to his work. In addition to the above, heavy loads were carried, intrenchments dug, camps fortified, and such works attacked and defended.

"Once in the service, the soldier had yet harder work to do. He was steadily drilling in the field, in camp, and in garrison. Constant occupation was believed to be the best means of keeping up the soldier's morale--a truism which is not always acted on to-day. Hence practice marches with full equipment and baggage, maneuvers, fortifications so far as it was essential for the camp, were common, and the men were not infrequently put on public works.

"The burden carried by the Roman soldier is scarcely credible, though from youth up he was trained to bearing heavy loads at drill. The foot soldier carried all through the campaign on the right shoulder two or three posts or palisades for the stockade of the nightly camp; these were quite long and two or three inches thick. Slung to the end of these was his bag of corn, calculated to last him at least two weeks, his shield, lance, and as many as seven darts he carried on his right arm. The helmet, if not worn, hung on his breast by a strap. At times he must also carry axe, saw, spade, scythe, a rope, a basket, and a pot to cook his rations in. His cloak was rolled up and slung on his back. About extra clothing, or sandals, we These with the armor, made up a

do not hear.

weight which had to be borne under the sun, dust, and sand of Italy and Africa, through the heavy mud of spring and fall and through the everlasting snows of the mountains. Including his clothing, the Roman soldier, with the load above given, must have carried something over eighty-five pounds, much more than half his own average weight."

As Gibbon says, "In the midst of peace, the Roman troops familiarized themselves with the practices of war." And he quotes a remark of an ancient historian who had fought against them. "The effusion of blood was the only circumstance which distinguished a field of battle from a field of exercise." We cannot overestimate the importance of the qualities for which the Romans worked. Endurance and skill at arms are as important today as they were in ancient times. They are, however, the background of the soldier's life. The early Roman battles were won by individual prowess in hand-to-hand encounters. Battles are won to-day by the tactical cohesion of units, each numbering hundreds of men. The strength and prowess of individuals tell and always will, but they count as strong raw material out of which a higher unit is moulded. Success on the modern battlefield depends upon the efficiency of these higher units in team play. To attain this, the training of a soldier involves more than the train

ing of single men. We must consider the single man and also train him in connection with the organization of which he is a part.

There are three essential qualities which make a soldier an effective part of a military organization: prompt obedience; exact obedience; and subordination.

Promptness and exactness are the Siamese Twins of military virtues. We naturally think of them together. They are the two qualities which are important in assuring correct responses in battle. In the midst of a chaos of noise and the confusion of action under fire, it is only the men in whom such qualities have become ingrained who can be depended upon to respond to orders. If the modern methods of warfare continue and we add bombardment from aeroplanes to death by other means, soldiers will need these qualities in more stringent forms than ever.

The qualities of promptness and exactness can be trained in one of two ways; and will differ accordingly. We can follow the lead of the old Prussian model or that of West Point. What I call the old Prussian model was described by Marshal Saxe when he declared that soldiers should be machines animated only by the voice of their commander. His statement shows what sort of obedience he expected. Men should react with the invariability, that is, the promptness and ex

actness, of machines. To this end, they were made to go through endless drills until they responded without thinking to regular orders. There is a story which illustrates the result of such training. When an old soldier was going to work with his dinner pail, a practical joker called, "Attention!" Immediately the old soldier jumped to the position of a soldier. His dinner pail fell, mutton and potatoes rolled in the gutter forgotten.

There is one drawback to this system. When men are trained into machines, they become subject to the limitations of machines. If the practical joker had assumed the voice of an old commander and ordered, "Over the nearest fence!" it is questionable whether the old soldier would have responded in such a way as to have endangered his luncheon.

The West Point method tries to make good where the old Prussian system runs the risk of failure. The cadets are put through a novel type of efficiency calisthenics. Major Koehler in his drills, gives any descriptive order that comes into his head. He may say, "Right hand on hip!" "Left hand on nose!" or anything else. The cadets have to keep awake. In time they get so they can answer the most unexpected order promptly and exactly. They attain the kind of promptness and exactness that we need. They become more dependable than machines, because they can be

counted upon to respond to the unexpected and yet with the sureness of a machine.

The West Point idea of subordination is not the unintelligent response of a machine, but the loyal support of an active mind, which grasps the purpose of a commander and strives to advance it with force and energy.

The point I wish to emphasize in this connection is, the great importance of retaining initiative. Paradoxically, the other point I wish to emphasize is, the importance of losing initiative to a certain extent the importance of subordination.

In a recent publication a Russian officer contrasts soldiers with it and without it. He says:"While, in attacking even weakly defended positions, German generals have had to send their soldiers forward in dense masses, and by this means artificially endow them with courage and tenacity, our Russian soldiers, though often greatly outnumbered, go forward on their own initiative to certain death because they understand the necessity of self-sacrifice, and of their own wills strain towards it."

There is in this story something more than obedience. The picture of self-sacrifice involves the idea of a standard, which the Russian soldier holds as an ideal, and to which he subordinates everything, even life. We see here a higher form of subordination than mere obedience. The sol