hand. The doors were broken in, and the example became contagious; instead of contenting themselves, as they had done the first time, with the floors of the corridors, the soldiers insisted upon having, some mattresses, and others couches. Their officers, too, tired of affecting morality, followed the bad example, and took the cells. In less than half an hour the convent was turned upside down, there had been scarcely time to post sentinels at the chapel, the cellar, and the library. After all, there was little to take; the brothers had left nothing but the larger furniture, such as could not be put into a havresac; but a good number of peasants, who had excited our soldiers to this rummaging, took advantage of the disorder, and like ants, joined, three and four together, to carry off things too heavy for one.

Many of our men, not too religious, ransacked the convent, happy once in their lives to have to deal with monks. One came out of a cell with a broad Dominican hat on his head, another walked gravely about with a long white robe over his uniform. All appeared at the call of the drum with an enormous lighted wax candle in their hands, and during all the the night, from the ninth to the tenth, in honour of our victory over the Neapolitans, the convent was splendidly illuminated. The correspondence of the poor brothers was no more respected than the rest, and more than one letter was brought in triumph and read aloud by the soldiers that would have made the chaste founders of the Order blush to the ears.* On the 10th of May, we stopped at Palestrina, and encamped in the meadows. The Neapolitans appeared to have lost all inclination to attack us, and crowned the hills of Albano and Frescati, drawing by degrees nearer to Rome. Garibaldi, who feared a combined attack of the Neapolitans and the French, set forward

As Medici was not present at the expedition to Palestrina, the greater part of these details are borrowed from Emile Dandolo.

that same evening on his return to Rome. We passed in silence and in perfect order within two miles of the enemy's camp, by paths almost impracticable, without any accident interrupting the quietness of a magnificent march.

At length, on the morning of the 12th we arrived at Rome, having marched during the night twentyeight miles, without stopping an instant. We stood greatly in need of rest; many of us, thinking we were only going upon a campaign of a few hours, in order to be the lighter, having taken neither kettles, bags, nor linen with us. But night being come, instead of sleeping, we were forced to resume our guns; an alarm was given to the city, a report prevailed that the French were attacking Monte Mario, we marched precipitately out at the Angelica Gate, exchanged a few shots with the French, and slept at the side of a ditch, with our hands on our weapons.

CHAPTER LIII.

[FROM this point the notes left by Garibaldi for us at his departure for Sicily permit us to let him again speak for himself, and to replace the pen in his own hand. It is he, therefore, who is about to continue his Memoirs.]

FIGHT OF VELLETRI.

On the 12th of May, the Roman Constituent Assembly, in consequence of the heroic defence of Bologna, issued the following decree :

66 ROME, 12TH MAY, 1849.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,

IN THE NAME OF GOD AND THE PEOPLE,

DECREES :

Only Article.

"The heroic people of Bologna are declared to have merited well of their country and the Republic, and

to be worthy rivals of their brothers, the Roman people."

On the day Bologna fell, the ambassador extraordinary of the French Republic, Ferdinand de Lesseps, entered Rome with Michael Accrusi, the envoy of the Roman Republic to Paris.

By means of the good offices of the French Ambassador, the armistice, which had been agitated for a fortnight, and against which I had given so strong an opinion on the 1st of May, was concluded.

The Roman Government resolved to take advantage of this truce to get rid of the Neapolitan army, without its being positively much to be dreaded. It is, however, not pleasant to have twenty thousand men and thirty-six pieces of cannon upon one's shoulders. -I am mistaken, they had but thirty-three, as we had brought back three with us from Palestrina.

On this occasion, the Government thought proper to make two generals of division, one of them a colonel, the other a general of brigade. The first was Roselli, the second myself. They named Roselli general-in-chief of the expedition.

Some of my friends urged me not to accept this secondary position under a man who the day before only was my inferior. But I confess I have been always inaccessible to these questions of self-love; whoever gives me an opportunity, if only as a simple soldier, of drawing my sword against the enemy, is entitled to my thanks. I would have served as a Bersaglieri; I therefore accepted with gratitude the post of general of division.

On the 16th of May, in the evening, the whole army of the Republic, that is to say, ten thousand men, with twelve pieces of cannon, marched out of the city of Rome by the San Giovanni gate. Of these ten thousand men, one thousand were cavalry. When en route, it was discovered that Manara's corps, which had been intended to form part of the expedition, was missing. A staff officer was sent to inquire how it was that

Manara, who was generally first when the order was given to march against the enemy, was this time the last. One thing had been forgotten, and that was to inform him of the affair. The officer found him in a state of fury at supposing that he alone had been left out of the expedition.

We passed from Teverone upon the road to Tivoli, from thence we inclined to the right, and arrived about eleven o'clock in the morning at Zagarola, after a most fatiguing march for our men; for although we had not come a great distance, we had marched for sixteen hours together. This arose from the extent of the column. We were annoyed by an intolerable dust. In addition to this, at certain places the road was so narrow that we were obliged to pass one by one.

On arriving at Zagarola, we found neither bread nor meat; the Neapolitan division had taken good care of that; they had eaten up everything, and almost drunk up everything. The staff had neglected to provide for such an emergency.

By good luck, I had taken a few head of cattle with me; my men caught others with the lasso; we slaughtered, we skinned, we roasted, and we ate.

It is true that when I complained of this want of foresight, which had nearly caused the expedition to perish with hunger, I was told that they feared they should have given the alarm to the enemy if they had collected provisions. That was all very well!

We remained nearly thirty hours in this little town, from which we departed as we had come, without bread.

On the 18th of May, the order for marching was given at one o'clock in the afternoon; but we did not really set forward before six o'clock in the evening. These halts are more fatiguing than forced marches. At length, at six o'clock, I was enabled to place myself at the head of the brigade of the vanguard, and set forward towards Valmontone, the other brigades following me. I ordered profound silence to be preserved

in the ranks, and the greatest watchfulness to be exercised at both the head and flanks. I had received information that the Neapolitan army was encamped at Villetri, with from nineteen to twenty thousand men, of whom two regiments were Swiss, and thirty pieces of cannon. It was likewise said that the King of Naples in person was in the city. In fact, the Royals occupied Velletri, Albano, and Frascati; their advanced posts came as far as Fratvecchia. Their left wing was protected by the sea, their right wing leant upon the Apennines. After I had abandoned Palestrina, they had occupied it, and thus commanded the valley through which was the only practicable road for an army coming from Rome to attack them. They were, then, able to oppose to us a serious resistance, as they had over us the advantage of position, the advantage of numbers, the advantage of cannon, and that of cavalry.

But the happy result of the first enterprise was a promise for the fate of the second. Besides which, the troops of the King of Naples were completely undisciplined, and every one knows that in war discipline is everything. To force the enemy to either retreat or come to battle, it had been thought necessary to gain possession of the valley rapidly, and take up a flank position which would menace the communication of the Neapolitan army with Naples. Monte Fortino was fixed upon as the strategic point. In fact, once masters of that point, we could throw ourselves upon Citerna, and close the road to their frontier against the Royals; we could take possession of Velletri, if, by chance, they abandoned it to turn us; or we might fall with all our forces upon the weakest portion of the enemy, if the enemy committed the error of dividing.

In the dusk of the evening we arrived at a very narrow passage which debouched upon Valmontone; it took us two hours to clear it. The Manara regiment, aided by a squadron of dragoons and two pieces of artillery, was charged with the support of the vanguard.