of his fortune, and the other as conquered foes.-Nor fhould it be forgotten, amongst the advantages of an hereditary monarchy, that as plans of national improvement and reform are seldom brought to maturity by the exertions of a single reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree of happiness and profperity to which it is capable of being carried, unless an uniformity of councils, a confiftency of public measures and defigns, be continued through a fucceffion of ages.-This benefit may be expected with greater probability, where the fupreme power defcends in the fame race, and where each prince fucceeds, in fome fort, to the aim, purfuits, and difpofition of his anceftor, than if the crown, at every change, devolve upon a stranger; whose first care will commonly be to pull down what his predeceffor had built up; and to fubftitute fyftems of adminiftration, which muft, in their turn, give way to the more favourite novelties of the next fucceffor.

ARISTOCRACIES are of two kinds, firft, where the power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective capacity alone; that is, where although the government refide in an affembly of the order, yet the members of that affembly feparately and individually poffefs no authority or privilege beyond the rest of the commu

nity:-this defcribes the constitution of VENICE.-Secondly, where the nobles are feverally invefted with great perfonal power and immunities, and where the power of the fenate is little more than the aggregated power of the individuals who compofe it-this is the conftitution of POLAND.-Of thefe two forms of government, the first is more tolerable than the laft; for although the members of a fenate should many, or even all of them, be profligate enough to abuse the authority of their stations in the profecution of private defigns, yet, not being all under a temptation to the fame injuftice, not having all the fame end to gain, it would still be difficult to obtain the confent of a majority, to any specific act of oppreffion, which the iniquity of an individual might prompt him to propofe: or if the will were the fame, the power is more confined; one tyrant, whether the tyranny refide in a fingle perfon, or a fenate, cannot exercise oppreffion at fo many places at the fame time, as it may be carried on by the dominion of a numerous nobility over their respective vaffals and dependents. Of all species of domination this is the most odious: the freedom and satisfaction of private life are more constrained and haraffed by it, than by the most vexatious laws, or even by the lawless will of an arbitrary monarch;

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monarch; from whofe knowledge, and from whofe injuftice, the greatest part of his fubjects are removed by their distance, or concealed by their obscurity.

Europe exhibits more than one modern example where the people, aggrieved by the exactions, or provoked by the enormities, of their immediate fuperiors, have joined with the reigning prince in the overthrow of the aristocracy, deliberately exchanging their condition for the miferies of defpotifm.-About the middle of the last century, the commons of DENMARK, weary of the oppreffions which they had long fuffered from the nobles, and exafpe-rated by fome recent infults, prefented themselves at the foot of the throne, with a formal offer of their confent to established unlimited dominion in the king.The revolution in SWEDEN, ftill more lately brought about with the acquiefcence, not to say the affiftance, of the people, owed its fuccefs to the fame caufe, namely, to the profpect of deliverance, that it afforded, from the tyranny which their nobles exercised under the old conftitution.-In ENGLAND the people beheld the depreffion of the barons, under the houfe of Tudor, with fatiffaction, although they faw the crown acquiring thereby a power, which no limitations, that the conftitution had then provided, were likely to confine. The leffon

to

to be drawn from fuch events is this, that a mixed go vernment, which admits a patrician order into its conftitution, ought to circumfcribe the perfonal privileges of the nobility, especially claims of hereditary jurifdiction and local authority, with a jealousy equal to the folicitude with which it provides for its own prefervation.For nothing fo alienates the minds of the people from the government under which they live, as a perpetual sense

annoyance and inconveniency; or fo prepares them for the practices of an enterprifing prince, or a factious demagogue, as the abuse which almost always accom panies the existence of separate immunities.

Amongst the inferior, but by no means inconfiderable, advantages of a DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, or of a conftitution in which the people partake of the power of legiflation, the following should not be neglected.

I. The direction which it gives to the education, fludies, and pursuits of the fuperior orders of the community.-The share which this has in forming the public manners and national character is very important.-In countries, in which the gentry are excluded from all concern in the government, fcarce any thing is left which leads to advancement, but the profeffion of arms. -They who do not addict themselves to this profeffion

(and miferable muft that country be, which conftantly employs the military service of a great proportion of any order of its fubjects) are commonly loft by the mere want of object and destination; that is, they either fall, without referve, into the moft fottifh habits of animal gratification, or entirely devote themselves to the attainment of those futile arts and decorations, which compofe the business and recommendation of a court: on the other hand, where the whole, or any effective portion of civil power is poffeffed by a popular affembly, more ferious purfuits will be encouraged, purer morals, and a more intellectual character, will engage the public efteem; thofe faculties, which qualify men for deliberation and debate, and which are the fruit of fober habits, of early and long continued application, will be roufed and animated by the reward, which, of all others, moft readily awakens the ambition of the human mind, political dignity and importance.

II. Popular elections procure to the common people courteJy from their fuperiors.-That contemptuous and overbearing infolence, with which the lower orders of the community are wont to be treated by the higher, is greatly mitigated where the people have fomething to give. The affiduity, with which their favour is fought upon thefe

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