agreed in advance to be bound by after enacted by-laws, a subsequent by-law increasing rates of assessment is binding upon him. (Mock v. Royal Arcanum, 121 App. Div. 174; Wright v. Knights of Maccabees, 122 App. Div. 904; Dowdall v. C. M. B. Assn., 123 App. Div. 913; Wineland v. Knights of Maccabees, 148 Mich. 608; Williams v. C. M. B. Assn., 152 Mich. 1; Polk v. M. R. F. L. Assn., 207 U. S. 310; Reynolds v. Supreme Council, 192 Mass. 150; Crosby v. M. R. F. L. Assn., 38 Misc. Rep. 708; Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489; Fullenweider v. Supreme Council, 180 Ill. 621.) The provision of the by-laws that "he shall pay the same rate of assessment thereafter so long as he remains continually in good standing in the order," is not a limitation upon the power of defendant to adopt adequate rates. (Mock v. Royal Arcanum, 121 App. Div. 474; Dowdall v. C. M. B. Assn., 123 App. Div. 913; Williams v. C. M. B. Assn., 152 Mich. 1; Dornes v. Supreme Lodge, 75 Miss. 466; Blasingame v. Royal Circle, 111 Ill. App. 202; Supreme Lodge v. Kutscher, 179 Ill. 340; Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489; Fullenweider v. Supreme Council, 180 Ill. 621; Reynolds v. Supreme Council, 78 N. E. Rep. 129; Conner v. Supreme Commandery, 117 Tenn. 549.) The provision of the by-law covering benefits at seventy years of age was repealable. (Bacon on Ben. Societies [3d ed.], $$ 185, 186; Beach v. Knights of Maccabees, 177 N. Y. 100; Wineland v. Knights of Maccabees, 148 Mich. 608; Parish v. N. Y. P. Exch., 169 N. Y. 34; Weber v. Knights of Maccabees, 172 N. Y. 90; Langan v. Supreme Council, 174 N. Y. 266; Shipman v. P. II. Circle, 174 N. Y. 398 ; Simons v. Supreme Council, 178 N. Y. 263.) Repeal of the by-laws containing the provision that upon attaining seventy years of age or becoming disabled the member should be exempt from the payment of further assessments and dues was valid. (Wineland v. Knights of Maccabees, 148 Mich. 608; Detroit St. Ry. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich. 580; Louisville W. Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1; Bacon on Ben. Societies [3d ed.], $$ 91a, 92, 185; Boyd v. Southern Association, 41 So. Rep. 164; Louisville v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1.) N. Y. Rep.] * Opinion of the Court, per VANN, J. * VANN, J. This appeal was heard on the judgment roll, no case having been made and none of the evidence or exhibits being printed, except as portions of the latter appear in the findings of the trial court. The following facts, found by the court, present the questions that we are called upon to decide: In his application to become a member of the defendant, dated June 9th, 1897, the plaintiff stated: "I hereby agree that * the laws of the Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World, now in force or that may hereafter be adopted, shall form the basis of this contract for beneficial membership * * *. * *; that any * neglect to pay any assessment which shall be made by the Supreme Tent within the time provided by the laws thereof, or neglect to pay the dues fixed by said laws, in the manner and at the time provided by said laws, or the by-laws of the tent to which I may belong, shall vitiate my benefit certificate and forfeit all payments made thereon ** This application and the laws of the Supreme Tent now in force, or that may hereafter be adopted, are made a part of the contract between myself and the Supreme Tent; and I, for myself, and my beneficiary or beneficiaries, agree to conform to and be governed thereby." * On the 19th of June, 1897, the defendant issued to the plaintiff a certificate or policy of insurance stating in part as follows: "This certifies that Sir Knight Dennis L. Wright has been regularly admitted as a member of Watertown Tent No. 418, located at Watertown, State of New York, and that in accordance with and under the provisions of the laws of the order he is entitled to all the rights, benefits and privileges of membership therein, and that at his death one assessment on the membership, not exceeding in amount the sum of $1,000, will be paid as a benefit to Mary Wright provided he shall have in every particular complied with the laws of the order in force or that may hereafter be adopted." * * The plaintiff, who at the date of the certificate was of the age of fifty years, complied with the rules of the defendant and paid all dues, assessments and charges against him until and Opinion of the Court, per VANN, J. [Vol. 196. including the month of December, 1904. According to the laws of the association in force at the time of plaintiff's admission to membership the annual dues were three dollars per year, and in January, 1898, with his acquiescence, they were changed to four dollars per year, and he thereafter paid at that rate. According to said laws when the plaintiff was adınitted each monthly assessment was $1.40, and, as the court found, "it was further agreed that he shall pay the same rate of assessment thereafter so long as he remains continually in good standing in the order.' Provision was made, however, that in case one assessment per month should not be sufficient to pay death and disability claims as they should occur, additional assessments might be made from time to time to pay such claims. 999 At the time the plaintiff joined the defendant the by-laws provided that "Any member holding a benefit certificate who shall become totally and permanently disabled from any cause, not the result of his own illegal act, to perform or direct any kind of labor or business, or who shall arrive at the age of seventy years, and who has paid all legal dues and assessments since the date of his initiation to the date of such disability or period in life, shall be relieved from the payment of any further dues or assessments levied under these laws, or the by-laws of the tent of which he is a member, and shall be entitled to receive from the disability fund annually onetenth part of the sum for which his benefit certificate is issued, provided, however, that the aggregate of such installments received by him shall in no case exceed the sum specified in such certificate." In July, 1904, the defendant, without the consent of the plaintiff, so amended its by-laws as to provide that "On and after January 1, 1905, all present life benefit members of the association who are then fifty-five years of age, or over shall pay three dollars per month for each $1,000 of life benefits carried." The amendment also provided for a per capita tax of ten cents per month and a "fraternal tax of fifty cents a year," upon every member of the associa *** N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per VANN, J. tion. Additional assessments at the new rate were authorized to pay death and disability claims whenever the amount of the life benefit fund was not sufficient for the purpose. On January 1, 1905, the plaintiff had passed the age of fifty-five years. The amended laws further provided that "A life benefit member of the association who shall become totally and permanently disabled by other than his own illegal, reckless or fool-hardy act from performing or directing any and all kinds of labor or business, whether such directing is his customary occupation or not, and he is in good standing in the associa tion at the time of such disability, may receive total and permanent disability benefits, provided that such member shall continue to pay all monthly rates, additional assessments, dues and fines which he would have been required to pay if such disability had not occurred. A member so disabled may receive from the life benefit fund annually onetenth part of the amount named in his life benefit certificate, which amount shall be paid in quarterly payments, provided that such installments shall be paid only during the good standing of such member in the association and the aggregate of such installments shall in no case exceed the amount in his life benefit certificate." * * * As the plaintiff declined to pay at the rate as increased by the amendments of 1904, he was suspended and owing to the suspension, according to the by-laws, he forfeited absolutely all his rights derived from membership. In January, 1905, he duly tendered to the defendant in due time the sum of $2.40, which included all that he was owing at the old rate of $1.40 per month, and $1.00 dues for the quarter beginning on the first of the month, but the defendant refused to accept less than $4.10, the amount due according to the new rate. The court further found that according to the defendant's experience the rate assessed at the time the plaintiff became a member "at twelve assessments per year is not sufficient for its perpetual maintenance and without an additional number of assessments to pay death and disability claims as they occur, it will be compelled to go out of business within eight Opinion of the Court, per VANN, J. [Vol. 196. een to twenty-five years from September, 1905;" and "that the increase in the rate, or the number of assessments, was necessary for the continued existence of the defendant." The contract between the parties consisted of the application, certificate and the by-laws in force when the certificate was issued. Seven years after the contract was made the by-laws were changed by the defendant, without the consent of the plaintiff, so as (1) to increase the monthly assessments from $1.40 to $3.00 and to require a per capita tax of ten cents per month together with a fraternal tax of fifty cents per annum, the provision for additional assessments being still continued in force; (2) to abolish the right of a member, upon reaching the age of seventy years, to relief from the payment of any further dues or assessments; (3) to abolish the right of a member on reaching that age to receive annually one-tenth of the sum named in his certificate and (4) to so modify the disability clause as to entitle a member to the benefit of the annual payment of one-tenth, only in case he should continue to pay precisely the same as if he had not become disabled, and even to continue to pay after he had received the full amount called for by his certificate. The question presented for decision is whether the reservation by the defendant of a general power to amend its by-laws, without specifying in what respects, authorized it to amend them in all the particulars above mentioned. In other words, can such an association amend a specific clause under a general power? The amendments involve not only a substantial increase in the rate of assessment, but also a substantial decrease in the amount of benefits. While the member is now required to pay more than twice as much as before, he is to receive in return materially less than before. He is deprived altogether of the benefit to which he was entitled upon reaching the age of seventy and is deprived of a material part of the benefit to which he was entitled in case of disability. While it was specifically provided that he should "pay at the same rate of assessment thereafter," the rate of assessment is now more than |