Sec. 159. The drainage act is sustained under the police power which is expressly reserved in this section, which provides that "the exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged." Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362. Cited but not construed in City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127.

Sec. 161. See Commonwealth ex rel. A. D. Kelly v. Southern Ry. Co. (State Corporation Commission), 3 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 431.

Sec. 162. A company chartered by the General Assembly as a railway corporation by a special act, but operated exclusively in connection with another corporation, a cement company, for the private purposes of the latter, both corporations being under one common ownership and control, its engines being propelled by steam, and doing regularly the sort of work which imparts peculiar hazard to the business of railroads, is a railroad company. Wilson's Adm'x. v. Va. Portland R. Co., 122 Va. 160, 94 S. E. 347. Cited but not construed in Karabalis v. E. I. Du Pont & Co., 129 Va. 151, 105 S. E. 755.

Sec. 164. As section 125 of the Constitution must be construed with this section, the latter section, providing that the right of regulation and control of public service corporations shall never be surrendered or abridged, did not prohibit municipal corporations from making irrevocable contracts as to rates on the condition of granting a franchise to public service corporations as electric light companies, and hence Corporation Commission, under Act 1914, page 673, has no authority to charge without consent of such municipalities rates so fixed. Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723.

Čited but not construed in City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127.

Sec. 168. Sections 2332, 2334-2337 of the Code, as amended, do not violate this section of the Constitution. Commonwealth v. United Cigarette M. Co., 120 Va. 835, 92 S. E. 901.

A charter provision of a city securing to the city a lien on the interest of a remainderman in property assessed to the life tenant is not unconstitutional. Powers v. Richmond, 122 Va. 328, 94 S. E. 803.

Intangible personal property, owned by minors who are domiciled in Virginia, is subject to taxation therein under this section, and the statutes contained in section 2306 of the Code of 1919, and Acts 1897-8, page 756, as amended by Acts 1916, page 828, enacted in pursuance of the Constitution; just as such property of other persons domiciled in the State is subject to taxation, unless it be true that the statute law of the State is such that no situs therein is fixed by law for the taxation of such property of a minor in a case where the minor has a guardian who is a non-resident of the State. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 445, 98 S. E. 5.

The act of March 15, 1915 (Acts 1915, p. 121) which provides that the board of supervisors of each county shall annually levy a road tax upon the property, subject to local taxation in their county and not within the corporate limits of any town in such county which maintains its own streets, is not in violation of this section, which provides that "All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." Watkins v. Barror, 121 Va. 236, 92 S. E. 908.

The "territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," within which the taxes, under this section must be uniform, corresponds with the taxing districts lawfully prescribed for the peculiar benefit of which such taxes are levied and collected. Thus, while the board of supervisors has authority to impose county levies for county purpose upon all property in the county, still under section 111 of the Constitution, the territorial limit of its authority to levy uniform district taxes is confined to the limits of the particular magisterial district for the benefit of which the taxes are imposed, and they may and do levy varying rates in different districts in the same county. Watkins v. Barror, 121 Va. 236, 92 S. E. 908.

Under the Constitutions of 1851 and 1870, because of the absence of such express provisions as those in this section, which provides that all property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be taxed, and section 183, which provides

that, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the following property and no other shall be exempt from taxation, a difference of opinion existed as to the question of whether it was in the power of the legislature to exempt, or to authorize a municipality to exempt, other property from taxation than that mentioned in the tax exemption clauses of such former Constitutions, and that point was left undecided, and although urged in argument, the supreme court of appeals did not find it necessary to determine the question. Richmond v. Va. R. & P. Co., 124 Va. 529, 98 S. É. 691.

The city of Richmond, under its charter, possesses plenary power of taxation, subject only to such limitations as may be placed upon the exercise of that power by the Constitution and legislature. Under an ordinance of the city, the capital of a bank was assessed at the rate of $1.40 on the $100, instead of thirty cents, the rate imposed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. It was contended by the bank that the ordinance conflicted with section 1040-a of the Code of 1904, and section 168 of the Constitution of 1902.

Held: That these objections to the ordinance were disposed of in favor of the ordinance by the construction placed upon the segregation act by the supreme court of appeals in the case of City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 94 S. E. 989. The exceptions in the act of 1915, in respect to the capital of merchants and the shares of stocks of banks, in the particular here involved are so concatenated as necessarily to demand the same construction. Richmond v. Merchants Nat. Bk., 124 Va. 522, 98 S. E. 643. Reversed 256 U. S. 635.

For article on "Taxation of Corporate Stock," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 569. For article on the constitutionality of "Sections 2332, 2334-2337 as to Omitted Taxes," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 161.

Under this section, the segregated intangible property of the estate of a decedent in the hands of his executors is taxable under segregation act (Acts 1915, p. 119) in the magisterial district in which decedent was last domiciled; the decedent, or his executors, being deemed residents thereof within the statute for purpose of taxation. Rixey's Ex'rs. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 337, 101 S. E.

404.

As merchants' capital is not embraced in the classification of schedule C of the tax bill, but remains where it has practically always been, in a class to itself, subject to a license tax only by the State, but liable to a local property tax, and the propriety and legality of such a classification has been too long recognized in this State to admit of serious question, and is, moreover, plainly authorized by this section, therefore, there is no force in the contention that if this construction is correct, the segregation act itself is unconstitutional because it violates section 168 of the Constitution requiring uniformity in taxation. City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 90 S. E. 635, 989.

In the case at bar, the tax exemption claimed was not an exemption for a reasonable time upon property reasonably certain as to identity and value. The exemption sought was "forever;" it extended not only to certain property which existed at the time when the exemption was conferred, but to all which may have been placed thereon since, and also, to all "other property which may hereafter be added thereto, including capital added thereto or used or employed thereon." Such an exemption was not within the power of the city of Manchester to create under the Acts of Assembly 1874-5, page 264. City of Richmond v. Va. R. & P. Co., 124 Va. 529, 98 S. E. 691.

A provision of a town charter that the town "shall have the right to collect three-fourths of all the road tax levied by the county on the inhabitants of Narrows" which shall be expended on the streets and roads within the town is not a violation of section 168 of the Constitution, as indirectly exempting the citizens of the town from the payment of county road taxes. Town of Narrows V. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, 105 S. E. 82.

The mere mandate of the Constitution that taxes shall be laid on certain property by the General Assembly, or a board of supervisors, does not by itself, impose a tax, though failure to do so may be a breach of duty by the officials charged therewith. Some positive action to that end must be taken by the legislative body. County v. Jarratt, 129 Va. 672, 106 S. E. 384, 627.

Sec. 169. Cited but not construed in Richmond v. Pace, 127 Va. 274, 103 S. E. 647.

Sec. 170. Sections 29 and 32 of the drainage act (Acts 1914, chap. 332), which provide for assessments against lands in the district and the issuance of

bonds of the district, and for levying assessments for the payment of the bonds, are not violative of this section which provides that: "Except in cities and towns no such taxes or assessments for local public improvements shall be imposed upon abutting landowners." Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

The snyonyms of "such" are "like," "similar," "of that kind," "of the like kind." "Such" is a descriptive and relative word, and refers to the last antecedent, unless the meaning of the sentence would thereby be impaired. It means identical with or similar to something which has been already specified or implied. As used in this section, it refers to the assessments which had been immediately theretofore mentioned in the section which were assessments for the usual and customary municipal improvements, clearly specified or indicated in the preceding paragraph, and it is assessments like these which the clause prohibits the counties from levying against abutting landowners. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

The assessments under the drainage act are not assessed against "abutting" owners as a class, but assessed against all landowners whose lands within the drainage district are benefitted, and no assessments can be made upon landowners simply because their lands abut or are merely adjacent to the district, however great the benefit to them may be. The prohibition, in this section, is against assessments against "abutting" landowners, and in such discussions it must be always remembered that it is not enought to suggest a constitutional restraint. If there be doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act under consideration. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

For article on "Taxation of Corporate Stock," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 569.

Sec. 174. Under this section no dereliction of the examiners of records in failing to report the property, or of the commissioner of revenue in failing to assess it for taxation, can relieve any taxpayer of his duty to list and return his taxable property for taxation; nor can such concurring failures and omissions relieve any of the property from its just proportion of the tax burdens, which are intended to be equal and uniform. Rixey's Ex'rs. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 337, 101 S. E. 404.

For article on the constitutionality of "Sections 2332, 2334-2337 as to Omitted Taxes," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 161.

For article on "The Examination of Titles in Virginia," see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 817.

Sec. 177. This section and section 28 of the tax bill of 1916 (Acts 1916, p. 815) deprive a city of the right to levy a license tax on railway corporations, and section 36 of the tax bill (Acts 1916, p. 803) limits the license tax which may be levied by a city or town upon corporations engaged in the business of furnishing water, heat or light and power, whether by means of electricity or gas, to one-half of one per cent. of the gross receipts from such business accruing to said corporation from said business in such city or town. The Constitution and the statutes, however, both contain a proviso, that nothing contained therein shall annul or interfere with or prevent any contract or agreement by ordinance between such corporations and municipalities as to compensation for the use of the streets or alleys of such municipalities by such corporations. An ordinance of the city of Lynchburg ratifying previous contracts with a traction and light company and granting additional rights to the company to operate its lines in the city reserved the right to levy a property tax on the property of the company within the city, and the right after twelve years to levy a license tax on the company. The city claimed the right under this ordinance to levy a license tax upon the railway business of the company and a license tax in excess of one-half of one per cent. of the lighting business of the company, resting the claim not upon the general statutes authorizing and limiting its right to levy taxes, but upon its power to enter into contracts by ordinance for compensation for the use of its streets and alleys.

Held: That the ordinance could not be construed as such a contract and the ordinances authorizing the license taxes and the assessments under the ordinances were void. City of Lynchburg v. Lynchburg T. & L. Co., 124 Va. 130, 97 S. E. 780.

Sec. 183. The general rule is that provisions exempting property of individuals or private corporations from taxation must be strictly construed, taxation of such property being the rule and exemption from taxation the exception. One of the reasons for this is, that all such persons should bear their fair share of the burdens of taxation, and that lessening the burdens of one increases the burden of others. But as the policy of the State has always been to exempt property of the character mentioned and described in this section, it should not be construed with the same degree of strictness that applies to provisions making exemptions contrary to the policy of the State, since as to such property exemption is the rule and taxation the exception. Com. v. Smallwood Mem❜l. Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S. E. 805.

An incorporated industrial school organized and maintained by charitable gifts was the equitable owner of three tracts of land adjoining each other. The important buildings of the school were located upon one of the tracts and the three tracts were occupied jointly and parts were cultivated for the benefit of the institution. The charter of the school showed that it was an eleemosynary corporation without shares of stock, not owned by individuals or corporations. Held: That these three adjoining parcels of land, together with the furniture, furnishings, books and instruments thereon, including farming implements used in connection with the farm or demonstration work, constitute property exempt from taxation under sub-section (d) of this section. Com. v. Smallwood Mem❜l. Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S. E. 805.

As amended by act of March 15, 1915, page 121, which provides that the board of supervisors of each county shall annually levy a road tax upon the property, subject to local taxation in their county and not within the corporate limits of any town in such county which maintains its own streets, is not in violation of section 168 of the Constitution, which provides that "All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." Watkins v. Barror, 121 Va. 236, 92 S. E. 908.

Under the Constitutions of 1851 and 1860, because of the absence of such express provisions as those in the Constitution of 1902, section 168, which provides that all property, except as hereinafter provided shall be taxed, and this section which provides that, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the following property and no other shall be exempt from taxation, a difference of opinion existed as to the question of whether it was in the power of the legislature to exempt, or to authorize a municipality to exempt other property from taxation than that mentioned in the tax exemption clauses of such former Coastitutions, and that point was left undecided, and although urged in argument, the supreme court of appeals did not find it necessary to determine the question. Richmond v. Va. R. & P. Co., 124 Va. 529, 98 S. E. 691.

A statute (Acts 1874, p. 264) providing that it should be lawful for the common council of the city of Manchester to make sale of the commons, including the water power of the said city, by such mode and upon terms as said common council shall deem proper was held, not to authorize the city to exempt the land, the subject of the sale, from taxation. Although the word "terms" might, in its broadest sense, authorize an exemption from taxation, the language is equally susceptible of the construction that the terms referred to are merely the terms of payment of the purchase money, including the manner of securing any deferred payments, etc., as it is of the construction that a tax exemption was thereby intended to be authorized. Similar language is frequently used in deeds, wills and other writings creating powers of sale, and the former is the usual and ordinary meaning of the word "terms" when used in connection with provisions conferring a power of sale. City of Richmond v. Va. R. & P. Co., 124 Va. 529, 93 S. E. 691.

Land assessed in the name of its legal owner, not adjoining the property upon which the school buildings are located, nor used for any school purpose, and never conveyed to the school, whether derived from the same source as the other property of the school or not, is not exempt under this section because not used for school purposes. Com. v. Smallwood Meml. Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S. E. 805.

An electric light and power plant located upon school property for the purpose of supplying the school buildings with light and power, and also supplying

a neighboring village, and some of the citizens with electric light, where it can be segregated for taxation from the residue of the school property, is not exempt from taxation under this section. Com. v. Smallwood Memĺ. Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S. E. 805.

The most casual consideration of this section shows clearly and distinctly the purpose of the convention thereafter to make it impossible for the legislature to create any exemptions from taxation, for it not only provides in detail affirmatively just what property can be exempted from taxation, but expressly denies the legislature the power to add thereto, and specifically prohibits the exemption of any other property. No historical discussion of the provisions of former Constitutions or legislation can make obscure the clear meaning of this section, so far as it affects this question. Hollywood Cemetery Co. v. Com., 123 Va. 106, 96 S. E. 207.

For article on "Taxation of Corporate Stock," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 569. For article on the constitutionality of "Sections 2332, 2334-2337 as to Omitted Taxes," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 161.

Sec. 184. Contraction of debts and issuing evidences of debt by State prohibited except in certain cases (as amended).

No debt shall be contracted by the State except to construct, or reconstruct, public roads, to meet casual deficits in the revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or defend the State in time of war. No scrip, certificate, or other evidence of State indebtedness, shall be issued except for the transfer or redemption of stock previously issued, or for such debts as are expressly authorized in this Constitution.

This amendment was adopted by the people at the election of November 2, 1920. For amendment, 111,309; against, 48,948.

Section 184, Acts 1920, chapter 213, was enacted for the purpose of enabling the county of Louisa to obtain the benefit of Acts 1920, chapter 184, entitled an Act to anticipate by counties, or otherwise, the construction of the State highway system. Held, that neither of these acts conflict with section 184 of the Constitution of 1902 as it stood at the time these statutes were enacted, nor with sections 185 and 187 of the Constitution as they stood and now stand. Board of Supervisors v. Bibb, 129 Va. 638, 106 S. E. 684.

Sec. 185. See Board of Supervisors v. Bibb, cited under section 184.

A county guaranty of payment for stone furnished contractors to be used in paving county roads is not within this section, providing the credit of the county shall not be granted. Holston Corp. v. Wise County, 109 S. E. 180. Sec. 187. See Board of Supervisors v. Bibb, cited under section 184. Sec. 196. The words "voting thereon," as used in this, and the following section, serve no other function than to expressly state a meaning which would be implied from the preceding language, even if it had not been so expressly stated, certainly in cases involving a special election, at which only a single proposition is voted upon; and, therefore, the absence of the word "voting thereon" from section 117 of the Constitution, as amended in 1912, does not require that section to be construed as requiring a majority of the qualified electors whether voting or not. Harrison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180, 102 S. E. 789.

Sec. 197. See Harrison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180, 102 S. E. 789, cited under section 196 above.