CHAPTER IX HOW THE ATROCIOUS WAR BEGAN Forgetful is green earth; the Gods alone By their great memories the Gods are known. GEORGE MEREDITH: France: December, 1870. HE Kaiser and his Ring have not been Table to evade the guilt of beginning this war. The inky stream, which, like the cuttlefish, they have emitted in their efforts to escape, has not availed them. Their garbled or faked documents, slyly mixed in with bits of genuine evidence, have been exposed. After all, however, in fixing the responsibility for a vast conflict, the historian seeks to know, not only who kindled the spark that set off the explosion, but also who accumulated the powder to be exploded, and who would benefit most by the explosion. On their own confession, the Germans have been for years fully prepared for war. "Hur rah for the dry powder and the sharp sword," the Kaiser shouted long ago; "for the end we have in sight and the forces we are bending towards it, for the German Army and the General Staff!" And on another occasion he declared: "The Teuton never fights better than when he is called upon to defend himself on all sides. So let our enemies begin. We are ready for them all!" Nobody has questioned Germany's material preparedness. But what of her will, what of her desires? Has she been harboring resolutions of peace? Has she been contented with her position as one of the European Powers? Has she never hinted that her increase in population not less than her industrial expansion called for territorial and colonial aggrandizement? Who was it that declared, as far back as June 18, 1891: "In spite of the fact that we have no such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a place in the sun. It will now be my task to see to it that this place in the sun shall remain our undis puted possession . . . for our future lies upon the water"? The desire and the will to conquer were in the hearts of the Germans. The other Powers-England, France, and Russia - would unquestionably have been glad to see Germany humbled; but neither singly nor in coalition would they attack her; and, with what seems now fatuous trustfulness, the English, at least, refused to believe that the Germans would carry out the project towards which their preparation pointed. Since 1905, the agreement entered into by the Triple Entente - England, France, and Russiaaimed at mutual defense in case Germany should assail any of them. The will to attack dwelt in the Kaiser and his military chiefs. Their sole concern was to choose the propitious moment. Why did they regard the last of July, 1914, as the appointed time? William's golden opportunity came in 1905 when Russia, in a death-grapple with Japan, could not assist France, which he wished then to shatter beyond recovery. But he did not feel quite sure of England's neutrality; and as France bowed her head at his threats, he decided to sheathe his sword, and during the next seven or eight years he contented himself with rattling his scabbard. The Balkan War of 1912 bristled with international asperities, any one of which might have served as an excuse to the great Powers for entering the conflict; but they refrained. The next year, however, Germany thought the time ripe. Austria, her willing vassal, acquiesced, and sounded Italy, their partner in the Triple Alliance; but Italy refused to join them, because they were bent on a war of conquest, whereas the terms of partnership required Italy's coöperation only for a war of defense. When 1914 came, William II determined to wait no longer. He planned that Austria should be his cat's-paw to reduce Servia to vassalage, and so both to push forward Teu tonic ascendency in the Balkans and to humiliate Russia, as Austria, abetted by Germany, had humiliated her in 1909 by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conditions as he and his Ring saw them were so favorable that it mattered little what Italy did. Of his own strength he had no doubts. The German Army had been increased, and the fruits of the five per cent patriotic contribution had served in many ways to complete preparations. The Kiel Canal, which as a means of naval strategy was worth more than several dreadnoughts, had been dedicated in June and was in perfect running order. The German Navy itself, although evidently inferior to the British, seemed to the eager Kaiser so formidable that it might play a great part in the war. But the unreadiness of his enemies, rather than his own strength, persuaded him. France was reducing her term of military service, and with it, in the opinion of many critics, the efficiency of her Army. It was no secret |