A charter provision of a city securing to the city a lien on the interest of a remainderman in property assessed to the life tenant, is not unconstitutional. Powers v. Richmond, 122 Va. 328, 94 S. E. 803.

The General Assembly may abolish city offices and the city is not liable for the salary accruing during the remainder of the term for which the officer is elected. Hobson v. City of Richmond, see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 434 (circuit court of city of Richmond). The court of appeals refused a writ of error in this case.

Under this section, providing that a change by a city to the city manager plan of government, shall be "by a majority vote of its qualified voters at an election," et cetera, a majority of the qualified electors of a municipality, actually voting at a special election held as prescribed by law, at which that is the only proposition voted on, is sufficient to adopt the changed form of government, though in point of fact it was not a majority of all of the electors who were qualified and entitled to vote at such election. Harrison v. Barksdale, 127 Va. 180, 102 S. E. 789.

This section does not forbid the enactment of special acts for the organization and government of cities and towns, if they are passed in a manner provided in article IV of the Constitution, and by a recorded vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each house, nor is it necessary that such special act should conform to the provisions of the general law, as to the incorporation of cities and towns. Town of Narrows v. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, 105 S. E. 82.

For article on "Road Laws, Bond Issues, and Taxation," see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 341.

Sec. 120. This section relating to the powers of mayors of cities, and declaring that the mayor shall have power to remove city officers and members of the police and fire departments when authorized by the General Assembly, is not a grant of power to the General Assembly, but a mere recognition of its sovereign powers by virtue of which it might authorize the mayor of the city to remove policemen. Sherry v. Lumpkin, 127 Va. 116, 102 S. E. 658.

This section declaring that the mayor shall see that the duties of the various city officers and members of the police and fire departments are faithfully observed, and that he shall have power to suspend such officers and members of the police and fire departments and to remove such officers and also members of said departments when authorized by the General Assembly, does not of itself give the mayor of a city power to remove members of the police and fire departments, the expression "such officers" referring to city officers as distinguished from policemen and firemen, and the power of removal, if conferred on the mayor, must be found in the statutes. Sherry v. Lumpkin, 127 Va. 116, 102 S. E. 658.

While this section gives the mayor power to remove city officers and members of police department, when authorized by the General Assembly, the Richmond Charter, (Acts of 1918, chapter 107), providing that the terms of officers and members of the police force shall be during good behavior and efficiency, and that any officer or members of the force may be fined, removed, or suspended by the chief of police subject to the approval of the director of public safety, is valid. Sherry v. Lumpkin, 127 Va. 116, 102 S. E. 658.

Under Constitution, 124, 125, and in view of Code 1904, sections 3014, 3016, 3018, in view of Constitution 156 (b), 156(d), which, however, do not of their own force give municipalities authority to fix irrevocably the rates to be charged, under this section and other sections, a municipality or an electric light company has power to irrevocably fix in the franchise rates to be charged. VirginiaWestern Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723.

Sec. 123. Cited but not construed in Head-Lipscomb Co. v. Bristol, 127 Va. 669, 105 S. E. 500.

Sec. 124. This section refers only to grants thereafter made. City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127.

The provisions of this section to the effect that no public service corporation shall occupy the streets of a city without its consent gives the city the power to impose such conditions, though arbitrary, as it may wish. The power is not, strictly speaking, the power to contract. The limitations are imposed by the city, subject to the supervision of the State. Decision of State Corporation Commission in. re. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 6 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 34.

Sec. 125. A city ordinance authorizing the granting of a franchise for lighting the streets, etc., of the city and requiring each bidder to accompany his bid with a certified check payable to the city treasurer in the sum of $5,000 to be forfeited to the city as liquidated damages should he fail to comply with his bid and execute the contract in the event of his bid being accepted, does not violate this section. Portsmouth v. Portsmouth Corp., 122 Va. 258, 95 S. E. 278.

Under this section and other sections, a municipality or an electric light company has power to irrevocably fix in the franchise rates to be charged. Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 46, 99 S. E. 723.

As this section must be construed with section 164, of the Constitution, the latter section providing that the right of regulation and control of public service corporations shall never be surrendered or abridged, did not prohibit municipal corporations from making irrevocable contracts as to rates on the condition of granting a franchise to public service corporations as electric light companies, and hence Corporation Commission, under Acts 1914, p. 673, has no authority to charge without consent of such municipalities rates so fixed. Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 S. E. 723, 125 Va. 46.

Cited but not construed in Head-Lipscomb Co. v. Bristol, 127 Va. 669. This section refers only to grants thereafter made. City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127.

Sec. 126. Section 1 of the new charter of the town of Narrows, Acts 1914, p. 573, taking in new territory and its inhabitants, not included in the original charter of the town, or its amendment of 1908, is in contravention of this section. Town of Narrows v. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, 105 S. E. 82.

Under the Constitution of 1902, section 126, and the general statute law enacted in pursuance thereof, the trial courts, in passing upon the questions relative to the annexation of territory to a municipal corporation, exercise a power formerly exercised by the legislature itself by the passing or refusing to pass special statutes for the enlargement of the limits of cities and towns. Hence the trial courts in such cases exercise a constitutionally delegated power, which, although mainly judicial, and not without limits, is to some extent quasi legislative and political in its character. Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 124 Va. 639, 98 S. E. 775.

Sec. 133. School districts, trustees (as amended).

Each magisterial district shall constitute a separate school district, unless otherwise provided by law. In each school district there shall be not more than three trustees selected, in the manner and for the term of office prescribed by law.

Men and women may serve as school trustees in said districts, and in cities and in towns forming separate school districts.

This amendment was adopted by the people at the election of November 2, 1920. For amendment, 112,429; against, 43,121.

For editorial on the effect of woman suffrage on our present laws, see 6 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 545.

Sec. 136. Local school taxes (as amended).

Each county, city, town, if the same be a separate school district, and school district is authorized to raise additional sums by a tax on property, not to exceed in the aggregate in any one year a rate of levy to be fixed by law, to be apportioned and expended by the local school authorities of said counties, cities, towns and districts in establishing and maintaining such schools as in their judgment the public welfare may require; provided that such primary schools as may be established in any school year, shall be maintained at least four months of that school year, before any part of the fund assessed and collected may be devoted to the establishment of schools of higher grade. The

boards of supervisors of the several counties, and the councils of the several cities, and towns, if the same be separate school districts, shall provide for the levy and collection of such local school taxes.

This amendment was adopted by the people at the election of November 2, 1920. For amendment, 111,540; against, 44,581.

Sec. 138. Compulsory education (as amended).

The General Assembly may, in its discretion, provide for the compulsory education of children of school age.

This amendment was adopted by the people at the election of Nov. 2, 1920. For amendment, 116,677; against, 41,056.

Sec. 153. A drainage district is not a private corporation, and this section, defining the term "corporation," has no application to such districts. A drainage district is neither a private corporation or association, nor is it either a municipal corporation or a public institution owned or controlled by the State. It is an organization not within the contemplation of the convention when the article was framed, an organization for which the Constitution has made no express provision, and against the creation of which there is no inhibition. It is a governmental agency, an unincorporated community, organized for a specified and limited public purpose under the police power of the State. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362. Cited but not construed in City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612.

Sec. 154. This section in requiring that "provision shall be made by general laws, for the voluntary surrender of its charter by any corporation, and for the forfeiture thereof for non-user or mis-user" in terms embraces corporations of every class, public service corporations as well as others, and there is no satisfactory reason for resorting to rules of construction to construe this language which, in itself, is so conspicuously clear. Jeffries v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.

This section provides for the creation, extension and amendment of charters of every kind, under general laws to be enacted by the General Assembly; the preservation of the right of repeal by the State and the delegation to the General Assembly of the power and duty of providing, as it might see proper, but by general laws, for the voluntary surrender of the charter of any corporation, regardless of its class; a reservation to the State of the power of repeal; and a consent by the State to a voluntary dissolution. This section of the Constitution cannot be construed so as to exclude public service corporations from the direction in regard to voluntary dissolution, unless they are also excluded from the operation of every other part of the section. Jeffries v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.

For article on a "Study of the Function of the State Corporation Commission of Virginia in Issuing Charters and of some of the Questions arising in connection therewith," see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 737.

Sec. 156. The drainage act (Acts 1914, chapter 332) is not unconstitutional as violative of this section providing that the State Corporation Commission shall be the department of government through which shall be issued all charters or amendments or extensions thereof, for domestic corporations. It has no relation whatever to public corporations, or to the governmental agencies created by the State. It refers to private corporations which individuals have the right to organize upon complying with the statutes conferring such right. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

For article on a "Study of the Function of the State Corporation Commission of Virginia in Issuing Charters and of some of the Questions arising in connection therewith," see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 737、

The State Corporation Commission had prescribed no rate on creosote oil in steel drums. The commission had, however, provided that "articles not enumerated will be classified with analogous articles." In an action of assumpsit to recover excess freight charges on creosote shipped from Richmond to Norfolk, the only question settled by the judgment was to which of two different classes the creosote oil in drums belonged.

A judgment by a court fixing the class to which certain freight belonged did not in any way call in question any action of the State Corporation Commission and accordingly was not in contravention of this section. If it be conceded that the court plainly erred in its classification, it was an error of judgment in the determination of the rights of the parties, which cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals when the amount in controversy is less than $300. Ches. & O. R. Co. v. Williams, 122 Va. 502, 95 S. E. 417.

It is the duty of the Corporation Commission to see that travelers upon the highways of the Commonwealth are not exposed to unnecessary dangers or unduly impeded in the use of such highways by the operation of railroads, and to that end it had jurisdiction to make all needful inquiries, and when in its judgment it is proper, it may require railway companies to eliminate gradecrossings of the public highways. The danger at such crossings is not confined to travelers or property upon the public highways, but extends also to persons and property transported on the railroads, and it cannot be doubted that the commission has jurisdiction for the protection of the latter. Southern Railway Co. v. Com., 124 Va. 36, 97 S. E. 343.

Under Constitution 124, 125, and in view of Code 1904, sections 3014, 3016, 3018, in view of Constitution, 156(b), 156(d), which, however, do not of their own force give municipalities authority to fix irrevocably the rates to be charged, under this section and others, a municipality or an electric light company has power to irrevocably fix in the franchise rates to be charged. Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 722.

Under sub-section (d) of this section the minority members of a social club are entitled to an appeal from the order of the Corporation Commission directing merger of two clubs. Jones v. Rhea, 130 Va. 345.

Under sub-section (f) of this section the chairman of the Corporation Commission alone is the proper party to mandamus, where persons entitled to an appeal are denied a transcript of the record. Idem.

The provision of sub-section (b) are self-executing. In re Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., 6 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 34.

The proviso in this section, sub-section (b), does not purport either to confer any new power on municipalities to fix rates of charge to be observed by public service corporations, or to ratify any contract previously made between municipalities and public service corporations. It embodies and constitutes the sole restriction upon the powers of the Corporation Commission as to such rates, but this restriction is in terms limited to rights that may have been or may thereafter be by law conferred on municipalities to prescribe rates of charge to be observed by any public service corporation. City of Richmond v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 127 Va. 612, 105 S. E. 127.

This section was a grant of power to the commission, and was never intended to be, and is not a limitation of any power of the legislature, except so far as such limitation is clearly and definitely expressed. In its essential features the section is a grant and not a limitation of power. Among other powers thereby granted, it expressly provides that the authority of the commission (subject to review on appeal) to prescribe rates for transmission companies, shall be paramount, while its authority to prescribe other rules, regulations, or requirements, shall be subject to the authority of the General Assembly, to legislate thereon by general law. Idem.

The jurisdiction of the commission conferred by this section to prescribe the rates to be charged by transmission companies is plenary and paramount. Idem. Even if the power of the Commission to prescribe the rates to be charged by the telephone company was not plenary and paramount, under this section, the General Assembly, which is not restricted nor controlled by the provisions of that section, has expressly conferred upon the commission by sections 4052 and 4054 of the Code, the jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce just and reasonable telephone rates, charges and regulations, notwithstanding they may have been provided by a municipal ordinance, franchise or other contract, which was adopted before the present Constitution became effective. Idem.

Under this section the commission would have authority, if it deemed an existing station a reasonable and just facility, to require a railroad to maintain it, and if the commission should approve the change of a site of a station, it has authority to require the railroad to establish the new station on a site deemed

just and reasonable, and as between two or more sites, to determine the most desirable. Southern Railway v. Commonwealth, 128 Va. 176, 105 S. E. 65. Sections 3709, 3710, 3711, 3712 and 3713 of the Code are taken from this section. See notes to same.

Sec. 157. The object of this section is not the forfeiture of the charter of any corporation, but the collection by the Commonwealth from every corporation of an annual registration fee and the requirement from it of an annual report "of the status, business or condition of such corporation." The revocation and annulment of the charter of such corporation is merely a penalty which the Constitution provides shall be imposed for the failure of a corporation to pay its annual registration fee or to make its said annual reports. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 235.

This section did not itself impose the tax (the annual registration fee), but left with the legislature the duty to impose it. Consequently, the authority inherent in the legislature to prescribe the method or system of such taxation was not taken away from it by the Constitution. The method or system adopted by the legislature for imposing such tax was to provide for an assessment of it by the State Corporation Commission. Under well established rules concerning taxation, such tax could not be considered as imposed or as having become due and payable until there was an assessment of it by the State Corporation Commission. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 235.

Under this section and the tax bills of 1903 and 1906, section 41, the report, the failure of the making of which is one ground of forfeiture, is a "report of the status, business and condition" of the corporation. As to such report it is manifest from both the statute as contained in the tax bills of 1903 and 1906 and from this section that a discretion was vested in the State Corporation Commission as to the form of it and as to what details it should cover; and no default in making such report occurs until such report is required of the corporation by affirmative action of the State Corporation Commission by forwarding forms for such report to the corporation. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 235.

The State Constitution, by self-executing ordinance, or the legislature, by self-executing statute, unless prohibited by the State Constitution, might have made a declaration of forfeiture of the charters of corporations upon their mere failure, for a specified time, to pay their annual registration fees or to make their reports of status, business or condition, independently of any attendant or preliminary steps in procedure with respect to these matters having been taken or not taken by the State through its governmental agency, the State Corporation Commission; this was not done by this provision and others. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 (S. E.) 235.

It is from the failure to make report of "its status, business or condition as the State Corporation Commission shall require," from which the forfeiture of the charter is to ensue, and not from the failure to make the report of the amount of its maximum capital stock. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 235.

The provision in this section, imposing annual registration fees upon corporations and requiring annual reports from corporations, is not self-executory. The Constitution leaves it discretionary with the legislature to provide reasonable regulations with respect to how and when such annual registration fees should be assessed and with respect to how and when such fees should become due and payable, and with respect to the making of the annual reports. And in view of the "general laws" in fact enacted by the legislature (Acts 1902-3-4, p. 137, secs. 45, 48; tax bills 1903, 1906, sec. 41), it follows that the constitutional provision must be construed to mean that it did not impose the penalty of the revocation and annulment of the charter of a corporation until there was an assessment of its annual registration fee as provided in such "general laws," and it had thus become due and payable and there was thereafter the "failure" or default specified in the Constitution to pay such fee, or until there was the report required of it by the State Corporation Commission in accordance with such general laws and there was thereafter the failure or default specified in the Constitution to make such report. Elliott's Knob I, etc., Co. v. Corp. Com., 123 Va. 63, 96 S. E. 235.