4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances. In Russia we are told that the czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition the throne, till he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In case he obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince; but upon pain of death if found to be in the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one dared to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and while they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only must be taken, lest, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and, to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II. st. 1. c. 5. that no petition to the King, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury in the country; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council: nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time. But, under these regulations, it is declared by the statute 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2. that the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal. (12)

y Montesq. Sp. L. xii. 26.

(12) See Vol. IV. p. 148. n. 11. But I would observe, that Mr. Dunning was of a different opinion from that expressed by Lord Mansfield in the name of the court of K. B., and asserted that the statute of Charles II. was completely repealed by the bill of rights. Ann. Reg. 1781. Sedgwick on Blackstone, p. 107.

5. THE fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute [144] 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2., and it is indeed a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression. (13)

In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of Englishmen: liberties, more generally talked of than thoroughly understood; and yet highly necessary to be perfectly known and considered by every man of rank or property, lest his ignorance of the points whereon they are founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the one hand, or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on the other. And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. So long as these remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliament be supported in it's full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And, lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence. And all these rights and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints - restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear upon farther inquiry, that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice to do

(13) The statute declares this right only in the case of protestants ;-by the effect, however, of modern statutes it is now undoubtedly universal.

every thing that a good man would desire to do; and are restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow-citizens. So that this review of our [145] situation may fully justify the observation of a learned French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom'; and who hath not scrupled to profess, even in the very bosom of his native country, that the English is the only nation in the world where political or civil liberty is the direct end of it's constitution. Recommending, therefore, to the students in our laws a farther and more accurate search into this extensive and important title, I shall close my remarks upon it with the expiring wish of the famous father Paul to his country, "ESTO PERPETUA!"

2 Montesq. Sp. L. xi. 5.

WE

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

E are next to treat of the rights and duties of persons, as they are members of society, and stand in various relations to each other. These relations are either public or private and we will first consider those that are public.

THE most universal public relation, by which men are connected together, is that of government; namely, as governors and governed, or, in other words, as magistrates and people. Of magistrates some are also supreme, in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; others are subordinate, deriving all their authority from the supreme magistrate, accountable to him for their conduct, and acting in an inferior secondary sphere.

In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which he as legislator thinks proper to give himself. But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power as may tend to the subversion of it's own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject. With us therefore in England this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one legislative, to wit, the parliament, [147] consisting of king, lords, and commons; the other executive,

consisting of the king alone. It will be the business of this chapter to consider the British parliament; in which the legislative power, and (of course) the supreme and absolute authority of the state, is vested by our constitution.

THE original or first institution of parliament is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a thing equally difficult and uncertain. The word parliament, itself, (parlement or colloquium, as some of our historians translate it,) is comparatively of modern date; derived from the French, and signifying an assembly that met and conferred together. It was first applied to general assemblies of the states under Louis VII. in France, about the middle of the twelfth century. But it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great councils of the realm. A practice, which seems to have been universal among the northern nations, particularly the Germans; and carried by them into all the countries of Europe, which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire. Relics of which constitution, under various modifications and changes, are still to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden, and the assembly of the estates in France: for what is there now called the parliament is only the supreme court of justice, consisting of the peers, certain dignified ecclesiastics and judges; which neither is in practice, nor is supposed to be in theory, a general council of the realm.

WITH us in England this general council hath been held immemorially, under the several names of mychel-synoth or great council, michel-gemote, or great meeting, and more [148] frequently wittena-gemote, or the meeting of wise men. It was

also styled in Latin, commune concilium regni, magnum concilium regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel procerum,

a Mod. Un. Hist. xxiii. 307. The first mention of it in our statute law is in the preamble to the statute of Westm. 1. 3 Edw. I. A.D. 1275.

sultant, de majoribus omnes. Tac. de mor. Germ. c.11.

These were assembled for the last time, A. D.1561. (See Whitelocke of

↳ De minoribus rebus principes con- parl. c.72.) or, according to Robertson,

A. D. 1614. (Hist. Ch. V. i. n. QQ.)