jurisdiction over their own body placed in spiritual hands; and if so, can the members of an Episcopal Church hesitate as to the proper persons in whom should be vested the exercise of that jurisdiction?

It is, as I have often had occasion to observe, one of the inconveniences we suffer by an union of the Church with the State, that the legal rights of each Incumbent, even when opposed to the authorities of his Diocese, are guarded with the same jealous care which protects all other kinds of property. And thus, when the punishment of a Clergyman would affect his temporalities, the law interposes all the caution and all the formalities by which the secular rights of individuals are protected. Whenever therefore both spiritual and temporal interests are involved in the question, the former are too often made subordinate and subservient to the latter; and no summary decision can be obtained, for fear of impairing that sacredness which Englishmen are taught to believe is inherent in a freehold. This is part of the price we pay for the advantage of being united with the State. The balance of advantage, I have no doubt, still preponderates in favour of religion. Yet it is surely allowable, and even incumbent on us, to lessen this inconvenience as far as we can, consistently with the spirit of our laws concerning the private rights of individuals.

I am desirous, therefore, of seeing a broad distinction recognized between absolute and qualified free

holds. It is a fallacy to speak of Church Endowments under the former character. There are many incidents to the tenure of Church property which deprive it of the character of a freehold estate, in the ordinary acceptation of that term. It is rather of the nature of a trust than a freehold. It can only be enjoyed by persons who hold certain opinions, who are subjected to a special examination at the discretion of the Ordinary, and who are thought worthy, by their learning, ability, and moral character, of the appointment. It cannot long be kept vacant; and if a duly qualified person be not speedily named by the patron, the nomination belongs to the spiritual governors of the Church. The nomination is void, if it be made for money'. The appointment is liable to be forfeited by the misconduct of the holder, or by a change in his opinions on certain doctrines, or by non-residence, or by acceptance of another benefice. All these conditions take it out of the class of possessions called freehold estates, and render every argument drawn from that consideration inconclusive and inapplicable.

1 Much error prevails as to the right of purchasing presentations to livings. The right of presenting may be purchased, but the exercise of the right for money is simoniacal. Hence, during a vacancy, the presentation cannot be sold; neither is it legal to buy the right of presenting a particular person. The right, whether of perpetual presentation, or of single presentation, must be conveyed absolutely and unconditionally, if conveyed at all.

Sacred as property may be, the purposes for which it is held are equally sacred. In the instance before us I may surely affirm that they are still more sacred. To sacrifice these purposes then to the security of the temporary holder of the property is preposterous. It is a solecism in theory, quite as revolting to our reason, as the practice is injurious to the spiritual welfare of the people.

But if, as is probable, the submission of these temporal interests to the Spiritual jurisdiction exercised in a summary way would be offensive to the legal profession, and, as far as lay patronage is concerned, would excite strong opposition in the country at large, let at least a compromise be made, which according to my own view of the case might easily be done, and which would be quite sufficient for the discipline of the Church. Let the Spiritual governor, in passing sentence on a delinquent Clergyman, interfere no farther with the temporalities than is requisite for the due performance of the Church service: let him provide for this object by sequestration, and leave the remainder, whatever be its amount, untouched, until a final sentence shall be pronounced, by a tribunal more competent to decide questions involving the rights of individuals. The Church would then await the issue, however distant it might be, without being in the mean time paralyzed as it were, and incapacitated in the performance of her most vital functions.

In venturing on these remarks, nothing is farther from my mind than to cast a reflection upon the administration of the laws by our Ecclesiastical courts, more especially by the Court of Arches. On the contrary, I believe that the praise usually bestowed upon the administration of justice in all the courts of law in this country, belongs at least in an equal degree to them. Of the distinguished individual who long presided over that Court, whose recent departure out of this life, full of years and honour, we of this diocese not only deplored as a public but as a private calamity, I need not here enlarge. In every quality that constitutes an able, upright, indefatigable judge, he shone conspicuous; and if I were to add that his loss has been adequately supplied by the appointment of one worthy to succeed him, the sentiment would I am sure be echoed from the bosoms of all who hear me.

Neither is it the conduct or the ability of the Judges alone of these Courts which is above all censure or cavil. The proceedings of the Courts themselves (although capable perhaps of improvement in detail), are I believe as pure, as sagacious, as conducive to the elucidation of the merits of the cases brought before them, and to a final sentence according to law and equity, as those of any tribunal, even the highest, in the kingdom. It is not with their authority in what is called contentious jurisdiction that I would wish to interfere. Of this in all mat

ters of right between man and man I am by no means jealous; nor am I now at all inclined to animadvert upon their method of proceeding. It is in questions concerning man and his Redeemer that I would wish to see the authority of Christ's Visible Church to be maintained by the State-and the power of its Governors recognized to restrain evil doers who minister in His name, to purify His sanctuary, to preserve His doctrines from corruption, and to provide, as far as human authority can provide, that His sheep be duly fed.

Whenever a question of this kind arises, is it not grievous to be told that the Bishop has no power of himself to control the offender, or to suspend his ministrations, or to stay the mischief? that he must wait the slow process of courts, sitting only at intervals, overwhelmed often with business, accessible only through functionaries of their own-that the Bishop must apply to these Courts in the character of a Suitor that he must wait his turn to be heard-that he must employ Counsel to plead and incur all the expenses and be subject to all the formalities which individual suitors submit to in order to determine some disputed right, or to obtain redress of some private wrong inflicted on themselves. Is this the adoption of Christianity into the constitution of the realm? Is this the union of Church and State? Are Bishops held to be incapable of "judging the smallest matters"-compelled to drop the character of governor