on. Captain Chevalier's name has been honourably known in naval literature for a good many years. He stands at the very head of French naval historians. Though inferior in philosophic insight and breadth of view to Captain Mahan and less gifted with the faculty of enforcing particular principles of maritime warfare, he is nevertheless a powerful writer and perhaps the one who best deserves a place-if with a long interval between-next after his eminent American contemporary. In 1877 Captain Chevalier published his striking Histoire de la Marine Française pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance Américaine.' ́ He followed this up in 1886 with two volumes, one containing the history of the French navy 'Sous la Première République,' and the other its history Sous le Consulat et l'Empire.' The work, especially the earliest volume, is of great value. It is based on the study of original documents preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Marine, which the author has examined with industry and used with discretion. The style has all the lucidity which we expect to find in French works of the kind, and the narrative has a sustained interest with which naval historians rarely succeed in investing their writings. Captain Chevalier is eminently impartial. He can do justice to an enemy as well as to a friend; and, if not entirely free from national bias-and what author worthy of respect is ?-his account of maritime events in the period with which he deals is fair and trustworthy.

The present book is a continuation of the other, and we have thus a connected account of the navy of France for nearly a hundred years by an author whose qualifications entitle him to be listened to with respect. It is to be regretted that Captain Chevalier did not carry his narrative down to a rather later year than 1870. We should have been glad to have from his pen a real history of the brilliant services and devoted gallantry of the French officers and sailors in the defence of Paris where they won the admiration of friend and foe alike.* We hope that it is only postponed; but we must confess to some disappointment at finding that in this latest volume he has not given us a disquisition, such as few besides himself could make equally attractive, on the effect of the general adoption of the new matériel-the armour-clad, the heavy rifled gun, the torpedo on naval policy and tactics. No one will suppose

Some years ago he published a study called La Marine Française et la Marine Allemande pendant la Guerre de 1870-71.

that the naval history of the years from 1815 to 1870 can be made as interesting as that of the five-and-thirty preceding them. The age of Rodney and Suffren, of Howe, of Hood and Nelson was filled with deeds, great in themselves and important in their effects, which have had no parallel since. Nevertheless, the story of the French navy since the fall of the Great Napoleon is one which was well worth telling and well worth the attention of Englishmen. It may be said decidedly that it is highly creditable to French seamen. What they have done within the period under review, when learned from Captain Chevalier's pages, will be likely to surprise those who have omitted to study naval affairs since the close of the last great war on the ocean. A record comprising accounts of Navarino, the expedition to Algiers, the forcing of the Tagus, the reduction of San Juan d'Ulloa, the campaigns in the River Plate, and against Russia in 1854 and 1855, the acquisition of Cochin-China, and the operations in Chinese waters and on the coast of Mexico-not to mention others-is one of which any navy might be proud. Though only briefly described, the proceedings of the naval brigade serving before Sebastopol should excite our interest, especially as it will probably be news to most of us that the French had a naval brigade in the Crimea at all.

There is one striking thing in this work. Of the fourteen books' or chapters of the historical part no fewer than eleven deal with operations carried on by the French in combination or in formal alliance with the English, and to these operations seven chapters are wholly devoted. One may be permitted to wonder if Frenchmen ever consider the facts on which this presentment of their naval history primarily and certainly rests. A people far less acute, if they were to consider them fully, would quickly perceive what difference the friendship or hostility of England makes to the prosperity and influence of France. Captain Chevalier's last historical chapter contains an account of the Mexican expedition of 1862-67, with which is associated the recollection of the dismal tragedy of Queretaro. Though the French navy can look back without dissatisfaction to its own particular share in that expedition, it can hardly be blind to the humiliating position into which France was led when she ceased to act in Mexico in concert with the English, and had adopted a policy which no longer received their material support or commanded their confidence.

A word has to be said of Captain Chevalier's method,

Even in

He does not give precisely detailed information. the earlier works he rarely put before his readers tabulated lists of naval forces; and those who wished to have exact accounts of the size, armament, and crews of ships had to look for them elsewhere than in his pages. In the present work he is even less communicative as to details. His plan is to give a succinct and clear narrative of events; and in this it must be allowed that he succeeds. A consequence of this is that, though his book gives pleasure to the reader, it is rather insufficient for the student of naval warfare. One could have spared several of the pages devoted to an account of inconsiderable operations on the Mexican coast had the space thus economised been utilised for a fuller description of the landing of the army in Algeria in 1830. While a detailed account-from the French side and by a seaman— of the French landing operation in the Crimea could hardly fail to be of value, and would certainly have been welcome to those who desire to have evidence in support of their opinion that both the operations just mentioned were creditable to those who performed them. Captain Chevalier is rather sparing of dates. It is perplexing to have to go back, occasionally, through several paragraphs to recall in what month operations are being conducted, and through several pages to make sure of the year.*

The quick succession of political changes in France in the years 1814 and 1815-the fall of the Empire, the restoration of the Bourbon family, the re-establishment for the celebrated Hundred Days of Napoleon's government, the flight of the Bourbons, the second fall of the Empire, and the second Bourbon restoration-naturally disorganised the administration of the French navy. The state of things was made worse by the necessity of doing something for the returned exiles who had been supporters of the old monarchy. If their navy ever had a golden age, Frenchmen would be unanimous in placing it in the days of the ancien régime. No English seaman will deny that its most brilliant period is to be looked for in the reign of Louis XVI.—in the war of American Independence. It is unlikely to be a mere accident, but the greatest naval names of France, for example Tourville and Suffren, are those of royal officers.

The present book, like the earlier, might have been more carefully revised for the press. In the early volume there is an error in the title-page. In the present volume a name is not always spelled in the same way.

The royalist noblesse has-at any rate till very recentlyshown less reluctance to serve in the navy, the glories of which are closely associated with the fleur de lys, than in the army which counts as its greatest achievements those performed under the tricolour.

The restored government felt itself compelled to admit into the service former emigrant officers who, as Captain Chevalier says, had ceased to have anything to do with the sea for more than twenty years and who were generally unfit for the duties of the ranks in which they were placed. The adoption of this procedure was an abandonment of the principle that had made the old Bourbon navy so efficient. In 1782,' says the American historian Theodore Roosevelt,* 'the French marine was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the sea.' The French navy proved to be formidable in direct proportion to its blue water' experience, a thing to be specially commended to British naval officers of the present day when training in harbour or on shore takes up so large a part of the time of those whom we wish to make into seamen. The French government had not long to wait before learning the result of giving commands to naval officers who had spent most of their lives on shore. The catastrophe of the 'Medusa,' which occupies so prominent a place in the literature and art of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was directly traceable to it. The command of a squadron, in which the frigate Medusa' was the principal vessel and which was despatched in 1816 to take over the restored territory of Senegal, was given to an officer who had left the navy as a lieutenant at the beginning of the Revolution and had had no connexion with it for five-and-twenty years. This officer was not less ignorant than desirous of concealing his want of knowledge. He would take no advice from the real seamen with whom he was associated. It is not surprising that the frigate was wrecked on the north-west coast of Africa. Part of the crew took to the boats; a large number, including a company of soldiers, were put on a raft, and most of the latter perished miserably. One good result followed on this disaster. The government put on the

* Late leader of the 'Rough-riders' in the Cuban campaign of 1898 and present Governor of the State of New York, in his valuable 'Naval War of 1812' (6th ed., 1897), p. 505,

retired list the greater part of the emigrant officers, whose ' restoration to the navy in 1815,' says Captain Chevalier, ' had become a national peril.'

The Restoration government wished to regain the influence which France had enjoyed in the Mediterranean before the Revolution. It accordingly sent ships of war to the Levant, and, in 1819, ordered a small squadron to join some English ships in a sort of naval demonstration at Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. At this time France had the good fortune of being served by a Minister of Marine who understood his work. The state of the public finances rendered it extremely difficult to find money enough to keep up a strong fleet. Baron Portal, the minister, was convinced that the possession of a respectable navy was a necessity for France; anything less would be a useless expense. You must,' he said, either abandon the insti'tution to save expenditure, or increase expenditure to 'preserve the institution.' He gained his point, and the French navy was in a position to make a respectable show when called upon to support the Duc d'Angoulême in his operations against Cadiz in 1823. The part played by the French squadron at the battle of Navarino, where it fought side by side with British and Russian ships, was creditable to both the seamanship and the valour of its crews. England we are familiar with the details of this action, as far as our own fleet is concerned; and we may find an excellent account of the French share in it in Captain Chevalier's pages.

In

The next operation on a large scale in which the French navy was engaged, and which-though primarily a military undertaking-was nevertheless of naval importance, was the expedition to Algiers in 1830. Attempts to put pressure on the Dey by naval means alone had been going on for three years; but the result was disappointing. Employment in these, however, had been an admirable preparation of the French naval officers and seamen for what was to come. It was decided to invade the territory of the Dey and reduce him to submission by means of an army. The expedition was on a large scale. The fleet was composed of one hundred men-of-war of various sizes and five hundred and seventy-two merchant vessels. The army to be transported was to consist of 37,000 men and 4,000 horses; and a large stock of provisions, stores, and war-material had to be carried across the sea at the same time. Many of the ships of war were used as transports for the troops. Con