days," Dr. Rhas pleasure in now and then giving his advice to a patient, advice not the less welcome that it is without a fee. I will not say indeed, for I do not believe, that the benevolent hope of doing some good has no part, or even a little, in this promptness to resume his quondam profession. But I am confident that, even without any such stimulus, the effect of long habit, and the gratification of the professional taste, would impel him to give his advice to any patient that asked it; though pretty sure that he could do no good. He will gloat on a "beautiful case," and detail its symptoms with rapture. Now a in the language of science, is a "case" that illustrates, in the most striking manner, some doctor's theory or some scientific principle, quite irrespective of the amount of suffering involved, or the disastrous issue. The "beauty" of the case is quite independent of any such accidents, and is not at all impaired by them.

"beautiful case,"

A case may be much more "beautiful" which has been attended with the uttermost amount of anguish, and has terminated fatally -provided it illustrates, with more than usual clearness, some pathological principle, and has allowed the physician, all the way through, to see how Nature has been doing her tragical work,than a humdrum case, in which the patient has been merely restored to health; probably by some obscure process of ignorant Dame Nature, which illustrates no "principle," and which that "empirical" lady has carried through without paying any attention to the physician's science at all.

Dr. Rgets quite eloquent and enthusiastic on a “beautiful case," as he calls it. "But, Doctor," you say, "the patient died?" "Oh! of course; but what has that to do with it?" says the Doctor..

I sometimes tell him in jest that he would prefer seeing a patient die, provided he distinctly knew how, than see him recover, and be unable to see the reason of it. He now and then reminds me of another enthusiast in the same profession, who, having prescribed an emetic to a patient in bad, but not apparently desperate, circumstances, called the next day and found him dead. The curious doctor solemnly asked if the emetic had

operated, just as if it was at all to the purpose. He was told it had; he begged to see the contents of the stomach, if possible; he was gratified; he pronounced them very abominable in very learned terms. "Well," said he, "dead or alive, it is a good thing that is off his stomach, any way."

But you will find my friend full both of useful and entertaining knowledge; and if you want advice for any of your patients, do not hesitate to avail yourself of his obsolete diploma. Ever yours,

R. E. H. G.

LETTER XII.

To the Rev. Charles Ellis, B.D.

My dear Friend,

London, Dec. 11, 1839.

In the last statement of your letter I most entirely agree. Foolish attempts to get over any of the difficulties of that great mystery the "Origin and Permission of Evil"—by insufficient solutions, are irritating to scepticism, rather than sedative. For example, look at that hypothesis (not even plausible if we go at all below the surface), which Deists often resort to by way of accounting for the stupendous physical evils of the universe, the "Sad Accident" column of the world's daily journal;—namely, the supposed inevitable effect of the establishment of "general laws." It really throws no light whatever on the mystery. "If 'general laws' be established," say our wise philosophers, "it would be unreasonable to demand their suspension in order to avoid occasional accidents; if the 'law of gravitation' be in force a man falling down a precipice will break his leg or his neck." To be sure, if he does fall down a precipice; no one wants him to be suspended, like Mahomet's coffin, between heaven and earth. Certainly that were as unreasonable as the suspension of the

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"law." But is the suspension either of the man or the law the only alternative ? Might not the more general" laws be so combined with the secondary laws which, as we see in fact, modify their effects, that they should never be otherwise than beneficial? Nay, are they not already so combined as to secure this end in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand? and will any one pretend that not even Infinite Power and Wisdom could have prevented the solitary thousandth case of accident also? Is not the muscular system of animals, for example, so perfect, that ten thousand people shall pass by a precipitous road on a mountain side, and not even one of them fall, though if he does fall, he will doubtless be dashed to atoms? Are not horses, and dogs, and asses, men, women, and children, wriggling in and out all day through the streets of London, and not half a dozen "accidents" in the four and twenty hours? Are not tens of thousands of fires blazing, and billions of sparks flying about there from morning to night, and yet is not a conflagration a comparative rarity. Would it be impossible for Omnipotence, had it so pleased, to combine the general laws and the secondary laws in such a way that this infinitesimal residue of exceptional mischief should not occur, without any suspension or removal of the more general laws, seeing that it would only be doing in every case what is already done in the immense majority of cases? One would imagine, to hear some of these philosophers talk, that the said "general laws" can prove their existence and vindicate their dignity only by punishing an occasional violation of them or producing a certain small amount of misery; as if the law of gravitation could not be sufficiently valued for its innumerable beneficial and beautiful results unless the equally admirable and beautiful laws of muscular action failed now and then (though very rarely) to adapt themselves to it, and to counteract the evil consequences thereof; as though it could not be adequately estimated unless it now and then broke a leg or a neck, or sent a sensitive creature flying through the air!

No; say that the stupendous and varied miseries of our world - stupendous, I mean absolutely considered, but really not so if

viewed in comparison with the good-have been allowed to enter it for reasons which we cannot comprehend, but which are especially connected with man's moral condition and education (and hardly anybody that is not an idiot will refuse to acknowledge, in the consciousness of his ignorance, that it may be so), and then Faith, finding that Reason affirms its own valid grounds for believing in the dominion of an Intelligent and Benevolent Ruler quite independent of all such difficulties, is able to confront, though it cannot vanquish them. But it irritates reason and faith too (at least it does mine), to be treated with solutions that are worse than none.

I am the more surprised when I find, as I occasionally do, some Christians using the above argument of "general laws," as an answer to the difficulties in question, since they at least professedly believe in the possibility of a world in which, though there will doubtless be "general laws," those laws will as certainly be combined with such mental, moral, and physical conditions (whatever these last may be) of the inhabitants, that, as the ages of eternity roll round, there will be no "sad accidents" to mar the universal felicity. Men ought to conclude, on such principles as those just commented on, that Omnipotence cannot prepare such a place, consequently there will be none; that Heaven itself will now and then exhibit a seraph who has lost his voice, or been lamed in the wing; or a young angel who has strayed into infinite space, and is lost to his disconsolate celestial kinsfolk, or broken his legs or his nose by stumbling on the treacherous smoothness of the jasper pavement !

Akin to such shallow and inadequate hypotheses as that of which I have been speaking, is another often insisted on by the Deist and the Christian, by way of illustrating the Benevolence of the Deity! "How bountifully," say they, "is prey provided for the various species of animals How exactly fitted is the entire organisation of the lion or the shark for seizing, and killing, and devouring his food! How perfectly good is his appetite, and with what goût he swallows his dinner! How is all about the sweet beast subservient to his happiness!"

Yes; but what, in

the mean time, is to be said for the Prey? Is that devoured with as much relish as the other devours it? Hudibras says

"Surely the pleasure is as great

In being cheated as to cheat;

but I think he would hardly have said

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Surely the pleasure is as sweet

In being eaten as to eat!

I doubt not that the thing is all right- but I cannot accept reasoning which thus refutes itself.

I have even known Deists, and good Christian men too, go further.

Even in print, I have seen it stated, by way of diminishing the impression of general suffering, that as we know that the chase is a great delight of the beast who takes his prey, so we know not what delight there may be in being hunted down (and truly I think we do not know)!— We are told there may be a delicious excitement in the stag or the hare in the attempts to baffle his pursuers! If so, surely he has the oddest ways of showing it. I shall next expect to hear a sentimental angler expatiate on the dear delight the little fishes perchance feel in getting hooked! "Handle him," says old Izaak Walton, in giving directions for impaling a frog or worm on the hook, "handle him tenderly, as though you loved him." "Nay," such a philosophic angler might reply, "I do love him, and am proving it; he likes to be thus transfixed. His wriggle is but a wriggle of delight."

No I agree with you that such arguments as these only irritate the mind that listens to them, as all inconclusive arguments are apt to do; it is but special pleading for God who, rely on it, does not need any such refinements, if, as Leibnitz says, we but knew all. "Shall we argue wickedly for God, and speak deceitfully for Him ?”

We do not know all, or rather we know next to nothing, and hence the difficulty; but we know enough, if we attend to it, not to allow ourselves to be baffled by what we do not know. From