valid reason either for the revival of the Combination Act, or for the enactment of any similar statute.

Nothing can apparently be more reasonable than that workmen should be allowed freely to combine or associate together, for the purpose of adjusting the terms on which they will sell their labour. Wages, like everything else, should always be left to be regulated by the fair and free competition of the parties in the market, without being interfered with by the legislature. "The property," says Adam Smith, "which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him fron employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbours, is a plain violation of the most sacred property." But it is false to affirm that workmen are allowed to dispose of their labour in any way they please, if they be prevented from concerting with each other the terms on which they will sell it. Capacity to labour is to the poor what stock is to the capitalists. Now a hundred or a thousand capitalists may form themselves into a company, or combination, take all their measures in common, and dispose of their property as they may, in their collective capacity, judge most advantageous for their interests:-And why should not a hundred or a thousand labourers be allowed to do the same by their stock? Of all the species of property which a man can possess, the faculties of his mind and the powers of his body are most particularly his own. And to fetter him in the mode in which he is to exercise or dispose of these faculties and powers, is a manifest encroachment on the most inviolable of all rights, and can be justified only by an overwhelming necessity.

It is easy, however, to show that, in point of fact, no such necessity ever did or can exist. The wages of any set of workmen who enter into a combination for the purpose of raising them, must be either-1st, below the natural and

proper rate of wages in the branch of industry to which they belong; or, 2nd, they must be coincident with that rate, or above it. Now, it is clear that, in the first case, or when wages are depressed below their natural level, the claim of the workmen for an advance is fair and reasonable: and it would obviously be unjust and oppressive to prevent them from adopting any measure, not injurious to the rights of others, which they may think best fitted to render their claim effectual. But a voluntary combination among workmen is certainly in no respect injurious to any right of their masters. It is a contradiction to pretend that masters have any right or title to the services of free workmen in the event of the latter not choosing to accept the price offered them for their labour. And as the existence of a combination to procure a rise of wages shows that they have not so chosen, and is a proof of the want of all concord and agreement between the parties, so it is also a proof that the workmen are fairly entitled to enter into it; and that, however injurious their proceedings may be to themselves, they do not encroach on the privileges or rights of others. Not only, therefore, is a voluntary combination, unaccompanied by violence, a fair exercise of the right of judging for themselves on the part of workmen, but when it is entered into for the purpose of raising wages that are unduly depressed, its object is proper and desirable. Few masters willingly consent to raise wages; and the claim of one or of a few individuals for an advance of wages is likely to be disregarded so long as their fellows continue to work at the old rates. It is only when the whole, or the greater part, of the workmen belonging to a particular master or department of industry combine together, or when they act in that simultaneous manner which is equivalent to a combination, and refuse to continue to work without receiving an increase of wages, that it becomes the immediate interest of the masters to comply with their demand. And hence it is obvious, that without the existence either of an open and avowed, or of a tacit and real combination, workmen would not be able to obtain a rise of wages by their own

exertions, but would be left to depend on the competition of their masters.

It is, however, abundantly certain that this competition will always raise wages that have been unduly depressed. And it was from not adverting to this fact, that the influence of the combination laws in depressing wages was so very greatly exaggerated. When the wages paid to the labourers in a particular employment are improperly reduced, the capitalists who carry it on obviously gain the whole amount of this reduction, over and above the common and ordinary rate of profit obtained by the capitalists who carry on other employments. But a discrepancy of this kind could not be of long continuance. Additional capital would immediately begin to be attracted to the department where wages were low and profits high; and its owners would be obliged, in order to obtain labourers, to offer them higher wages. It is clear, therefore, that if wages be unduly reduced in any branch of industry, they will be raised to their proper level, without any effort on the part of the workmen, by the competition of the capitalists. And looking generally to the whole of the employments carried on in the country, we do not believe that the combination laws had any sensible influence over the average and usual rate of wages. That they occasionally kept them at a lower rate in some very confined businesses than they would otherwise have sunk to, may be true; though for that very reason they must have equally elevated them in others. This, however, is no good reason why the workmen engaged in employments in which wages happen from any cause to be unduly depressed, should be interdicted from adopting the only means in their power of doing themselves justice. When they are allowed freely to combine, their combination may occasion an immediate rise of wages; but when their combination is prevented, more or less time must always elapse before the high profits caused by the undue reduction of wages become generally known, and consequently before capital can be attracted from other businesses. And hence it is clear, that

every attempt to prevent combination in such cases as this, is neither more nor less than an attempt to hinder workmen from making use of the only means by which their wages can be speedily and effectually raised to their just level. It is. committing injustice in behalf of the strong, at the expense of the weaker party.

We admit that the object of the second class of voluntary combinations, or of those which take place when the wages of the combining workmen are already equal to or above their natural and proper rate, is improper and unreasonable. Still, however, it is easy to see, that there is no more cause for the interference of the legislature in their case, than in the former. There is no good reason why workmen should not, like the possessors of every other valuable and desirable article, be allowed to set whatever price they please upon the labour they have to dispose of. If they combine to raise wages beyond their natural limits, or to enforce vexatious or improper conditions in regard to their employment, it is all but certain that their combination will be unsuccessful. It may be taken for granted, that the masters will resist any really improper demand; and the slightest glance at the relative condition of the parties must satisfy every one that, supposing them to be in earnest in their opposition, they can hardly fail to succeed in defeating it. The workmen always suffer more from a strike than the masters. It is indeed true, as Adam Smith has observed, that in the long run, they are as necessary to their masters as their masters are to them. But this necessity is far from being so immediate. The stock and credit of the master are in almost every instance much greater than the stock and credit of his labourers; and he is, therefore, able to maintain himself for a much longer time without their labour, than they can maintain themselves without his wages. In old-settled and fully-peopled countries, wages are seldom so high as to enable labourers to accumulate any considerable stock; and though the scanty funds of those engaged in strikes are frequently

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eked out by contributions from the work-people in other businesses, and in other parts of the kingdom, the combination never fails, provided the masters do not give way, to break to pieces.

It is also evident, that when workmen enter into a combination to enforce an unreasonable demand, or to raise wages that are already up to the common level, they can gain nothing, but must lose by entering into other employments to which they have not been bred; while it is equally evident that a small extra sum will be sufficient to entice other labourers to the business they have left. All the great departments of industry have so many closely allied branches, that a workman who is instructed in any of them, can, without much training or difficulty, apply himself to some of the others. And thus the workmen who enter into the combination, will not only fail of their object, and be obliged to return to their work, but, owing to the influx of other labourers into their business during the strike, they will probably be compelled to accept of a lower rate of wages than they previously enjoyed.

Many extensive combinations have been broken up by the masters acting on this principle, or by their bringing workpeople from other districts, or other businesses, to supply the place of those in the combination. At first, these workpeople may not be so skilful or expert as those who have seceded; but these deficiencies soon become insensible, and are more than compensated by the greater command the masters have over the new hands, who, it is commonly stipulated, shall not enter into any union or association with other workmen for the

purpose of raising wages, regulating the hours of work, &c. The combination of the coal miners of the north in 1844, when about 40,000 hands struck for a modification of the conditions under which they had previously been employed and an advance of wages, though one of the most formidable that has hitherto existed, was defeated in the way now mentioned. It was carefuly organized, and had, when it began operations, a reserve fund of about £24,000, besides receiving subscriptions from trades'-unions in most parts of the country.