named can be changed, except by constitutional | vance, as in section 4. The absence of such amendment.

The resolution was as follows: "Whereas, doubt exists as to the meaning of section 5, art. 8, of the constitution: therefore be it resolved that the following question be submitted to the supreme court, to-wit: Does the constitution prohibit the removal of either of the institutions referred to in said section from their present location, or the consolidation of any two or more at the present location of any one, or at some place remote from the location of either?"

provisions supports the construction which we have given. It follows that the locations of the institutions named, or of any one of them, cannot be changed, except by an amendment to the constitution.

(9 Colo. 628)

In re HOUSE BILL No. 166. (Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)1 NOTARIES PUBLIC-WOMEN NOT ELIGIBLE. Under Const. Colo. art. 7, §6, prohibiting the election or appointment "to any civil or military office in the state" of any person except "a qualified elector," and art. 14, § 10, providing that "no person shall be eligible to any county office unless he shall notaries public. be a qualified elector," women cannot be appointed

PER CURIAM. At the date of the adoption of the constitution the several territorial institutions named in section 5, art. 8, were already in existence, and located, respectively, at the points mentioned in said section. The question submitted is whether the proThe first declaration of the section is as fol- visions of house bill No. 166, entitled "A bill lows: "The following territorial institutions, for an act concerning notaries public," are to-wit, the university at Boulder, the agri- constitutional. cultural college at Fort Collins, the school of mines at Golden, the institute for the education of mutes at Colorado Springs, shall, upon the adoption of this constitution, become institutions of the state of Colorado.” It is

Inde

PER CURIAM. Section 6, art. 7, of the con

* *

stitution, prohibits the election or appointment to any civil or military office in the state of any person except a qualified elector. not entirely clear but what this provision in civil officers within the meaning of the fourth Judge Story discusses the question, who are itself involves a constitutional location of section of the second article of the constituthe several institutions mentioned at the tion of the United States? and his conclusion places specified. The next declaration, that is that "all officers of the United States the management of said institutions shall be "subject to the control of the state, under the national government, whether their du* who hold their appointments under such laws and regulations as the general as- ties are executive or judicial, in the highest sembly shall provide," taken in connection with the context, is apparently a limitation or lowest departments of the government, of legislative control, (excluding power to with the exception of officers in the army or remove,) in harmony with this view. navy, are properly civil officers, within the pendently, however, of these provisions, the meaning of the constitution." 1 Story, Const. section declares that "the location of said in-88 789-792. A government office is defined stitutions, as well as all gifts, grants, and to be "a public station or employment, conappropriations of money and property, real and personal, heretofore made to the said several institutions, are hereby confirmed to well, 6 Wall. 385-393. An office held under the use and benefit of the same, respectively." This is an awkwardly constructed sena state government necessarily includes the tence, but we think it sufficiently indicates same characteristics, and all of them are coinan intention to fix the location of the several prised in the office of notary public, as will institutions specified permanently at the appear by reference to the several statutory points named. The word "location" in this section is used in its ordinary sense, and in the same sense as used in section 2 of the same article, namely: "In the sense of situation with respect to place." The use of the word "location," in the only other sense in which it could have any legal mean ing or effect, would be unusual, and, having

ferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties." U. S. v. Hart

provisions in relation thereto. Again, section 10, art. 14, of our constitution, makes ineligible to hold any county office every person who is not a qualified elector. A notary public, while holding his office by the appointment of the governor, can exercise the he is appointed. In this sense he is a county functions thereof only in the county for which officer. Hill v. Bacon, 43 Ill. 477. The term "qualified elector, as employed in the fore.

reference to the rest of the sentence, unnecessary. We call attention to sections 2 and 4 of the article. If the framers of the con-going constitutional provisions, is used in its stitution had not regarded section 5 as per manently locating the institutions named, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have made some explicit provision with regard to their permanent location, as they did in the case of the state capital, (section 2,) and likewise prohibited any expenditure in ad

vote generally. We are of opinion, therefore, broadest sense, meaning a person qualified to that said bill is unconstitutional, in so far as it provides for the appointment of women as notaries public.

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(9 Colo. 629)

In re BILL RELATING TO ARBITRATION. (Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMPULSORY ARBITRATION. Const. Colo. art. 18, § 3, providing that the legis lature shall pass "such laws as may be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitrators, to be appointed by mutual agreement of the parties to any controversy, who may choose that mode of adjustment," neither contemplates nor admits of a law providing for a compulsory submission to arbitration.

sideration and amendment, if in accordance with the parliamentary practice adopted by the respective houses, of a bill thus returned.

(9 Colo. 631)

In re HOUSE BILL No. 38.

(Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)* CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TENURE OF OFFICE.

1. A bill, the purpose of which is, not to extend, but to fix the commencement of, the term of office of county treasurers, is not in conflict with Const. Colo. art. 5, § 30, providing that "no law shall extend the term of any public officer, " etc. 2. Where an act changes the time for the commencement of the term of office of county treas

Question submitted: Is the bill entitled "A bill for an act to provide for the amicable adjustment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employés, and to authorize the creation of a board ofurers, a vacancy is created upon the expiration of arbitration," as to its compulsory provisions, in conflict with section 3, art. 18, of the constitution, and of section 7, art. 2, of the bill of rights?

Section 3 of article 18 of the constitution is as follows: "It shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitrators, to be appointed by the mutual agreement of the parties to any controversy, who may choose that mode of adjustment. The powers and duties of such arbitrators shall be as prescribed by law." Section 7 of article 2 of the bill of rights contains the usual provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the usual restrictions concerning search warrants.

the terms of the then incumbents, extending from the date of such expiration to the commencement of the term as fixed by the new law, which vacancy the county commissioners have power to fill, under Const. art. 14, § 9.

The bill in question is entitled "A bill for an act to fix the term of office of county treasurers." Section 30 of article 5 of the constitution is as follows: "Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, no law shall extend the term of any public officer, or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments, after his election or appointment: provided this shall not be construed to forbid the general assembly to fix the salary or emoluments of those first elected or appointed under this constitution."

PER CURIAM. 1. The purpose of the bill is, not to extend the term, but to fix the commencement of the term, of oflice of county treasurers, and is not in conflict with section 30, art. 5, of the constitution.

PER CURIAM. We are of the opinion that section 3, art. 18, neither contemplates nor admits of a law providing for the compulsory submission of differences to arbitration. A submission of differences to the decision of 2. The effect of the act, should it become arbitrators must be by mutual agreement of a law, will be to leave a vacancy extending the parties to the controversy, who (in the from the date of the expiration of the term language of the section) choose that mode of of oflice of county treasurers as now fixed by adjustment. We see nothing in the provis-law and the date of the commencement of ions of the bill in conflict with section 7, art. 2, of the bill of rights.

(9 Colo. 630)

In re SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO
RECALL OF BILLS.

the term as fixed by this act. The power to fill this vacancy is lodged in the board of county commissioners by section 9, art. 14, of the constitution.

(9 Colo. 631)

(Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)1 In re HOUSE BILL No. 203. LEGISLATURE-RECALL OF BILLS FROM GOVERNOR. (Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)2 In Colorado there is no constitutional objection ELECTIONS-NOMINATIONS-STATUTORY REGULAto the legislature's requesting, by joint or concurrent resolution, the return of a bill in the hands of the governor for his approval; nor is there anyThere is no constitutional objection to a law regthing which directs or controls the governor's aculating the machinery of a political party in maktion in response to such request, nor which in- ing nominations of candidates for public office.

hibits a reconsideration and amendment of a bill thus returned.

TIONS.

The bill in question is entitled "A bill for an act to prevent frauds in the nominating PER CURIAM. We discover nothing in the public officers." "RESOLUTION. Whereas, constitution or statutes that forbids the leg-doubts exist as to the constitutionality of islature's requesting, by joint or concurrent house bill No. 203: therefore be it resolved, resolution of both houses, the return of a bill by the senate of the state of Colorado, that in the hands of the governor for his approval, or which directs or controls the action of his excellency in response to such request. Neither do we find any provision in the constitution or statutes which inhibits a recon

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the supreme court be respectfully requested to answer the following interrogations: (1) Is it constitutional to enact any law attempting to regulate the machinery of a political party in making nominations of candidates

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for public offices? (2) Can the law take any that fractions of a day are not to be noticed, cognizance of political parties as such? (3) but each fraction of a day is to be considered Can the law interfere in any wise with the in the computation as a full day. It is theremodes and methods employed by a political fore immaterial at what precise hour the bill party in the nomination of its candidates for was presented to the governor on March 17th, public office? (4) Are the provisions of the or at what hour he returned the same to the bill properly the subject-matter of legisla-senate on March 28th. tion? Resolved, that a copy of said bill and a copy hereof be forthwith transmitted by the secretary to the supreme court."

PER CURIAM. We do not find any consti-ed by this court, and sanctioned by the weight tutional objection to the bill submitted for our consideration, nor is our attention called to any provision of the constitution as forbidding such legislation. The abuses sought to be corrected by the provisions of the bill are of the gravest character, and are a prop-returnable to the senate on March 27th, uner subject of legislation, entirely within the legislative power. Leonard v. Com., 112 Pa. St. 622, 4 Atl. Rep. 220; McCrary, Elect. § 192, and cases there cited.

In re SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO or in the protesting and giving notice of dis

1. Assessors being officers created by the constitution, the legislature cannot exercise their functions in relation to assessment of property for taxation, but can only enact "general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property," etc. 2. A bill providing that the entire tax imposed on placer mines shall not exceed $25 per acre, and on all other mining claims shall not exceed $40 per 100 linear feet, does not secure a just valuation of such property; inasmuch as the county tax alone might equal or exceed the prescribed rates.

3. A bill nominally providing for assessment of mining property by the assessor, but declaring that all lode claims shall be valued at $70 per acre, and all placer claims at $25 per acre, is an attempt by the legislature to make the assessment.

4. By Const. Colo. art. 10, § 7, the legislature is prohibited from imposing taxes for any other than state purposes.

1

to the enactment of "general laws, which
shall prescribe such regulations as shall se-
cure a just valuation for taxation of all prop-
erty, real and personal." Also, in respect to
the taxation of property, or the levy of taxes,
the general assembly can only impose taxes
for state purposes. It is prohibited by sec-
tion 7 of article 10 from imposing "taxes for
the purposes of any county, city, town, or
other municipal corporation," but authorized
to vest such power in the corporate author-
ities. It is likewise authorized to fix the
rate per centum which shall be levied upon
the assessed valuation of property for state
taxes, and it may prescribe a maximum rate
per centum on the assessed valuation for
Have these constitutional
county taxes.
principles and provisions been observed in
the framing of the bills submitted? Section
1 of house bill No. 270 provides for an annual
assessment or valuation of all patented min-

5. It is not constitutional to assess mining prop-ing claims, but sections 2 and 3 are inconerty at an arbitrary sum, without regard to its

actual value.

6. A valuation is a prerequisite to a valid levy. 7. There is no constitutional objection to the legislature's making the gross output of producing mines the criterion to govern assessors in determining the valuation.

sistent with this provision, and their effect is to nullify it under circumstances very likely to arise. As we have seen, taxes are levied upon valuations ascertained and fixed by the proper officers. Essential to a levy is the fixing of a mill rate or per centum. For PER CURIAM. The three bills, transmit- state taxes, this rate is fixed by the general ted by the senate for the opinion of the su- assembly; for county taxes, it is fixed by the We have, preme court as to their constitutionality, board of county commissioners. severally make provisions for the taxation of then, in the case of a mining claim, a valuaa species of property which has heretofore tion fixed by the assessor; also a certain mill been exempt from taxation, by virtue of a rate or per centum to be levied for state taxprovision in section 3 of article 10 of the es, and another rate to be levied for county state constitution. Our attention not being taxes. But section 2 of this bill, if we uncalled to the details of any of these bills by derstand it correctly, provides that the entire the questions submitted, we apprehend that levy-in other words, the entire tax imposed the point upon which our opinion is solicited on a placer mine-shall not exceed $25 per is whether the mode of taxation provided in acre, and section 3 provides that the entire the respective bills is constitutional. We tax imposed on all other mining claims shall observe, in the first place, that while the ne- not exceed $40 for each 100 linear feet. Supcessity for specific legislation applicable to pose that the mill rate prescribed for county this class of property was foreseen by the purposes, when levied upon the assessed valframers of the constitution, as is evident uation of a mining claim, shall produce the from the provision, "and thereafter may be maximum amount of tax permitted by this taxed as provided by law," yet there is neither bill, what becomes of the state's proportion authority nor reason for holding that a mode of revenue from that claim, or vice versa? of taxation might be provided by law at vari- In such case it may be said that, although ance with the constitutional provisions and one section of the bill secures a just valua principles bearing upon the general subject tion of the mine for the purposes of taxation, of taxation. The constitution does not au- yet these purposes are defeated by other secthorize the general assembly to assess any tions of the same bill. Our opinion is that class of property for taxation. Before taxes this bill does not provide a constitutional can be levied upon any article of property, it mode of taxation. must be assessed; that is to say, valued for taxation. This, in general, is the province of officers whose title of office indicates their duties, to-wit, assessors. The constitution has created this office, and requires that an assessor shall be elected biennially in every county of the state. Legislative jurisdiction over the assessment of property, in the legal signification of that term, is limited by the constitution, so far at least as counties and other municipal corporations are concerned,

Referring to senate bill No. 69, we find that the mode of taxation provided is obnoxious to at least two constitutional objections: First. While the assessment is, by the provisions of section 4, nominally made by the assessors, it is in fact made by the general assembly. It provides that all lode claims shall be valued at $70 per acre, and all placer claims at $25 per acre, surface measurement. Second. No regulations are prescribed for securing a just valuation for taxation of different mining claims, but all lode claims, irrespective of their real value, are assessed at an arbitrary sum, and all placer claims

are in like manner assessed at another arbi-
trary value.
These are substantial objec-
tions, and, in our judgment, render this bill
unconstitutional.

|ing of the fact upon the senate journal, may be Colo. art. 5, § 22, requiring every bill to be read treated as one reading of the bill, under Const. at length, on three different days, in each house."

We now come to senate bill No. 106. This On the 8th day of January, 1887, the state bill divides mining claims, for the purpose senate, under section 3, art. 6, of the conof taxation, into five classes, according to stitution, as amended, duly presented to the the gross product thereof in the year ending supreme court for determination a matter December 31st preceding the assessment. substantially as follows: May the considerIt then proceeds by section 4, if we interpretation of a bill, as provided for in the followit correctly, to impose a specific tax on each ing proposed senate rule, be regarded as one 100 feet of all lode claims, making the reading thereof, under the provision of the amount of the tax to be imposed on a lode constitution relating to the subject? "Every claim to depend upon the class to which it bill shall be read at length in the committee belongs, and its linear extent. There is a of the whole, (unless the committee decide further provision that, if a lode claim ex- to recommend that the enacting clause be ceeds 150 feet in width, the rate of assess-stricken out,) the chairman shall so report, ment shall be increased according to its an entry thereof shall be made in the journal, width. The same principle is applied to and such reading shall be considered one of placer claims, except that the specific amount the readings required by the constitution." of taxes prescribed for the several classes The constitution (article 5, § 22) provides into which they are divided depends on acre- that "every bill shall be read at length on age, instead of length and width in feet. three different days in each house," etc. The constitutional objections to this mode of taxation are-First, the general assembly by PER CURIAM. We are of the opinion it virtually levies the entire tax, both for that the reading of a bill at length in comstate and county purposes, which, as above mittee of the whole, together with the reshown, is beyond its jurisdiction; second, porting and recording upon the senate jourthis total levy is not based upon any valua- nal of the fact of such reading, as provided tion, a prerequisite to a valid levy; third, by the foregoing rule, may be treated as one the bill discards the regulations now pre-reading of the bill, under amended section 22, scribed by statute for securing a just valua- art. 5, of the state constitution.

In re STATE CENSUS.

(9 Colo. 612)

(Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)* VETO POWER-SPECIAL SESSION.

1. Whether the constitutional provision in re

mands a special session of the legislature is a mat2. Whether or not an occasion exists which deter resting entirely in the judgment of the executive.

tion of real estate for taxation, and in lieu thereof fails to provide any mode for securing a just valuation of mining claims for this purpose. For these reasons this bill must also be held to be unconstitutional. While holding that there is no other constitutional basis for the taxation of property than that of valuation, we fully appreciate the diffi- gard to the legislature's providing by law for a census every 10 years is mandatory or not, a bill culty of devising any plan which will enable passed in compliance with it is, like any other an assessor to ascertain the quantity of pre-bill, subject to the governor's veto. cious metals which lie hidden from sight in the treasure vaults of our mines, and to correctly estimate their values. At best, the true values of mining claims can only be approximated. In connection with this subPER CURIAM. Whether section 45, art. 5, ject, the legislature must encounter peculiar of the constitution, is mandatory or not, the difficulties, from the nature of the property; legislature having treated it as mandatory, yet it is not only proper, but it is the duty, and passed a bill in compliance with its proof that body, to provide by statute some sys-visions, it was, like any other bill, subject to tem or basis for determining the valuation the veto power lodged in the executive. The of this as well as all other kinds of property; and, if the legislature should see fit to make the gross output of producing mines the criterion to govern assessors in determining the valuations of this class of mining property, we perceive no constitutional objections to the method.

(9 Colo. 641)

In re SENATE RULE.

3

bill having been vetoed by the governor, and the legislative assembly having failed to pass it notwithstanding the veto, the existing legislation upon the subject-matter of the bill remains undisturbed and in force.

Whether or not an occasion exists of such extraordinary character as demands a convention of the general assembly in special session, under the provisions of section 9, art. 4, of the constitution, is a matter rest

(Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. Term, 1886.)1 | ing entirely in the judgment of the executive.

STATUTES-READING OF BILLS.

The reading of a bill at length in committee of the whole, together with the reporting and record

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Relating to the duty of the legislature to provide by law for a state census in 1885, and every tenth year thereafter.