and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as poffible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the flate.-A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways.— FIRST, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whofe falaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquifites may impose another additional tax upon the people.-SECONDLY, it may obftruct the industry of the people, and difcourage them from applying to certain branches of bufinefs which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps deftroy, fome of the funds which might enable them more eafily to do fo.THIRDLY, by the forfeitures and other penalties which thofe unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unfuccefsfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to fmuggling.-But the penalties of fmuggling muft rife in proportion to the temptation.-The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates VOL. II. Q

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the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very circumftance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime *.FOURTHLY, by fubjecting the people to the frequent vifits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unneceffary trouble, vexation, and oppreffion; and though vexation is not, ftrictly fpeaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it.

IT IS IN SOME ONE OR OTHER OF THESE FOUR difFERENT WAYS THAT TAXES ARE FREQUENTLY SO MUCH MORE BURDENSOME TO THE PEOPLE THAN THEY ARE BENEFICIAL TO THE SOVEREIGN.

The beft taxes are fuch as are levied upon confump tions, especially thofe of luxury; because fuch taxes are leaft felt by the people.-They seem, in fome measure, voluntary; fince a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed: they are paid gradually and infenfibly they naturally produce fobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed: and being confounded

• See Sketches of the Hiftory of Man, page 474, & feq.

with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the confumers.-Their only difadvantage is, that they are expenfive in the levying.-Another thing is, a duty upon commodities checks itself; and a minifter will foon find, that an increase of the impoft is no increase of the revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by fuch taxes.

Taxes upon poffeffions are levied without expence; but have every other difadvantage.-Most states, however, are obliged to have recourse to them, in order to fupply the deficiencies of the other.

As taxes take nothing out of a country; as they do not diminish the public stock, only vary the distribution of it, they are not necessarily prejudicial to happiness.— If the ftate exact money from certain members of the community, the difpenfes it alfo amongst other members of the fame community.-They who contribute to the revenue, and they who are fupported or benefited by the expences of government, are to be placed one against the other; and, whilft what the fubfiftence of one part is profited by receiving, compenfates for what that of the other fuffers by paying, the common fund of the fociety is not leffened. This is true: but it must Q2

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be observed, that although the fum diftributed by the ftate be always EQUAL to the fum collected from the people, yet the gain and loffes to the means of fubfiftence may be very UNFQUAL; and the balance will remain on the wrong or the right fide of the account, according as the money passes by taxation from the industrious to the idle, from the many to the few, from those who want to those who abound, or in a contrary direction.

For instance, a tax upon coaches, to be laid out in the repair of roads, would probably improve the happiness of a neighbourhood; a tax upon cottages, to be ultimately expended in the purchase and fupport of coaches, would certainly diminish it.

In like manner, a tax upon wine or tea, distributed in bounties to fishermen or husbandmen, would augment the provision of a country; a tax upon fisheries and husbandry, however indirect or concealed, to be converted, when raised, to the procuring of wine or tea for the idle and opulent, would naturally impair the public stock.

The EFFECT, therefore, of taxes upon the means of fubfiftence depends not fo much upon the amount of the fum levied, as upon the object of the tax, and the application.

Taxes likewife may be so adjusted as to conduce to the reftraint of luxury, and the correction of vice; to the encouragement

* When the expediency of laying a further tax on distillation of fpirituous liquors was canvailed before the Houfe of Commons fome years ago, it was faid of the distillers with great truth," They take the bread from the people, and convert it into poijon." Yet is this manufacture of disease permitted to continue, as appears by its paying into the treasury above 900,000l. near a million of money annually.

It is generally allowed, " that government is for the benefit of the governed and not the governors," and no deviation should exift to this fundamental principle. Get money, was the advice of a father to his fon,-honeftly if you can,— if not,-Get money. It is alfo a queftion, How far the king's patent to quack remedies is expedient, as it difcourages an useful body of men, favours impofition, begets incredulity, and is the deftruction of the lives and the health of thousands. Get money can never be an excufe in a free government, where happiness in the fubject is its avowed principle.

MONOPOLIES and CHARTERS.-James the First granted many of these, and his fon followed his example. Between them both almost every trade was conned in a few hands; but these monopolifis paid heavy fums for becoming the elder children of a partial father. Monopolies had crept in during the reign of Queen ELIZABETH; but that great qucen, finding that the House of Commons was uneafy, called in most of thefe grants. The House of Commons, ftruck with this generofity of the queen, in meeting their defires, and anticipating their requests, deputed one hundred and forty of their members to wait upon her with their thanks. To their address the queen returned an answer, which, as flowing from her heart, made the deepest impreffion on her fubjects. -I shall fubjoin a part:

"GENTLEMEN,

"I owe you hearty thanks and commendations, for your fingular good will towards me, not only in your heart and thoughts, but which you have openly expreffed and declared, whereby you have recalled me from an error proceeding from my ignorance, not my will. These things had undeservedly

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