5. The board had the power on the day set to hear the petition to continue the hearing and allow a new bond to be filed, and it is sufficient if the bond 6. The recording of an ordinance of a board of supervisors, providing for the holding of regular meetings, is not essential to the validity of the or be filed on the day of the hearing. dinance. 7. A verbal application to the supervisors by an owner of land, to have the same included in the district, is sufficient. 8. Section 2 of the act provides that the board capable of irrigation by the same system. Held, that the judgment of the board as to the propriety of excluding any lands was final. shall not exclude lands from the district which are 9. There is nothing in the act requiring the board to state the reasons which led it to establish the boundaries of the district. the election." 4. Where the statute requires a bond conditioned purpose of the one is to make large bodies of to pay the costs "in case the organization is not ef land fit for cultivation by removing the exfected," a bond to "pay all the costs" is insufficient cess of water, and that of the other is to compliance therewith. make large bodies of land fit for cultivation by distributing water over them. Their general powers are similar in many respects, and they are organized upon the same plan. It is settled that reclamation districts are public corporations, (Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 410, 411; People v. Reclamation Dist., 53 Cal. 348; People v. Williams, 56 Cal. 647; Hoke v. Perdue, 62 Cal. 546; People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 528, 8 Pac. Rep. 84;) and we think that irrigation districts must be held to be so to the same extent. Many objections are taken to the proceedings for the organization of the district, and the argument in relation thereto rests in great part upon the proposition that 10. A publication of the notice of the election on the proceedings are to be strictly construed. November 22d in a weekly newspaper, on October This is put upon two grounds. It is said, in 28th, and on the 5th, 12th, and 19th of November, is a sufficient compliance with the provision of the the first place, that the proceedings are for act requiring publication "three weeks prior to the purpose of divesting the citizen of his 11. The act provides that the election shall be property in invitum. It is true that later on "conducted" in accordance with the general elec-provision is made for assessing the property tion laws, which provide that voting precincts within the district for the purpose of defrayshall be established at least 30 days before the ing expenses; but no assessments have yet election. Section 3 of the irrigation act provides been levied, and none are involved in the that the supervisors shall establish a convenient number of election precincts. Held, that the time case before us. The objections made relate for establishing the precincts was in the discretion to the organization of the district. The pri of the board, and when published with the election mary purpose of such organization is to perproclamation it was sufficient. 12. Section 15 of the act provides that the board form certain important public functions. of directors shall determine the amount of money The power of assessment, it is true, is incirequired for the purpose of constructing the works, dental. But in the same way it is incidental etc., and shall call an election and submit to the to cities, and other municipal corporations, electors "the question whether or not bonds of said district shall be issued in the amount so de- strictly so called, for the improvement of termined, and if a majority vote 'Bonds, yes,' then streets, etc. And it can no more be said that the board shall cause bonds in said amount to be for this reason proceedings for the organizaissued. " "The bonds shall each be of the denomination of not less than $100, nor more than tion of irrigation districts are for the purpose $500," and "said bonds shall be payable in install- of depriving the citizen of his property in ments." Held, that the bonds were properly invitum than the same could be said of prodrawn so as to make each one payable in install-ceedings for the organization of cities and other municipal corporations. It is said, in Commissioners' decision. Appeal from the next place, that the district was not cresuperior court, Colusa county; E. A. BRIDG-ated by the legislature itself, but by or under FORD, Judge. ments. W. F. Good, W. C. Belcher, H. M. Albery, and K. Albery, for appellants. Richard Bayne, for respondent. Stanton L. Carter, amicus curia. HAYNE, C. This was an application for mandamus to compel the secretary of an irrigation district to sign and seal certain bonds. One of the property owners of the district was allowed to intervene for the purpose of contesting the validity of the bonds. The court below awarded the mandamus, and the defendant and the intervenor appeal. The district was organized under the act known as the "Wright Law." See Laws 1887, p. 29. This act was held to be constitutional in Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 18 Pac. Rep. 379. In that case irrigation districts were likened to districts organized for the reclamation of swamp lands, and the court said that it was inclined to think that they were to be regarded as public corporations. We think that the analogy between the two kinds of corporations is strong. The the supervision of a local body. But all municipal corporations in the state are henceforth to be created in this way. The constitution provides that corporations for munici pal purposes shall not be created by special laws, but shall be organized under such general laws as the legislature shall provide. Article 11, § 6. This necessitates organization under some kind of local supervision, and the general laws which the legislature has provided require that the organization shall be under the supervision of a local body, much in the same way as in the case of an irrigation district. A petition "which shall set forth and particularly describe the proposed boundaries of such corporation" is to be presented to the board of supervisors of the county, which body is to deal with it much in the same manner as the board is to deal with the petition for the formation of an irrigation district. In fact the phraseology of the irrigation law is so similar to that of the municipal corporation act as to make it evident that the former was modeled upon the latter. See Laws 1883, p. 94. Hence, if is so; and the evidence to explain and locate the calls, which was clearly admissible, (Reamer v. Nesmith, 34 Cal. 626,) makes them sufficiently definite. Similar objections are made to the description in the order of the board establishing the boundaries of the district, and similar answers apply. proceedings for the formation of irrigation | starting point and certain other calls of the districts are to be strictly construed because description are too indefinite. But we canthey are organized under the supervision of not say from the face of the paper that this a local body, proceedings for the formation of municipal corporations must be so construed for the same reason. But the consequences of wiping out municipal organizations, perhaps after property rights had grown up, because of some slip in the preliminary proceedings, would be so serious that we cannot think that any court would adopt the strict | rule of construction which would require it. It will be time enough to apply such a rule when questions as to the extent of the powers arise. So far as proceedings for the organization are concerned, we think that a reasonably liberal rule of construction should be adopted to carry out the wise purposes of the law. In the light of this rule we proceed to examine the various objections made. 1. Several objections are taken to the description contained in the petition. They are based upon the requirement of the second section of the act, that such petition "shall set forth and particularly describe the proposed boundaries of such districts." It is probable that this provision requires a description by metes and bounds, for it is "the boundaries" which are to be described, and not merely the district. But we think that a description by metes and bounds, which would be sufficient in an ordinary deed, is a compliance with the provision. "The same construction that is given to grants is given to statutes which prescribe the boundaries of incorporated territories." Iron Works v. Tolland, 9 Cush. 496. It has even been held that a more liberal rule should be applied. Hamilton v. NcNeil, 13 Grat. 394. But, at all events, a description by metes and bounds, which would be good in a deed, is sufficient in the petition. 2. It is contended that a proper bond was not filed with the petition. The provision of the act is that "the petitioners must accompany the petition with a good and sufficient bond, to be approved by the said board of supervisors, in double the amount of the probable cost of organizing such district, conditioned that the bondsmen will pay all said cost in case said organization shall not be effected. * * * When such petition is presented, the said board of supervisors shall hear the same," etc. Section 2. The petitioners presented, and the board approved, a bond which is claimed to be insufficient in form. The particulars in which it is said to be insufficient are the following: It is said, in the first place, that the recital in the bond misdescribes the petition. The petition was signed by 64 persons, among whom were J. A. Sutton, James McDermott, George B. Harden, George M. Sutton, and P. R. Garnett. The recital in the bond is that “whereas, J. A. Sutton, James McDermott, Geo. B. Harden, Geo. M. Sutton, P. R. Garnett, N. D. Rideout, A. J. Tully, and others, their associates, propose to present herewith" a petition, etc. Rideout and Tully did not sign the petition. The argument is that the petition filed does not correspond to the one referred to in the bond, and, consequently, that there was no bond upon that petition. The recital, however, is not of a petition actNow, the main point in regard to the de- ually presented, but of one proposed to be prescription is that it cannot be made to close sented. There is no pretense that any other upon itself. The learned counsel say that petition was presented. The bond did in "the only way in which this could be done fact accompany this petition, and we think would be to change the distance 200 feet' that this circumstance, coupled with the rein line 10 of folio 14 to 2,000 feet,' and cital, is sufficient to identify the document. 540 feet' in line 6 of folio 18 to 5,400 feet.'" In the next place it is said that the bond was But, if this is necessary, we think that it can not conditioned as required by the act. The and should be done upon the data furnished condition was that the bond should be void by the petition itself. The first call referred "if said obligors or bondsman shall pay all to is as follows: "Thence south, 34 degrees the costs," etc., while the condition required east, 200 feet to stake 208." For anything by the statute is that the bondsmen shall pay that appears to the contrary, this stake is a the cost "in case said organization shall not perfectly plain monument; and, being so, it be effected." The difference is therefore must control the statement of the distance. that the bond given provided that the bondsMills v. Lux, 45 Cal. 273; Penry v. Richards, men should pay the cost in any event, while 52 Cal. 672. If, therefore, it is 2,000 feet the statute only requires that they should pay from the point of departure, the call for 200 in a certain contingency. We think, howmust be rejected. False calls may be re-ever, that the bond may fairly be said to injected, and lines supplied by intendment, in the description of the boundaries of a municipal corporation. In re Inhabitants of Ipswich, 13 Pick. 431. A false call may be rejected even in a tax-deed. Bosworth v. Danzien, 25 Cal. 299. The objection to the call for "540 feet" is to be disposed of in a similar way. It is also contended that the clude the provision required by the statute, and that it is not vitiated by including something which was not required; and the use of the singular number in the phrase "if said obligors or bondsinan shall pay," etc., is unimportant. But at most the bond was defective merely, and, if it be assumed for the purposes of the case that the giving of a bond was jurisdictional, we think that the board | are founded on slight mistakes in the spellhad power to allow a new one to be given be- ing of some of the names, which are entirely fore taking action on the petition. The pe- unimportant, and of certain defects in the tition was presented, pursuant to notice, on description which are disposed of by what is October 10th; and when the matter came up said under the first head. on that day the board made an order allowing 5. It is urged that the board had no power a new bond to be filed, and continuing the to modify the boundaries of the proposed dishearing until a future day. A bond free trict in the way it did. What the board did from objection was filed, and the board then was, in the first place, to include in the disproceeded with the hearing. We think that trict certain lands not included by the petithis course was within the power of the tion, upon the verbal request of the owners, board. No time is fixed for the presentation and, in the second place, to exclude from the of a petition. It is to be presented at a regu- district certain lands included by the petition. lar meeting, pursuant to notice, and the bond The provision of the act under which this must "accompany" the petition. Neither was done is as follows: "The said board, on the petition nor the bond need be filed before the final hearing, may make such changes in the petition is presented, and the hearing and the proposed boundaries as they may find to the action of the board in the matter may be be proper, and shall establish and define such at the same meeting, although power is ex- boundaries: provided, that said board shall pressly given to adjourn for a certain time. not modify said boundaries so as to except It is sufficient, therefore, if the bond be giv- from the operation of this act any territory en on the day of the hearing, and we think within the boundaries of the district proit clear that there was power to adjourn the posed by said petitioners which is susceptihearing so as to allow a proper bond to be ble of irrigation by the same system of works filed. Such a bond may be said to "accom- applicable to the other lands in such propany" the petition in the sense of the stat-posed district; nor shall any lands which ute. Even in the case of an appeal-bond it will not, in the judgment of the said board, be was held, prior to the enactment of any stat-benefited by irrigation by said system, be inute on the subject, that where a bond had been given which was defective merely the defects could be cured by giving a new bond in the supreme court. See cases in Hayne, New Trial & App. 651. cluded within such district: provided, that any person whose lands are susceptible of irrigation from the same source shall, upon application of the owner to said board, be entitled to have such lands included in said district.' Section 2. 3. It is objected that the petition was not presented at a lawful meeting of the board. (a) The objection to the inclusion of lands The act provides that the petition "shall be not embraced in the petition is that the appresented at a regular meeting of said board." plication of the owners (which is admitted A similar provision is in the municipal cor- to have been made) was not in writing; but poration act. Laws 1883, p. 94. In relation we see nothing in the act which requires a to meetings of boards of supervisors the writing, and we do not think that the court county government act has the following: is authorized to superadd such a require"The board of supervisors must by ordinancement. provide for the holding of regular meetings (b) The objection to the exclusion of lands of the board at their respective county-seats. " from the proposed boundaries is based upon In pursuance of this provision the board, on the proviso that "said board shall not modify April 11, 1885, passed an ordinance fixing | said boundaries so as to except from the opthe times for its regular meetings. Meet-eration of this act any territory within the ings were held under this ordinance for near-boundaries of the district proposed by said ly two years, and up to and including the petitioners, which is susceptible of irrigation presentation of the petition. The objections by the same system of works applicable to made go back to the validity of this ordi- the other lands in such proposed district." nance. It is said that it was not properly The appellants offered evidence to show that recorded in the ordinance book. But its re- the excluded lands were in fact susceptible cording in that book has been held to be not of irrigation by the same system of works as essential to its validity. People v. Cole, 70 the other lands; and such evidence was exCal. 60, 11 Pac. Rep. 481. It is further said cluded on the ground that the judgment of that the vote of one of the supervisors was the board as to the matter was final. We not shown by the entry in the minutes or by think that this ruling was right. It is to be the publication; but the meetings were held observed that no power is given to the board under this ordinance for a long period as and to include lands which are not included by for regular meetings, and they were the only the petition, except upon request of the ownmeetings of the kind which were held; anders; and with reference to excluded lands it we do not think that the question of their is possible (although we express no opinion regularity can have any such far-reaching upon the point) that the owners could, upon and collateral effect as to render abortive all request and a proper showing in some approthe public business that has been transacted | priate proceeding, have their lands reincludduring a series of years. ed. But, so far as the validity of the organ 4. It is contended that the petition was ization of the district is concerned, we think not published. The objections in this regard that the judgment of the board cannot be contradicted, as is attempted here. It is tion shall be conducted in accordance with clear that this would be so in the absence of the general election laws of the state," and the proviso quoted, (People v. Hagar, 66 by the general election laws the voting preCal. 60, 4 Pac. Rep. 951; People v. Riverside, cincts must not be established less than 30 70 Cal. 461, 11 Pac. Rep. 759;) and from the days before the election. We are inclined to nature of the question we think that the pro- doubt whether the "conducting" of an elecviso must be considered merely as a rule for tion necessarily includes something which the guidance of the board, and that, so far as cannot take place within 30 days before the the validity of the district is concerned, their election day; but, assuming that it does, the decision is as conclusive as if the proviso had evident meaning is that the election shall be not been inserted. It is objected to this view, conducted in accordance with the general however, that the records simply show what laws, except as otherwise provided in the act the action of the board was, and do not show itself. The act provides that, "for the purthe grounds or reasons upon which such ac- poses of the election above provided for, the tion proceeded, or as counsel put it, that said board of supervisors must establish a there was any decision of the board upon the convenient number of election precincts in question of the application of the system of said proposed district, and define the boundworks to the excluded lands. But the order aries thereof, which said precincts may therefixing and establishing certain boundaries, after be changed by the board of directors of excluding certain of the lands included by such district." Section 3. This provision the petition, is certainly a decision as to does not say when the precincts are to be eswhere the boundaries shall be; and there is tablished; but we think it cannot be the nothing in the act which requires the board meaning that the board is to establish them to state why it fixes the boundaries in any 30 days before the election; for the notice of particular place, and we think it may be election is to be, or at least may be, given at safely laid down as a general proposition the time the order establishing the boundathat the reasons or grounds of the action of ries of the district is made, (Id.;) and only any tribunal or body, whether legislative or three weeks' publication of the same is rejudicial, need not be stated unless the law quired. Hence the election may take place expressly so requires. It is to be observed within less than 30 days from the time when that there is a clear distinction between cases it is first known where the boundaries of the of the statement of the reasons or grounds district are to be. Consequently the arguof the action which a tribunal is authorized ment made would require the voting preto take and cases where the power to act de-cincts to be established before it was known pends upon the existence of antecedent con- where the district was to be, or what it was ditions. We think that this case belongs to to include. No such absurd construction the former class. will be adopted. The time for the establish6. It is objected that the proclamation for ment of the precincts seems to be left to the the election on the question of the organiza-discretion of the board. They were estabtion of the district was not published as re-lished by the election proclamation, which quired by the act. The objection is based was published for at least three weeks; and partly on small inaccuracies in the descrip- this, we think, was sufficient. tion, which have been already considered, 8. It is finally objected that the bonds were partly on unimportant mistakes in the spell-not in proper form. The provision of the ing of names, and partly on the alleged act is as follows: "Said bonds shall be payground that the proclamation was not pub-able in gold coin of the United States, in inlished for "three weeks prior to the election." stallments, as follows, to-wit: At the expiraThese words, we think, simply indicate the tion of eleven years, not less than 5 per cent. time during which the notice is to be pub- of said bonds; at the expiration of twelve lished, and not the manner of the publica-years, not less than 6 per cent.; at the extion, (In re Cunningham, 73 Cal. 558, 559, piration of thirteen years, not less than 7 15 Pac. Rep. 136;) and, nothing being said per cent.; at the expiration of fourteen years, about the number of publications, we think not less than 8 per cent.; at the expiration this matter was left to the discretion of the of fifteen years, not less than 9 per cent.; at board. The board ordered that the publica- the expiration of sixteen years, not less than tion be made in a weekly newspaper "as 10 per cent.; at the expiration of seventeen often (or for four insertions) as the same years, not less than 11 per cent.; at the exmay be published between this date and the piration of eighteen years, not less than 13 said day of election." This order was made per cent.; at the expiration of nineteen years, on October 28th. The election was on No- not less than 15 per cent.; and for the twenvember 22d, and the proclamation was pub-tieth year a percentage sufficient to pay off lished on October 29th and on the 5th, 12th, said bonds." Section 15. The bonds here inand 19th of November. This, we think, was volved were drawn so as to make each one sufficient. payable in installments; and the objection is 7. It is said that the voting precincts were that a proper construction of the act reestablished less than 30 days before the elec- quires that a certain number of bonds should tion. The irrigation act does not say in be payable in 11 years, a further number in terms when the voting precincts shall be es- 12 years, and so on. We think, however, tablished. It says, however, that “such elec-that the bonds were in proper form. The self as an individual, which land was paid for with funds of the church. The record title remained in plaintiff as an individual for more than 20 years. A college, chapel, dormitory, etc., were erected on the land, and were used as a college and for church purposes. Plaintiff controlled and managed the property alone and expended the moneys. The corporation had no trustees, and its business was entirely in plaintiff's hands. There was no overt act changing the possession from plaintiff individfor sale of the land for a street assessment, plaintiff not being made a party in his corporate capac ity. Held, in action by plaintiff in such capacity to enjoin the enforcement of the decree, the position that more than 20 years before the assessment proceedings plaintiff, as individual, had delivered possession to the corporation, which had held the land adversely and under claim of ownership, was not supported by the evidence. J. C. Bates, for appellants. Wilson & Wilson, M. C. Hassett, and S. M Wilson, for respondent. phrase, "a bond payable in installments," is clear, and can mean only one thing. Is the meaning changed by putting it in the plural, and making it "bonds payable in installments?" But there are other provisions of the act which make the intention clear. The sixteenth section provides that "the board may sell said bonds from time to time in such quantities as may be necessary and most ad-ually to the corporation. A decree was rendered vantageous," etc. It may happen, therefore, that only a portion of the bonds are sold. Now, for illustration, we will suppose that the bonds are issued on appellant's theory, and that only those payable at the end of 11 years are sold. In such case the only bonds outstanding would be the 11-year bonds; for a bond which has not been sold, or, in other Department 1. Appeal from superior words, not issued, cannot be said to be "out-court, city and county of San Francisco; standing." The whole amount of the prin- JOHN HUNT, Judge. cipal of such bonds would be due and payable at the end of 11 years. How would it be paid? The twenty-second section provides, in substance, that at the expiration of the tenth year the board of directors shall make an assessment "in the following percentage of the principal of the whole amount of bonds then outstanding, to-wit: For the eleventh year, five per cent.," etc. This is the only provision for raising money to pay the principal of said bonds. It would, therefore, result that upon the appellant's theory, that although the whole amount of the principal of the 11-year bonds would be due and payable, only 5 per cent. thereof could be paid, and similar results would follow as to the others, while, as the bonds are drawn, 5 per cent. upon the whole amount of the principal of the bonds "then outstanding" would be sufficient to pay off each installment of the principal as it became due. It may be that the legislature supposed that there was a good reason for making each bond run in part for the whole 20 years. As is well known, a bond for a long term is more salable (other things being equal) than The only question necessary for us to cona bond for a short term, and the object may sider, arises upon the point made by the aphave been to help the sale of the short bonds pellant that the findings of the court below by incorporating them with the long ones. are not sustained by the evidence. The reHowever this may be, we think that the in-spondent contends that there is but one questention to have the bonds drawn as the respondent has drawn them is sufficiently expressed. The other matters do not require special notice. We therefore advise that the judgment appealed from be affirmed. I concur: FOOTE, C. BELCHER, C. C., being disqualified, took no part in this decision. PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion be judgment is affirmed. (79 Cal. 288) ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN ADVERSE POSSESSION. Plaintiff, who was archbishop, and as such a sole corporation, took a conveyance of land to him WORKS, J. This is an action to enjoin the enforcement of a decree for the sale of certain real estate in the city of San Francisco for the satisfaction of a street assessment, upon the ground that the plaintiff was, at the time the action was brought and the decree rendered, the owner of the property, and, not having been made a party to the suit, the judgment as against it was void. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled, and upon a trial by the court a perpetual injunction was decreed. This is the second time the case has been to this court on appeal. At the former hearing it was reversed on the ground that the complaint was insuficient. Archbishop v. Shipman, 69 Cal. 586, 11 Pac. Rep. 343. The complaint has been amended in such a way as to avoid the objections then urged against it, and, as amended, is sufficient, and the demurrer to it was properly overruled. tion in the case, viz., whether the respondent was or was not the owner of the property in controversy at the time of and subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding to foreclose the street assessment lien. This is undoubtedly true, if this question of ownership be determined against the respondent. The undisputed facts as shown by the evidence are these: Joseph S. Alemany was the Roman Catholic archbishop of San Francisco, and was, as such archbishop, a sole corporation. The real estate mentioned in the complaint was, on the 25th day of July, 1858, conveyed to said Alemany, not as such archbishop, but in his individual name, by the then owner of the property; but the same was purchased by and paid for with moneys donated by members of the church. The property was, subsequent thereto, improved by said corporation by the erection of buildings, |