from other motives, government must poffefs an influence to counteract these motives; to produce, not a bias of the paffions, but a neutrality: it must have fome weight to caft into the scale to fet the balance even.

It is the nature of ambition always to prefs upon the boundaries which confine it.-LICENTIOUSNESS, FACTION, ENVY, IMPATIENCE OF CONTROL OR INFERIORITY; THE SECRET PLEASURE OF MORTIFYING THE GREAT, OR THE HOPE OF DISPOSSESSING THEM; A CONSTANT WILLINGNESS TO QUESTION AND THWART WHATEVER IS DICTATED OR EVEN PROPOSED BY ANOTHER; A DISPOSITION COMMON TO ALL BODIES OF MEN TO EXTEND THE CLAIMS AND AUTHORITY OF THEIR ORDER; ABOVE ALL, THAT LOVE OF POWER AND OF SHOWING IT, WHICH RESIDES MORE OR LESS IN EVERY HUMAN BREAST, AND WHICH, IN POPULAR ASSEMBLIES, IS INFLAMED, LIKE EVERY OTHER PASSION, BY COMMUNICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT: these motives, added to private defigns and refentments, cherished also by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great share of power already poffeffed by the house of commons, might induce a majority, or at least a large party of men in that affembly, to unite in endeavouring to

draw to themselves the whole government of the ftate; or at least so to obftruct the conduct of public affairs, by a wanton and perverse oppofition, as to render it impoffible for the wifeft statesman to carry forwards the business of the nation with fuccefs or fatisfaction.

Some paffages of our national history afford grounds for thefe apprehenfions.-Before the acceffion of James the First, or, at least, during the reigns of his three immediate predeceffors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his measures in parliament by INTIMIDATION.-A fense of perfonal danger kept the members of the house of commons in fubjection.-A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at laft the parliament and nation from flavery. That overbearing system, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his fon. After the restoration there fucceeded in its place, and fince the revolution has been methodically purfued, the more fuccessful expedient of INFLUENCE.-Now we remember what paffed between the lofs of terror, and the establishment of influence.-THE TRANSACTIONS OF

-

THAT INTERVAL, WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF THEIR OCCASION OR EFFECT, NO FRIEND OF REGAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO SEE REVIVED.

But

But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the fame doctrine.-In the British colonies of NORTH AMERICA, the late affemblies poffeffed much of the power and conftitution of our house of commons.-The king and government of Great Britain held no patronage in the country, which could create attachment and influence fufficient to counteract that reftlefs, arrogating fpirit, which in popular affemblies, when left to itself, will never brook an authority, that checks and interferes with its own. To this caufe, excited perhaps by fome unfcafonable provocations, we may attribute, as to their true and proper original, we will not fay the misfortunes, but the changes that have taken place in the British empire.-The admonition, which fuch examples fuggeft, will have its weight with those, who are content with the general frame of the English confiitution; and who confider ftability amongst the firft perfections of any government.

We protest however against any conftruction, by which what is here faid fhall be attempted to be applied to the juftification of BRIBER, or of any clandeftine resward or folicitation whatever.-The very fecrecy of fuch negociations confeffes or begets a confcioufness of guilt; which when the mind is once taught to endure without uncafinefs,

the

the character is prepared for every compliance.-And there is the greater danger in these corrupt practices, as the extent of their operation is unlimited and unknown. Our apology relates folely to that influence, which refults from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments.

In political, above all other fubjects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures on each fide of a question, are often fo equally poized, that the wifeft judgments may be held in fufpenfe.-Thefe I call fubjects of INDIFFERENCE. But again, when the fubject is not indifferent in itself, it will appear fuch to a great part of those to whom it is propofed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either fide is fupported.— Thefe are fubjects of APPARENT INDIFFERENCE.-This indifference occurs ftill more frequently in perfonal contefts; in which we do not often discover any reason of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to another.-Thefe cafes compofe the province of influence; that is, the decifion in thefe cafes will inevitably be determined by influence of fome fort or other.-The only doubt is, what influence fhall be admitted.-If you remove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for in

fluence

fluence from a different quarter.-If motives of expectation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fucceed in their place, acting probably in an oppofite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the question.-There exift, as we have feen, paffions in the human heart, which will always make a strong party against the executive power of a mixed government.-According as the difpofition of parliament is friendly or adverfe to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the business of empire will be tranfacted with cafe and convenience, or embarrassed with endless contention and difficulty.-Nor is it a conclufion founded in juftice or warranted by experience, that, because men are induced by views of interest to yield their confent to measures, concerning which their judgment decides nothing, they may be brought by the fame influence, to act in deliberate ppofition to knowledge and duty.

Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country fince the revolution, will find few even of the most queftionable measures of administration, about which the best inftructed judgment might not have doubted at the time; but of which he may affirm with

certainty,