mediately set about erecting a battery upon the Place of the city-a position which dominated all around it. I sent couriers to Brazil to open communications with the refugees, and commence, by means of them, the reorganization of an army.

In a short time the battery was constructed, and mounted with two cannons; so that, on the 5th of December, 1845, it was ready to repulse the attacks of General Ürguisa, who made his appearance on the morning of the 6th with 3500 horse, 800 infantry, and a field battery.

My dispositions were such as are made when we wish to centuple material forces with moral influence. I ordered the squadron to retire, and not leave a single boat even at our command. I spread my men among the courts and alleys, which they barricaded, only leaving the principal streets open. I issued an incendiary order of the day, and awaited the enemy, who, trusting to his strength, had proclaimed to the soldiers that they had only chicken-hearted men to contend with.

About nine o'clock in the morning we were attacked at all points. We replied by scattered shots from all the lanes and alleys, and by the fire of our two pieces of cannon.

The moment being come: when I saw they were astonished at our resistance, I charged them with two reserved companies, and they retreated disgracefully, leaving a good number of dead and wounded in the houses of which they had begun to take possession, and gaining nothing by the attack but the carrying off of some cattle, and that, moreover, by the fault of a picket belonging to an English ship-of-war, which, together with a French ship, had followed us, by the command of their Governments, to Salto.

These two vessels then offered to assist us in defending the country, and the English picket changed into a fort a house which defended a Coral, in which were shut up about six hundred head of cattle. The enemy

sent a strong detachment of infantry towards this point, and the English soldiers were seized with a panic; so that some made their way out at the windows, and others at the doors, leaving every facility for the soldiers of Urguisa to drive away the animals.

During twenty-three days the enemy renewed their attacks without obtaining any favourable result. When night came it was our turn; we did not leave them a moment's repose. We were short of provisions but we ate our horses. At length, convinced of the inutility of his efforts, the General gave orders to retreat, confessing that he had, in his various attacks, lost more men than at the battle of India Muerta.

Urguisa, when retreating, endeavoured to get possession of my vessels, to enable him to cross the river; but, thanks to my watchfulness, his project having failed, he was obliged to cross the river twelve leagues lower down, after which he turned and encamped on the other side of the Uruguay, on the plains of Carnardia, opposite Salto.

Whilst Urguisa held this encampment, I made, in open day, several of our horse cross the river, protected by our ships and a small body of infantry. This little troop attacked the men who guarded immense droves of horses grazing in the pampas, and drove away about a hundred horses before them, to replace those we had eaten. They drove them across the river, and brought them to me before the enemy had recovered from their surprise so as to attempt to prevent them.

CHAPTER XLVII.

AFFAIR OF THE SALTO SANT ANTONIO.

In the meanwhile, Colonel Baez, coming from Brazil, had joined us with about two hundred horse. General Medina was collecting forces and we expected him daily. I received a message from General Medina, on

the 7th of February, 1846, informing me that the following day he should be on the heights of Zampevi with about five hundred horsemen. He asked for news of the enemy, and hoped for assistance in case of an attack.

His messenger carried back advice that on the 8th of June, I should be on the heights of Zampevi, with sufficient forces to protect his entrance into the country.

In consequence, about nine o'clock, I set out with a hundred and fifty men of the legion, and two hundred horse, keeping along the banks of the Uruguay. We directed our course to las Laperas of Zampevi, at about three leagues from Salto, flanked by four hundred enemies belonging to the corps of General Servando Gomez, the only forces that, for the moment, were in observation at Salto.

Our infantry took a position beneath a zaperè—a zaperè is a roof of straw, supported by four posts, which offered us no other advantage than some protection from the burning rays of the sun. The cavalry, commanded by Colonel Baez and Major Caraballa, reached as far as Zampevi. Anzani had remained behind for the defence of Salto, suffering with an injured leg, and with him, as helpless from sickness as himself, had remained thirty or forty soldiers. Besides these, half a score of men were left in charge of the battery.

It was about half-past eleven when I saw advancing over the plains of Zampevi towards the heights where I was, a considerable number of the enemy on horseback, and with a foot soldier mounted behind each. At a short distance from the heights the horsemen seemed doubled, and the foot soldiers dismounting, immediately fell into order, marching towards us.

Our cavalry at once opened their fire upon the enemy, but, superior in numbers as they were, they charged them and put them quickly to flight.

The fugitives directed their course towards our

zaperè, which was already suffering from the balls of

the enemy.

Perceiving clearly that effective resistance was only to be expected from my brave legionaries, and that where they were the fight would be, I galloped off towards them, but just as I gained their front ranks, in the midst of the enemy's fire, I felt my horse sink under me, and in falling he dragged me with him. My first idea was, that on seeing me fall, my men would suppose I was dead, and that that belief would throw them into disorder. On falling then, I had the presence of mind to draw a pistol from my holsters, and to fire it immediately in the air, in order that they might see I was safe and sound. The consequence was, that before I was well down, I was snatched up by eager hands and was standing in the midst of them.

In the meantime, the enemy, consisting of twelve hundred horse and three hundred foot, continued advancing. Abandoned by our cavalry, we had only one hundred and ninety men left. I had no time for a long speech; besides, that is not my way. I raised my voice, and only said these few words: "The enemy are numerous, we are few; so much the better! the fewer we are, the more glorious will be the fight. Be calm! do not fire till they are close upon us, and then charge with the bayonet."

These words were spoken to men upon whom every one of them fell like an electric spark. Besides, any

other determination at such a moment would have been fatal to us. Within about a mile of us we had on our right the Uruguay, with some thick masses of wood, but a retreat, under the circumstances, would have been the signal for our destruction. I perceived that at once, and therefore did not hesitate a moment.

When within sixty paces of us the enemy's column, fired, and caused us a considerable loss; but our men replied to them by a discharge vastly more murderous, our guns being loaded, not only with ball, but with deer-shot. The commander of the infantry was shot

dead. I then placed myself at the head of these brave men, and, a gun in my hand, I led them on to a charge upon the thickest of the enemy.

It was quite time, for the cavalry were already upon our flanks and our shoulders. The mêlée was terrible. A few men only of the enemy's infantry owed their safety to a rapid flight. This gave me time to fire upon the cavalry. Our men pirouetted as if every one had received the order to perform that manœuvre. All fought, officers and soldiers, like giants.

At this period of the fight a few of our horsemen, led by a brave officer named Vega, ashamed of the flight of Baez and his men, who had left us alone, turned bridle, preferring to come to share our fate to continuing their shameful retreat. We saw them all at once pass through the midst of the enemy, and place themselves by our side.

I can aver that it required much courage to do what they did. Besides, the charge they accomplished was of great service to us at a critical minute; it separated and confused the enemy, a part of whom were gone in pursuit of the fugitives. Upon our second discharge, then, the cavalry seeing the infantry were destroyed, and that from five-and-twenty to thirty of themselves had fallen beneath our fire, the cavalry, I say, retreating a few paces, dismounted, and about six hundred men, armed with carbines, surrounded us on all sides.

We had all around us a large space of ground covered with the bodies of men and horses, of the enemy's as well as of our own. I could relate numberless acts of individual bravery; we fought like our ancient knights of Tasso and Ariosto. Many were covered with wounds of all kinds-bullet wounds, sword cuts, and lance thrusts. A young trumpeter, only fifteen years old, whom we called the Ruddock, and who had animated us with his clarion during the fight, was pierced by a lance. To throw away his trumpet, draw his knife, and rush upon the horseman