f VIII. ments in its productive powers, to which the CHAP. divifion of labour gives occafion. All things would gradually have become cheaper. They would have been produced by a finaller quantity of labour; and as the commodities produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this ftate of things be exchanged for one another, they would have been purchased likewise with the produce of a smaller quantity. BUT though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in appearance many things might have become dearer than before, or have been exchanged for a greater quantity of other goods. Let us fuppofe, for example, that in the greater part of employments the productive powers of labour had been improved to tenfold, or that a day's labour could produce ten times the quantity of work which it had done originally; but that in a particular employment they had been improved only to double, or that a day's labour could produce only twice the quantity of work which it had done before. In exchanging the produce of a day's labour in the greater part of employments, for that of a day's labour in this particular one, ten times the original quantity of work in them would purchase only twice the original quantity in it. Any particular quantity in it, therefore, a pound weight, for example, would appear to be five times dearer than before. In reality, however, it would be twice as cheap. Though it required five times the quantity of other goods to VOL. I. purchase H BOOK purchase it, it would require only half the quanI. tity of labour either to purchase or to produce it. The acquifition, therefore, would be twice as eafy as before. BUT this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole produce of his own labour, could not laft beyond the first introduction of the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end, therefore, long before the most confiderable improvements were made in the productive powers of labour, and it would be to no purpose to trace further what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of labour. As foon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a fhare of almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise, or collect from it. His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land. IT feldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally advanced to him from the stock of a mafter, the farmer who employs him, and who would have no intereft to employ him, unless he was to share in the produce of his labour, or unlefs his ftock was to be replaced to him with a profit. This profit makes a fecond deduction from the produce of the labour which is employed upon land. THE produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction of profit. In all arts and VIII. and manufactures the greater part of the work- CHAP. men ftand in need of a mafter to advance them the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be completed. He shares in the produce of their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed; and in this fhare confifts his profit. IT fometimes happens, indeed, that a fingle independent workman has ftock fufficient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to maintain himself till it be completed. He is both mafter and workman, and enjoys the whole produce of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which it is beftowed. It includes what are usually two distinct revenues, belonging to two distinct perfons, the profits of ftock, and the wages of labour. SUCH cafes, however, are not very frequent, and in every part of Europe, twenty workmen ferve under a master for one that is independent; and the wages of labour are every where understood to be, what they usually are, when the labourer is one perfon, and the owner of the ftock which employs him another. WHAT are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract usually made between thofe two parties, whofe interests are by no means the fame. The workmen defire to get as much, the mafters to give as little as poffible. The former are difpofed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour. BOOK I. IT is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties muft, upon all ordinary occafions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, befides, authorifes, or at leaft does not prohibit their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it. In all fuch difputes the mafters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a mafter manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a fingle workman, could generally live a year or two upon the ftocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not fubfift a week, few could fubfift a month, and fcarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as neceffary to his mafter as his mafter is to him; but the neceffity is not fo immediate. WE rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of mafters; though frequently of thofe of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that mafters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the fubject. Mafters are always and every where in a fort of tacit, but conftant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. Το violate this combination is every where a most unpopular action, and a fort of reproach to a mafter among his neighbours and equals. We feldom, feldom, indeed, hear of this combination, be- CHA P. cause it is the ufual, and one may fay, the natural ftate of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters too fometimes enter into particular combinations to fink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost filence and fecrecy, till the moment of execution, and when the workmen yield, as they fometimes do, without refiftance, though feverely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently refifted by a contrary defenfive combination of the workmen; who fometimes too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their ufual pretences are, fometimes the high price of provifions; fometimes the great profit which their mafters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defenfive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decifion, they have always recourfe to the loudeft clamour, and fometimes to the most fhocking violence and outrage. They are defperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of defperate men, who muft either ftarve, or frighten their mafters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters upon thefe occafions are just as clamorous upon the other fide, and never cease to call aloud for the affiftance of the civil magiftrate, and the rigorous execution of thofe laws which have been enacted with fo much feverity against the combinations of fervants, labourers, |