ducting this prodigious armament of 674 vessels from Toulon to Sidi-Ferruch Bay, where the landing was to take place, was an operation requiring no small talent in the admiral and a fairly high average of seamanship in his subordinates. It is interesting to find, when we remember the date, that seven steam-vessels took part in the expedition.

Admiral Duperré, who was in command on the sea, carried out his part of the undertaking in a very efficient manner. Off the Balearic Isles the fleet encountered a heavy gale. The merchant-vessels-many of which, as may have been deduced from a consideration of their number, were small had to run into port. The men-of-war kept under way under the lee of the islands. The fleet started again, and on the evening of the third day anchored in Sidi-Ferruch Bay. The disembarkation began at 3 o'clock on the following morning (June 14, 1830). The Algerines had made some preparations to dispute the landing. They had erected batteries on the neighbouring heights. The disembarkation of an army is an operation in which, just now, we take special interest, and this will justify a rather full account of the one under notice. In accordance with his method Captain Chevalier does not give us details, so they must be looked for elsewhere. M. Troude* tells us that the First Division was composed of

It was on shore by 4.30 A.M., two steamers having given valuable assistance in towing the boats filled with troops. The enemy's opposition was soon overcome, and he was driven from his positions, the French loss being about fifty killed and wounded. The Second Division, rather less than 10,000 strong, was on shore by 6 A.M.; and by noon the Third Division, of equal force. Thus in nine hours, counting from 3 A.M., in the face of a feeble opposition, the French had landed an army of a little over 30,000 men, with four field batteries, one mountain battery, 200 horses, a quantity of ammunition, and ten days' rations. Several thousand men, over 4,000 horses, the siege-train, and a multiplicity of stores were still afloat, and the work of putting allt on

*Batailles Navales en France (Paris, 1868), vol. iv. p. 262. †The Annuaire Historique for 1830 (p. 74) gives details of the composition of the expeditionary army. It was significant of the

shore was not finally completed for nearly a fortnight, the work having been impeded by bad weather on June 16, 23, and 27. Several vessels had parted their cables and had gone ashore.

The ships of war were employed in making a diversion in aid of the army by cannonading the defences of Algiers; but this proceeding had no useful result and was given up, but not however until an unfortunate accident had occurred in the fleet. A gun burst on board one of the ships, killing ten men and wounding an officer and fourteen men. On July 4, twenty days after the disembarkation, the French army entered the city of Algiers, and the admiral took possession of seven small vessels forming the Dey's navy. A squadron was sent to seize Bona and to bring the Bey of Tripoli to terms, both of which it carried out successfully. The navy had done its work well; but, as Captain Chevalier is careful to point out, during the expedition to Algiers it had not been called upon to fight, and, moreover, was not in a condition to do so. It is important to bear this in mind. A moderate amount of opposition on the water would have seriously

royalist government methods that an enormous number of persons were included as members of the staff. Une foule de jeunes gens des plus nobles familles et d'étrangers, un prince de Schwartzenberg, un aide de camp du grand-duc Michel, le colonel Philosophoff, un capitaine de la marine anglaise, M. Mansell, avaient sollicité et obtenu l'honneur de faire cette campagne.' The numbers were:—

hampered, and probably would have entirely prevented, the disembarkation of the army. The little Algerine navy of vessels carrying from eight to twenty guns was too insignificant to attempt to oppose it. The French, in fact, held the undisputed and, in the circumstances, indisputable command of the sea, and were therefore able to put their army on shore without any risk of molestation.

Before the close of the month which saw the French occupation of Algiers there had been another revolution in France, the Bourbon family had been again expelled, and the Monarchy of July had been established. The new

government soon had an opportunity of employing the navy in an operation which was more distinctly naval in character than that just effected in North Africa. France had cause of complaint against Portugal. As this did not receive proper attention, it was decided to send a squadron to enforce reparation. Early in 1831 this squadron, after fruitless efforts to obtain satisfaction of the French demands, seized several Portuguese merchant-ships off the Tagus and also a corvette and a man-of-war brig at the Azores. The Portuguese authorities still held out, and Admiral Roussin was sent with a fleet of six line-of-battle ships, four frigates, three corvettes, and a brig, to insist upon submission. In case this were refused, he was ordered to force an entrance into the Tagus, proceed to Lisbon, and impose conditions on the Portuguese by arms. The admiral sent in his demands, and, these being rejected, he proceeded on July 11, 1831, to carry out his instructions.

Fort

The wind was fresh from north to north-west. The pilots thought it was not favourable enough to ensure a passage of the channels through the bar at the mouth of the Tagus. Admiral Roussin nevertheless determined to go on. St. Julian and Bugio Tower, about 2,000 yards apart and able to cross their fire, were the first obstacles to be encountered. After passing them ships going up the river would come under the guns of Belem Castle and several batteries established along the shore as far up as Lisbon. The admiral's plan was to anchor at Paço d'Arcos if his ships were damaged by the fire of St. Julian and Bugio; otherwise to push on to Lisbon itself. To take a fleet of sailing-ships with a 'scant' wind past a succession of hostile forts and batteries required no uncommon resoluteness of spirit in the admiral and unfaltering reliance on the seamanship of his captains. Navies then did not know so much about passing in front of forts as was afterwards

learned in the American civil war. What little was known, for example as regards Duckworth's passage of the Dardanelles in 1807, tended to foster a belief that, though the passage could be effected, the damage done to the ships would be considerable.

The six French ships of the line formed one column and were directed to engage Fort St. Julian. The four frigates and the three corvettes formed a second column on the starboard side of the first and were to cannonade Bugio Tower. The two Portuguese works opened fire as soon as the leading ships came within range. The fleet reserved its fire till it got near. After five or six broadsides St. Julian and Bugio, which suffered considerably, were practically silenced; and the admiral continued his route towards the city, exchanging shots on the way with the shore batteries, the opposition offered by which was not very serious. Belem Castle was engaged about 4 P.M. at a range of half a cable or a hundred yards. A few broadsides from one of the frigates induced the vessels of the Portuguese squadron to strike their colours. At five o'clock,' says Captain Chevalier, 'the whole fleet was moored six hundred yards off the quays of the city. The victory of the French fleet was complete.' The Portuguese government ceded all that was demanded. The operation just concluded was one of the last on any considerable scale carried out by the old sailing fleets, and it merited the approbation conveyed by our author in the following words:

'To appreciate correctly the success obtained by the French fleet we ought not to lose sight of the fact that the entrance to the Tagus was, at that date, considered impassable. The resistance of the Portuguese government to the demands of France had no other support than this opinion. It is, above all, for this reason that the result obtained did the greatest honour to Admiral Roussin and to the captains of his fleet. As a seaman the admiral showed a decision and a coup d'œil which cannot be too much praised.' (P. 78.)

The next achievement of the French navy also was to be performed in an engagement with coast fortifications. There had existed for some time, between France and Mexico, difficulties which, as Captain Chevalier states, la 'diplomatie ne parvenait pas à résoudre.' The Mexican coast was blockaded, but without effect; and stronger measures had to be tried. Admiral Baudin, a veteran of the great war, in which he had gained high distinction and had lost an arm, was sent to Vera Cruz, where he arrived on October 26, 1838. His force was composed of four frigates,

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two corvettes, three brigs, two bomb-vessels, and two steamers.* Receiving an unsatisfactory reply to his representations, he prepared to attack the fortress of San Juan de Ulloa, the chief defence of the city of Vera Cruz on the side of the sea. It lies about half a mile to seaward of that city, being built on a shoal covered by only a foot or two of water. This was of itself a defence against close attack by ships or assault by landing-parties. It was a bastioned work of four faces, and at the time in question was armed with 186 guns of different calibres and seven mortars. The • French squadron,' says Captain Mahan,† though few in numbers, deliberately undertook to batter by horizontal fire

as well as to bombard, in the more correct sense of the 'word, with the vertical fire of mortars-the long-renowned 'castle of San Juan de Ulloa, the chief defence of Vera 'Cruz. It was still the day of sailing-ships, both of war and ' of commerce.'

The attack was made on November 27. The frigates anchored with springs on their cables about half a mile from the works. The bomb-vessels were towed by the steamers to a position a mile distant. The Prince de Joinville, who died only a few weeks ago, was in command of a corvette, and signalised himself by the bold and skilful manner in which he joined in the attack with his ship under way. The engagement began at 2.30 P.M., and was continued till 8 o'clock, when darkness ended it. Half an hour later the Mexican commander asked for an armistice, and on the following day the fortress was delivered up to the French, who garrisoned it; and a convention was made by the terms of which only a thousand Mexican troops were to remain in Vera Cruz. The fire from the ships had been well sustained. They discharged 320 mortar shells, 177 shells from guns, and 7,771 shot. The French loss was small: 4 killed and 29 wounded. Of a garrison of 1,100 men, the Mexicans in San Juan de Ulloa lost one-half.

The Mexican Government refused to recognise the convention made with Admiral Baudin, sent troops to reinforce those left in Vera Cruz, and declared war against France. The admiral's care now was to disarm the sea-face of the city fortifications. To do this he landed twelve hundred men

The first steamers to cross the Atlantic under the French flag: Mahan's Admiral Farragut' (London, 1893), p. 80.

In his Life of Admiral Farragut (p. 75). The admiral, then commanding the U.S.s. Erie,' was an eye-witness of the French attack.