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one of fact or of principle; whether of right or of expediency; whether admitting of certain decision or only probable; whether of universal or of limited application; such questions as these, questions to be answered by a kind of larger exposition, do much to determine on what lines the proposition is to be argued, and what range of result is to be sought.

ILLUSTRATION.

The following, on the legislative question of Copyright, shows how such considerations as these affect the discussion.

"The first thing to be done, Sir, is to settle on what principles the question is to be argued. Are we free to legislate for the public good, or are we not? Is this a question of expediency, or is it a question of right? Many of those who have written and petitioned against the existing state of things treat the question as one of right. The law of nature, according to them, gives to every man a sacred and indefeasible property in his own ideas, in the fruits of his own reason and imagination. The legislature has indeed the power to take away this property, just as it has the power to pass an act of attainder for cutting off an innocent man's head without a trial. But, as such an act of attainder would be legal murder, so would an act invading the right of an author to his copy be, according to these gentlemen, legal robbery.

"Now, Sir, if this be so, let justice be done, cost what it may. I am not prepared, like my honorable and learned friend, to agree to a compromise between right and expediency, and to commit an injustice for the public convenience. But I must say, that his theory soars far beyond the reach of my faculties. It is not necessary to go, on the present occasion, into a metaphysical inquiry about the origin of the right of property; and certainly nothing but the strongest necessity would lead me to discuss a subject so likely to be distasteful to the House." Etc.

By a paragraph of such exposition he fixes the exact issue, and then says: "We may now, therefore, I think, descend from these high regions, where we are in danger of being lost in the clouds, to firm ground and clear light. Let us look at this question like legislators."1 In other words, this question is of such nature as to demand practical, not theoretical, procedure.

1 MACAULAY, Speeches, p. 279.

II.

For the question's

Measures looking to Attack and Defense. sake and for the progress of thought, no less than for the sake of contest, it is of practical value to treat the issue on the military plan, as something calling for attack and defense. For not only may an alert opponent draw away one's energies to side issues; the question itself, also, has many digressions and subordinate involvements to solicit an unwary debater away from the main line of procedure. He must keep the main truth in mind, a cause that must emerge clear from every confusion of discussion; must be watchful also of everything that would make against or obscure it.

The following are some of the things to be provided for, as occasion calls, in the tactics of debate.

The Burden of Proof. - The question which side in a debate has the burden of proof, that is, must lead the attack and make its contention good by positive argument, is answered by ascertaining which side has the presumption of things with it. The prevailing order of custom or opinion holds the field, and has merely the defensive. Whoever proposes an innovation, or maintains some proposition not generally held, must take upon himself the labor, or burden, of proving it. A man is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. A custom, statute, or prevailing opinion is presumed good until it is demonstrated to be bad. An important step it is, therefore, bringing out as it does the intrinsic strength of the cause, and dictating the method of procedure, to locate rightly the burden of proof.

In some merely speculative discussions the question of the burden of proof is not of enough significance to pay for raising. Such cases of course are to be discovered and allowed for by the debater; they belong to the question of essentials and non-essentials for his purpose.

Points to be conceded. A great promotive both of fairness in discussion and of clearness in fixing the issue is the conceding of points on which there is no contest. A debater who will

yield nothing is liable to incur the odium not only of being obstinate and wrong-headed but of having a lame cause. A debater who concedes broadly and generously, on points of common agreement, secures a fairer hearing, while also the spirit of concession betokens a broader and wiser mastery of the question. As a matter of clever procedure it is not infrequently wise to yield to one's opponent in every point except the one wherein he would make his opponent yield to him.

Points to be waived. - To waive is not the same as to concede. It is simply to set aside or postpone some consideration which, though not yielded, is not relevant, not in place here. This belongs to the watchful business of keeping the course of argument simple and clear. The consideration thus waived may come up afterward, when the way is opened for it by argument. Or it may, if admitted, merely complicate or befog the case. An unscrupulous opponent may seek no better escape from a lame cause than to involve the debater in some irrelevant discussion. It is important, therefore, to have an alert sense for what should, or may, be waived as not to the present purpose.

Fairness of Encounter.

Fairness, largeness, honesty of encounter applies both to the statement of an opponent's views and to the estimate of an opponent's argument.

1. Fair and full statement of the opponent's position, without attempt to modify his words in order to favor your own side, is the only procedure that pays in the long run. It pays for your own argument; for if the opponent's position is strong, to whittle at it is only to attempt evasion, and thus indirectly to confess yourself baffled. It pays also in fortifying your own position; for if in representing your antagonist

you leave some unappreciated point, some underrated principle, it will work to your discomfiture.

2. While of course an opponent's weak argument is to be shown as weak, on the other hand, when an opponent's argument is found impregnable, honesty requires that the fact be fairly acknowledged. Subterfuge and evasion in the face of an evident truth may be the natural impulse of a wounded pride, but they are ruinous tactics for a broad and noble cause. As to the treatment of an opponent's argument recognized as strong, - if its strength is evident and yet you surpass, you have the greater honor; the stronger foe gives the nobler victory.

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III.

Order of Arguments. - Although the order in which a body of arguments is arranged is a matter of cardinal importance, little can be laid down by way of rule. It must be left for the most part to the tact of the reasoner, the character of the audience, the state of feeling and knowledge regarding the question, the presuppositions to be encountered, and many other considerations that can be determined only in the individual case.

All that can be done here, therefore, is to note a few ways in which arguments of various types and characters derive advantage from the relative order in which they are placed.

As regards Kind of Argument. Some types of argument contain intrinsically a suggestion of the relative position they should occupy in the discussion.

In an inductive investigation, concerned with a question, the leading place is naturally due to considerations that establish an antecedent probability, the a priori type of argument. This becomes the basis of procedure, the hypothesis; and whatever is added by testimony comes in then either to

1

1 See above, p. 608 sq.

strengthen the probability or to compel modification.

Thus the order is from the more general to the more particular and circumstantial. If the argument from probability came in after the other, it would seem to betray the reasoner's sense that positive testimony is inadequate and must be buttressed up by something else.

The deductive type of argument, based as it is on acknowledged truths and principles, has something of a clinching and enforcing nature, and hence, in a series of arguments, would naturally occupy a place well along in the discussion, after the preliminaries are disposed of, and the course of thought draws toward its summary and conclusion. So much of suggestion, not absolute but to be taken for what the individual case makes it worth, may be drawn from the intrinsic character of the type.

Arguments from example and analogy, being of more expository and illustrative nature,1 come naturally near the beginning or near the end, according as they define the issue and lay it out, or summarize and clinch it.

As to Relative Strength of Arguments. A body of arguments, of all literary works, is especially susceptible to climax, - an order growing to greater strength and cogency. Yet also, so much depends on the vigor of the first impression, that it will not do to begin with an argument obviously weak, however its effect may be retrieved. The resource seems to be, to begin with arguments that are strong in the sense of being clear, explanatory, self-evident, in other words, arguments that contain most of the expository virtue. On the same principle, the final argument, which gathers up the conclusiveness of the whole, should be strong in the sense of being comprehensive, summarizing, containing most of consequence and enforcement.

Arguments relatively weak, while they are to occupy the

1 See above, p. 615.

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