(NOTE. The Constitution remains as printed in the Code 1919, with exception of the amendments here printed.)

Sec. 6. The drainage act (Acts 1914, chapter 332) is not violative of this section. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

Sec. S. An indictment for an offense under section 4587 of the Code was in substance as follows: That the accused, "within one year next prior to the finding of this indictment, and subsequent to the first day of November, 1916, in said city of Norfolk, did unlawfully manufacture, sell, offer, keep, store and expose for sale, give away, dispense, solicit, advertise and receive orders for ardent spirits, against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Virginia." This indictment is not violative of this section on the ground that it does not sufficiently inform the defendant of the cause and nature of the accusation against her. Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 920, 95 S. E. 388.

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1902, there was no express or implied constitutional inhibition upon the right of appeal to the Commonwealth, and as the subject was then controlled entirely by the common law, there was no legal reason why the legislature might not, by express statute, have allowed the State a writ of error in any criminal case. Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820.

Under both this section and section 88 of the Virginia Constitution, the legislature may allow the Commonwealth an appeal in any criminal case involving the revenue law regardless of the degree of punishment, but by virtue of the operation of this section, such appeal does not lie in any other kind of criminal cases; and therefore, section 4931 of the Code is unconstitutional except in so far as it refers to appeals in revenue cases. Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820.

Section 5910 of the Code of 1919, giving the corporation courts concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts over criminal offenses committed within a mile of a city, is not unconstitutional as violative of the right of a prisoner, under section 8 of the Constitution, to have a jury of his "vicinage," which as used means the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the venue of the crime is laid. Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S. E. 562.

An act that confers upon the mayor of a city concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to try a defendant for the unlawful transporting of intoxicating liquors along one of the city streets, and his judgment therein bars a second prosecution therefor in the circuit court by virtue of this section, which ordains that no man shall "be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Bryan v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 749, 101 S. E. 316.

This section incorporated for the first time in the fundamental written law of the State the well known common law doctrine of former jeopardy. When the purpose of an appeal in a criminal case is to procure on behalf of the State a reversal of the judgment and a new trial of the accused (as distinguished from a mere review and decision of the legal question involved for use as a precedent in future cases), the rule against a second jeopardy for the same offense operates proprio vigore to destroy the right of appeal. The matter is jurisdictional, and the accused is not obliged to first abide the result of the appeal, and, in the event of a reversal, resort to his plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict to avoid a second trial. Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820.

Whatever view may prevail in other jurisdictions, in this State the rule against putting any person in jeopardy more than one time for the same offense is to be applied in all criminal cases, regardless of the character and degree of the punishment. Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124, 97 Va. 805, 97 S. E. 820.

The denial of a continuance was properly made in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 109 S. E. (Va.) 447, under the circumstances of that case and in view of the provisions of this section and section 4893 enacted to secure a speedy trial. Discussed 3 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 8.

For note on "Right of State to Appeal in Criminal Cases," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 923.

Sec. 10. For article on "Search and Seizure under Prohibition Act," see 4 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 641; 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 32.

Sec. 11. Section 6063 of the Code, so far as it authorizes the service of process on a domestic corporation, which has no person in the county or corporation wherein the case is commenced on whom process can be served, by the publication of a copy of the process in a newspaper, is not violative of this section as a taking of property "without due process of law." White v. Jordan, 124 Va. 465, 98 S. E. 24.

The "Cedar Rust Law affords due process of law." Bowman v. Va, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141.

The provision of this section (11) as to trial by jury does not refer to chancery cases. Forbes v. Cotton Seed Co., 108 S. E. 15.

The succession tax under section 44 of the tax bill is not unconstitutional under the "due process" provision of this section. Commonwealth v. Carter, 126 Va. 469, 102 S. E. 58; Withers v. Jones, 126 Va. 500, 102 S. E. 68; nor is sec. 1521 of the Code relating to abatement of houses of ill-fame. Brunkley v. Commonwealth, 130 Va. 55. 108 S. E. 1.

The drainage act (Acts 1914, chapter 332) is not violative of this section. Strawberry, etc., v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S. E. 362.

The constitutional guaranty of a jury trial is by no means universal in its application. Thus the provision has no application to suits in chancery, demurrer to the evidence, case agreed, special verdicts, and other methods of procedure. The word "suit" is manifestly used in much the same sense as the word "controversies" in the preceding part of the same sentence. Forbes & Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 130 Va. 245, 108 S. E. 15.

If a litigant has offered no facts upon which a jury would be warranted in finding a verdict in his favor, then he has not presented a controversy respecting property, or a suit between man and man which entitles him to the jury trial granted by this section of the Constitution. Idem.

Sec. 21. In view of this provision of the Constitution, giving one the right to vote if he has paid all poll taxes assessed against him, "during the three years next preceding," the city treasurer, under section 38 of the Constitution, and section 109 of the Code, requiring him to file a list of all who have paid the poll taxes required by the Constitution "during the three years next preceding," must place on such list the names of all who have paid the taxes required as a prerequisite to their right to vote at the ensuing election, whether that be the payment of such taxes for one, two, or all three years, section 38 merely furnishing the evidence of the discharge of the requirement imposed by section 21. the word "during" in which means, not throughout the continuance of, but in the time of, nor is the right of persons coming into a city from another city within such period to inclusion in the list affected by section 110 of the Code, entitling them to have their names entered on application to the court, though not entitled to vote on the treasurer's certificate under section 115 of the Code. Ziegler v. Sprinkel, Va. 108 S. E. 656.

Sec. 32. Qualifications of officers and notaries (as amended).

Every person qualified to vote shall be eligible to any office of the State, or of any county, city, town or other sub-division of the State, wherein he resides, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, and except that this provision as to residence shall not apply to any office elective by the people where the law provides otherwise; and except, further, that the requirements of this section as to residence. and voting qualifications shall not apply to the appointment of persons to fill positions under a municipal government requiring special technical or professional training and experience. Men and women

eighteen years of age shall be eligible to the office of notary public and qualified to execute the bonds required of them in that capacity.

This amendment was adopted by the people at the election held November 2, 1920. For the amendment, 105690 against 40623.

For editorial on effect of woman suffrage on our present law, see 6 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 454.

For an act permitting females to serve as deputy clerks, see chapter 303 of Acts of 1920, herein.

Sec. 34. For article on "Reference to Commissioner in Chancery," see 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 497.

Sec. 38. See Ziegler v. Sprinkel, cited under section 21 above.

Sec. 44. The circuit court of the city of Norfolk decided that a retired naval officer is not one "holding any office, or post of profit, or emolument, under the U. S. Govt." within this section of the Constitution, and is therefore eligible to a seat in the general assembly. Galt v. Hobbs, 7 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 255.

255.

Sec. 47. Cited but not construed in Galt v. Hobbs, 7 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.)

Sec. 50. An act which simply extends the lien of a city for taxes and neither imposes, continues nor revives a tax does not violate this section. Powers v. Richmond, 122 Va. 328, 94 S. E. 803.

These provisions that a law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is applied, apply only to ordinary and general taxes for State purposes, and such as are imposed generally on all the taxable property in the State, and not to local taxes for local purposes. From the earliest date, the local authorities in the counties and cities of the Commonwealth have by the General Assembly been authorized to impose local taxes, and fix the rates thereof. Powers v. Richmond, 122 Va. 328, 94 S. E. 803.

Cited but not construed. Bowman v. Va. 128 Va. 351.

Sec. 51. The "West Fee Bill" does not violate this section. Martin's Exrs. v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603, 102 S. E. 77, 724.

Sec. 52. The purpose of this section in providing that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title; was to prevent the members of the legislature and the people from being misled by the title of a law. It was intended to prevent the use of deceptive titles as a cover for vicious legislation; to prevent the practice of bringing together into one bill for corrupt purposes subjects diverse and dissimilar in their nature, and having no necessary connection with each other; and to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation; but it was not intended to obstruct honest legislation, nor to prevent the incorporation into a single act of the entire statutory law upon one general subject. It was not designed to embarrass legislation by compelling the multiplication of laws by the passage of separate acts on a single subject. Although the act or statute authorizes many things of diverse nature to be done, the title will be sufficient if the things authorized may be fairly regarded as in furtherance of the object expressed in the title. It is therefore to be liberally construed and treated, so as to uphold the law, if practicable. Dickens and Others v. Radford-Willis Southern Railway Company, 121 Va. 353, 93 S. E. 625.

Wherever the title of the original act sufficiently complies with this section, the title of subsequent amendatory acts is a matter of no consequence. Jeffries v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.

The title of an act amending the Code is sufficient if it refers to the chapter and sections to be amended and the body of the amendatory act is within itself germane to the subject of the chapter referred to in the title. Jeffries v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 425, 93 S. E. 701.

The title of an act that expressly states that it relates to the lien of the city for taxes assessed on real estate, and to the sale thereof for non-payment of taxes, is sufficient to sustain the provision that the lien of the city for taxes shall be on the land and every interest therein. Powers v. Richmond, 122 Va. 328, 94 S. E. 803.

Section 4638 of the Code is not unconstitutional, in that it violates this section, in so far as it prohibits the acceptance and receipt of ardent spirits.