execute would be fully completed before the limitation was reached. The rule which should control the determination of such questions is to the effect that when a contract is made for a public improvement, which by its terms or by the provisions of the charter is required or directed to be paid with longtime bonds presently issuable, it becomes a debt within the meaning of the Constitution, even though such debts are payable in the future by installments. But in contracts for such improvements which are not required to be paid by the issuing of such bonds, but are payable in cash when the future installments become due, they are not debts within the meaning of the Constitution until the maturity of the installments, even though the municipality in its discretion may issue bonds to such installments. In the former case the debt is deemed to be created at once, the time of payment only being postponed. In the latter case, the indebtedness is not considered created until the consideration has been furnished. This, as I understand, is in accordance with the views of Judge Dillon as expressed in his new work on Municipal Corporations. pay Inasmuch as the referee has not found facts upon which we can determine the precise character of these contracts I am inclined to the view that questions 19th, 23d and 27th, certified, should not be answered either in the affirmative or negative, but should be answered in accordance with the requirements of the rule to which I have called attention. Orders affirmed, with one bill of costs in all cases. Opinions by CULLEN, Ch. J., and GRAY and HAIGHT, JJ.; CULLEN, Ch. J., WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ., concur with GRAY, J., except as to the allowance of the securities in the sinking funds to meet the water debt created since the Constitution of 1894 as a deduction from the general indebtedness of the city; EDWARD T. BARTLETT and VANN, JJ., concur with HAIGHT, J.; EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT, VANN, WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ., concur with CULLEN, Ch. J., as to the effect of the sinking funds; GRAY, J., dissents from CULLEN, Ch. J., on this point. Answers to questions certified. The questions certified are answered as follows: [Vol. 196. No. 1. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Questions certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 5. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 6. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 7. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 8. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 9. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 10. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 11. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. Nos. 12, 13 and 14. Questions certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 15. Question certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 16. Question certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 17. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 18. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 19. Question certified answered in the affirmative. Concur: CULLEN, Ch. J., GRAY, WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ. Not voting: EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT and VANN, JJ. Nos. 20, 21 and 22. Questions certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 23. Question certified answered in the affirmative. Concur: CULLEN, Ch. J., GRAY, WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ. Not voting: EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT and VANN, JJ. N. Y. Rep.] Answers to questions certified. Nos. 24 and 25. Questions certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 26. Question certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 27. Question certified answered in the affirmative. Concur: CULLEN, Ch. J., GRAY, WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ. Not voting: EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT and VANN, JJ. No. 28. Question certified answered as follows: The real estate that furnishes the basis for valuation is what appears assessed as such in the assessment roll. All concur. No. 29. Question certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 30. Question certified answered as follows: The amount becomes an indebtedness when the contract has been certified by the comptroller under section 149 of the charter. See answer to question No. 27. Concur: CULLEN, Ch. J., GRAY, WERNER and HISCOCK, JJ. Not voting: EDWARD T. BARTLETT, HAIGHT and VANN, JJ. No. 31. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 32. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 33. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 34. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 35. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 36. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 37. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 38. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 39. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 40. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 41. Question certified answered in the affirmative. All concur. No. 42. Question certified answered in the negative. All concur. No. 43. Question certified answered in the affirmative. concur. All The answers to questions 31 to 41, both inclusive, relative to the sinking funds, must be qualified by the statement that none of the securities in the sinking funds especially pledged under the Constitution for the retirement of obligations not counted against the city in ascertaining its indebtedness, can be allowed as a deduction or offset against the general debt, which under the Constitution is the subject of computation. Ordered accordingly. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. SOUTH SHORE Public service commission - right to appeal from order of Appellate Division reversing its determination erroneous determination by commission. The public service commission is entitled to prosecute an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division which annulled its determination deny. ing an application by a railroad company for permission to construct and operate an extension of its road. The public service commission determined that the public interest required the construction and operation of a railroad upon the route over which the relator had acquired a franchise, but recommended that the permission and approval of the commission be withheld because of the limitations imposed by the municipal authorities of the city of New York upon the franchise contract. Held, that so far as the consent of the municipal authorities to the construction of the proposed line may be limited by conditions which are in conflict with the provi sions of the Public Service Commissions Law, the statute must prevail and the public service commission was without authority to refuse to the relator the certificate provided for in section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law. People ex rel. South Shore Traction Co. v. Willcox, 133 App. Div. 556, affirmed. (Argued October 11, 1909; decided October 26, 1909.) APPEAL from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered July 22, 1909, which annulled a determination of the defendants denying the relator's application for permission to construct and operate an extension of its railroad and directed said defendants to grant such permission. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. George S. Coleman, II. II. Chamberlain and Jesse F Orton for appellants. The public service commission has a right to appear in this court to defend its determination. (People ex rel. Breslin v. Lawrence, 107 N. Y. 607; People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 110 N. Y. 509; Bryant v. Thompson, 128 N. Y. 435.) The order of the Appellate Division annulling the determination of the commission and directing the issuance of a certificate under section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law is appealable to this court. (Matter of Wood, 181 N. Y. 98.) The Appellate Division erred in holding that upon the application of a company pursuant to section 53 of the Public Service Commissions Law the commission was powerless to inquire into and to consider the terms and conditions of the franchise granted by the municipal authorities. (Lord v. E. L. Assur., 194 N. Y. 212; People ex rel. M. S. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comrs., 174 N. Y. 417; V. of Fort Edward v. II. V. Ry. Co., 192 N. Y. 139; Matter of T. F. S. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 343; Adamson v. V. E. R. R. Co., 89 Hun, 261.) Clarence Lexow for relator, respondent. The order is not appealable. (Code Civ. Pro. § 191; Matter of Wood, 181N. Y. 93; Matter of Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463; People |