to the defendant as a retail dealer in malt liquor at 503 East Lincoln highway, DeKalb, Illinois, covering the period from July 1, 1914, to June 30, 1915, for a consideration of $20. It is argued that the court erred because there was no evidence of posting the revenue stamp at 425 East Lincoln highway. When the stamp was offered the objection at first was only general, and afterward that the copy was not properly certified. There was no defect in the certificate, and the certified copy was admissible, under section 41 of the Local Option law, as prima facie evidence of the sale of intoxicating liquor at the place mentioned in the stamp or at any place of business where the stamp or receipt was posted. There was no evidence that the stamp was posted at the place alleged to be a nuisance but there had been evidence of sales, and the paper was properly admitted to show the character of the liquor sold.

The court admitted in evidence two cases of beer taken from the basement at the home of Baraisis, one of the witnesses, and it is insisted that this was improper because the presence of the cases of beer shown to the jury had a tendency to inflame the minds of the jurors against the defendant and because it had not been proved that he sold the beer. Baraisis had testified that he ordered two cases of beer from the defendant; that he did not see who brought them to the house but he first saw them when the policeman was removing them from his basement, which was the day after they were delivered. There also had been evidence that the defendant peddled blank orders for beer about the city and delivered cases to customers, and the evidence was sufficient to admit the cases of beer in evidence. Nothing is suggested by counsel which would cause these particular cases of beer to have any especial effect upon the minds of