Congressional Record

tended to bring on war. In truth, the only true way to prevent war is for our people to understand the elements of national defense and the real factors that determine war and peace. Nothing can have a more beneficial effect at this juncture than a general discussion of the contingencies of war. If there were not a single cloud above the horizon this would still hold true. As it is, the sky is overcast. It is past the eleventh hour. Any other people on earth or in the world's history would, long ere this, have thoroughly investigated the contingency of war with the great powers over the ocean from us and would have adopted precautionary measures to prevent the culmination of war if possible and to insure victory if war must come. As it is, our people, absorbed in developing our resources, have given no heed to the steady approach of the world's great armies. The annihilation of space and the conquest of the ocean have brought the great armies of Europe to our eastern doors; new armies, more portentous than those of Europe, have arisen in Asia and are likewise at our western doors, and to-day America is not only unable to prevent war but is powerless to avert disaster if war comes.

It has been shown how completely Japan is prepared for war. A recent interpellation in the Japanese Parliament as to the nation against which the warlike preparations were being made brought forth the answer from the minister of war that the preparations were "against eventualities in the Pacific," an official confirmation of the universally recognized fact that great war preparations have been going on for a long time. It has been evident for some time that Japan intends to move upon China, but her stupendous efforts in augmenting her navy leave no doubt that America is the objective. The swarming of spies over our country and our possessions, the peremptory attitude of Japan after the trivial incidents in San Francisco, her attitude on the immigration question, all confirm this conclusion. To study the contingency of war with Japan is, therefore, now an urgent public duty. In discussing this contingency, it may be remembered that there is no danger of divulging any secrets, naval or military. Japan and every other nation already know all our secrets, all our elements of weakness and of strength.

No one can forecast the exact date for the beginning of any war, even when war is recognized as inevitable. The only means of approximating it is to determine the time when the aggressive power will have relatively the greatest strength. By this test war is liable to come before our fleet reaches the Far East. If it does not come before that time, it is likely to be postponed until the fleet, or part of it, returns to the Atlantic, or until it deteriorates because of the lack of docking and repairing facilities and the Japanese fleet is reenforced by additional vessels.

Permanent control of the sea in the Pacific will determine the issue of the war. Therefore the destruction of the battleship fleet of the enemy will be the supreme objective of both powers. Japanese diplomacy has been invoked to secure the division of the American fleet by bringing danger from Europe through the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The second clause of the treaty of alliance reads as follows:

If, by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contractor be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble, the other contractor shall at once come to the assistance of its ally, and both parties will conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with any power powers involved in such war.

It is to be noted that an "aggressive action" may occur anywhere. The special interests mentioned in the preamble are those "in the regions of eastern Asia and India." It is impossible for any war against Japan not to endanger that country's interests in the regions of eastern Asia," and any war would be proclaimed unprovoked and " aggressive on the part of the other party. Therefore the only interpretation permissible is that Great Britain would join with Japan in a war with America.

When America assembled sixteen battle ships in the Atlantic, Great Britain assembled twenty-six battle ships. This was designed to cause a protest from the Atlantic coast States against the stripping of the Atlantic and to result in only a part of the fleet being sent to the Pacific. Our Government wisely proceeded to send the whole commissioned fleet. As new vessels are commissioned in the Atlantic they should be sent straight way to the Pacific, and the whole fleet should be kept together, constantly ready. As soon as practicable this whole fleet should be sent to the Philippines. If it is permitted to reach those waters before a rupture occurs, the Japanese-English purpose will be to bring about its departure for the Atlantic in whole or in part. We should, on the contrary, keep the whole united fleet permanently in Far Eastern waters and build additional fleets for the Atlantic. It is only by having the fleet in the Far

East that we can be sure of forcing a general engagement in case of war. This very fact gives us our only chance of peace and our only hope of victory if war is inevitable.

Should the fleet remain in the Far East, Japan will doubtless wait until it deteriorates because of the lack of docking and repairing facilities, and until she adds the Ibuki, the Kurama, the Oki, and the Satsuma to her fleet. Without the last two vessels the Japanese would have twenty-four armored vessels to our twenty-six. While they would have the advantage of being in home waters and of having adequate docking facilities, our fleet would still have a good fighting chance. But when the Oki and the Satsuma are added, each carrying four 12-inch guns and twelve 10-inch guns, thirty great guns in all-as many as any eight of our vessels, giving the Japanese the equivalent of thirty-two vessels to our twenty-six-the chances will be heavily against us. In spite of all that we can do this Japanese preponderance will exist before the summer is here. For the last three years we have neglected to build big vessels of the new type; and if war comes upon us in these most unfavorable circumstances, our best possible condition will see our fleet of obsolete vessels move out to engage a superior Japanese fleet, headed by two Dreadnoughts with their terrible concentration of power. Our only reliance, a reliance that should never be required, would be upon superior skill and greater efficiency.

It is altogether likely that Japan will add two more, and possibly four more, Dreadnoughts to her fleet before we can hope to add the Delaware and the North Dakota. We must therefore proceed with all dispatch not only to build new fleets of Dreadnoughts for the Atlantic, but new ones for the Pacific, and these latter must come as fast as the Japanese reenforcements. If the fleet reaches the Far East and remains there, we must be prepared for some time to come to see a general engagement with the odds against us. Should we win the victory, the war would be over. Should the Japanese win, the war would be just begun, for they would have control of the Pacific, and the inva sion of the Philippines and of our Pacific coast would begin. There is little doubt that the British would join the Japanese the moment the Japanese gained such control of the Pacific that their armies would be available to cooperate with the British armies in an invasion from Canada. It is probably one of the objects of the peculiar wording of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to give the British a line of retreat or advance, according as defeat or victory perches on the Japanese banner.

Let us now take the case of our fleet being on the Pacific coast when war comes. As before, the permanent control of the sea is supreme and the destruction of the battle-ship fleet of the enemy the objective. In this case the long distance across the ocean becomes a leverage against us. Hawaii is the point without which neither power could take the aggressive, even after a victory that gave control of the sea. If Japan had control of the sea and also held Hawaii, the Pacific slope would at once be open to invasion. If America held Hawaii in force, the Japanese would have to overpower our force there, at great sacrifice, before invasion would be possible. Since Japan is compact, with strongly fortified harbors and a great army, America is forced to adopt the defensive. Even if we held Hawaii and gained control of the sea, we could never do more than destroy Japanese over-sea commerce, which is never a deciding factor in a great war. From the outset, therefore, we must realize that we have nothing to gain and everything to lose by war. Japan has little to lose and from her standpoint everything to gain.

Considering the fact that there are over 100,000 Japanese and only 7,000 Americans in the Hawaiian Islands, we must assume that Japan controls the pivot; and if she should get control of the sea, invasion of the Pacific slope would follow. We should at once place in Hawaii a garrison sufficient to keep the Japanese inhabitants under control and to repel a landing in force, even under the protection of Japanese ships, and we must take no chances of losing the control of the sea.

After hostilities began our fleet should remain on the defensive off our coast and put the enemy at the disadvantage of crossing the ocean before he could get an engagement. On no consideration should we venture farther than Hawaii, and this far only if we were in control and Pearl Harbor entrance can be dredged. This harbor is the most wonderful and most vital sheet of water in the world. Whether in the hands of the white men or the yellow men, it is destined to become the greatest naval station the world has ever seen. If held by the yellow men, America will be helpless against Asiatic invasion. It is our supreme duty to hasten to garrison and fortify the island of Oahu and speedily establish a naval station at Pearl Harbor. Judging from the circumstances attending the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, America would know nothing of the

first moves of Japan if war should come. Our first indication would be the simultaneous cutting off of cable communication with the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines without warning or explanation. The cutting of the cables would be followed within a few hours by the landing of Japanese expeditions. Two of our fastest armored cruisers would probably be dispatched at once to make a reconnoissance of Hawaii. A week would probably elapse before any definite news would come from Manila by way of Hongkong or Saigon or Singapore. This news would probably recite that a Japanese expedition, under heavy escort, had landed probably 100,000 men in the Lingayen Gulf or on eastern Luzon, and that this army was advancing on Subic Bay and Manila. Reports would follow that the Filipinos were flocking to the Japanese colors. From the day America retained the Philippine Islands the Japanese have been in communication with the natives, planning our expulsion. The landing of the Japanese army would be the signal for an uprising. The first report about Honolulu would probably be brought by the armored cruisers about ten days after they started from the coast, and their report would probably announce that a Japanese expedition had landed probably 15,000 men, with large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies; that the Japanese on the island had risen; that the small garrison and the American residents who joined it had been overpowered; that a Japanese army of probably 50,000 men was in camp out of range from the water; that active preparations were in progress to resist any landing that might be attempted, and that the vessels in the expedition had retired.

The seizure of the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands would be the first move of Japan. Preparations have been completed for this move. The bases for the Philippine invasion will be Kilung, Formosa, and a harbor in the Pescadores Islands, which are being prepared for this purpose. These bases are so near to Luzon that 150,000 men could be thrown into this island long before our fleet could cross the Pacific, and once in the islands, with large quantities of munitions, the army could live on the country.

The first advance of this army would be upon Subig Bay, which would be quickly taken from the rear, and would there after be the naval base for the Japanese fleet. I do not believe, however, that the Japanese fleet would remain there. The one supreme objective being control of the Pacific, the Japanese plan would be to lure our fleet to the relief of Manila. The advance of the Japanese army and the siege of Manila would be conducted toward this end, and the dispatches allowed to go out would be planned to stir the American people to the attempt. Should we make the blunder of attempting the relief of Manila, the disintegration and ultimate annihilation of our fleet would be practically assured. It really could not relieve Manila, because we have no transports to convey the necessary troops, and we have no troops if we had the transports. The fleet would find itself in hostile waters over 6,000 miles from a base and unable to force a general engagement. The main Japanese battle-ship fleet would retire to the security of fortified home bases. Our fleet would be compelled to seek one of the inadequate, undeveloped harbors of the Philippines, without any facilities for docking or repairing. The enemy's cruisers would scour the ocean and cut off or cripple the collier coal service. The coal carried by the colliers with the fleet would be quickly exhausted. The fleet would doubtless be subjected to repeated attacks from torpedo boats and to harassment from the enemy's cruisers. Every time a vessel was injured repairs would be impossible. The machinery would rapidly deteriorate for lack of overhauling and the bottoms would foul without a chance for cleaning. The health and esprit of the men would sink steadily to a low level. Disintegration and ultimate defeat would be inevitable.

In case the fleet undertook to find the Japanese fleet and to force an engagement, it would be compelled to force an entrance into one of the fortified harbors of Japan to reach their fleet, incurring dangers and disadvantages that could not end but in disaster. Without troops it would be almost impossible to seize and hold an adequate Japanese harbor for a base from which to conduct a blockade. Thus it may be taken for granted that any attempt to relieve the Philippine Islands after they had been occupied would certainly end in disaster that would give to Japan permanent control of the sea.

The moment this control was secured the invasion of America would begin. The first step would be the gathering of a great army in Hawaii. Two hundred thousand men could be landed there in two weeks, 200,000 more in four weeks, and 200,000 additional men every month for six months. From Hawaii it is but a step to the Pacific coast-about 2,100 miles to San Francisco, about 2,200 miles to Los Angeles, and a few more to

Port Townsend. The choice of these points of invasion would depend on whether the British were in cooperation or not. Judging from the words of the Canadian premier, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in a speech in the Dominion Parliament on the Japanese immigration question, on February 28, we can not assume that the Japanese would be alone. On the contrary, Sir Wilfred pictured a Japanese fleet wieghing anchor at Vancouver to proceed against a common enemy in the North Pacific. With British cooperation the invasion would take place simultaneously from British Columbia and at points on the coast of California.

Assuming British cooperation, there would be ample transport service, and in a few weeks 250,000 Japanese, with substantial reenforcements of Canadian and British soldiers, would proceed to occupy the cities and country around Puget Sound and then go southward through Portland, Oreg., occupying as they went all the territory from the coast to the Cascade Mountains. Branch expeditions would be dispatched to hold the railroads and other passes through the mountains. Simultaneously two expeditions would land, one below Los Angeles, whence the city and the Southern Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Salt Lake railroads would be seized, the other landing below San Francisco, whence this city and the Union Pacific Railroad would be seized. As reenforcements arrived these expeditions would move northward, occupying the territory from the coast to the Sierra Nevada Mountains, and seizing the mountain passes. The forts defending San Francisco would be taken from the rear, and this city, with its harbor, would become the base for the united armies of invasion after they made a juncture. In the seizure of the coast cities and the mountain passes the Japanese already on the coast would be invaluable, particularly the compact, disciplined Japanese clubs. As the country was occupied it would be thrown open to Chinese and Hindoos, as well as Japanese, and with the ocean open the white population of the slope would soon be overcome.

Simultaneously with the invasion of the slope Alaska would be occupied by Canadians, and there would be an invasion by the British from the Canadian frontier. Porto Rico, Cuba, and Panama would be seized, an unopposed fleet would destroy all the shipyards, and assaults would be made on our cities on the Great Lakes and on the Gulf and Atlantic seaboards. Our vulnerability on these waters is appalling. On the Atlantic coast alone our population aggregates over 15,000,000, with over $17,000,000,000 worth of property within gunshot of the water. Coast defenses have always proved inadequate. The efficient protection of all these cities depends on the control of the sea. With the enemy in undisputed control of the sea the damage that could be inflicted and the tribute that could be exacted would stagger the world.

On the Great Lakes there are over 7,000,000 people and over $7,000,000,000 worth of property within gunshot of the water, all without defenses of any kind, while over 200 British light-draft vessels can pass quickly through the Canadian canals to the Lakes.

I do not believe that Great Britain would undertake to join Japan unless Japan soon gained permanent control of the Pacific, so that troops from Japan and India, coming in through Vancouver and on the trans-Canadian railways, could join Canadian and British troops in the invasion from the north. However this may be, Great Britain is held in the offensivedefensive alliance, and it is our duty to investigate the contingency of war with those two powers. This investigation shows that for a long time nothing but the direst adversity could be expected. Upon the outbreak of war the Regular Army would be mobilized and the militia would be called out. Our people would awaken in consternation to find that there were only about 9,000 infantry of the Regular Army in the whole country, and that these few were scattered far and wide. The consternation would be intensified when it was found that only about 60,000 militia were fit for duty, and that these likewise were scattered over the whole country.

The President would probably issue a call for 250,000 volunteers, and the nation would be shocked to find that there was no system prepared for their organization and equipment; that not even uniforms could be supplied to half that number; that facilities were lacking even for their mustering in.

In olden days, when the numbers involved were comparatively small and the time available after the declaration of war was great, preparation in advance was not vital, though it has always been of great importance. Not so to-day. It is too late to prepare after war has come. Formerly vessels could be built in ninety days, and it took an enemy's fleet that long to get over the ocean and inaugurate a campaign. To-day it takes three years to build a battle ship, and an enemy's fleet could

It is to be noted that an "aggressive action" may occur anywhere. The special interests mentioned in the preamble are those "in the regions of eastern Asia and India." It is impossible for any war against Japan not to endanger that country's interests in the "regions of eastern Asia," and any war would be proclaimed "unprovoked" and "aggressive" on the part of the other party. Therefore the only interpretation permissible is that Great Britain would join with Japan in a war with America.

When America assembled sixteen battle ships in the Atlantic, Great Britain assembled twenty-six battle ships. This was designed to cause a protest from the Atlantic coast States against the stripping of the Atlantic and to result in only a part of the fleet being sent to the Pacific. Our Government wisely proceeded to send the whole commissioned fleet. As new vess are commissioned in the Atlantic they should be sent straig way to the Pacific, and the whole fleet should be kept toget constantly ready. As soon as practicable this whole fleet sho be sent to the Philippines. If it is permitted to reach t waters before a rupture occurs, the Japanese-En will be to bring about its departure for the Ar or in part. We should, on the contrary, keep ti fleet permanently in Far Eastern waters and fleets for the Atlantic. It is only by having the

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East that we can be sure of forcing a general engag case of war. This very fact gives us our only chan and our only hope of victory if war is inevitable.

Should the fleet remain in the Far East, Japan less wait until it deteriorates because of the la and repairing facilities, and until she adds the I rama, the Oki, and the Satsuma to her fleet. last two vessels the Japanese would have tw vessels to our twenty-six. While they would tage of being in home waters and of having facilities, our fleet would still have a good fisio when the Oki and the Satsuma are added, en 12-inch guns and twelve 10-inch guns, fl all-as many as any eight of our vessels, the equivalent of thirty-two vessels to chances will be heavily against us. can do this Japanese preponderance wi mer is here. For the last three ye. build big vessels of the new type; an these most unfavorable circumstane s tion will see our fleet of obsolete ves superior Japanese fleet, headed by t terrible concentration of power. that should never be required, won a greater efficiency.

It is altogether likely that Ja sibly four more, Dreadnoughts ra to add the Delaware and the V proceed with all dispatch not e noughts for the Atlantic, but latter must come as fast as the fleet reaches the Far Eas prepared for some time to ce with the odds against us. would be over. Should the J begun, for they would have s sion of the Philippines and There is little doubt that the moment the Japanese that their armies would British armies in an in one of the objects of the treaty to give the Britis ing as defeat or victory

Let us now take th coast when war comes. sea is supreme and th the enemy the objective the ocean becomes a 1without which neither after a victory that gave trol of the sea and als at once be open to inva the Japanese would have sacrifice, before invasio compact, with strongly America is forced to a Hawaii and gained conti than destroy Japanese ok ciding factor in a great must realize that we ha lose by war. Japan has everything to gain.

Considering the fact t and only 7,000 Americg assume that Japan contr trol of the sea, invasion. should at once place in I' Japanese inhabitants m force, even under the pro . take no chances of los

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long trip, that they did it out of courtesy to that they were determined, in this vital for their rights first, last, and all the time. conference at the White House they hastened heisco and "put those pupils back in those

done because the law required it, for the law side; it was not done because the principle in, for the principle of intimately mingling two in large numbers is wrong; it was not done beof San Francisco wished it, for they emphaticwish it.

ne to comply with the ultimatum of Japan, and it one because we were utterly unprepared.

tion in the history of the world has ever suffered , real humiliation as we have suffered at the hands Every Department of our Government has been to turn aside from its orderly procedure-executive, egislative—and finally an American city has been to surrender the right of local self-government. Ime for Americans to pause and take account of where drifted. The right of local self-government is the e for which our forefathers died; it is the principle for Anglo-Saxons have died for a thousand years; it is the corner stone upon which the edifice of human liberty has built. So absorbed are our people in their individual afs, it is a question whether we are worthy to be intrusted th the holy cause of liberty. Our forefathers of the Revodion prized liberty above life, and in its cause, when less than ,000,000 in population, they defied the "mistress of the seas." Their immediate sons, receiving the cause as a sacred trust, realized that America is the exponent and champion of human berty in the world. When still less than 10,000,000 population they decreed that even the people in distant South America and the people of the whole Western Hemisphere shall have a chance for self-government. Here we are now, numbering 90,1000,000 of population, stretching across the continent, with wealth unlimited, and yet not only are we unable to guarantee the chance for liberty to the people of South America, not only are we unable to guarantee the chance for liberty to the helpless peoples of our outlying possessions, but we are actually unable to guarantee the principles of liberty in the mainland of America itself. We have negligently drifted to the point where we must disturb the functions of our Government and must compel an American city to surrender the most sacred principle in all the institutions of liberty at the dictation of a power across the Pacific Ocean, a power of an alien race, an oriental absolutism just emerging from mediævalism.

Furthermore we must keep on surrendering, no matter what demand is made upon us. It would be the part of folly to refuse and fall into the very traps laid for us and open the way for national disaster and worse humiliation in the end. The To have whole thing is palpably wrong. It is sinful and wicked. This izens nation, with so much depending upon her, must not continue like a weakling, unable to make good. How different it would tion's all be if we had done our duty and promptly established our 1 gen- bases and adequately expanded our Navy. Japan would not of oven now be strangling our commerce in Korea, Manchuria, and China and be plotting for the abolition of the open-door policy there; she would not be looking with covetous eyes upon our outlying possessions, she would not be seizing every little trivial incident that occurs in America to stir up animosity between the two peoples; she would not be seeking war; there would have been no Anglo-Japanese alliance, with its menace to our very life as a nation, and we would not be compelled to submit in abject humiliation to surrender what is more sacred than life itself, the trust committed to us by our forefathers. On the contrary, we would then be on a self-respecting solid basis for close friendship with Japan, and would be able to fulfill our duty to the cause of liberty and the cause of peace in the Pacific Ocean and in the world at large.

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Japan was loath to drop the school incident even after the pupils had been put back in the schools.

Some time after this action a general meeting of the chambers of commerce of the principal cities of Japan was called, and the united chambers of commerce adopted resolutions condemning treatment of Japanese children in America that refused them. co | educational advantages, and calling upon the chambers of comI merce of America to use their good offices in securing justice to these children and avert the grave consequences that might otherwise arise.

These resolutions were simply ridiculous to Americans who knew that at the moment they were adopted not only all the other schools in America but also the schools of San Francisco themselves were open to Japanese pupils on absolutely the same

be at our doors in less than two weeks and destroy our shipyards, so that no vessels could be built at all. Likewise with armies. When the numbers are so great it is impossible to perfect the organization overnight. In the Spanish war we called out but a quarter of a million volunteers altogether, but the woes of imperfect organization were so great that they died off like flies in camps at home here in our midst. A great industry or a great business can not be created overnight. Much less can an army.

country.

expeditions. Quickly executed, with 25,000 men in each expedition, there would be no hope of successful resistance at a single point.

Fabulous ransoms would be exacted, and, if refused, the cities would be looted and laid waste or left in ashes. If the ransoms were paid, all the works of defense would be destroyed, forts would be blown up, naval stations, arsenals, shipbuilding plants, wharves, dry docks, ferry boats, and railroad terminals would all be destroyed. All vessels and shipping would be captured and taken away. The size of the ransom and the extent of the damage that could be inflicted can be appreciated when we understand that in the State of Washington there are $317,000,000 worth of property within gunshot of the water; in Oregon $248,000,000; in California the huge sum of $2,100,000,000, a total of $2,665,000,000.

If war comes before we have taken more adequate steps for defense, we can only expect humiliation and defeat. The American nation, however, has never yet accepted defeat as final.

JAPAN IS TRYING TO FORCE WAR UPON AMERICA.
[By Capt. RICHMOND PEARSON HOBSON.]

With the Japanese in control of the sea in the Pacific, it would be impossible to prevent the invasions mentioned above. We could not possibly oppose the three invasions of 200,000 trained soldiers each, the veterans of Port Arthur and Manchuria, with 25,000 trained soldiers in each case. It would simply be slaughter and butchery to attempt resistance. It would take America at least a year to assemble and train an army competent to undertake the expulsion of the invaders. Ere this the host of Japanese, reenforced doubtless by Chinese and Hindus, would be in complete occupation, and with a million and a half veterans in control of the mountain passes they would be impregnable. The transportation and commissary problems, with the deserts and thinly settled stretches east of the coast ranges of mountains, would be stupendous, while the Japanese, besides having a rich country on which to live, would have the open-sea communications with the mother We might as well realize now as later that the Asiatics, ingerations and misrepresentations in the Japanese press the peocontrol of the Pacific, could dislodge the Americans on the Pacific slope, and as long as they retained control of the sea we could never successfully contest their supremacy. A general invasion from Canada by the combined British, Canadian, and Asiatic forces, with both oceans open and with east and west railroads and the waters of the Great Lakes for transportation, while the coasts were held by the unopposed fleets, would present us with a problem almost as hopeless. The invasion would probably reach from the frontier to New York and even to the Chesapeake, east of the Appalachians, and perhaps to the Ohio River, in the Middle West. Our people have been living under the impression of absolute security against invasion. This impression was well founded when the ocean was a great barrier and the only danger was from · Europe. Events of recent years, however, have demonstrated the great capacity of Asiatics for war and have at the same time annihilated the time-and-space separation due to the ocean. With Europe and Asia cooperating and in control of the sea in both oceans the question of invasion takes on a new aspect. Japan is planning and preparing to gain control of the population and resources of China. The cooperation of Great Britain, the "mistress of the seas," would make practicable the invasion of America along its northern frontier. No nation could stand up under the weight of numbers the alliance could command.

It is time patriotic Americans were considering the possibility of a war for our very existence. They should realize that everything would hinge on the control of the sea in the Pacific. must take no chances of having the permanent control of the sea in this ocean. If our fleet were on the Pacific coast at the outbreak of war it should remain on that coast, moving out no farther than Hawaii, and allow the Japanese to occupy the Philippine Islands for the time. Except for cruises by our armored cruisers, we should stand fast and proceed to build a new fleet as big again as our present fleet, and in the meantime should undertake no offensive move except to gain complete control of the Hawaiian Islands and establish a great naval base there. Of course Japan would proceed to build new ships also, but we could ask nothing better than a race in building ships. We should so move that the Japanese fleet could get a general action only by crossing the ocean.

Should war come when the fleet is in the Atlantic, its difficult transfer to the Pacific would begin immediately, but it should hug the coast on the eastern shores of the Pacific and force the Japanese fleet to cross the ocean to get a general engagement. Of course the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hawaii, the Aleutian Islands, Samoa, and Alaska would be seized, but the general invasion of the Pacific coast would not be undertaken while our fleet remained afloat. During the absence of the fleet, however, the coast would be subject to raiding expeditions. It is only too true that, almost without warning, such expeditions could seize Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Tacoma, and the other cities on Puget Sound, and possibly Portland. It is conservative to state that with our present lack of coast defense these raiding expeditions could be made successfully with our fleet in the Philippines, and some of them could be made successfully with our fleet on the coast. The Japanese have no doubt planned such

naval, military, and diplomatic preparations for war with It has been pointed out that Japan, having completed her America, has recently been seizing upon incidents, no matter how trivial, to stir up the masses of Japan against America. These efforts have been eminently successful. By gross exagple's hatred and cupidity have been aroused, and this feature of preparation may be regarded as completed. The press campaign molehills into mountains out of the local incidents in San Franin Europe has been equally successful. By adroitly building cisco, the press of Japan's ally has produced the impression that America has formed a fierce race hatred against Japan and is treating the subjects of that nation as inferiors; that she has been violating treaty rights, and that a war of recognition as a civilized nation would be justified on the part of Japan. The broad, plain fact that the American people could not possibly change overnight; that as a matter of fact their admiration for the Japanese has steadily grown; that they have a pride in Japan's success something akin to the pride of a sponsor; that they love the Japanese and invite and welcome them into the schools and everywhere else, everywhere, all over the countrythese truths count for naught. The impression has been produced in Europe that there are causes that would warrant Japanese reprisals. It is not surprising, therefore, when we remember that Japan is ready and America is not, that the school incidents in San Francisco are seized by Japan to create a crisis and force the American Government into war.

When our Government learned about the inflammatory propaganda in Japan and the pro-Japanese propaganda of distortion in Europe, it took immediate occasion to correct the mistakes and sent a most courteous cablegram to the Japanese Government to the effect that the attitude of love that our people have always held toward the Japanese had in no wise changed; that we were upholding and would scrupulously uphold all our treaty obligations and would protect the rights of Japanese in America; that the friction in San Francisco was purely local, growing largely out of abnormal labor conditions, and that the best offices of the Government would be used to have even these local matters adjusted; but of course, as in all other international incidents arising within individual States, that the regular course required by our institutions would have to be followed, requiring local and State adjustment before action could be taken by the General Government. A more courteous, conciliatory assurance could not have been conceived.

Close upon the heels of this courteous cablegram, the Japanese ambassador in Washington went down to the State Department and left a note. I have been criticised for referring to this note as an ultimatum. It was just as much an ultimatum as Rome ever delivered to an enemy. When Rome was all ready for war she used to issue an ultimatum which she knew the enemy would not accept, and then would inaugurate the war because the enemy would not comply.

The ultimatum has been used by aggressive nations ever since, in the effort to justify themselves or gain moral advantage in the eyes of the world when they proceded to break the world's peace.

The Japanese note says, in effect, that the matter of our "institutions" was no concern of theirs; that the question would not be discussed. We command you to put those pupils back in those schools. They evidently thought that our President would resent such a demand, involving, as its compliance would have involved, the disregard of institutions the product of a long evolution, the fundamental law of the land.

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Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ..., Volumen42,Parte8