much depend on the administration; and this is one of the greatest inconveniences attending that form of government.— But a REPUBLICAN OF MIXED GOVERNMENT Would be an obvious abfurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the conftitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.-Such is the intention of thefe forms of government, and fuch is their REAL EFFECT, where they are WISELY CONSTITUTED: as, on the other hand, they are the fource of all diforder, and of the blackeft crimes, where either Skill or bonefty has been wanting in their original frame and inftitution *.

So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and fo little dependence have they on the bumours and tempers of men, that confequences almost as general and certain may fome

The prefent conftitution in France can hardly be called a mixed form of government, it has no balance of interests and powers. It is a pure republic, although reprefentative, and a fad example of the truth of the above remark.

times be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical Sciences afford us.

The conftitution of the ROMAN REPUBLIC gave the whole legislative power to the people, without allowing a negative voice either to the nobility or

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confuls. This unbounded potver they poffefs in a collective, not in a reprefentative body.-The conJequences were: When the people, by fuccefs and conqueft, had become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from the capital, the city-tribes, though the most contemptible, carried almoft every vote: they were, therefore, most cajoled by every one that affected popularity: they were fupported in idleness by the general diftribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almoft every candidate: by this means they became every day more licentious, and the CAMPUS MARTIUS was a perpe→ tual scene of tumult and fedition: armed flaves were introduced among thefe rafcally citizens; fo that the whole government fell into anarchy, and

the

the greatest happiness, which the ROMANS could look for, was the defpotic power of the CÆSARS. -SUCH ARE THE EFFECTS OF DEMOCRACY

WITHOUT A REPRESENTATIVE.

A Nobility may poffefs the whole, or any part of the legislative power of a ftate, in two different ways.-Either every nobleman fhares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as compofed of parts, which have each a diftinct power and authority.

The VENETIAN ariftocracy is an instance of the first kind of government; the POLISH of the Second.

In the VENETIAN government the whole body of nobility poffeffes the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole.

In the POLISH government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs, has a distinct hereditary authority over his vaffals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts.

The different operations and tendencies of thefe two fpecies of government might be made apparent even a priori.-A VENETIAN nobility is preferable to a POLISH, let the bumours and education of men be ever so much varied.-A nobility, who poffefs their power in common, will preferve peace and order, both among themfelves, and their fubjects; and no member can have authority enough to controul the laws for a moment.The nobles will preferve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; because fuch a tyrannical government promotes not the intereft of the whole body, however it may that of fome individuals.-There will be a diftinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be

the

the only distinction in the ftate.-The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of those private feuds and animofities, which spread ruin and defolation every where. It is easy to see the disadvantages of a POLISH nobility in every one of these particulars.

It is poffible fo to conftitute a FREE GOVERNMENT, as that a fingle perfon, call him doge, prince, or king, who fhall poffefs a large share of power, fhall form a proper balance or counterpoise to the other parts of the legislature.―This chief magiftrate may be either elective or bereditary; and though the former inftitution may, to a fu perficial view, appear the most advantageous, yet a more accurate infpection will discover in it greater inconveniences than in the latter, and fuch as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable. -THE FILLING OF THE THRONE, IN SUCH A GOVERNMENT, IS A POINT OF TOQ GREAT AND TOO GENERAL INTEREST, NOT TO