A letter from the Doorkeeper of the House of Representatives, transmitting a list of public property under his charge in the various committee rooms of the House (H. R. Doc. 972)— to the Committee on Accounts and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, transmitting a summary of Parts II and III of the report of the Commissioner of Corporations on cotton exchanges-to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a statement in response to the inquiry of the House as to railroads in Alaska (H. R. Doc. 973)-to the Committee on the Territories and ordered to be printed.

Also, a bill (H. R. 22263) granting an increase of pension to J. J. McKenna-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FORNES: A bill (H. R. 22264) granting a pension to Nora Fitzgerald-to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LANGLEY: A bill (H. R. 22265) to correct the military record of Solomon Back-to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin: A bill (H. R. 22266) to amend an act approved July 1, 1902, entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes "to the Committee on Insular Affairs.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows: By Mr. BURKE: Papers to accompany bills for relief of Maj. D. D. Barclay and John J. McKenna-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions. By Mr. BURLEIGH: Petitions of W. B. Sullivan, of Bar Harbor, and citizens of Bar Harbor and Madison, Me., for amendment to Sherman antitrust law (H. R. 20584), and for Pearre bill (H. R. 94), employers' liability bill, and the eighthour bill-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BURTON of Delaware: Petition of sundry members of labor organizations, for amendment to Sherman antitrust

RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII,

Mr. CUSHMAN, from the Committee on Private Land Claims, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 437) for the relief of D. J. Holmes, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1788), which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS. Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. SIMS: A bill (H. R. 22256) to make it unlawful for certain public officials to own capital stock or bonds in any and all public-service corporations doing business in the District of Columbia-to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. HUBBARD of West Virginia (by request): A bill H. R. 22257) to amend the pension laws by increasing the pensions of soldiers and sailors who may have served in any war prior to 1866, and of widows and orphans of such soldiers and sailors to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RAINEY. A bill (H. R. 22258) to place watch cases and watch movements on the free list-to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LANGLEY: A bill (H. R. 22259) to prohibit the interstate shipment of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors from one State, Territory, or District of the United States to any point within another State, Territory, or District thereof where the law prohibits the sale of same-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BURLEIGH: A bill (H. R. 22260) to provide for the purchase of a site and the erection of a public building thereon at Hallowell, Me.-to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

Also, a bill (H. R. 22261) to provide for the purchase of a site and the erection of a public building thereon at Skowhegan, Me.-to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. COOK of Colorado: Resolution (H. Res. 431) directing the Attorney-General and the Secretary of the Interior to transmit certain information to the House-to the Committee on the Public Lands.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BURKE: A bill (H. R. 22262) granting an increase of pension to D. D. Barclay-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

liability bill, and the eight-hour bill-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CAULFIELD: Petition of W. J. Gutweiler, for the

amendment to the Sherman antitrust law known as the "Wilson ers' liability bill, and the eight-hour bill-to the Committee on bill" (H. R. 20584), for the Pearre bill (H. R. 94), the employthe Judiciary.

By Mr. COUDREY: Petition of Mechanics' American National Bank, favoring selection of one-third of currency commission outside of Congress-to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. GRAHAM: Paper to accompany bill for relief of James Kane-to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of Pittsburg Board of Trade, favoring the name Pittsburg for one of the new battle ships-to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. HENRY of Texas: Petition of Cuauhtemoe Union, No. 240, for the amendment to the Sherman antitrust law (H. R. 20584), for the Pearre bill (H. R. 94), for a just and clearly defined general employers' liability law, and an eighthour law-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUBBARD of West Virginia: Paper to accompany bill for relief of Martin Metzger-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petitions of Abraham Woodward and 328 others, John W. Marshall and 329 others, and William Hamilton and 132 others, in support of House pension bill introduced by Mr. HUBBARD of West Virginia on May 29, 1908-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petitions of John W. Marshall and 329 others and Abraham Woodward and 328 others, soldiers at the Danville Branch of the National Soldiers' Home, favoring the Hubbard pension bill introduced May 29, 1908-to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SHERMAN: Petition of various councils, for H. R. 7559, making the 12th of October a national holiday-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SMITH of Iowa: Petition of citizens of Montgomery County, Iowa, for legislation stopping collection of internal revenue from " speak easies" in no-license territory or granting them Federal liquor tax receipts-to the Committee on the Judiciary. Also, petition of citizens of Montgomery County, Iowa, for an antipolygamy amendment to the Constitution-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of citizens of Montgomery County, Iowa, for legislation suppressing the opium traffic-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of citizens of Montgomery County, Iowa, for legislation prohibiting sale of liquor on Government propertyto the Committee on Alcoholic Liquor Traffic.

Also, petition of citizens of Montgomery County, Iowa, favoring Littlefield original-package bill-to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE.

SATURDAY, May 30, 1908.

absence of a quorum.

Mr. HOPKINS. That has been decided.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair is of the opinion that the Senate has already decided that question. It has decided that roll calls of the Senate having disclosed the presence of a quorum and no business having intervened, the suggestion of a lack of a quorum is not in order.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. It is two hours since that decision was made, and during that time a considerable amount of business has intervened. I, of course, am always reluctant not to acquiesce in the ruling of the Chair, but I think I shall have to take an appeal from that ruling.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Wisconsin appeals from the decision of the Chair. The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the Senate? Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I ask for a division.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. Upon that question division is demanded. Those in favor of sustaining the decision of the Chair will rise. [After counting.]

Mr. ALDRICH. Mr. President

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. CULBERSON. I rise to a point of order. Nothing is in order pending a division.

Mr. ALDRICH. There has been no announcement made by the Chair.

Mr. CULBERSON. The Senate is dividing.

Mr. ALDRICH. Have I the floor, Mr. President?

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair did not hear the Senator.

Mr. ALDRICH. The result has not been announced.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The result has not been announced. Mr. ALDRICH. I ask if I have the floor.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. ALDRICH. In my own right? I am recognized, I suppose, in my own right.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. ALDRICH. Then I desire to make some remarks upon this subject.

Mr. CULBERSON. I rise to a point of order.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Texas will state his point of order.

Mr. CULBERSON. It is that nothing is in order when the Senate is dividing. The rule is plain.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Mr. ALDRICH. Until the result is announced I think I am entitled to the floor.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair did not hear the Senator.

Mr. ALDRICH. I say, until the result is announced I think I am entitled to the floor. While the roll is being called no debate is in order, but that presents an entirely different question. I propose to discuss the question of the appeal from the decision of the Chair.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Rhode Island-
Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President-

Mr. ALDRICH. Mr. President, I make the point that I am entitled to the floor.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. ALDRICH. I desire to discuss this appeal in my own right.

I have no question whatever that the decision made by the Senate is a correct decision. The RECORD read by the Senator from Wisconsin discloses plainly that the question decided in that case was almost the precise question decided in this case, which was that a call of the roll having disclosed the presence of a quorum no point of the absence of a quorum may be made until business has intervened. I made the point upon the distinct ground that debate was not business, and the point was sustained by the Senate. I therefore believe that the appeal from the decision of the Chair should not be sustained, and I move that the appeal be laid on the table.

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President

Mr. KEAN. A motion to lay on the table is not debatable. The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President, "a question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, except when the Senate is dividing," page 20, Rule XX. The Senator from Rhode

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Wisconsin appealed from the decision of the Chair. The question then was, Senate? Upon that question a division was demanded. Under the rule, the Chair asked those in favor of sustaining the decision of the Chair to rise and stand until they were counted. Twenty-eight voted in the affirmative.

Mr. ALDRICH. But no announcement had been made.
The VICE-PRESIDENT. No announcement had been made.
Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President-

Mr. HOPKINS. Mr. President

Mr. CULBERSON. I submit that of course no announcement had been made, because the Chair had not called for the negative vote, and the Senator from Rhode Island undertook to interrupt the division. I call him to order.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Chair is of the opinion that there can be no interruption during a division, under the rule. Mr. ALDRICH. I ask that the rule may be read. The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Secretary will read the rule. Mr. CULBERSON. It is Rule XX, on page 20. The SECRETARY. Rule XX, page 20:

A question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, except when the Senate is dividing, and, unless submitted to the Senate, shall be decided by the presiding officer without debate, subject to an appeal to the Senate. When an appeal is taken, any subsequent question of order which may arise before the decision of such appeal shall be decided by the presiding officer without debate; and every appeal therefrom shall be decided at once, and without debate; and any appeal may be laid on the table without prejudice to the pending proposition, and thereupon shall be held as afirming the decision of the presiding officer.

Mr. ALDRICH. I did not raise a question of order. I made no suggestion of that kind.

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President, I rise to a point of order. The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator will state his point of order.

Mr. CULBERSON. It is that the Senator from Rhode Island is out of order when the Senate is dividing. I call attention to the fact that he was discussing a point of order as well as raising one.

Mr. ALDRICH. I beg the Senator's pardon. I never discussed the point of order. I was proposing to address the Senate upon the question of the appeal from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. CULBERSON. That is the point of order.

Mr. ALDRICH. I expressly stated that when I rose and asked the Presiding Officer to recognize me in my own right, which he did. I was not raising any point of order.

Mr. OVERMAN. The Senator can not speak when the Senate is dividing. Mr. ALDRICH. There is no rule that prevents it. After the roll call has been started and there has been a response debate is shut off. But up to that time debate is in order always upon any question that is debatable.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. The Senator has moved to lay the appeal on the table.

Mr. ALDRICH. I did, afterwards.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. That is not debatable.

Mr. ALDRICH. No; it is not debatable.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island to lay on the table the appeal from the decision of the Chair.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. On that I ask for a division. There were on a division-ayes 33, noes S. Mr. ALDRICH. I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered, and the Secretary proceeded to call the roll. Mr. DILLINGHAM (when his name was called). I transfer my general pair with the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. TILLMAN] to my colleague [Mr. STEWART] and will vote. I vote "yea."

Mr. OVERMAN (when his name was called). I am paired with the Senator from California [Mr. PERKINS]. The roll call was concluded.

Mr. CLARK of Wyoming (after having voted in the affirmative). I have a general pair with the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. STONE]. As that Senator is absent, I transfer the pair to the Senator from Nevada [Mr. NIXON] and will allow my vote to stand.

Mr. WARREN (after having voted in the affirmative). I announced early in the evening that I have a general pair with the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. MONEY], but that I would transfer the pair to the Senator from Maine [Mr. FRYE]. 1

again make that announcement and will say that may stand for the present session.

The roll call was concluded.

Mr. ALDRICH. I ask that the names of the Senators who have not voted be called.

The VICE-PRESIDENT.

The Secretary will call the names

of the Senators who have not voted. The Secretary read the names of the Senators not voting. Mr. CLAY. I am paired with the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE], but I believe I will take the liberty of voting for the purpose of making a quorum. I vote "nay."

Mr. OVERMAN. I am paired with the Senator from California [Mr. PERKINS]. As announced heretofore, I transfer my pair to the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. CRANE] and I will vote. I vote "nay."

The result was announced-yeas 35, nays 13, as follows:

So the appeal from the decision of the Chair was laid on the table.

BUSINESS INTERESTS OPPOSE THE BILL.

The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senator from Wisconsin will proceed.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Mr. President, I would not weary the Senate with statistics. I received in my mail this morning a letter which I am sure will be interesting in connection with this discussion. It is dated at New York, May 28, 1908, and is as follows:

SIR: To enact the Aldrich-Vreeland currency bill would be to place machinery of inflation in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury and the banks and would lead to the greatest political corruption since Rome. We have seen the results of the infallible judgment of an illadvised Secretary of the Treasury, who, in 1996, by the use of United States Treasury funds to facilitate the importation of gold "to relieve the monetary stringency," inflated the markets of the country and intensified the force of the panic and depression which had to come. We are now suffering from the effects of too much Secretary of the Treasury.

Our present currency system, one which furnishes us with the cheapest and most economic circulating medium yet used by any nation, sufficient for our daily needs, yet forcing a period of inflation to take place upon a currency based dollar for dollar on gold, has worked properly and efficiently. It forced the Stanard Oil crowd to their knees, and made the stock gamblers and commodity speculators let go. It has checked the inflation, which if fed with more currency would have gone on expanding till it exhausted the loanable capital of the country and even impaired its operating capital, resulting in a greater congestion of capital and a period of stagnation and depression from which it would have taken years to recover and during which labor would have been scantily employed. This system has reduced the cost of the necessities of life, making the speculators, who by hoarding had forced them to exorbitant figures, sell out, and is now protecting us from a long depression. The common people have benefited, and it is the only protection they have. And now it is to be taken away by the Aldrich-Vreeland political emergency currency bill. The experiences of last fall are infinitely to be preferred to a system which would promote the concentration of wealth in the hands of those managing the new currency and increase the burdens of the common people for the benefit of speculators and prolong these periods of depression.

The men who are urging this new bill might as well urge a currency to be issued by the Standard Oil, redeemed by the steel trust, secured by a prior lien on the New York Stock Exchange, and to bear on its face the picture of John D. Rockefeller and on its back the inspiring motto "Let us alone." It is to be remembered that those who furnish the security get the currency, and what hindrance would a 5 per cent, or even 10 per cent, tax be to those who were making 100 per cent out of booming the markets" and unloading on a financially ignorant public. The experience of the German nation has proven the fallacy of a tax restricting speculators. It is only the fear of an experience like last fall that forces the bankers to conduct sound business; remove that fear and we will have the wildest inflation this country has ever known. Respectfully, A. N. JORDAN,

No. 211 East Thirty-third street, New York City.

Hon. ROBERT LA FOLLETTE,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

SIR: No legitimate business needs an elastic currency. There is no depression of legitimate business needing an emergency currency. There is no demand from the common people for an emergency currency. There is a demand from the allies of Wall Street-stock speculation gambling that asks for this ruinous emergency currency to enable the haves to issue shinplaster money and loan it for usury to the shorts. Divorce the Treasury from the Wall street gambling syndicate and there will be no panics, as then each will have to depend upon his own resources for means to meet obligations, and thus, being on a level with the common citizen, the chance of using the United States Treasury to rescue the market from ruin will be impossible.

Panies must cease, and just ordinary, common, everyday' failures will come and go. And those who gamble and lose will go under, and the rest of the world go on and attend to the ordinary business of the day.

For the sake of all legitimate business, fight this iniquitous emergency currency bill as the most vicious and ill-advised measure ever attempted to be foisted on the masses for the benefit only of the stockgambling class.

God grant that the honorable Senate may have wisdom and strength to preserve our beloved country from the baneful effects of this monumental effort to aid Wall street at the expense of all legitimate business enterprises of all the rest of the people.

So prayeth your humble servants.

PAUL BROTHERS.

Mr. WARREN. We can not hear the speaker.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DIXON in the chair). The Senator from Wyoming asks the Senator from Wisconsin to speak louder. He says he can not hear.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. I will endeavor to be heard. Of course it would be very easy for the Senator to come over here on this side and get a nearer seat. I know he does not want to miss any of this, and I want to save my voice as much as possible. It might add to the interest of this occasion, as there has been no discussion of any constitutional question involved here, and, as that is always a favorite question with this body, to consider for a few moments in this connection some of the defects of our Constitution as viewed by one of the great jurists of the country. As I desire to keep my audience here fresh and interested, I will vary the programme a little and present to them an address that I am sure it will be quite worth their while to hear.

SOME DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. AN ADDRESS TO THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA, DELIVERED ON APRIL 27, 1906.

[By the Hon. Walter Clark, Chief Justice of North Carolina.] Philadelphia is one of the great cities of the world. To the student of history who remembers that Nineveh and Palmyra. Carthage and Thebes, and many another, have been great, populous, and wealthy, and then have passed entirely away from the thoughts and lips of men, Philadelphia has yet a glory that shall live always. Mohanimedanism has its Mecca, the cradle and the acme of its hopes. Jew and Christian alike turn to Jerusalem. But to the utmost verge of earth, and to the last syllable of recorded time, in whatever language liberty and freedom shall be honored among men, in whatever accents government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall be asserted, there Philadelphia shall be remembered as the cradle of its birth. Her streets at some far distant day may be overgrown with grass and her ruined and tottering buildings may become the home of bats and birds of night; but around her name will linger a luster that shall never depart.

Here, on July 4, 1776, was proclaimed Liberty throughout all the land and to all the inhabitants thereof." And here, too, eleven years later, was another notable event, when on September 17, 1787, was issued to the world the Constitution of these United States. It is of the latter its defects and the necessity for its revision "-that I shall speak to you to-night.

Just here it is well to call to mind the radical difference between these two conventions. That which met in 1776 was frankly democratic. Success in its great and perilous undertaking was only possible with the support of the people. The Great Declaration was an appeal to the masses. It declared that all men were "created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights- among them life. liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-to secure which rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and that when government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and institute a new government in such form as shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." Never was the right of revolution more clearly asserted or that government existed for the sole benefit of the people, who were declared to be equal and endowed with the right to change their government at will when it did not subserve their welfare or obey their wishes. Not a word about property. Everything was about the people. The man was more than the dollar then. And the convention was in earnest. Every member signed the Declaration, which was unanimously voted. As Doctor Franklin pertinently observed, it behooved them to hang together or they would hang separately."

The convention which met in 1787 was as reactionary as the other had been revolutionary and democratie. It had its beginning in commercial negotiations between the States. Wearied with a long war, enthusiasm for liberty somewhat relaxed by the pressing need to earn the comforts and necessities of life whose stores had been diminished, and oppressed by the ban upon prosperity

caused by the uncertainties and impotence of the existing government of the Confederacy, the Convention of 1787 came together. Ignoring the maxim that government should exist only by the consent of the governed, it sat with closed doors, that no breath of the popular will should affect their decisions. To free the members from all responsibility members were prohibited to make copies of any resolution or to correspond with constituents or others about matters pending before the convention. Any record of yeas and nays was forbidden, but one was kept without the knowledge of the Convention. The journal was kept secret, a vote to destroy it fortunately failed, and Mr. Madison's copy was published only after the lapse of forty-nine years, when every member had passed beyond human accountability. Only twelve States were ever represented, and one of these withdrew before the final result was reached. Of its sixty-five members only fifty-five ever attended, and so far from being unanimous, only thirty-nine signed the Constitution, and some actively opposed its ratification by their own States. That the Constitution thus framed was reactionary was a matter of course. There was, as we know, some talk of a royal government with Frederick, Duke of York, second son of George the Third, as king. Hamilton, whose subsequent great services as Secretary of the Treasury have crowned him with a halo, and whose tragic death has obliterated the memory of his faults, declared himself in favor of the English form of government with its heriditary executive and its House of Lords, which he denominated "a most noble institution.' Failing in that, he advocated an Executive elected by Congress for life, Senators and judges for life, and governors of States to be appointed by the President. Of these he secured, as it has proved, the most important from his standpoint, the creation of judges for life. The Convention was aware that a constitution on Hamilton's lines could not secure ratification by the several States. But the Constitution adopted was made as undemocratic as possible, and was very far from responding to the condition, laid down in the Declaration of 1776, that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Hamilton, in a speech to the Convention, stated that the members were agreed that "we need to be rescued from the democracy." They were rescued. Thomas Jefferson unfortunately was absent as our minister to France and took no part in the Convention, though we owe largely to him the compromise by which the first ten amendments were agreed to be adopted in exchange for ratification by several States which otherwise would have been withheld.

In truth, the consent of the governed was not to be asked. In the new Government the will of the people was not to control and was little to be consulted. Of the three great departments of the Governmentlegislative, executive, and judiciary—the people were intrusted with the election only of the House of Representatives, to wit, only onesixth of the Government, even if that House had been made equal in authority and power with the Senate, which was very far from being the case. The Declaration of 1776 was concerned with the rights of man. The Convention of 1787 entirely ignored them. There was no Bill of Rights and the guaranties of the great rights of freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, liberty of the people to assemble, and right of petition, the right to bear arms, exemption from soldiers being quartered upon the people, exemption from general warrants, the right of trial by jury and a grand jury, protection of the law of the land and protection from seizure of private propety for other than public use, and then only upon just compensation; the prohibition of excessive bail or cruel and unusual punishment, and the reservation to the people and the States of all rights not granted by the Constitution-all these matters of the utmost importance to the rights of the people were omitted, and were inserted by the first ten amendments only because it was necessary to give assurances that such amendments would be adopted in order to secure the ratification of the Constitution by the several States.

Its

The Constitution was so far from being deemed satisfactory, even to the people and in the circumstances of the time for which it was framed, that, as already stated, only eleven States voted for its adoption by the Convention, and only thirty-nine members out of fifty-five attending signed it, some members subsequently opposing its ratification. ratification by the conventions in the several States was carried with the greatest difficulty, and in no State was it submitted to a vote of the people themselves. Massachusetts ratified only after a close vote and with a demand for amendments; South Carolina and New Hampshire also demanded amendments, as also did Virginia and New York, both of which voted ratification by the narrowest majorities and reserving to themselves the right to withdraw, and two States rejected the Constitution and subsequently ratified only after Washington had been elected and inaugurated-matters in which they had no share.

George Washington was president of the Convention, it is true, but as such was debarred from sharing in the debates. His services, great as they were, had been military, not civil, and he left no impress upon the instrument of union so far as known. Yet it was admitted that but for his popularity and influence the Constitution would have failed of ratification by the several States, especially in Virginia. Indeed, but for his great influence the Convention would have adjourned without putting its final hand to the Constitution, as it came very near doing. Even his great influence would not have availed but for the overwhelming necessity for some form of government as a substitute for the rickety "Articles of Confederation," which were utterly inefficient and whose longer retention threatened civil war.

An instrument so framed, adopted with such difficulty and ratified after such efforts, and by such narrow margins, could not have been a fair and full expression of the consent of the governed. The men that made it did not deem it perfect. Its friends agreed to sundry amendments, ten in number, which were adopted by the first Congress that met. The assumption by the new Supreme Court of a power not contemplated, even by the framers of the Constitution, to drag a State before it as defendant in an action by a citizen of another State, caused the enactment of the eleventh amendment. The unfortunate method prescribed for the election of President nearly caused a civil war in 1801 and forced the adoption of the twelfth amendment, and three others were brought about as the result of the great civil war. The Convention of 1787 recognized itself that the defects innate in the Constitution and which would be developed by experience and the lapse of time, would require amendments, and that instrument prescribed two different methods by which amendments could be made.

Our Federal Constitution was adopted one hundred and nineteen years ago. In that time every State has radically revised its constitution, and most of them several times. Indeed, the constitution of New York requires that the question of a constitutional convention shall be submitted to its people at least once every twenty years. The object is that the organic law shall keep abreast of the needs and wants of the people and shall represent the will and progress of to-day, and shall not, as is the case with the Federal Constitution, be hampered by provisions

deemed best by the divided counsels of a small handful of men in providing for the wants of the Government of nearly a century and a quarter ago. Had those men been gifted with divine foresight and created a Constitution fit for this day and its development, it would have been unsuited for the needs of the times in which it was fashioned.

When the Constitution was adopted in 1787 it was intended for 3,000,000 of people, scattered along the Atlantic slope, from Massachusetts to the southern boundary of Georgia.

We are now trying to make it do duty for very nearly 100,000,000, from Maine to Manila, from Panama and Porto Rico to the Pole. Then our population was mostly rural, for three years later, at the First Census, in 1790, we had but five towns in the whole Union which had as many as 6,500 inhabitants each, and only two others had over 4,000. Now we have the second largest city on the globe, with over 4,000,000 of inhabitants, and many that have passed the half million mark, some of them of over a million population. Three years later, in 1790, we had 75 post-offices with $37,000 annual post-office expenditures. Now we have 75,000 post-offices, 35,000 rural delivery routes, and a post-office appropriation of nearly $200,000,000.

During the first ten years the total expenditures of the Federal Government, including payments on the Revolutionary debts, and including even the pensions, averaged $10,000,000 annually. Now the expenditures are 75 times as much. When the Constitution was adopted Virginia was easily the first State in influence, population, and wealth, having one-fourth the population of the entire Union. North Carolina was third, and New York, which then stood fifth, now has double the population of the whole country at that date, and several other States have now a population greater than the original Union, whose very names were then unheard and over whose soil the savage and the buffalo roamed unmolested. Steamboats, railroads, gas, electricity (except as a toy in Franklin's hands), coal mines, petroleum, and a thousand other things which are a part of our lives to-day, were undiscovered. Corporations, which now control the country and its government, were then so few that not till four years later, in 1791, was the first bank incorporated (in New York), and the charter for the second bank was only obtained by the subtlety of Aaron Burr, who concealed the banking privileges in an act incorporating a water company--and corporations have had an affinity for water ever since.

Had the Constitution been perfectly adapted to the needs and wishes of the people of that day, we would still have outgrown it. Time has revealed flaws in the original instrument, and it was, as might be expected, wholly without safeguards against that enormous growth of corporations, and even of individuals, in wealth and power, which has subverted the control of the Government.

The glaring defect in the Constitution was that it was not democratic. It gave, as already pointed out, to the people-to the governed-the selection of only one-sixth of the Government, to wit, onehalf-by far the weaker half-of the legislative department. The other half, the Senate, was made elective at second hand by the State legislatures, and the Senators were given not only longer terms, but greater power, for all Presidential appointments and treaties were subjected to confirmation by the Senate.

The President was intended to be elected at a still further remove from the people, by being chosen by electors, who, it was expected, would be selected by the State legislatures. The President thus was to be selected at third hand, as it were. In fact, down till after the memorable contest between Adams, Clay, Crawford, and Jackson, in 1824, in the majority of the States the Presidential electors were chosen by the State legislatures, and they were so chosen by South Carolina till after the civil war, and, in fact, by Colorado in 1876. The intention was that the electors should make independent choice, but public opinion forced the transfer of the choice of electors from the legislatures to the ballot box, and then made of them mere figureheads, with no power but to voice the will of the people. who thus captured the executive department. That department, with the House of Representatives, mark to-day the extent of the share of the people in this Government.

The judiciary were placed a step still further removed from the popular choice. The judges were to be selected at fourth hand by a President (intended to be selected at third hand) and subject to confirmation by a Senate chosen at second hand. And to make the judiciary absolutely impervious to any consideration of the "consent of the governed," they are appointed for life.

It will be seen at a glance that a Constitution so devised was intended not to express, but to suppress, or at least disregard, the wishes and the consent of the governed. It was admirably adapted for what has come to pass the absolute domination of the Government by the "business interests" which, controlling vast amounts of capital and intent on more, can secure the election of Senators by the small constituencies, the legislatures which elect them, and can dictate the appointment of the judges, and if they fail in that, the Senate, chosen under their auspices, can defeat the nomination. Should the President favor legislation and the House of Representatives pass the bill, the Senate, with its majority chosen by corporation influences, can defeat it; and if by any chance it shall yield to the popular will and pass the bill, as was the case with the income tax, there remains the judiciary, who have assumed, without any warrant, express or implied in the Constitution, the power to declare any act unconstitutional at their own will and without responsibility to anyone.

The people's part in the Government in the choice of the House of Representatives, even when reenforced by the Executive, whose election they have captured, is an absolute nullity in the face of the Senate and the judiciary, in whose selection the people have no voice. This, therefore, is the Government of the United States-a Government by Senate and judges--that is to say, frankly, by whatever power can control the selection of Senators and judges. What is that power? We know that it is not the American people.

Let us not be deceived by forms, but look at the substance. Government rests not upon forms, but upon a true reply to the question, "Where does the governing power reside?" The Roman legions bore to the last day of the Empire upon their standards the words, "The Senate and the Roman People," long centuries after the real power had passed from the curia and the comitia to the barracks of the Pretorian Guards, and when there was no will in Rome save that of their master. There were still Tribunes of the People, and Consuls, and a Senate, and the title of a Republic; but the real share of the people in the Roman Government was the donation to them of "bread and circuses" by their tyrants.

Years after the victor of Marengo had been crowned Emperor and the sword of Austerlitz had become the one power in France, the French coins and official documents still bore the inscription of "French Republic "-" République Francaise."

In England to-day there is a monarchy in form, but we know that in truth the real Government of England is vested in a single House of Parliament, elected by the people, under a restricted suffrage; that the real Executive is not the King, but the Prime Minister and his cabinet, practically elected by the House of Commons and holding office at the will of the majority in that House; that the King has not even the veto power, except nominally, since it has not been exercised in a single instance for more than two hundred years, and that the sole function of the House of Lords-a club of rich men representing great vested interests-is in the exercise of a suspensive veto (of which the King has been deprived), which is exercised only till the Commons make up their mind the bill shall pass-when the House of Lords always gives way, as the condition upon which their continued existence rests. So in this country we retain the forms of a republic. We still choose our President and the House of Representatives by the people; but the real power does not reside in them or in the people. It rests with those great "interests" which select the majority of the Senate and the judges.

This being the situation, the sole remedy possible is by amendment of the Constitution to make it democratic and place the selection of these preponderating bodies in the hands of the people.

First, the election of Senators should be given to the people. Even then consolidated wealth will secure some of the Senators; but it would not be able, as now, at all times to count with absolute certainty upon a majority of the Senate as its creatures. Five times has a bill, proposing such amendment to the Constitution, passed the House of Representatives by a practically unanimous vote, and each time it has been lost in the Senate; but never by a direct vote. It has always been disposed of by the chloroform process of referring the bill to a committee, which never reports it back, and never will. It is too much

to expect that the great corporations which control a majority of the Senate will ever voluntarily transfer to the people their profitable and secure hold upon supreme power by permitting the passage of an amendment to elect Senators by the people. The only hope is in the alternative plan of amendment, authorized by the Constitution, to wit, the call of a constitutional convention upon the application of two-thirds of the States, to wit, thirty_States. More than that number have already instructed in favor of an amendment to elect Senators by the people.

It may be recalled here that in the convention of 1787 Pennsylvania did vote for the election of Senators by the people. A strong argument used against this was that the farming interest, being the largest, would control the House and that the Senate could only be given to the commercial interests by making its members elective by the legis latures which was prophetic-though the deciding influence was the fear of the small States that if the Senate was elected by the people its membership would be based on population.

It is high time that we had a constitutional convention, after the lapse of near a century and a score of years. The same reasons which have time and again caused the individual States to amend their constitutions imperatively require a convention to adjust the Constitution of the Union to the changed conditions of the times and to transfer to the people themselves that control of the Government which is now exercised for the profit and benefit of the "interests." Those interests, with all the power of their money and the large part of the press which they own or control, will resist the call of such a convention. They will be aided, doubtless, by some of the smaller States who may fear a loss of their equal representation in the Senate. But in truth and justice it may be that there might be some modification now in that respect without injury to the smaller States. There is no longer any reason why Delaware, or Nevada, or Rhode Island should have as many Senators as New York, or l'ennsylvania, or Illinois. It would be enough to grant to every State having a million of inhabitants or less one Senator, and to allot to each State having over one million of inhabitants an additional Senator for every million above one million and for a fractional part if over three-quarters of a million. This, while not putting the Senate frankly on the basis of population, would remove the dissatisfaction with the present unjust ratio and would quiet the opposition to the admission of new States whose area and development entitle them to self-government, but whose population does not entitle them to two Senators.

The election of President is now made by the people, who have captured it. though the Constitution did not intend the people should have any choice in naming the Executive. The dangerous and unsafe plan adopted in 1787 was changed in consequence of the narrowly-averted disaster in 1801. But the method in force still leaves much to be desired. It readily lends itself to the choice of a minority candidate. It is an anomaly that 1.100 votes in New York (as in 1884) should swing 70 electoral votes (35 from one candidate to the other) and thus decide the result. The consequence is that while, nominally, any citizen of the Republic is eligible to the Presidency, only citizens of two or three of the larger States, with doubtful electoral votes, are in fact eligible. All others are barred. For proof of this, look at the history of our Presidential elections. For the first forty years of the Union the Presidents came from two States-Virginia and Massachusetts.

Then there followed a period when the growing West requiring recognition, Tennessee, Ohio, and New York commanded the situation for the next sixteen years. The Mexican war gave us a soldier who practically represented no State, and was succeeded by a New Yorker. Then for the only time in our history "off States" had a showing, and Pennsylvania and New Hampshire had their innings. Since then the successful candidates have been again strictly limited to "pivotal States "New York in the East and Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio in the West.

This condition is unsatisfactory. The magnetic Blaine from Maine was defeated, as was Bryan from Nebraska. Had the former hailed from New York and the latter from Illinois, the electoral votes and influence of those States would have secured their election.

It would be dangerous, and almost a certain provocation of civil war, to change the election of President to a per capita vote by the whole Union. Then a charge of a fraudulent vote at any precinct or voting place, however remote, might affect the result; and as frauds would most likely occur in those States where the majorities are largest-as in Pennsylvania or Texas, Ohio or Georgia-a contest would always be certain. Whereas, now, frauds in States giving large majorities, unless of great enough magnitude to change the electoral vote of the whole State, can have no effect. The remedy is, preserving the electoral vote system as now, and giving the smaller States as now, the advantage of electoral votes to represent their Senators, to divide the electoral vote of each State according to the popular vote for each candidate, giving each his pro rata of the electoral vote on that basis, the odd elector being apportioned to the candidate having the largest fraction. Thus, in New York, Mr. Blaine would have gotten 17 electoral votes and Mr. Cleveland 18. Other States would have also divided, more or less

evenly; but the result would be that the choice of President would no longer be restricted to two or three States, as in our past history, and is likely to be always the case as long as the whole electoral vote of two or three large pivotal States must swing to one side or the other and determine the result. This change would avoid the present evil of large sums being spent to carry the solid electoral vote of "pivotal States, for there would cease to be pivotal" States. At the same time this would avoid the open gulf into which a per capita ballot by the whole Union would lead us. While the electoral vote of a State should be divided, pro rata, according to the popular vote for each candidate, it is essential that each State should vote as one district, since its boundaries are unchangeable. To permit the legislature of each State to divide it into electoral districts would simply open up competition in the art of gerrymandering.

By the convention of 1787 the term of the President was originally fixed at seven years and he was made ineligible for reelection. This was reduced to four years by a compromise that he could be reelected without limitation. This was done in the interest of those who favored a strong government and a long tenure. Washington imposed a limitation by his example which will not always be binding. An amendment making the term six years and the President ineligible to reelection has long been desired by a large portion of the public. Indeed, when the constitutional convention of the Union shall assemble, as it must do some day, to remodel our Constitution to fit it to face the dangers and conform to the views of the people of this age, with the aid of our experience in the past, it is more than probable that the powers of the Executive will be more restricted. His powers are now greater than those of any sovereign in Europe. The real restrictions upon Executive power at present are not in constitutional provisions, but in the Senate and Judiciary, which often negative the popular will, which he represents more accurately than they.

And now we come to the most important of the changes necessary to place the Government of the Union in the hands of the people. By far the most serious defect and danger in the Constitution is the appointment of judges for life, subject to confirmation by the Senate. It is a far more serious matter than it was when the Convention of 1787 framed the Constitution. A proposition was made in the Convention-as we now know from Mr. Madison's Journal-that the judges should pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. This was defeated June 5, receiving the vote of only two States. It was renewed no less than three times, i. e., on June 6, July 21, and finally again for the fourth time on August 15, and though it had the powerful support of Mr. Madison and Mr. James Wilson, at no time did it receive the votes of more than three States. On this last occasion (August 15) Mr. Mercer thus summed up the thought of the Convention: "He disapproved of the doctrine, that the judges, as expositors of the Constitution, should have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be incontrovertible."

Prior to the Convention, the courts of four States-New Jersey, Rhode Island, Virginia, and North Carolina-had expressed an opinion that they could hold acts of the legislature unconstitutional. This was a new doctrine never held before (nor in any other country since) and met with strong disapproval. In Rhode Island the movement to remove the offending judges was stopped only on a suggestion that they could be "dropped" by the legislature at the annual election, which was done. The decisions of these four State courts were recent and well known to the Convention. Mr. Madison and Mr. Wilson favored the new doctrine of the paramount judiciary, doubtless deeming it a safe check upon legislation, to be operated only by lawyers. They attempted to get it into the Federal Constitution in its least objectionable shape-the judicial veto before final passage of an act, which would thus save time and besides would enable the legislature to avoid the objections raised. But even in this diluted form, and though four times presented by these two very able and influential members, this suggestion of a judicial vote at no time received the votes of more than one-fourth of the States.

The subsequent action of the Supreme Court in assuming the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional was without a line in the Constitution to authorize it, either expressly or by implication. The Constitution recited carefully and fully the matters over which the courts should have jurisdiction, and there is nothing, and after the above vote four times refusing jurisdiction there could be nothing, indicating any power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and void.

Had the Convention given such power to the courts, it certainly would not have left its exercise final and unreviewable. It gave the Congress power to override the veto of the President, though that veto was expressly given, thus showing that in the last analysis the will of the people, speaking through the legislative power, should govern. Had the Convention supposed the courts would assume such power, it would certainly have given Congress some review over judicial action and certainly would not have placed the judges irretrievably beyond "the consent of the governed" and regardless of the popular will by making them appointive, and further clothing them with the undemocratic prerogative of tenure for life.

Such power does not exist in any other country and never has. It is therefore not essential to our security. It is not conferred by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, the Convention, as we have seen, after the fullest debate, four times, on four several days, refused by a decisive vote to confer such power. The judges not only have never exercised such power in England, where there is no written constitution, but they do not exercise it in France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, or in any other country which, like them, has a written constitution. A more complete denial of popular control of this Government could not have been conceived than the placing such unreviewable power in the hands of men not elected by the people, and holding office for life. The legal-tender act, the financial policy of the Government, was invalidated by one court and then validated by another, after a change in its personnel. Then the income tax, which had been held constitutional by the court for an hundred years, was again so held, and then by a sudden change of vote by one judge it was held unconstitutional, nullified and set at naught, though it had passed by a nearly unanimous vote both Houses of Congress, containing many lawyers who were the equals if not the superiors of the vacillating judge, and had been approved by the President and voiced the will of the people. This was all negatived (without any warrant in the Constitution for the court to set aside an act of Congress) by the vote of one judge; and thus $100,000,000, and more, of annual taxation, was transferred from those most able to bear it and placed upon the backs of those who already carried more than their fair share of burdens of government. Under an untrue assumption of authority given by thirty-nine dead men, one man nullified the action of Congress and the President and the will of 75,000,000 of living people, and in the thirteen years since has taxed