supplement the action of Congress in interstate commerce, but the exercise of an authority outside of that commerce that always has remained in the states. Decree reversed. Err., V. JOHN FARSON, Jr., William Farson, and been transported from one state to an-, other, although the transit is at an end, while the articles remain unsold or in original unbroken packages, as again it may. There is no reason why a lien ex delicto should be lost by the end of the journey in which the wrong was done. The two things have no relation to each other. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, [289] BERNARD_FLEXNER, Plff. in 220 U. S. 45, 57, 58, 55 L. ed. 364, 368, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364. Finally, the duty to retain the label upon the single bottles does not disappear at once. For reasons stated in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 57 L. ed. 754, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 984, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 401, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39, if the state could require the label to be removed while the bottles remained in the importer's hands unsold, it could [288] interfere with the means reasonably adopted by Congress to make its regulations obeyed. But all this has nothing to do with the question when interstate commerce is over and the articles carried in it have come under the general power of the state. The law upon that point has undergone no change. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 289–293.) Judgment jurisdiction personal judgment against nonresident -necessity of service. A personal judgment against nonresidents doing business within the state as process upon a resident agent upon any partners cannot be based upon service of theory that by doing business within the state the partners consented to be bound by the service prescribed by a local statute, even though such statute purports to make the person served an agent to receive service in suits arising out of the business done [For other cases, see Judgment, III. c, 1: Con in the state. stitutional Law, IV. b, 8, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] The Food and Drugs Act indicates its intent to respect the recognized line of distinction between domestic and interstate commerce too clearly to need argument or an examination of its language. It naturally would, as the distinction is constitutional. The fact that Submitted a food or drug might be condemned by Congress if it passed from state to [No. 101.] December 18, 1918. Decided State of Illinois to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County, in that state, in favor of defendants in a suit upon a judgment of a Kentucky court. Affirmed. See same case below, 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 810. state does not carry an immunity of IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the foods or drugs, making the same passage, that it does not condemn. Neither the silence of Congress nor the decisions of officers of the United States have any authority beyond the domain established by the Constitution. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 362, 60 L. ed. 679, 688, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. When objects of commerce get within the sphere of state legislation, the state may exercise its independent judgment and prohibit what Congress did not see fit to forbid. When they get within that sphere is determined, as we have said, by the old long established criteria. The Food and Drugs Act does not interfere with state regulation of selling at retail. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 517, 60 L. ed. 771, 776, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 131, 57 L. ed. 754, 765, 47 L.R.A.(N.S.) 984, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39. Such regulation is not an attempt to The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Joseph S. Laurent submitted the cause for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Ralph D. Stevenson and Robert G. Gordon were on the brief: Due process of law is not susceptible of any restricted definition, but can be adapted to the changing conditions of society and business. Any legal pro Note. On validity of personal judgments rendered upon constructive service of process-see note to Moyer v. Bucks, 16 L.R.A. 231. As to what service of process is sufficient, generally, to constitute due process of law-see note to Pinney v. Providence Loan & Invest. Co. 50 L.R.A. 577. ceeding which is consonant with natural thiesson, 232 U. S. 221, 58 L. ed. 577, 34 justice in the light of present conditions Sup. Ct. Rep. 312; Mutual Reserve Fund affords due process of law. It does not Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 require adherence to fixed rules of pro- L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707. cedure. Magna Charta, §§ XXXIX., XL.; Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 40 L. ed. 467, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 344; Black, Const. Law, pp. 571, 572; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 517, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292; 2 Words & Phrases, 2d series, 167; State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, 43 L.R.A. 727, 32 S. E. 283; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Tenement House Dept. v. Weil, 76 Misc. 273, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1062; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 242, 51 L. ed. 462, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co. 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419. Laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into and form a part thereof. Subsection 6 of 51 of the Kentucky Civil Code was, therefore, impliedly written into the contract sued on herein. Edward v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 598, 24 L. ed. 793, 796; Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221, 58 L. ed. 577, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707. A state may provide by statute that in suits against a nonresident partnership engaged in business in the state, summons may be served on the manager or agent in charge of such business in the state in suits on contracts growing out of the business conducted in the state. Service of process, made in pursuance of such a statute, is valid, and a judgment rendered thereon is entitled to full faith and credit in each of the several states. Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co. 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419; Johnson v. Westerfield, 143 Ky. 10, 135 S. W. 425; Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney, 75 C. C. A. 131, 144 Fed. 1; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Re Grossmayer, 177 U. S. 48, 44 L. ed. 665, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41, 36 L. ed. 338, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 541; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. ed. 222, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Continental Nat. Bank v. Folsom, 78 Ga. 449, 3 S. E. 269; Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Exch. 290, 154 Eng. Reprint, 1221, 18 L. J. Exch. N. S. 398; Copin v. Adamson, L. R. 9 Exch. 345, 43 L. J. Exch. N. S. 161, 31 L. T. N. S. 242, 22 Week. Rep. 658; Bank of Australia v. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717, 117 Eng. Reprint, 1055, 20 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 284; Thomas v. Mat The provision of the Kentucky Civil Code does not deny equal privileges and immunities to the citizens of the several states. It applies to all citizens alike who are nonresident of the state. It is well settled that a state may provide a mode of service for nonresidents different from that which applies to residents. Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591, 15 L. ed. 497; Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 242, 51 L. ed. 462, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 32 L. ed. 544, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. A state may validly provide by statute that process against the members of a nonresident partnership may be served on the agent who was in charge of their business in the state, and transacted the business in the state out of which the suit arose, although such agent had ceased to represent his principals at the time of the institution of the suit, provided that there be no other agent in the state on whom process can be served. Nelson v. Rehkopf, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 352, 75 S. W. 203; International Harvester Co. v. Com. 147 Ky. 664, 145 S. W. 393; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 204, 46 Am. St. Rep. 335, 40 N. E. 488; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707. V. Judgments rendered by the courts of a state must be consistent with due process of law, and if they are valid in the state where rendered, they are entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of the several states. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 61 L. ed. 608, L.R.A.1917F, 458, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343. W. Miller submitted the cause for deMessrs. Harry P. Weber and George fendants in error: Defendant transacted business in Ken tucky as a matter of right under the Constitution of the United States, and did not thereby submit or consent to any condition imposed by that state which was not likewise imposed upon citizens of Kentucky generally. Caldwell v. Armour & Co. 1 Penn. (Del.) 545, 43 Atl. 518; Cabanne v. Graf, '87 Minn. 510, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722, 92 N. W. 461; Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 186. Defendant was entitled to equal privileges and immunities with citizens of Kentucky generally instead of with the few who may reside beyond its limits while conducting business within its limits. Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 186. Personal service means service on the defendant in person within the jurisdiction of the court. 19 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 613; Black's Law Diet. 2d ed. 1076; 3 Bouvier's Law Dict. 3d Rev. 2577; Thisler v. Little, 86 Kan. 787, 121 Pac. 1123; Dalton v. St. Louis, M. & S. R. Co. 113 Mo. App. 71, 87 S. W. 610; McKenzie v. Boynton, 19 N. D. 531, 125 N. W. 1062; Moyer v. Cook, 12 Wis. 336. Substituted or constructive service is not personal service. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 725, 24 L. ed. 565, 570; Caldwell v. Armour & Co. 1 Penn. (Del.) 545, 43 Atl. 520; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722, 92 N. W. 461; Baker v. Baker E. & Co. 242 U. S. 394, 401, 61 L. ed. 386, 391, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 41 L.R.A. 331, 72 Am. St. Rep. 181, 23 So. 825; National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257, 49 L. ed. 184, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 70; Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 312, 79 Atl. 347. Such a judgment denies to the nonresident defendant the equal privileges and immunities with the citizens of the state of the forum guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. Caldwell v. Armour & Co. 1 Penn. (Del.) 545, 43 Atl. 520; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722, 92 N. W. 461; Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 181. Black's Law Dict. 2d ed. 1076, 1118; 3 Bouvier's Law Dict. 3d ed. 3048, 3173. Nothing short of personal service Courts will refuse to enforce judgwithin the jurisdiction, or entry of ap-ments in personam entered in sister pearance, would give the Kentucky court jurisdiction to enter a judgment in personam enforceable in Illinois. 2 Black, Judgm. § 906; 2 Freeman, Judgm. §§ 564, 566; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 13 L. ed. 648; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 725, 24 L. ed. 565, 570; Caldwell v. Armour & Co. 1 Penn. (Del.) 545, 43 Atl. 517; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722, 92 N. W. 461; Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 184; Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 297, 34 L. ed. 670, 672, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 147; Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 312, 79 Atl. 347. A judgment in personam, rendered without personal service within the jurisdiction, or entry of appearance, is not entitled to full faith and credit in other states. 2 Black, Judgm. § 906; 2 Freeman, Judgm. §§ 564, 566; Baker v. Baker, E. & Co. 242 U. S. 394, 400, 61 L. ed. 386, 391, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 174, 13 L. ed. 648, 652; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 725, 24 L. ed. 565, 570; Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 294, 297, 34 L. ed. 670-672, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 92; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 41 L.R.A. 331, 72 Am. St. Rep. 181, 23 So. 825. Such a judgment deprives the defendant of the due process of law guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. states upon service had on nonresidents under statutes similar to the one involved in the case at bar. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 174, 13 L. ed. 648, 652; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 41 L.R.A. 331, 72 Am. St. Rep. 181, 23 So. 825. And Federal courts, sitting in the same state where the service was made or the judgments rendered, have refused to sustain them. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 725, 24 L. ed. 565, 570; Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 181; Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 147. Even courts of the state where such service is made upon a nonresident in an action in personam will quash the service or set aside any judgment which may have been entered. Caldwell v. Armour & Co. 1 Penn. (Del.) 545, 43 Atl. 520; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 59 L.R.A. 735, 94 Am. St. Rep. 722, 92 N. W. 461. This court is not bound by the rulings of the supreme court of Kentucky. 58 L. ed. 1363, 1368, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394, 779. A partnership is not a legal entity distinct from the individuals composing it. Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 290, L.R.A.1915F, 668, 106 N. E. 782, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 741; Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695, 57 L. ed. 1029, L.R.A.1915E, 706, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 701. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the the states could exclude foreign corpoopinion of the court: rations altogether, and therefore could This is an action brought by the plaintiff in error upon a judgment for money rendered by a Kentucky court. The declaration alleges that the transaction in respect of which the judgment was rendered took place at Louisville, Kentucky, and that at that time the defendants were doing business there as partners through Washington Flexner, who was and continued to be their agent until the time of this suit. It further alleges that the defendants were nonresidents, and that the service of summons of the Kentucky suit was made upon Washington Flexner, in accordance with a Kentucky statute authorizing it to be made in that way. The defendant William Farson was the only one served with process in the present action, and he pleaded that the defendants in the former suit did not reside in Kentucky, were not served with process, and did not appear; that Wash-[294] CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, Plff. In ington Flexner was not their agent at Err., V. COMPANY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 294-297.) Federal courts following state court decisions local law. the time of service upon him; that the DENVER & SOUTH PLATTE RAILWAY Kentucky statute relied upon was unconstitutional; that the Kentucky court had no jurisdiction, and that its judgment was void under the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff demurred to the pleas, and stood upon his demurrer when it was overruled, whereupon judgment was entered for the defendants. There was an appeal to the supreme court of the state on the ground that the court below did not give full faith and credit to the Kentucky judgment and erred in holding the Kentucky statute as to service unconstitutional. The supreme court affirmed the judgment [293] below. 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 810. The same errors are alleged here. 1. The Federal Supreme Court will not go behind the decision of a state court that the rates which a street railway company may charge are subject to regulation by a lated by it in due form, if the state could public utilities commission and were reguconfer such power. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII. e; Courts, VII. c. 3, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] powers Municipal corporations street railway franchises rates. 2. Clearer language than can be found in the provisions of a state statute that ed by a municipality except by ordinance, street railway franchises shall not be grantand of the ordinance itself, permitting the It is argued that the pleas tacitly admit that Washington Flexner was agent of the firms at the time of the transaction sued upon in Kentucky, and the Note. As to state decisions and laws Kentucky statute is construed as pur- as rules of decision in Federal courtsporting to make him agent to receive see notes to Clark v. Graham, 5 L. ed. service in suits arising out of the busi- U. S. 334; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 6 L. ed. ness done in that state. On this con- U. S. 290; Jackson ex dem. St. John v. struction it is said that the defendants, Chew, 6 L. ed. U. S. 583; Mitchell v. Burby doing business in the state, consent-lington, 18 L. ed. U. S. 351; United States ed to be bound by the service prescribed. The analogy of suits against insurance companies based upon such service is invoked. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 47 L. ed. 987, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707. But the consent that is said to be implied in such cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 19 L. ed. U. S. 490; Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 5 L.R.A. 508; and Snare & T. Co. v. Friedman, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 380. On power of municipality to make binding contract as to rates of public service corporation-see note to Benwood V. Public Service Commission, L.R.A. 1915C, 264. grantees of a street railway franchise to charge certain fares provided they made certain transfer arrangements with another street railway company, must be used before the municipality can successfully claim that rates so fixed were withdrawn from subsequent control by the legislature and its authorized agent, a public utilities commis sion. [For other cases, see Municipal Corporations. II. f; Constitutional Law, 1230-1246, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 106.] 410; Shreveport Traction Co. v. Shreveport, 122 La. 1, 129 Am. St. Rep. 345, 47 So. 40; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1; Owensboro v. Cumberland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 1389, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R. Co. 194 U. S. 538, 48 L. ed. 1109, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764. Mr. Fred Farrar submitted the cause for defendant in error: The case at bar is controlled by a long line of decisions, both state and Federal, which recognize the distinction between Submitted December 19, 1918. Decided cases in which the municipality has been IN January 7, 1919. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to review a decree which reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill, a decree of the District Court of Arapahoe County, in that state, in favor of plaintiff in a suit by a municipality to compel a street railway company to make certain transfer arrangements without additional charge. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See same case below, 62 Colo. 229, A. L. R. —, P.U.R.1916E, 134, 161 Pac. 151. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. L. F. Twitchell submitted the cause for plaintiff in error. Messrs. S. D. Crump and H. C. Allen were on the brief: The act of the general assembly of the state of Colorado of 1813, known as the Public Utilities Act, if given the construction placed upon it by the majority of the state court, is a direct and flagrant violation of this constitutional inhibition against impairing contract obligations. Atlantic Coast Electric R. Co. v. Public Utility Comrs. 89 N. J. L. 407, P.U.R. 1917B, 949, 99 Atl. 398; Reed v. Trenton, 80 N. J. Eq. 506, 85 Atl. 271; Detroit v. Detroit United R. Co. 173 Mich. 314, 139 N. W. 61; Peoria R. Co. v. Peoria R. Terminal Co. 252 Ill. 73, 96 N. E. 692; Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Mobile, 162 Fed. 532; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 81; North Wildwood v. Public Utility Comrs. 88 N. J. L. 81, P.U.R.1916B, 77, 95 Atl. 750; Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 215 U. S. 417, 54 L. ed. 259, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121; Monett Electric Light, P. & Ice Co. v. Monett, 186 Fed. 364; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. granted the power to enter into irrevocable contracts with utility companies, and those in which the municipality either had no direct authority to enter into such a contract, or, having the power to contract, the contract was subject to revocation whenever the latent power of the state was called into action and the supervision of rates and fares undertaken. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission, 238 U. S. 174, 59 L. ed. 1254, P.U.R.1915D, 591, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820; Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 273, 53 L. ed. 176, 182, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Wyandotte County Gas Co. v. Kansas, 231 U. S. 622, 58 L. ed. 404, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 226; Puget Sound Traction, Light & P. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574, 61 L. ed. 1325, P.U.R.1917F, 57, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 705; Benwood v. Public Service Commission, 75 W. Va. 127, L.R.A.1915C, 261, 83 S. E. 295; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Ct. 67 Wash. 37, L.R.A. 1915C, 287, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78; Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co. 145 Wis. 13, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1056, 129 N. W. 925; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co. 159 Wis. 130, L.R.A.1915F, 732, 150 N. W. 411; Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, 82 Or. 114, L.R.A.1917C, 98, P.U.R.1917B, 967, 161 Pac. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 996; Seattle Electric Co. v. Seattle, 206 Fed. 955; California-Oregon Power Co. v. Grants Pass, 203 Fed. 173. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is a bill to compel the defendant to arrange for passengers on its road to be transported without extra fare over the line of the Denver City Tramway Company from a point of connection, and in like manner for [296] passengers on |