and those which suit the Republican managers of the Senate have been roundly denounced over here. Thus, upon high Republican authority, the conference report embodies a measure which is 50 per cent House infamy and 50 per cent Senate infamy, thereby making the whole of it utterly bad. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

I once heard the late distinguished Senator John J. Ingalls describe Paradise Lost as "that matchless epic poem which everybody praises and nobody reads;" and so we have here a currency bill for which every Republican Member will vote, but in the provisions of which not one of them honestly believes. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I might go further and say it is a bill which not one Member on the other side, save the conferees, has read. It is the most extraordinary bill ever presented to the House of Representatives, under circumstances quite as extraordinary as the bill itself. As far as the Vreeland or House bill is concerned, it does not figure in this measure, as I view it; and no Member on that side may vote for this conference report under the false assumption that he is getting something for which the House Republicans have stood. Not a bit of it; for, gentlemen, we have here, in all its essential provisions, the Aldrich currency bill, pure and simple-that “abominable makeshift" which the House Republicans have vowed they would never support. [Applause on the Democratic side.] And yet the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BURTON], for whose intellectual integrity and independence of spirit this House has so great admiration, has yielded. "Swearing he would ne'er consent," he, with the rest, "has consented." [Applause on the Democratic side.]

THERE IS NO EMERGENCY.

Mr. Speaker, it may confidently be predicted that there is not a single great bank in America capable of taking care of itself in time of financial disturbance that will be induced to join a currency association as provided by the Vreeland clause of this composite bill for the purpose of getting emergency currency. The country will have to be in an unhappy state, indeed, to cause the formation of such associations. The only part of this bill that will ever be appealed to for relief by the banks of the country will be section 3, which prescribes State, county, and municipal bonds as a basis for so-called emergency issues. And, Mr. Speaker, why should we have an emergency currency? There is no emergency. There is no likelihood of any emergency. A hundred bankers from every section of the country appeared before the Committee on Banking and Currency; and, besides these, many representatives of mercantile and industrial associations, as well as financial experts and text-book writers.

Only one of all these was willing to suggest the possibility of an emergency within the next ten years. Moreover, should a disturbance come next fall, as has been hinted here as an excuse for precipitancy, it has been mathematically demonstrated that, owing to clerical and mechanical requirements, no relief could possibly come from this bill, for the reason that more than twelve months, probably two years, will be required by the Treasury Department to get fully prepared to issue the emergency notes for which it provides. Then why present this crude and ill-digested measure and rush it ruthlessly through the House of Representatives without a moment's time for orderly consideration?

Mr. BURGESS. The emergency is political.

Mr. GLASS. Precisely so. The only emergency is the necessity which party leaders imagine confronts them to "do something," even though it be the wrong thing.

PERMANENT REFORMATION NEEDED.

This bill is utterly wrong in principle, as any bill must be which merely provides an emergency currency. What the country needs is not a makeshift legislative deformity, designed to help out a desperate situation, but a careful revision and a wise reformation of the entire banking and currency system of the United States whereby panics may be prevented, or, if not prevented, under which their violence may be diminished and the evils consequent greatly abated. I shall not soon forget the earnestness and the deliberate vehemence of that great banker of the West, Mr. James B. Forgan, who has spent his life in the study and practical application of banking principles in this country and abroad, when asked by a member of the Banking and Currency Committee if he "believed there was need of emergency currency legislation at this time." "I do not," was the reply; ".and I do not think that a condition can ever exist in this country or any other country that will warrant the use or the issue of anything that could bear such an infernal name as emergency currency.""

And yet, Mr. Speaker, that is precisely the sort of bill this is which will presently be put through this House under whip and spur, without adequate consideration, with the least possible opportunity for debate, without being read even by a single

Member of the side which must assume full responsibility for its enactment into law. Why, sir, the Republican conferees themselves are not entirely familiar with the measure; there are some things omitted and some which appear that are inscrutable to gentlemen who have signed this report and asked the House to accept this bill. And if the conferees do not know, how much less do those Members of the House who have been summoned to their seats in such haste as to have scarcely recovered their breath?

SMALL BANKS ENDANGERED.

I have said that no great bank will enter, a currency association under the Vreeland clauses of this bill "for the purpose of getting emergency currency." There is, however, a cunning inducement here to strong banks to enter in order to dominate such associations; for the bill practically puts it within the power of three men, constituting a majority of the managing board of a currency association, to strangle the very existence out of the weaker banks and to practically appropriate the assets of the weaker banks. The bill provides that— The association

Which means, in the last analysis three members of the managing board

may, at any time, require of any of its constituent banks a deposit of additional securities or commercial paper to secure circulation; and in case of the failure of such bank to make such deposit, the association may, after ten days' notice to the bank, sell the securities and paper already in its hands.

What would be easier in time of stress than for the managers of currency associations, representing the one or two strong banks, to seize upon an exigency as an excuse to squeeze the weaker banks and, by foreclosure, get possession of their most desirable assets? In this matter of foreclosure three men would be supreme. The managing board is charged with plenary power. There is no appeal from its order and no escape from the craft, the cupidity, or avarice of its members. THE VREELAND "INIQUITIES."

In part, Mr. Speaker, this is the same Vreeland bill which was denounced by high Republican authority at the other end of the Capitol for its inadaptability to practical uses, and yet It is the same Vreeland bill all its freak provisions remain. which was assailed by powerful Republican Senators because it contained a sham clearing-house clause, which was not founded on real clearing-house usages; yet here is the same clearing-house clause, identical with the other, except for change of title to currency association."

This is the Vreeland bill of which it was said by Republican critics that seventeen States would be entirely precluded from constructing associations under its provisions; yet no alteration is made in this respect. This is the Vreeland bill, characterized with manifest impatience by Republican Senators as a scheme to compel undesirable partnerships in the banking business; yet the objectionable partnership feature is still there. This is the Vreeland bill which positively would not be accepted, or even seriously considered, by a Republican Senate because it put the Federal Government in the picayune and incongruous business of discounting commercial paper; yet the Senate is waiting to take it, with this and all other offensive features.

And the only apology given for thus paltering in a double sense with the interests of commerce and the stability of our financial fabric is the confident assertion of those who urged these objections and savagely pointed out these deficiencies that the Vreeland clauses of the bill are not worth the ink that was used in their writing, since they will never be invoked in time of panic or at any other time! And we are gravely told, amid Republican applause, that this is constructive statesmanship, that the Republican party "does things."

THE ALDRICH "INFAMIES."

In its other and larger part, Mr. Speaker, this hybrid bill embodies the essential features of the Aldrich bill. Describing the Aldrich bill before the House Committee of Banking and Currency, Mr. Gage, late Secretary of the Treasury, said: I have no sympathy with it at all. I do not think it is curative. I do not think it is curative of our evils. At best it is a patch or a panacea, if it even be a penacea, which once in ten years may be availed of when the country is in a condition of intense panic, and when many of the evils of the panic are developing and existing, and it may not be effective then. In the meantime, if adopted. it probably puts us to sleep. It is a gentle narcotic that woos the community into a false repose, I think, from which we will suffer many a nightmare. from which we will awaken at last in trouble and real agony.

This is the bill we have here, Mr. Speaker, with a gauze curtain erected before it by the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND], hoping to hide its deformities and to conceal from public gaze its economic decrepitude. It is even considerably worse than that Aldrich bill, so severely condemned by President McKinley's Secretary of the Treasury; for when Mr. Gage characterized the Aldrich bill as "a patch" or a

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mere panacea," the Senate had eliminated from it the dangerous railroad-bond feature which this conference report restores in a form which intensifies its threatening possibilities. We have here, gentlemen, the same Aldrich bill that House Republican leaders swore by Jupiter and all the gods with which mythology and Holy Writ acquaint us they would never enact into law; yet see how eager, how impatient you wait to answer roll call for this masterpiece of legislative legerdemain ! The conference report presents the Aldrich bill which some of was written in Wall street" when it "provided a you said bond market" for railroad securities; yet, with railroad bonds restored and the door opened wide to railroad stocks and every conceivable description of speculative security, you have the audacity to pretend that your action here to-day in voting for this bill involves you in no reprehensible inconsistency! We have here the independent bank feature of the Aldrich bill, put in, as many Republicans contended, to peculiarly benefit certain great financial institutions at the money centers; yet you will take that under the assumption that there is really something vital about the Vreeland provisions which may operate as an antidote to the Aldrich poison.

SOME OF ITS DEFICIENCIES.

Mr. Speaker, I might traverse this composite bill in each of its features-I mean separately as to the Vreeland provisions and then as to the Aldrich clauses-and point out its technical and actual deficiencies; but scientific disputation, involving the use of statistics and of terminology with which few persons, comparatively, are familiar, does not appeal to this House nor to the country, because not readily understood. I might point out how this bill weakens the security to depositors in banks in order to strengthen the security of the Government; how it threatens the credit of the National Treasury by inviting a raid on the gold reserve; how it gives the Government guaranty to private corporations; how it perpetuates and accentuates the rigidity of a bond-secured currency system which intelligent bankers, scarcely without exception, have denounced as a menace to the civilized world of finance."

"AWAKEN AT LAST IN AGONY."

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But what is the use? It is sufficient to point to the exhaustive hearings had before the House Committee on Banking and Currency to show that this bill, both as to its Vreeland features and its Aldrich features, has been condemned and utterly reprobated by the wisest bankers, the ablest merchants, the best financial experts, the most eminent text-book writers in America and abroad. The bill, should it pass and receive Executive sanction, will do infinite harm. It will, as Secretary Gage declared, prove a deception, or, to precisely quote him, “A narcotic, to woo the country into false repose," from which we will "awaken at last in trouble and real agony."

This is the bill, Mr. Speaker, which is about to be jammed through Congress under threat and stress. The only, or I should say the best, defense to the bill is the belief of the Rhode Island Senator that the Vreeland "iniquities" will never be invoked, and the equally confident prediction of the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND] that the Aldrich "infamies" are mere surface manifestations. [Applause on the Democratic side.] Mr. PUJO. Mr. Speaker, I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. OLLIE M. JAMES]. Mr. OLLIE M. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, our Republican friends told us this panic was a depositors' panic, and therefore you want to give to the depositors some relief and safeguard their deposits. If there has been one demand that has come to you, gentlemen, stronger than any other during this Congress it was by that vast throng who earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow and who deposit their little savings in banks. [Applause on Democratic side.] How have you answered that? You have answered that demand from that great body of the American people by reducing the reserve to 10 per cent and by giving no such safeguards as were proposed in the so-called La Follette amendment of the Senate, denying directors to loan to themselves as directors in other corporations the depositors' money, and by the provisions of this bill making the lien of the Government for emergency currency a superior and first lien upon the assets of the bank. [Applause on Democratic side.] Why, Mr. Speaker, not only that, but you have gone further. You not only turn over to the banks the Public Treasury, but you turn it over to one man. Let us see this provision here relative to the appointment of the Commission. The man who is the chairman of that Commission, and he will undoubtedly be the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. ALDRICH], has the right under this bill to do what? He has the right

To employ a disbursing officer and such secretaries, experts, stenographers, messengers, and such other assistants as shall be necessary to carry out the purposes for which said Commission was created.

And further, you do not limit his right to draw upon the Public Treasury. You turn over the Public Treasury—the money of the American people-to his audit, and his audit alone. Listen to this provision:

That a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of sections 17 and 18 of this act, and to pay the necessary expenses of the Commission and its members, is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated. Said appropriations shall be immediately available and shall be paid out on the audit and order of the chairman or acting chairman of said Commission, which audit and order shall be conclusive and binding upon all departments as to the correctness of the accounts of such Commission.

You do not even provide that the accounts shall be approved 3,000,000 idle men. by your commission. What will be the result? You have got full dinner pail, and that you would put them to work. Do you I know that you boasted you gave them a mean to put them to work under the provisions of this bill? [Applause on Democratic side; cries of "Oh" on the Republican side.]

Gentlemen, you will howl worse than that when the people get a chance at you next November. [Applause on Democratic side.] This commission feature not only does that, but it gives to them the right to go to such foreign countries as they may desire for the purpose of investigating currency. [Applause on Democratic side.]

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. HOBSON. Was the time of the interruption taken from the gentleman's time?

The SPEAKER. The Chair was not aware that the gentleman was interrupted, except as talkers love to be. Mr. PUJO. Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask if the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND] will not use some of his time now?

Mr. VREELAND. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. LOVERING] one minute.

Mr. LOVERING. Mr. Speaker, I have read this bill very carefully. I am satisfied that it is a better bill than any that has yet been presented to this House. [Applause on the Republican side.] The other day when the conference failed it happened that within twenty-four hours after the wages in our New England cotton mills were cut down from 10 to 17 per cent, and the cut was accepted. I hope that this measure may soon What was true of our cotbe the means of restoring wages. ton mills was likewise true of many of our other industries. I hope the conference report will be accepted. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. VREELAND. I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS).

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. Speaker, it is not difficult for gentlemen who wish to do so to conjure up in their minds objections to any bill. For instance, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. PUJO] has just stated what can be included in the security provided under this bill. As a matter of fact, this security is protected in exactly the same way that that behind clearing-house certificates has been protected for the last forty-five years. More than a billion of those certificates have been issued first and last, and there is not an instance of a failure. Banks always put up their best securities, not their poorest securities, when they are asking for clearing-house certificates, and they will do the same thing when asking for circulation under this bill. They have to go to their fellow-bankers who have to guarantee these certificates, and when a man has to guarantee somebody else's obligations he is pretty sure to see that he is amply protected before he will join in the guaranty. Therefore I conclude that that is one of the class of wild fancies which may be conjured up by anyone who wishes to object to a

measure.

I want to explain briefly some of the things in this bill which are different from those which were in the original Vreeland bill. It is proposed to allow the issue of circulation based on State, municipal, and county bonds to individual banks. That is to say, if a bank owns bonds of that character and prefers to take out the circulation as a separate organization, without But there are only going into the association, it may do so. $65,000,000 of those bonds held by all the national banks in the United States, and $16,000,000 of them are held by the banks in the city of New York, made up almost entirely of the bonds of the city of New York, which leaves less than $50,000,000 held by all the other banks in the United States. Therefore it will be impossible to take out more than 90 per cent of that amount-less than $45,000,000-unless the banks buy bonds or and it may be indulged in, but the original objection to the borrow them. Of course, borrowing bonds can not be prevented Aldrich bill and the strongest objection to it, in my opinion, was that objection which would have compelled banks to either invest their money, which should have been used for commercial purposes, in bonds, or which would have compelled them to buy

bonds when the emergency arose. That objection is entirely removed in this bill.

The average amount of the surplus held by national banks is about 50 per cent of their capital. The banks of this country have a capital of about $900,000,000, and the total capital and surplus amounts to a little over $1,400,000,000. The average bank, under this bill, would be able to do just this: Suppose a bank had a capital of $100,000 and a surplus of $50,000, which would be about the average. Under this bill it would be obliged to have 40 per cent of its capital in bond-secured circulation, which would be $40,000. It could then take out 30 per cent of its capital and surplus secured by commercial paper, which is circumscribed in its character; that would be $45,000 more, leaving $65,000 which could be taken out secured by other securities, such as State, county, and municipal bonds, and other bonds. With any other securities than the three I have mentioned the bank must go into the clearing house and can take out but 75 per cent of their value, and they must be guaranteed by every bank in the association.

Again, there is one feature which the gentleman from New York did not refer to that I wish to call your attention to, and that is the time limit placed upon the life of this bill. There has been a great deal of criticism because that was not done in the Vreeland bill. The time limit in this case is six years. A commission is provided for which is supposed to study this question from every standpoint, and if radical changes are necessary in our currency system, as many believe, the commission will file its report before six years-I presume in two years, and I hope within one year-whatever their findings may be. But in any case this bill provides for, and is, a temporary measure. It is not intended that it should be permanent law. Recognizing that idea, the conferees have agreed to make the time limit which it shall remain on the statute books six years. The rate of interest provided for this circulation commences at 5 per cent and increases 1 per cent a month until it reaches 10 per cent. That is not an abnormal rate of interest for banks to pay in times of money stringency. In many of the cities of this country where clearing-house receipts were taken out, the rate was 71% per cent, and in very few instances less than 6 per cent. As those certificates did not remain out, ordinarily, more than three months, the 6 per cent rate would be equal to the average rate on this proposed circulation. [Loud applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. PUJO. Does the gentleman expect to close the debate in more than one speech, or does he wish us to use some of our time?

Mr. VREELAND. I say to the gentleman I wish him to consume some of his time.

Mr. PUJO. I yield four minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MCHENRY].

Mr. MCHENRY. The House of Congress, Mr. Speaker, is supposed to be both a deliberative and a representative body, but in this action which you now propose the people are to learn that this legislative body is governed not by deliberation, but by party passion; controlled not by the people, but by one man. You can pass this iniquitous measure if you choose, because you have the power; but there is one thing you can not de-you can not compel the people to accept the provisions of a law which they do not approve.

For six long tedious months the Committee on Banking and Currency have given faithful study and consideration to this vitally important question. The committee was unanimous in a desire to frame a nonpartisan measure which would work to the good of all the people and not for the special interest of a favored few. There were some basic principles upon which we disagreed, but the disagreement was an honest and nonpolitical one. But the gentleman from New York [Mr. VREELAND], who seems to have become the spokesman for the Republican managers in the House, appeared before our committee at the public hearings, literally whipping the Republican members into line, injecting a discordant partisan element in our deliberation. We have been frankly told that a panic was on and another one coming, and that it was necessary, in order to secure the election of a Republican President, that some sort of financial legislation be placed upon the statute books. No matter what, only so it was something. We accept the challenge, Mr. Speaker. But while we of the minority are fighting with every ounce of strength we have to prevent the passage of this bill, we feel that it is a hopeless fight; that the orders from Wall street and Republican party bosses are more powerful in this Congress than the appeals or the needs of the people.

The issue is now squarely before us, with the Republican party management lined up where it rightfully belongs and where it has been for the past forty years, legislating for the

predatory interests. When I made the statement in my speech on the 14th, that the issue before the people was no longer a question of Republicanism or Democracy, but that it was a struggle between the people and Wall street, I did not believe your party managers would have the courage thus early to make this open declaration of war against the people. While I am the Representative of the people in Congress, I will always be found upon the side of the people, whether the issue is a Democratic issue or a Republican issue. [Applause.] In this instance all possible doubt is removed, and in your action of forcing a vote here now the majority party burns all bridges behind and strikes off at one blow the mask of hypocrisy which has given protection to predatory interests for the past forty years and which has made possible the accumulation of vast individual fortunes; the assembling of gigantic trusts, levying enormous tributes upon the people's earnings and placing the country under the domination of complete corporate control while at the same time deceiving the people with their cries of protection and full dinner pail promises. Drunk with power, the Republican managers will have become, with the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland bill, the open advocates and servants of Wall street.

I am anxious, Mr. Speaker, that proper currency legislation shall be enacted, but I am not willing that the people shall be fooled and that the sovereign right of the Government to issue money shall be taken from it and delegated to Wall street gamblers. Rather than have a bill of this kind, it would be infinitely better for the country to have no legislation at all at this session.

Under the rule by which this bill is brought up for action practically all debate is shut off and no amendments permitted. If you will give us two days' debate, Mr. Speaker, the bill can probably be so amended that it will be a workable measure and fair to all parts of the country alike and to all people, but this is not a part of your plan-the Wall street plan demands that the bill shall go through just as it was, without any changes. It has just come from the conference report and we are to vote on it immediately, and I will venture the assertion that nine out of ten Members of the House have not had time to read the bill-do not know what they are voting upon, and are simply obeying the order of the party-Wall street bosses. Why this haste? If the measure is an honest one, it will bear the light of investigation and intelligent discussion. Is it the part of a deliberative body to rush a conference report here and demand that we shall speak and vote against the measure without even having had time to read the bill? It is now just twelve minutes since the printed conference report has been delivered, and without any study or preparation whatever we are called upon to register our protest against the bill. This represents the most important legislation that Congress has had before it since the civil war. To now vote upon it, without a full knowledge of the bill and without any privilege to amend, do you suppose, sir, that the American people can view our action with favor? If you will give us reasonable time for debate, I have sufficient confidence in the intelligence and integrity of the individual Members of the House to believe that the bill will either be honestly amended or killed outright, which, for the country's sake and for the Republican party's sake, too, would be the better plan.

The bill provides that ten banks with a total capitalization of $5,000,000 may go together and form themselves into a so-called "clearance-house association," with the power delegated to them by the Government to issue currency to the extent of $500,000,000. At the present time, Mr. Speaker, the currency of our country is on what is termed a gold and United States bond basis. That is, every dollar of currency except our present outstanding national-bank notes is guaranteed by the actual gold or silver coin in the United States Treasury and is redeemable in gold or silver on demand. In the establishment of the national banking system, it was agreed that a national bank could, to the extent of its capital, issue money against the United States bonds. The United States Government, through this medium, merely divides up the bonds, which represent the people's obligation, into small denominations in order that they may be used in circulation to meet the demands of trade. successful has been the practical working of this plan that today no man thinks of looking at a note to see whether it is a national-bank note, a United States Treasury note, a gold certificate, or a silver certificate. The people have absolute confidence in their currency at the present time. If anything is needed, it is a bill which will unify our currency system and not make it more diverse, as this does. As I have already told you in my previous address, the country is now suffering more from lack of confidence than lack of money, and that any legislative action upon this question should be with the idea of re

So

storing confidence, not of creating further doubt or distrust in the minds of the people as to the character or value of the money which they are to receive in exchange for the sale of their labor or the products of their labor. This bill is the entering wedge for a radical and violent change in the currency of our country. It means the retirement of the present United States bondsecured note as rapidly as it can be done under the law, and to replace the national bond security with whatever railroad or other bonds or notes which a bank issuing currency may have.

I will not go into the economic side of this question or burden you with statistics, but will discuss the practical workings of the bill and prove to your satisfaction, if you are open to conviction, that the bill is impractical; that its use will be confined entirely to Wall street banks; that it will not stop panics, but, on the contrary, will precipitate them; that it will absolutely insure the monopoly of the people's money by predatory interests. In brief, sir, I will prove to you that it is a Wall street measure pure and simple; that it is a measure against the honest business interests and producers of all classes, and to enact it into a law will be a crime against the people which they will resent at the polls in November, [Applause.]

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE BILL.

IMPRACTICAL AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION.

I propose to show you, Mr. Speaker, that in its practical application this bill is not intended for the benefit of the average country bank, but is intended for the sole benefit of the Wall street bank. The bill is so cunningly devised that the average country bank would not dare take the risk of becoming a member in these associations, because they will be liable to share in the losses and failures of all other banks in the association, but would never receive any benefit whatever from their connection, as I will prove.

In the first place, the average country national bank has taken out its full amount of bond-secured currency, and under the provisions of the Aldrich-Vreeland bill the bank which has its full circulation out could only receive from this association, provided it could get it if it wanted to, 40 per cent of the amount of its surplus. For instance, a bank having one hundred thousand capital and its full circulation issued, and having a surplus of, say, $25,000, could only receive under the law 40 per cent of its surplus, which would be $10,000. It is quite evident, therefore, that the average country bank would not be justified in assuming so great a risk for so small a benefit, especially when the possibility for any benefit is so remote. Furthermore, by this restriction, it becomes very plain that

First. It provides for an association of not less than ten banks, with a total capitalization of not less than $5,000,000, for the purpose of issuing money. Each bank in said association to have one vote, and to choose a board of five managers, of which three shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. Second. It provides that the total issue shall not exceed $500,000,000.

Third. That the issue shall be based upon national, State, county, or municipal bonds, railroad stock, or bonds and notes or any security which a bank may own or hold as collateral.

Fourth. It provides that the rate of tax on said circulation shall be 5 per cent per annum for the first month and 1 per cent per annum for each additional month until a maximum tax of 10 per cent is reached.

Fifth. It provides an interest rate of 1 per cent per annum on Government deposits-perhaps.

THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE BILL.

The Wall street interests have become alarmed at the attitude of the people in their demand for banking and currency reform. Realizing that all such demands are eventually enacted into law, they have decided, while they have the power, to fool the people under threat of another panic, and enact a law which will continue their present control of the currency of the country. That is, if a supplemental issue of currency is to be authorized, it must not be allowed to pass beyond the control of the large banking syndicates, so the underlying principles of this forced measure may be found in two definite objects.

First, to enable them to control and regulate panics at will and to stop panics when it suits their purposes to have them stopped.

Second, to provide a permanent fund for the Wall street gambler's use.

THE NEEDS OF THE WALL STREET GAMBLER.

It is estimated that the average daily balances needed for carrying the gamblers' debts on Wall street ranges from $250,000,000 to $500,000,000. The use of this sum of money is neither for the benefit of the country at large nor for the benefit of the corporations whose stocks and bonds are dealt in. When stocks or bonds are sold and the money received from such sale goes into the treasury of the corporation issuing such stock, the money has been wisely expended and represents a legitimate investment. But after the treasury stock of the company has been sold there is no economic gain, either to the company or to the country, in the interchange of that stock from one hand to another, which, under the present method, resolves itself into a pure stock gambling, stock manipulating deal.

So the result is that large sums of money are used to carry the stock gamblers' debts, and for this purpose the actual cash | is required, and in this way the reserves of the country banks become tied up and unavailable at certain periods of the year when needed, because the gambler can not convert his stock into cash upon the call of the bank. The sum of $250,000,000 of cash, if distributed throughtout the country in the regular channels of commerce, would give the country an additional sustaining credit of at least $1,000,000,000. So the Wall street banker wants to be put in a position where he can return the country bank reserves, either in real money or this proposed new kind of money.

our present bond-secured currency.

All currency panics-and this measure is said to be only intended as a remedy for a currency panic-begin in New York. No matter how severe any money stringency or general panic may be, it requires a certain period of time for the crisis or the panic to extend into the country and into the Far West and South.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I want you to observe the extreme adroitness with which this bill is drawn in the interests of the Wall street banks. In one paragraph the bill says the money shall be distributed with geographical fairness. In another it says: If any section does not apply for their quota, it shall be available and shall be given to those banks which do make application for the money. So when a panic starts in Wall street the clearing-house application is rushed into the Treasury for all the money which is due them. In a few days, or a few weeks, perhaps, the pressing need for money in New York continues, and up to this time the need has not been felt in the interior or the Far West or South, and the entire issue, if needed, goes to New York. But eventually the panic extends to all parts of our country. So when the interior or Southern or Western banker realizes that he will need his quota of this money and sends in his application, he will be met by the answer, "You did not apply soon enough; the New York demand has absorbed all the available money."

Any national-banking law offering special privileges to banks should be so framed as to extend the privilege to all the banks of the country with equal fairness, that it may be of equal benefit to all the people, and any law which fails to do this is not a law which will fulfill an honest purpose in the interests of the whole people. The practical result therefore of this bill will be to place this vast fund of $500,000,000 to the sole credit of the Wall street banks, to be used, not for the commercial or industrial needs of the country, because they can not afford to pay such a high tax, but for purely speculative purposes to carry out the bull and bear markets on a scale such as the country has never yet witnessed.

There are seventeen States whose total capitalization for each State is less than $5,000,000. These States could not form themselves into a State association of their own. Here again we see the growing tendency toward the destruction of State lines and States rights and the centralization toward the Federal Government.

The result under this bill will be that a syndicate of Wall street banks, radiating from New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago, will constitute a syndicate of absolute control of the entire issue. Wall street never waits for a panic. It both anticipates and precipitates a panic and is always ready for it with the cash in hand when the panic comes. So under this bill the managers of a clearing-house association can take out the full issue of the money with the Secretary's consent, because no other applications have been received. Then when the panic comes they have the money at hand to take advantage of the falling values and can easily afford to pay a steady rate of 10 per cent interest.

THE DANGER OF INFLATION AND CONTRACTION.

The wildest dreams of the Wall street manipulator are fully realized in this bill. The Wall street operator never loses except when he runs short of money, and with the legal right which he will appropriate under this bill, he reaches into the People's Treasury and converts his stocks and bonds into the

currency of the people to the extent of $500,000,000, or onesixth of the total amount of all the currency of all the people of the United States. It is giving him a power so great that the combined interests which will control this fund can carry out any market-manipulating scheme their brains may conjure; can create panics at will; boom markets one day by opening the Treasury lid and letting out plenty of money, and creating depression and panic and falling prices the next day by putting the money back and closing the lid. Plenty of money means a bull market and high prices. A scarcity of money means a bear market and low prices.

The Wall street rigger is now supplied with an automatic device, furnished him by Uncle Sam, who will hand over by this law the key of the people's Treasury to the Wall street managers to create artificial prices and artificial panics at will. If they want to build a new railroad or issue a new basketful of bonds on a railroad already built, they will be enabled under the mechanism of this bill to convert their stocks and bonds into money. The high rate of interest will always be sure to keep this huge sum in reserve for them. It will never be used by country banks or for the use of the farmer or homebuilder or manufacturer or merchant. So the Wall street man will always find this sum available for his own use. That he will use it to his own profit there can be no doubt. That all profits must come from the people, for there is no other source from which they may come, is also true. Therefore the Aldrich-Vreeland bill acts as a huge sponge in the hands of Wall street to absorb the vitality from the people and to never give anything out which does not benefit the predatory interests.

A HIGHER FIXED RATE OF INTEREST.

It is the function of government, acting for its people, to issue money, and is the most sacred of all governmental functions. Any tax upon money is a direct tax upon the people; If, therefore, money is needed for our commercial and industrial needs, it should be forthcoming under a fair and equitable law adhering to a fixed standard of value such as we now have, and it should bear no tax beyond the ordinary expense incurred in making and maintaining the issue.

The predatory interests who have framed this bill have made the tax under the bill range from 5 to 10 per cent to serve two distinct purposes: First, to prevent the farmer, the manufacturer, and the merchant from using any of this money, because they can not afford to pay 10 per cent; second, it will give every bank an excuse, which will be taken advantage of by the banks to charge a uniformly higher rate of interest than they have ever charged before. When a farmer calls at the bank and wants to borrow money for use in the harvesting of his crops or the purchase of stock or machinery, he will be told that the bank would be glad to accommodate him, but in order to do so they will have to use "emergency currency," which will cost him 8 per cent or 10 per cent or 12 per cent. To-day the average interest rate is higher than it was one year ago or two years ago. It will gradually be forced to a still higher level. We are told that there is a plethoric condition of money at the present time. True, there is plenty of money now in the large money centers, but it is not available for commercial uses. The stock gambler can borrow it on call at a low rate of interest, but long-term commercial or industrial paper can only be sold at a high rate of interest. There is one thing, Mr. Speaker, that I would have the House and the country understand, and that is that a high rate of interest means a direct tax upon all forms of human production. This bill tends to increase this tax, and will not only fail absolutely to give the people a corresponding benefit, but, on the contrary, will furnish an additional means to rob them of what they have.

INFLATED SECURITIES.

On page 4 of the conference report the bill reads as follows:

The officers of the association may thereupon, in behalf of said bank, make application to the Comptroller of the Currency for an issue of additional circulating notes to an amount not exceeding 75 per cent of the cash value of the securities or commercial paper so deposited. On page 5 of said report it further reads:

That upon the deposit of any of the State, city, town, county or other municipal bonds, of a character described in section 3 of this act, circulating notes may be issued to the extent of not exceeding 90 per cent of the market value of such bonds as deposited.

So, Mr. Speaker, under the bill banks can procure currency to the extent of 90 per cent of the market value of any railroad or other bonds which they may put up, or 75 per cent of the market value of any securities which they may have.

This is a fatal defect. The bill should be amended by inserting after the words "market value" the words "not reckoned above par." The people of the country know, if Members of Congress do not, that Wall street can regulate its own prices

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to serve its own purpose and that the market price, as indicated by Wall street during a boom period, seldom has any relation whatever to intrinsic value. For instance, amalgamated copper was selling a year ago around $135 per share. To-day it is selling for $62 per share.

Suppose, now, the Government had permitted an issue of $1,000,000,000 of currency on copper-stock securities, the market value of which is less than half to-day of what it was a year ago. So we are asked to create a medium for the conversion of these wild-cat stocks into a form of wild-cat currency, and then compel the United States Treasury, the people's Treasury, under section 12 of the bill, to redeem these bank notes in the lawful money of the United States.

Do you suppose, Mr. Speaker, that the people of this country want a currency law of this kind? Do you suppose, sir, that the legitimate banks of the country, whose best interests are always conserved with the best interests of the people, want a measure of this kind? No; they do not. There invariably comes a time in the lives of all men when the common brotherhood of men--the patriotism and love of country-predominates above self-interest, but when self-interest is combined with the common interest of the American people and a patriotic interest in our Government, the condemnation and opposition to any move which destroys these primary elements of common good becomes unlimited in its duration and violence.

The people of the country and the banks of the country, with the exception of a few Wall street banks, are opposed to this measure, and I want to make the prediction that every man here who votes in favor of this bill under the spur of the party lash will live to see the day when he will regret his action, but will never live to be old enough to earn the forgiveness of his people who have sent him here to represent them in drama of American politics in which the people are giving to the Congress. This is the consummation of the final act in the predatory interests of Wall street absolute control of their individual welfare and of their Government.

THE POWER OF THE SECRETARY.

I presume it will be urged by gentlemen of the other side that the measure is an entirely safe one, because the Secretary of the Treasury has the power to say whether this money shall be issued or not. Mr. Speaker, we are dealing with practical conditions and not theories. The honesty and upright conduct of Secretaries in the past will afford no criterion upon which we may pass judgment of the individual strength and honesty of the Secretaries of the future. But however honest and able the Secretary of our Treasury may be, in future he will become not the representative of the people and a great Government, but he will be the "hired man" of Wall street. They will control him by persuasion if they can, by force if they must.

Does it not strike you as singular, sir, that nearly every Secretary of the Treasury for the past thirty years has almost invariably stepped from the office of Secretary into the presidency I do not intend for a moment to of a large Wall street bank? cast any reflection whatever upon any Secretary. I believe they have all been able, honest men and have been faithful in the performance of their duties. But I wish to point out the practical evolution of the office, in which it becomes the natural stepping stone for a higher advancement in the banking world. Our Secretary is now placed in a position of entire helplessness, for he will be compelled to do the bidding of Wall street. When the predatory interests have two or three hundred million dollars of railroad bonds to market, they will come to him and ask him for the currency. He refuses, saying, "There is no panic; no necessity for this enormous issue, and therefore it can not be authorized." "Very well, Mr. Secretary, we will make a panic for you," they say. So there is an immediate tying up of fifty or one hundred million dollars of the country bank reserves in the large city banks. The country banks need their money, but can not get it. The panic is precipitated and the Secretary is obliged to authorize the issue of currency to meet the forced demands made upon him by the business interests of the country. Under this bill one or two men, whose names I do not care to mention in this public address, can put through any gigantic scheme which may appeal to them. When labor becomes too insistent in its demands, or too prosperous, the order goes forth to shut down the factory and starve them into submission.

If there is a new consolidation of railroads or a new combination of industrial corporations or a combination of all the gold mines of the country, the people have provided them a fund of $500,000,000 to carry out their nefarious schemes. It would only cost them about 1 per cent for the use of this money for a period of three months. During those three months they would