TAXATION.

L. GOODS BROUGHT FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER BECOME LAWFUL OBJECTS OF TAXATION in the latter state the moment they reach their destination, and are there kept, ready and offered for sale, at any point within the place of destination; and it is immaterial that they remain unloaded on the vessel that brought them, without being consigned to any particular point or to any specially authorized agent. Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 519.

2. DESIGNATION OF NEWSPAPER FOR PUBLICATION OF DELINQUENT TAX LIST, named in a resolution of the board of county commissioners the "Enterprise," sufficiently designates the "Glencoe Enterprise," there being no other newspaper published in the county bearing that name, and being in common speech spoken of as the "Enterprise." Knight v. Alexander, 675.

3. DESCRIPTION IN PUBLISHEd DelinquenT TAX LIST as follows: "NNE SEINEN E of N W section 23, township 114, range 30, 160 acres," ," is not a sufficient description of the north half of the northeast quarter, the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter, and the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of that section. In such a pub. lication a description which is in fact erroneous, and which is calculated to mislead, is legally insufficient as constructive notice. Id.

TIME.

except

1. LAW DOES NOT IN GENERAL REGARD FRACTIONS OF DAY, in cases where the hour itself is material, as where priority of judg ments and the like is in question. Mitchell v. Schoonover, 282.

TOWNSHIP.
See HIGHWAYS, 4.

TRESPASS.

1. PERSON HAS LICENSE TO ENTER PUBLIC OFFICE OF ANOTHER to transact business with the latter, who may refuse to transact business with him, and may order him from the office, and eject him in a reasonable manner, if he refuses to go, using sufficient force to meet any offered resist. ance. Breitenbach v. Trowbridge, 829.

2. IF ONE IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER OFFICE OF ANOTHER, he is a trespasser if he persists in entering. Id.

3. PERSON HAS RIGHT, IN HIS PRIVATE BUSINESS, TO CONTROL IT, and may select such persons as he chooses with whom to transact it, and can prevent whom he pleases from entering his office; and when a person, under implied license, has entered, he may request him to depart, and thereafter he has no legal right to remain. Id.

4. PERSON'S PRIVATE BUSINESS OFFICE CANNOT BE MADE, against his will, free to all to enter and remain, even upon proper business, and such person can admit or reject whom he pleases. It is his own business, and the public have no rights therein against his wishes. Id.

5. IN CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR Assault and Battery, ADMISSIONS, MADE by the defendant in conversation with the police justice before whom he was tried on the same charge, are admissible in evidence, but what the police justice said to him is incompetent. Id.

6. IN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BEING EJECTED FROM Or. fice of DefendANT, where the plaintiff went to tender money due him, evidence of a prior offer of the money to an agent of the defendant, and that he refused it and sent the plaintiff to the defendant, is a legitimate part of the transaction, and the agent's statements are admissible in evidence. Id.

7. EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE, IN CIVIL ACTION FOR Assault and Battery, that the defendant called the plaintiff a "d-d police-court shyster," on the former's trial on a criminal charge arising out of the same transaction, as showing the animus of the defendant towards the plaintiff, but is incompetent for the purpose of showing malice at the time of the assault. Id.

See EXECUTIONS, 2.

TRIAL.

1. UPON MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE ON GROUND OF PREJUDICE, EVIDENCE is admissible other than that of the supporting affiants, and witnesses may be examined on both sides as to the existence or non-existence of "prejudice" in the county. Article 583 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Texas does not, in such cases, restrict the matters to be investigated solely to the credibility and means of knowledge of the defendant's compurgators in the application. Meuly v. State, 477.

2. IT IS DUTY OF TRIAL JUDGE, WHEN REQUESTED, BEFORE SUBMISSION OF CASE TO JURY, to decide, as a preliminary question of law, whether there is any evidence on which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party on whom the burden of proof lies, and if there is not, he ought to withdraw the case from the jury. Mynning v. Detroit etc. R. R. Co., 804.

3. INSTRUCTION IS ERRONEOUS where there is no evidence in the case to which it is applicable; it is also erroneous where, although it states a correct principle of law, yet the language used is inexact, obscure, and therefore misleading. Lombard v. Mayberry, 234.

4. VERDICT ARRIVED AT BY EACH JUROR MARKING A SUM AS DAMAGES, the total of which constitutes a dividend, taking their own number as a divisor, and the quotient as their verdict, without prior agreement to be bound by it, will not be disturbed. Village of Ponca v. Crawford, 144.

USAGE AND CUSTOM.

USAGE AND CUSTOM CANNOT BE PROVED TO CONTRAVENE A RULE OF LAW, or to alter or contradict the express or implied terms of a contract free from ambiguity, nor to make the legal rights or liabilities of the parties to a contract other than they are by the terms thereof. Hopper v. Sage, 771.

USURY.

See PAYMENT, 7.

VARIANCE.

See INDICTMENT, 5.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

1. EVIDENCE. — INSTRUMENT SET FORTH IN COMPLAINT, ACKNOWLEDGING the receipt of a sum of money in part payment of a certain described lot,

is not a contract for the sale or purchase of land, but a receipt only, subject to be explained and supplemented by evidence aliunde. McKinney v. Harvie, 640.

2. EVIDENCE IN THE PARTICULAR CASE SHOWING that the plaintiff acted as the agent of another person in a negotiation for the purchase of land. Id. 3. RECOVERY BACK OF PURCHASE-MONEY PAID BY PURCHASER. - Purchaser of land under a parol contract for the sale thereof, who repudiates the contract, and refuses to fulfill, is not entitled to recover an installment of purchase-money previously paid by him, if the vendor is willing, and offers to perform on his part, notwithstanding the contract is within the statute of frauds. Id.

4. MISTAKE IN DESCRIPTION OF LAND. - Where, a bond for title incorrectly describes the land to be conveyed, the purchaser is entitled, in a proper case, to a correction of the bond, and the mistake may be established by parol evidence. Goff v. Jones, 619.

5. CANCELLATION OF DEED FOR FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS BY VENDEE. -Where parties to a deed stand on an equal footing, expressions of opinion as to the value of the property, whether true or false, will not constitute fraud. But if the purchaser resides near the property, and has full knowledge of its situation and approximate value, and the owner resides in another state, without any knowledge on the subject, opinions as to value by the purchaser, which he knows to be much below the real value of the property, and statements made by him that the owner's title has been abrogated by tax sales, will be sufficient, where the property was purchased for a grossly inadequate consideration, to set aside and cancel the deed. Morgan v. Dinges, 121.

6. CANCELLATION OF DEED FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS BY VENDEE.- Where the purchaser does any act, or makes any declaration, with the intention of misleading the seller, and preventing him from ascertaining the real situation of the property, and at the same time conceals from him a material fact upon which he relies, and of which the vendee has knowledge, the latter is guilty of fraudulent deception, for which the deed may be canceled. Id.

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

VENUE.

See TRIAL, 1.

VERDICT.

See TRIAL, 4.

VOTERS.

See ELECTIONS, 23, 25. 30, 36-40,

WARRANT.

See EXTRADITION, 1-4.

WATERS.

1. "WATERCOURSE," IN LEGAL SENSE OF TERM, DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONSIST merely of the stream as it flows within the banks which form the channel in ordinary stages of water; and when, in times of ordinary