Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. most part, old violations. And to this court, the Dean decree assures, as completely as any decree can assure, that there will be no new violations." 111 F. Supp., at 581. Accordingly the court dismissed that part of the complaint which alleged violations of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act. Thus it appears that the Government was refused an injunction solely because of the existence of the prior decree entered against defendants in the course of a private action. We think that refusal on this basis constituted an abuse of discretion. Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 25, charges the United States district attorneys, under supervision of the Attorney General, with the duty of instituting equity proceedings to prevent and restrain violations of certain of the antitrust laws, including price discrimination. Under 16 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 26, a private plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief against such violations only on a showing of "threatened loss or damage"; and this must be of a sort personal to the plaintiff, Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F. 2d 875, 881 (1943). The privateinjunction action, like the treble-damage action under § 4 of the Act, supplements government enforcement of the antitrust laws; but it is the Attorney General and the United States district attorneys who are primarily charged by Congress with the duty of protecting the public interest under these laws. The Government seeks its injunctive remedies on behalf of the general public; the private plaintiff, though his remedy is made available pursuant to public policy as determined by Congress, may be expected to exercise it only when his personal interest will be served. These private and public actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually exclusive. S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 42; cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 694–695 (1948). “... [T]he scheme of the statute is sharply 514 Opinion of the Court. to distinguish between Government suits, either criminal or civil, and private suits for injunctive relief or for treble damages. Different policy considerations govern each of these. They may proceed simultaneously or in disregard of each other." United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F. R. D. 73, 77 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). In short, the Government's right and duty to seek an injunction to protect the public interest exist without regard to any private suit or decree. To hold that a private decree renders unnecessary an injunction to which the Government is otherwise entitled is to ignore the prime object of civil decrees secured by the Government-the continuing protection of the public, by means of contempt proceedings, against a recurrence of antitrust violations. Should a private decree be violated, the Government would have no right to bring contempt proceedings to enforce compliance; it might succeed in intervening in the private action but only at the court's discretion. The private plaintiff might find it to his advantage to refrain from seeking enforcement of a violated decree; for example, where the defendant's violation operated primarily against plaintiff's competitors. Or the plaintiff might agree to modification of the decree, again looking only to his own interest. In any of these events it is likely that the public interest would not be adequately protected by the mere existence of the private decree. It is also clear that Congress did not intend that the efforts of a private litigant should supersede the duties of the Department of Justice in policing an industry. Yet the effect of the decision below is to place on a private litigant the burden of policing a major part of the milk industry in Chicago, a task beyond its ability, even assuming it to be consistently so inclined. We agree with appellees that the statute confers on the Government no absolute right to an injunction upon a showing of past violation of the antitrust laws by 288037 0-54-38 Opinion of the Court. 347 U.S. defendants. As we said in United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953): . . . the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it." The Government contends that it has "an independent right to relief against violations of the Clayton Act, without regard to whether such violations previously have been enjoined by a decree in a private antitrust suit." But we cannot say that the existence of the private decree warrants no consideration by the chancellor in assessing the likelihood of recurring illegal activity. We hold only that, in view of the difference in the respective interests sought to be vindicated by the Government and the private litigant, the district judge abused his discretion in refusing the Government an injunction solely because of the existence of the private decree. The judgment of dismissal as to the Sherman Act allegations is affirmed; as to the Clayton Act allegations the case is remanded to the District Court for further consideration, and such further proceedings as may be necessary, in accordance with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Opinion of the Court. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORP. v. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 394. Argued April 26-27, 1954. Decided May 17, 1954. The case having been fully argued and the Court being satisfied that the findings of the District Court are justified by the evidence and support the decree, the judgment is affirmed. 110 F. Supp. 295, affirmed. John L. Hall, Robert Proctor and Claude R. Branch argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Walter Powers, John B. Reigeluth and Conrad W. Oberdorfer. Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Marvin E. Frankel, Margaret H. Brass and C. Worth Rowley. PER CURIAM. The case having been fully argued and the Court being satisfied that the findings are justified by the evidence and support the decree, the judgment is affirmed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. GALVAN v. PRESS, OFFICER IN CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 407. Argued January 11-12, 1954.-Decided May 24, 1954. 1. Section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, providing for the deportation of any alien who has been a member of the Communist Party at any time after entry, is constitutional-as here applied to a resident alien shown to have been willingly a member of the Communist Party from 1944 to 1946 although not shown to have been aware of its advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. Pp. 523-532. (a) In the light of the broad power of Congress over the admission and deportation of aliens, it cannot be said that the classification by Congress contained in § 22 is so baseless as to be violative of due process and therefore beyond the power of Congress. Pp. 529–532. (b) The ex post facto clause of the Constitution has no application to deportation. P. 531. 2. On the record in this case, the evidence adduced at the administrative hearings was sufficient to support a finding that petitioner, a resident alien, had been a "member" of the Communist Party from 1944 to 1946 and, therefore, was deportable under § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, even though he may not have known the full purposes or program of the Communist Party. Pp. 523-529. (a) The word "member" in § 22 cannot be construed as applying only to aliens who joined the Communist Party fully conscious of its advocacy of violence. Pp. 525-529. (b) It is enough that the alien joined the Party, aware that he was joining an organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active political organization, and that he did so of his own free will. P. 528. (c) The record in this case does not show a relationship to the Party so nominal as not to make petitioner a "member" within the terms of the Act. Pp. 528–529. 201 F.2d 302, affirmed. |