ther as the fimple forms, by fome combination and intermixture of which all actual governments are composed, than as any where exifting in a pure and elementary state.-These forms are,

I. Defpotifm, or ABSOLUTE MONARCHY, where the legiflature is in a single perfon.

II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a felect affembly, the members of which either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, property, tenure of certain lands, or in refpect of some personal right or qualification.

III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by reprefentation, constitute the legislature.

The feparate advantages of MONARCHY are unity of council, activity, decifion, fecrecy, difpatch; the military ftrength and energy which refult from these qualities of government; the exclufion of popular and ariftocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of fucceffion, of all competition for the fupreme power; and thereby repreffing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambition of aspiring citizens.

The mifchiefs, or rather the dangers, of MONARCHY,

p

are tyranny, expence, exaction, military domination; unneceffary wars waged to gratify the paffions of an individual; risk of the character of the reigning prince ; ignorance in the governors of the interefts and accommodation of the people, and a confequent deficiency of falutary regulations; want of conftancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, infecurity of perfon and property.

The feparate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY confifts in the wisdom which may be expected from experience and education-a permanent council naturally poffeffes experience; and the members, who fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the ftations which they are destined by their birth to occupy.

The mischiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, dissensions in the ruling orders of the ftate, which, from the want of a common fuperior, are liable to proceed to the most defperate extremities; oppreffion of the lower orders by the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the feparate interefts of the law makers.

The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needlefs reftrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumftances of the people;

public fpirit, frugality, averfenefs to war; the opportunities which democratic affemblies afford to men of every description, of producing their abilities and councils to public obfervation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth to the service of the commonwealth, the faculties of its beft citizens.

The evils of a REPUBLIC are, diffenfions, tumults, faction; the attempts of powerful citizens to poffefs themselves of the empire; the confufion, rage, and clamour which are the inevitable confequences of affembling multitudes, and of propounding questions of ftate to the difcuffion of the people ; the delay and difclofure of public councils and defigns; and the imbecility of measures retarded by the neceffity of obtaining the confent of numbers: lastly, the oppreffion of the provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the legislative power.

A MIXED GOVERNMENT is composed by the combination of two or more of the fimple forms of government above defcribed-and, in whatever proportion each form enters into the conftitution of a government, in the fame proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, thofe are the uses to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the conftitution, and thefe are the dangers to be provided

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vided against in each.-Thus, if fecrecy and difpatch be truly enumerated amongst the feparate excellencies of regal government; then a mixed government, which retains monarchy in one part of its conftitution, fhould be careful that the other eftates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquifitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, referved to the administration of the prince, interpofe delays, or divulge what it is expedient to conceal.-On the other hand, if profufion, exaction, military domination, and needlefs wars, be justly accounted natural properties of monarchy, in its fimple unqualified form; then are thefe the objects to which, in a mixed government, the ariftocratic and popular parts of the conftitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dangers against which they fhould raife and fortify their barriers: thefe are departments of fovereignty, over which a power of inspection and control ought to be depofited with the people.

The fame obfervation may be repeated of all the other advantages and inconveniencies which have been afcribed to the feveral fimple forms of government; and affords a rule whereby to direct the construction, improvement, and adminiftration of mixed governments, fubjected however to this remark, that a quality fometimes

refults

refults from the conjunction of two fimple forms of government, which belongs not to the feparate exiftence of either: thus corruption, which has no place in an abfolute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is fure to gain admiffion into a conftitution, which divides the fupreme power between an executive magistrate and a popular council.

An hereditary MONARCHY is univerfally to be preferred to an elective monarchy.-The confeffion of every writer upon the fubject of civil government, the experience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the papal dominions, feem to place this amongst the few indubitable maxims which the fcience of politics admits of.-A crown is too fplendid a prize to be conferred upon merit.— The paffions or interefts of the electors exclude all confideration of the qualities of the competitors.-The fame obfervation holds concerning the appointment to any office which is attended with a great fhare of power or emolument.-Nothing is gained by a popular choice worth the diffenfions, tumults, and interruption of regular induftry, with which it is infeparably attended.-Add to this, that a king, who owes his elevation to the event of a conteft, or to any other cause than a fixed rule of fucceffion, will be apt to regard one part of his fubjects as the affociates

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