is essential to the levy of a valid tax. (People v. Toledo, St. Louis and Western Railroad Co. 266 Ill. 112; People v. Chicago and Springfield Railway Co. 270 id. 600.) We have held it to be the duty of the town clerk to keep a record of the meetings of the commissioners of highways and that the action of the commissioners can only be shown by the record. (People v. Toledo, St. Louis and Western Railroad Co. 270 Ill. 472.) It having been proved that there was no record of the August and September meetings, showed prima facie that there was no valid levy of the tax. This was not conclusive, however, but if the meetings were, in fact, held, it was incumbent upon appellee to prove it and amend the record to show the meetings and what was done at them and then introduce the record in evidence. This was not done, and in our opinion, under the proof made, the court should have sustained the objection to the tax for Elmwood township.

The town clerk of Brimfield township testified there was no record of any meeting of the commissioners of highways to levy the road and bridge tax for that township. For the reasons above stated the court should have sustained the objections to the road and bridge tax for Brimfield township.

As to the taxes of Princeville township, the town clerk was called by the appellant and testified that he had with him the record of the board of highway commissioners of Princeville township showing the meetings held in the year 1914. He was asked if the book he had in his hand was the book referred to and said it was. Appellant offered in evidence page 89 of the book, which showed a meeting of the commissioners August 25, 1914, at which time the tax rate for road and bridge purposes was fixed. No record of the September meeting was introduced in evidence and no inquiry was made of the witness whether any such meeting was held by the commissioners. The town clerk was subsequently called by the People. He was shown the certificate of levy made by the commissioners and filed with the

county clerk, and testified it was made just after the meeting of the commissioners, and he thought the same day. It was dated September 1, 1914, and signed by all three of the commissioners. It was offered in evidence by appellee and admitted subject to appellant's objection. Over appellant's objection the witness testified there was a meeting of the commissioners the first Tuesday in September; that a record of the meeting was made in a book but that the witness did not have the book with him. He testified it was in the town clerk's office, and when asked if he would get the book and produce it at the hearing said he would. The book was never produced or offered in evidence. We are of opinion the testimony of the town clerk when called by appellant, and the record offered in evidence by appellant, did not sufficiently show that no September meeting was held by the commissioners. The clerk testified the book he had with him, parts of which appellant offered in evidence, was the record of the board of commissioners showing the meetings held by them in 1914, but he was not asked, and did not testify when offered as a witness by appellant, that the book contained no record of a September meeting or that no such meeting was held. When subsequently called as a witness on behalf of appellee, and after identifying the certificate of levy made by the commissioners, he testified that it was made at a meeting held, he thought, on the day the certificate bore date, and that a meeting was held on the first Tuesday in September, 1914. He was asked if there was any record of the meeting and testified there was, in a book he did not have with him but which was in his office. He was asked to produce it and said he would, but did not do so. It will be seen the town clerk's testimony was somewhat involved and conflicting, but having testified that the book he produced was the record of the commissioners' meetings in 1914 and that it contained no record of any September meeting, we think if there was a record of that meeting in some other book it was incumbent upon appellee

to produce the record, and having failed to do so the objection to that tax should have been sustained.

The proof sufficiently shows that meetings of the commissioners were held, as required by law, in Kickapoo, Milbrook and Rosefield townships and that the tax in those townships was legally levied. The objection that the certificates of levy in all seven of the townships filed by the commissioners with the county clerk did not recite facts sufficient to authorize the extension of the tax is untenable. All of the certificates were alike and were exactly or substantially in the same form as certificates which we have held were sufficient. People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 270 Ill. 636; People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. 270 id. 527.

It is further objected that the certificates of levy for Milbrook and Kickapoo townships recite the levy was made for the year 1915 instead of the year 1914. This was undoubtedly a clerical mistake and might have been corrected (Revenue act, sec. 191,) if the mistake had been called to the court's attention. (People v. New York Central Railroad Co. supra.) That objection to the certificates was not made on the hearing and cannot be here raised for the first time. City of Arcola v. Wilkinson, 233 Ill. 250; Taylor v. Adams, 115 id. 570; Village of North Chillicothe v. Burr, 185 id. 322.

For the errors indicated in not making a further reduction of $4400 from the sum levied to pay county officers' salaries and in overruling the objections to the road and bridge taxes in Elmwood, Brimfield and Princeville townships the judgment of the county court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a judgment in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.

Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

MELAINE DINQUEL et al. Appellees, vs. LEOPOLDine Dacco et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed April 20, 1916.

1. HOMESTEAD—the question of abandonment of a homestead is largely one of intention. The question of abandonment of homestead is very largely one of intention, to be determined from the particular facts in each case.

2. SAME―re-marriage of widow and removal from homestead raise presumption of abandonment. The re-marriage of a widow and removal from the homestead premises to the home of her second husband raise a presumption of abandonment of the homestead, but such presumption will yield to explanatory proof showing that the removal was intended to be temporary.

3. SAME-homestead interest is an estate in land. Under the present statute the homestead interest is an estate in land vested in the person designated by law, and upon the death of the householder in whom the homestead is vested the estate passes to the surviving husband or wife.

4. SAME when proceedings to set off homestead are unnecessary. Where the whole premises do not exceed the value of the homestead estate the limits of such estate are already fixed, and the widow may avail herself of her rights without any proceeding for setting off the homestead estate.

5. SAME-person having homestead estate need not occupy the premises personally. The person in whom an estate of homestead is vested is not required to occupy the premises personally, but may rent the same or put them in the possession of one to whom she has given a deed to her interest.

6. SAME-positive testimony by widow that she intended to return to homestead cannot be disregarded. Positive testimony of the widow that her removal from the homestead premises was not intended to be permanent cannot be disregarded, where it is not contradicted or impeached by positive or circumstantial evidence.

7. SAME what does not necessarily show an abandonment of a homestead estate. The facts that the widow, having a homestead estate in a house and several lots worth less than $1000, rents the homestead premises and goes to visit a son in a distant place, where she meets a man whom she marries and lives with in a rented house for some three years before returning to the homestead premises, do not necessarily show an abandonment of the homestead estate, where she testifies that she did not intend to re

move permanently from the homestead premises, and where, during her absence, she received the rents therefrom.

8. SAME-effect of increase in the value of homestead premises after estate has vested. Where the homestead premises at the time the homestead estate vests in the widow are not worth $1000 the boundaries of the homestead estate are fixed and determined by law at that time, and she cannot be deprived of any part of it by any increase in value before beginning of a partition proceeding.

9. WITNESSES-when widow may testify in a partition suit. In a suit by heirs for partition and an accounting from the widow for the rents from the premises claimed by the widow as a homestead, the widow is not precluded, by section 2 of the Evidence act, from testifying to facts occurring after the death of her husband.

10. SAME when widow's second husband is not incompetent. In a proceeding by heirs for partition and accounting against the widow, the man whom the widow has married since she acquired her homestead estate is not incompetent under section 5 of the Evidence act and may testify he has never owned any real estate.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Woodford county; the Hon. T. M. HARRIS, Judge, presiding.

FORT & FORT, for appellants.

W. H. FOSTER, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a bill filed by appellees in the circuit court of Woodford county to partition certain real estate and for an accounting. An answer was filed by Leopoldine Dacco, one of the defendants, claiming that she was entitled to homestead and dower rights in said premises and that appellees were not entitled to any accounting. Other defendants answered, setting up the same defenses. The cause was referred to a master, and on his report of the evidence and his findings to the circuit court a decree was entered denying the right of appellees to an accounting, and finding that the appellant Leopoldine Dacco was entitled to dower in said premises but making no specific finding as to her home