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rather technical summary of the main posi tions of the movement. "The general movement," he says, "which rightly or wrongly is coming to be designated as pragmatism is away from an intellectualistic and transcendental, toward a voluntaristic and empirical metaphysics. It is thoroughly evolutionistic in its general presuppositions, though critical in its exposition of details of this doctrine. And, finally, it seeks to interpret in dynamic and functional terms the valuable results of the analysis of consciousness which the structural psychology has given us, and turns, for its basic principles of interpretation, to psychogenetic science."1

V. A NEW PROTEST CONSTANTLY NEEDED IN THE INTEREST OF THE WHOLE MAN

All these tendencies in the general history of thought, thus briefly passed in review, are in harmony with the psychological trend, and are so many assertions that all reality must be conceived as concretely as possible. But not only philosophy, but all our thinking -for the very reason that it is finite and

1 The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, August 4, 1904, p. 427.

seeks to formulate the universe in intellectual terms-is likely to be too abstract-too onesided-to be unjust to feeling, to will, and to the æsthetic, the ethical, and the religious ideals. That is, it is most likely to minimize, if not to ignore, those portions of life that refuse to be adequately formulated in intellectual terms. Even here one need not arbitrarily limit thought, but may cherish earnestly Hegel's ideal, that thinking itself is to be a kind of living, and so hope that, in the long reflection of the philosopher and in the insights of the artist and poet, thought may more and more nearly approach an adequate expression of reality; but the danger of one-sidedness and of mere intellectualism is a real one, and a new protest is therefore constantly needed in the interests of the whole concrete reality, and particularly of the whole man.

It is such a protest that is refreshingly made by Münsterberg in his Psychology and Life, which is not less refreshing that I do not believe it is possible in one's ultimate philosophy to keep as absolutely distinct, as he tries to do, mechanical explanation and ideal interpretation. "We are not merely passive subjects with a world of conscious objects,"

he says; "we are willing subjects, whose acts of will have not less reality in spite of the fact that they are no objects at all." "The reality of the will and feeling and judgment does not belong to the describable world, but to a world which has to be appreciated; it has to be linked, therefore, not by the categories of cause and effect, but by those of meaning and value."

The Protest in the History of Literature.—It is the repetition of the same protest for the whole reality that has constituted the periods of literature, as Howells has pointed out. Romanticism was a protest against the barren formalism of a decadent classicism—a demand that literature must return to the fullness and richness of life. When Romanticism came only to dream dreams and to build castles in the air, and so got away from the realities of life, Realism came in as another protest for the whole real life. The new Symbolism seems to be a kind of new protest against a barren recital of facts, while ignoring their meaning for life. Every reformation in literature, thus, as in Philosophy, is a protestantism -a protest against a one-sided viewing of life-a realism. Leslie Stephen's theory of literary development involves much the same

emphasis, for it insists that the vital literature of any period must be a genuine expression of the profoundest life of that period. "The watchword of every literary school," he says, "may be brought under the formula, 'Return to Nature'; though Nature receives different interpretations." Literature must express "the really vital and powerful currents of thought which are molding society. The great author must have a people behind him; utter both what he really thinks and feels and what is thought and felt most profoundly by his contemporaries."

The Protest in Philosophy.-The severest critics of Hegel have really criticized him in that he did not carry out his own demand. He draws a sharp and unwarranted line, for example, between the analytical understanding and the unity-seeking reason. That the analogy of the organism so fully satisfies him, and is so constantly returned to, even where it has been declared insufficient, is itself a failure to follow his own principle; for the organism (though doubtless our best material symbol) can never fully express the significance of personal relations; he consequently underestimates the personal, gives no sufficient place to feeling and will, and therefore

belittles the ethical, and for both reasons fails to understand the real and permanent significance of the historical. No principle less broad than that of the whole spirit can be made to interpret spirit.

The Protest in History.-But does not the immense influence of the evolution theory in all subjects of inquiry, and the well-nigh universal use of the biological or historical method show that the analogy of the organism is sufficient for the spiritual as well as for the natural sciences? Do not both classes of sciences use the same method? In a broad sense, no doubt, both these implied statements are true. The methods of natural science and of history never so nearly approached each other as today, and both do aim to trace a growth. But it is still true that personal relations cannot be adequately expressed by the organic, and that the aims and interests of the methods of the natural sciences and of history are different.

Windelband seems to me to state the contrast not too strongly, in his Rector's address before the University of Strassburg, when he says: "The empirical sciences (including natural science and history) seek in the knowledge of the actual (1) either the universal in

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