Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1921Mercer University Press, 2001 - 269 páginas In 1918, as the United States flung itself into the Armageddon of World War I, Russia was pulling out of the war -- but with an entire legion of Czech deserters who still wanted to fight Germany. The Wilson administration came up with a daring plan. It involved sending an American army into the wilds of Siberia, where the Russian Civil War was igniting, to rescue the embattled Czech Legion. |
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Página 17 - They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs, and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.
Página 247 - Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czech-Slovaks [sic] from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces.
Página 245 - They recognize the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside. They do not wish to exploit, or make use of Russia in any way. They recognize the revolution without reservation, and will, in no way, and in no circumstances, aid or give countenance to any attempt at a counter-revolution.
Página 242 - It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association...
Página 27 - It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany.
Página 242 - Allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter...
Página 247 - May 26, 1919 The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russia. It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia.