The Economic Nature of the Firm: A ReaderThis book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen and William Meckling, and Oliver Williamson, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Bengt Holmstrom, and Oliver Hart. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's economic nature and its place in the market system; Part II covers the scope of the firm; Part III examines internal organization and the human factor; and Part IV ties the firm's organization and behavior to issues of financing and ownership. This second edition has twelve new selections and an introductory essay that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm. |
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Contenido
a new introduction | 1 |
Within and among firms the division of labor | 33 |
From The Wealth of Nations | 35 |
From Capital | 46 |
From Risk Uncertainty and Profit | 60 |
The use of knowledge in society | 66 |
Relational exchange economics and complex contracts | 72 |
From The Visible Hand | 78 |
Production information costs and economic organization | 193 |
Contested exchange new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism | 217 |
Understanding the employment relation the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange | 233 |
Multitask principalagent analyses incentive contracts asset ownership and job design | 254 |
The prisoners dilemma in the invisible hand an analysis of intrafirm productivity | 267 |
Labor contracts as partial gift exchange | 276 |
Profit sharing and productivity | 288 |
Finance and the control of the firm | 297 |
The scope of the firm | 87 |
The nature of the firm | 89 |
Vertical integration appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process | 105 |
The governance of contractual relations | 125 |
The organization of industry | 136 |
The limits of firms incentive and bureaucratic features | 146 |
Bargaining costs influence costs and the organization of economic activity | 162 |
Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm | 175 |
The employment relation the human factor and internal organization | 191 |
Mergers and the market for corporate control | 299 |
Agency problems and the theory of the firm | 302 |
Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure | 315 |
Organizational forms and investment decisions | 336 |
The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm | 345 |
An economists perspective on the theory of the firm | 354 |
Ownership and the nature of the firm | 361 |
References | 371 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader Louis G. Putterman,Randy Kroszner Sin vista previa disponible - 1996 |
Términos y frases comunes
activities agency agent analysis appropriate assets assume authority becomes behavior benefits capital central claims common competitive complete consider contract cooperation coordination corporation costs decisions determined developed direct discussion division economic effect efficient effort employed employees employment enterprise example exchange existence expected fact factors firm function future give given greater important incentives increase individual industry inputs institutional integration interest internal investment labor less limited literature managerial managers marginal means measure mechanism monitoring nature observed Oliver Williamson operations optimal organization output owner ownership particular parties performance person position possible problem production profit question reason reduce reference relation relationship relative rent residual result risk separation sharing specialized specific standard structure supply tasks theory tion transactions University utility wage wealth Williamson workers