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that has been indulged in during the past three months on this question of submerged armor belts.

Furthermore, even if the belts were submerged, which they are not, when our ships start out to fight and find the enemy, the consumption of coal, provisions, water, etc., would bring them up several inches a day, and by the time they met the enemy it is probable that they would be floating not much below their normal draft, with several feet of the belt above water.

2. Low freeboard.-Mr. Reuterdahl has much to say about the "lowness of American ships, and he would have us believe that the forward decks are much lower than those of foreign ships. He says: "All" (the italics are ours) "modern battle ships in foreign navies have forward decks about 22 to 28 feet above water." We have no space to consider the various foreign navies in detail, and in this reply we will confine ourselves to the acknowledged leader of them allthe British navy. What are the facts? With one single exceptionthe Dreadnought-there is not a British battle ship in commission with a forward deck 28 feet above the water, all the other modern battle ships being, like our own, three-decker ships-that is, having a berth deck, gun deck, and main or upper deck above the protective deck; and the height between decks being about the same for all ships, viz, from 7 feet 6 inches to 8 feet, it follows that the height above normal water line is approximately the same. As a matter of fact, on several of our ships the height between decks is greater than on the British ships, and the freeboard is correspondingly greater. The two photographs herewith shown of the King Edward and the Vermont, selected because the ships are of about the same date of design, show the Vermont to have actually a foot more freeboard on the same normal flotation line. The draft marks" (figures painted on the side) on the King Edward clearly indicate the position of the normal water line for her known normal draft of 26 feet 9 inches.

3. "Broadside guns useless in a seaway."-The question of freeboard is intimately associated with that of the height of guns above water. Though we have not at hand the figures of freeboard of the British ships, the low elevation of broadside batteries on certain crack British ships as compared with our own proves conclusively that their freeboard must generally be considerably lower, and not, as Mr. Reuterdahl states, considerably higher, than that of our ships of the same date. Therefore all his pictorial description of the trouble our turrets and broadsides would encounter when steaming in a seaway may be relegated to that land of fiction to which so much of this article belongs.

Not only would "one-third of our guns" not be useless in a seaway," but the muzzles of the guns would be clear of the water when the eight battle ships of the King Edward class and the two battle ships Swiftsure and Triumph class, to say nothing of the four armored cruisers of the Drake class, would be rolling theirs under.

We have always been a great admirer of Mr. Reuterdahl's marine pictures; and one of the chief elements of their charm, for the writer at least, is their freedom of treatment. The trouble with the present

article is that the artist has carried this freedom of treatment into a field from which it should have been most rigidly excluded. The statement that "broadside guns of foreign battle ships and cruisers are, generally speaking, twice as high as ours, and many of them three times as high," would be startling, indeed, if it were true. As a matter of fact, our broadside guns are as high as the similar broadside guns in the German and Japanese navies, and, as we have seen, are from 2 to 4 feet higher than those in some of the finest modern battle ships and cruisers of the British navy.

The question of giving ships a lofty freeboard is not as simple as Mr. Reuterdahl seems to think. To add a forecastle deck, raising the freeboard from 20 to 28 feet, means the addition of an enormous weight, and, on a given displacement, involves heavy sacrifices, either in guns. armor, speed, or coal supply. Grave questions of stability are also encountered. We hear much in this controversy about the high freeboard of the French ships. As a matter of fact, there are two schools of designs: The French, favoring lofty freeboard, and the British, American, Japanese, and to a less extent the German, favoring a 20foot freeboard. The British, of whom Mr. Reuterdahl mistakenly gives the impression that they have several 28-foot freeboard ships, were content with 20 feet until the great length of the Dreadnought compelled the addition of a forecastle deck to give her good sea-riding qualities. All this talk about flooded turrets and broadside guns useless in a seaway is no more, and not as much, applicable to our own Navy as it is to the others of the same school. The battle of Tshushima was fought by Japanese ships of the same freeboard as our own and in weather that was described in Admiral Togo's report as rough." But we have yet to hear that the Japanese broadside guns were useless in a seaway;" and our broadside guns are as high, if not higher, than theirs.

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4. Poor protection for gun crews. Mr. Reuterdahl's imagination never leads him so far away from the facts as when he comes to speak of the poor protection for gun crews due to overlarge gun ports and the poor subdivision of the broadside batteries. The story of the enormous" turret ports of the Kearsarge and Kentucky, and the pathetic incident of the "painted wooden canvas screens has been retailed to the public ad nauseum. As a matter of fact, these turret ports are large only in comparison with the naturally smaller ports which appear in turrets using an inclined face of the character shown on our front-page engraving. The Kentucky and Kearsarge are pretty old ships, as things go nowadays, for their designs were prepared some thirteen years ago. The turret ports were no larger than the necessities of the type of gun mount used at that period demanded. fronts of the turrets of the Alabama class, which followed the Kearsarge, are inclined, and the ports are proportionately smaller. It is an abuse of the ethics of fair criticism to keep ringing the changes on the supposed poor design of this out-of-date ship, without making any reference to the fact that in all of our later ships the ports have closed in on the guns until the protection is ample. Mr. Reuterdahl is so fascinated with these " yawning gun ports that apparently he sees double, if not quadruple, for he tells us that "the openings above and below the guns in the turrets of these ships are 10 feet square." Were this indeed the case, there would be not 1 square foot of the port plate left, and the Empire State express could drive bodily into the turret without let or hindrance. Well might "the service journal, the Navy," say that "these ships are not fit for service in battle line against a really modern vessel." In his search for further proof of poor protection for our gun crews, Mr. Reuterdahl goes back to ships that were authorized from twelve to seventeen years ago, and speaks of the broadside guns which "stand glowering from unprotected or badly protected openings as wide as double doors;" but he omits to state that most foreign ships of the same date used the same wide ports, and that many of them, notably in the British navy, mounted their guns in the open with nothing but shield protection. So also he states, by implication, that there is no attempt at isolation of the

separate broadside guns from shell fire on eleven of our battle ships, upon which, as a matter of fact, special screen protection has been carefully provided.

5. The open shaft to the magazinc.-That Mr. Reuterdahl's criticisms of the open shaft, or well, leading down from the turret guns to the handling room below is well made, is proved by the fact that what is known as the "interrupted hoist," with a floor cutting off the upper from the lower part of this shaft, is being installed on our latest ships. It is only fair, however, to bear in mind the considerations which led to the adoption of the present type of hoist. In the first place, at the period when it was designed, our ordnance officers were anxious to avoid a very serious defect which existed in many foreign ships, and noticeably the British, namely, that the loading could be done only in one position. That is to say, if a ship were firing on the broadside, her turret guns would have to be swung back to the axial position for loading to bring the breech in line with the loading tray and rammer. an arrangement which entailed a great loss of time and a slow rate of fire. Our officers designed a hoist which rotated with the gun and its carriage, and brought the ammunition direct from the handling room to the breech, no matter on what point of bearing the gun was laid. This, of course, necessitated an opening direct down to the handling room. In its later form the hoist was given a high speed of 600 or 700 feet a minute, and it is believed to give a more rapid service and enable a faster rate of fire to be obtained than is possible with the big guns of other navies. The hoist gave great satisfaction, and no complaints were heard until the introduction of smokeless powder developed the danger of "flarebacks." To meet this difficulty the Ordnance Bureau provided gas ejectors for blowing the combustible gases out of the gun before the breech was opened, and stringent regulations were laid down to prevent crowding of ammunition up to the gun in the effort to obtain rapidity of fire at target practice.

Later, an intersecting floor of steel was placed at the mid height of the turret shaft, with an automatic shutter, which lifted as the charge passed through and then fell by its own gravity, shutting off the handling room from the turret. With a view to shutting off the ammunition room from the handling room floor below the turret, the doors of the ammunition room are provided with circular hinged shutters, and the instructions are that these shutters shall be closed except when a charge is passed through them. Now, it is well known in the Navy that, in the zeal to secure good target records, these safety devices have, at times, been rendered inoperative; and it is a fact that much of the loss of life in the target-practice accidents of recent years would have been avoided had the safety devices been fully utilized, and the instructions for safeguarding the powder been strictly followed. There is one feature in which the hoisting gear of our turrets is subjected to unjust comparison with that of foreign battle ships. The impression may be gathered from Mr. Reuterdahl's description that every foreign battle ship has an independent ammunition heist, with track, ammunition This is not the case. cars, and cable complete in itself. There is but a single cable, and the auxiliary gear consists of a hand-operated crankShould shaft geared to the motor shaft, which drives the one cable. the motor be short-circuited or otherwise injured, the driving shaft can be hand-operated, but, of course, at only a slow speed. If a shell fragment should cut this cable on a foreign ship, the whole hoist would be immediately put out of business and the turret would be just as completely disabled as our own.

6. Lack of torpedoes and destroyers.-We are entirely in agreement with Mr. Reuterdahl in his belief that our weakness in torpedo-boat destroyers is a distinct menace to the efficiency of the Navy. Congress should make liberal appropriations for ships of this type, which should be of not less than 750 tons displacement and 30 to 32 knots speed. Such boats should be of sufficient strength and freeboard to enable them to cruise with the fleet in any weather. But Mr. Reuterdahl is in error when he considers that the lack of submerged torpedoes in the ships of the Pacific Fleet is a serious matter. Expert opinion on this question has been "seesawing" for several years, according as the speed and range of the torpedo or the range and deadliness of armorpiercing gun fire have been in the ascendency. In 1903 the General Board, speaking on this question, said: "The range, speed, and accuracy of torpedoes have so greatly increased within the last year or two that at the present time the torpedo may be considered a weapon of offense to be seriously reckoned with up to 3,000 yards, and even more. Since gun fire, in order to result in a decisive action, must be delivered at a range not greatly exceeding 3,000 yards, it follows that the tactics of fleet actions will hereafter be influenced by the presence or ab sence of torpedoes." Since that opinion was given the battle range has increased from 3,000 to 8,000 or even 10,000 yards, as witness the remarkable shooting up to 9,000 yards made by our own Connecticut during the past summer. At such ranges the torpedo becomes an incumbrance, and the space occupied by the submerged torpedo room may much better be given up to coal or stowage.

In concluding this answer to the criticisms of Mr. Reuterdahl's article, and to the general campaign of criticism by which it was preceded, we wish to state that the Scientific American has based its statements upon facts which are either of its own knowledge or gathered from public Government documents. We believe that after a careful consideration of the facts as here presented the general American public will agree with us that our Navy stands second to none in the general efficiency of its ships.

There is one feature, however, in which our ships are superior, and often greatly superior, ton for ton, to the ships of other navies. We refer to the exceptionally heavy armament which they carry. Since the days of the Revolutionary war it has been our aim to mount upon our ships heavier batteries than were carried by foreign ships of corresponding size, and to this policy very largely have been due most brilliant victories, particularly where single ships were engaged. That policy has been steadily followed in the creation of our new Navy, whose birth may be dated from the year 1883. Although Congress has persisted in the most unreasonable practice of stating what the displacement of the ships shall be, the Department has succeeded in equaling the foreign ships in speed, protection, and coal supply, and at the same time has greatly outmatched them in the weight of the armament.

SHIPS.

[Senate Document No. 427, Sixtieth Congress, first session.] HEARINGS ON ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN UNITED STATES BATTLE Mr. HALE presented the following article from the Scientific American (April 4, 1908) on the hearings on alleged structural defects in United States battle ships.

THE SENATE HEARING ON THE ALLEGED DEFECTS OF OUR NAVY.

The Senate hearing on the alleged defects in the vessels of our Navy was held with a view of ascertaining the exact facts regarding the freeboard, position of water-line armor, height of guns, and other

features of our battle ships as compared with those of the leading foreign navies. The proceedings were very exhaustive, and resulted in the presentation of a vast amount of information, accompanied with detailed plans bearing upon these important points. The people of the United States will be gratified to learn that the evidence which has thus far transpired is not only a complete vindication of the excellence of the ships of our Navy, but it proves them to be, in some respects, decidedly superior to foreign ships of the same date and type.

It was evident from the testimony given by certain seagoing officers who have been active in criticism of our ships that they indorsed the allegations made in what is known as the Reuterdahl article. Now, the charge made in that article (and it is well to be perfectly clear on this point) was not so much that our ships could be made better than they are (a fact which everybody is prepared to admit), but that our ships are inferior, and greatly inferior, to the ships of foreign navies. It is with this last statement in particular that we have always taken decided issue. The Scientific American claims (and not a word of truth has been adduced to show the contrary) that our battle ships of any given type and date are as efficient as foreign battle ships of the same type and date, and in respect of their armament are greatly superior.

The official cross sections of a large number of typical foreign battle ships, which were presented in the recent Senate hearing, prove that this contention is absolutely correct. Compared with the British and Japanese ships, our armor belts are as thick, and sometimes thicker; they are in the same position with regard to the water line; our freeboard is as great, and in some cases greater; our broadside guns are carried as high, and generally higher; our rate of ammunition supply is as rapid, and in many ships more rapid; and (greatest surprise of all the open ammunition hoist to the turrets is not peculiar to our own Navy, but is found in several of the crack battle ships and cruisers of other navies.

That the above comparison is a high testimony to the quality of our ships will be recognized when we mention that the cross sections cited are of such ships as the British Royal Sovereign, Majestic, King Edward, and Dreadnought, and the Japanese Ashai, Mikasa, Kashima, and Aki; and we may mention just here that even in the case of the two crack battle ships, Mikasa and Asahi, of the Japanese fleet, the broadside guns are only about 12 feet above the water line, as against from 14 to 153 feet on our own ships. So, also, in the comparison with contemporaneous French ships, it is found that the thickness and position of our armor belts is fully as satisfactory; that the armoring of the top sides is greatly superior, and that in respect of the freeboard only and the heights at which the guns are carried have the French ships any so-called "advantage." That lofty guns and towering top sides have been adopted at the expense of stability is shown by the fact that, with one exception, the French-type Russian battle ships which fought in the battle of the Sea of Japan proved their topheaviness by turning turtle and going to the bottom. Furthermore, the one French-type ship, the Orel, which was captured by the Japanese, was changed by them to the American type by cutting down her decks and lowering her gun positions, as is clearly shown in the illustrations on page 241 of this issue.

According to press dispatches, Rear-Admiral Evans has sent to the Department a report upon the behavior of our ships during the Pacific cruise, in which certain suggestions are made with reference to the questions of armor belts, turrets, freeboard, etc., which are now in debate. The report contains the opinion of a naval constructor detailed especially to watch the behavior of the vessels, and of various seagoing officers in charge of the ships. In due course, when this report becomes available, we hope to give a review of its salient features. According to press dispatches, Naval Constructor Robinson noted that although, in the main, the voyage was made in quiet weather the ships at times rolled sufficiently to expose the unarmored bottom below the belt, and hence the suggestion of some of the officers that the belt be made wider is accompanied with the stipulation that the bottom of the belt be left in its present low position. It is suggested that the additional weight due to wider belts be compensated for by the removal of what is termed "superfluous weight." We believe that no small reduction of weight can be made in this way, for it is a notorious fact that our ships carry, in the way of comforts and conveniences for officers and men, much weight that is not to be found in foreign battle ships. It is also stated that Rear-Admiral Evans recommends taking off the after bridges;" though why he should do this, when it was at his earnest insistence, and in opposition to the strong wish of the construction department, that an extra flying bridge was built aft on the Connecticut for his special use, we are at a loss to understand. Commenting on the suggestion of some of the commanding officers that the belts might be raised from 6 inches to a foot higher (which, by the way, would bring them just where they were designed to be before extra weights were added during construction) Admiral Evans says:

"But even this is open to question, for it has been noted that even when heavily laden and in the smooth to moderate seas, which have thus far characterized this cruise, the ships frequently expose their entire belt and the bottom plating beneath.

"It must be remembered that even a 5 or a 6 inch shell, of which there would be a great number, could inflict a severe and dangerous injury if it struck below the belt, while otherwise the water line, even with the belt entirely submerged, is, on account of the casemate armor and coal, immune to all except the heaviest projectiles.

"The fact is that under the sea conditions in which battles may be fought a belt 8 feet in width, if considered alone, is too narrow to afford the desired protection wherever it may be placed, and the question becomes an academic discussion, with certain arguments on each side. "It is understood that on the latest ships this question is of little Import, as the citadel armor is but 1 inch less in thickness than on the water line, and for those ships already built it is believed that when the bridges are removed and all weights which would be landed should war break out are taken into consideration, the ship will rise to the 6 to 12 inches, which is believed to be the maximum that it could be desired to raise them."

If, as is reported, the admiral states that the broadside guns "can only be used to advantage when the battle ships are not steaming more than 10 knots," we can only say that bad, indeed, must be the case of the battle ships of other navies, the majority of which carry these guns from 1 to 3 feet nearer the water than do our own ships.

The country is to be congratulated on the fact that the recent wild and baseless criticism of our ships should have been made just when the fleet was starting for the Pacific. In spite of the fact that most of it was either false or grossly exaggerated, it has done an incalculable amount of good; for, as a result of the discussion and investigation which has followed, a large amount of information has been made

public regarding our ships, which scarcely could have become known in any other way. Not only have they now a more intelligent knowledge of our Navy, but the confidence of the people of the United States in the excellence of our ships has been greatly strengthened. As a further indorsement, there has come the brilliant success achieved by Admiral Evans and his officers and men in bringing that fleet through its 14,000-mile trip in perfect order and two days ahead of the schedule time.

APPENDIX D.

APPENDIX ACCOMPANYING HEARING OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, IN RELATION TO ALLEGED DEFECTS IN DESIGN OF UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS.

N. B.-The following extracts from foreign publications are submitted without comment and merely as indicating European opinion with respect to some typical designs of United States naval vessels: "Extracts from a paper contributed to the proceedings of the Institution of Naval Architects (London) in 1891, on Some recent war-ship designs for the American Navy,' by J. H. Biles, subsequently professor of naval architecture at the University of Glasgow, and extracts from the discussion of the above-noted paper.

"Extracts from the French annual Les Flottes de Combat,' 1907, and the English annual All the World's Fighting Ships,' edition of 1905-6 and edition of 1907.

"Also a few extracts from foreign periodicals commenting on various designs of vessels of the United States Navy, as follows:

"Engineering of March 26, 1907, in relation to the designs of the Alabama class.

Engineer of June 14, 1901, in relation to casemates and the attitudes of the British, French, Japanese, and Italian services with respect thereto.

Engineer of July 12, 1901, giving a comparison of the qualities of various foreign vessels and United States vessels of the New JerseyVirginia class.

"Engineer of December 27, 1901, containing further comments concerning vessels of the New Jersey, Virginia, and Connecticut classes." TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS, 1891

"Some recent war-ship designs for the American Navy,"
[By J. H. Biles.]

Referring to the earlier protected cruisers, Mr. Biles says: "The American ship designers and builders have shown that they are capable of producing vessels quite equal to their promises, and at least equal to the best European practice. * (Referring to the New

York.) Compared with the Edgar class, this vessel is much more powerfully armed and much better protected. Her sustained sea speed will probably be greater. She is, however, 800 tons more displacement, and should therefore be a superior vessel.

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The coast-line battle ships (the Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon) are the most important vessels of this programme. They have been designed to be able to fight vessels carrying the heaviest guns and armor,' and by. inference comparison with our most recent battle ships can not fail to be courted. ** The armament of these vessels seems to be

more powerful than that of any European battle ships, there being four guas capable of piercing any armor afloat and eight 8-inch guns capable of penetrating almost any armor, and certainly of penetrating the armor at the ends of the belts and on the barbettes and redoubts of most of our battle ships at close quarters.

Of course, in order to attain this result something has had to be sacrificed-or, rather, something is not existent in these ships which exists in the larger ones. The speed estimated, compared with our latest battle ships, is probably about 13 knots less. The coal supply is 500 tons less.

"The breadth of the armor belt is 1 foot less, but it is as wide as that of the Admiral class, which has not the advantage of the 5-inch belt above.

"As these vessels will probably have to act very much nearer their base than European vessels, their bottoms will probably be in better condition, so that the real speed would not be much, if any, less. For the same reason their coal supply need not be so large, and therefore it would seem that their preponderance of armament would give them an advantage in a combat near their own coast line with any European vessel. They are distinctly superior in most respects to any European vessel of the same displacement, and for the purpose intended, of protecting the American coast line, they seem to be quite a match for any ships afloat. They can keep the sea as well as any battle ships, and must not be looked upon as coast-defense vessels in the ordinary restricted sense, though they are called coast-line battle ships. Compared with the Admiral, their freeboard at the ends is 15 inches higher, and compared with the turreted battle ship Hood, it is practically the same. It is, however. 8 feet less forward than the barbette battle ship of the Royal Sovereign class. Judging by the amount of water which will come on board the Atlantic liner with a freeboard forward of 26 feet, the chance of fighting the 31-inch turret guns end on in a head sea is not very great, but the 8-inch guns could probably be fought in almost any weather. In maneuvering power this ship will be superior at her normal load draft to the Royal Sovereign class on account of her less length and draft."

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DISCUSSION ON THE ABOVE PAPER.

By Admiral, the Right Honorable Sir John Hay, K. C. B., D. C. L., F. R. S. (vice-president): "I think, my lord, this paper is rather an eye opener.

In

Mr. Biles's statement I think he indicates that the United States are now becoming a great naval power and that they are beating us in speed. Speed is of very great consequence, and that is exactly what the United States did some seventy years ago. While we were supposing ourselves to be the first naval power of the world, they built a certain number of very large ships and captured all the frigates which were supposed to be their equals, except in one or two famous actions. I think the fact that the United States is coming back again into the range of great naval powers makes it necessary that she should be considered in all the estimates of naval power which we have hitherto been conducting rather with reference to our possible European relations." By Admiral A. F. R. De Horsey, K. C. B. (associate):

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* I am glad to see that our friends across the Atlantic, with their great cleverness, stick to water-line protection. Any damage above the water line, however much the ship may roll, may probably be temporarily repaired, but there is a poor chance of dealing with injury below the water line."

By Mr. W. H. White, C. B., F. R. S. (vice-president):

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The facts * show that in America the reconstruction of the Navy has been undertaken in a most businesslike manOur friends there # *Ex at first did not produce rival designs, but obtained from this country designs and working drawings for ships and engines. * The first result at which they aimed has been most satisfactorily achieved. Ships are now afloat built in the States from designs acquired here which compare favorably with ships of the same date built in this country. Haying got through that stage of progress, the Americans are undertaking designs of their own. As regards the freeboard in the battle ships and the heights of the guns above the deck and above water. Sir Nathaniel Barnaby has well said that there is an essential difference between the Admiral class in the royal navy and the new American naval vessels. There are, however, ships like the Nile, Trafalgar, and Victoria, where the speed is practically the same and the freeboard is about the same as the Americans contemplate. The general feeling of naval officers is, however, in favor of our later practice in the Royal Sovereign class. The new vessels are, it is true, called coast-defense vessels in the official programme, but we are also told that they have a coal supply, or rather a bunker capacity, that would give them the power to go almost anywhere that other battle ships could go. With bunkers filled the thick armor would be about on the level of the water line. That is a matter calculated upon and accepted by the designers as a feature to which they do not object when the bunkers behind the 5-inch armor are full of coal. We have ships which come into the same class. I do not myself see the least objection to filling up the bunkers-they existbut I think that what needs to be clearly understood is that the nominal speeds of which we have heard are associated with a certain weight of coal in the ship, and not with the condition of full bunkers. So long as there is such a clear understanding no harm is done."

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LES FLOTTES DE COMBAT, 1907.

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This annual contains references to various United States vessels, as follows:

"Iowa. May be compared to the Carnot." NOTE.-Carnot laid down, 1891; completed, 1896. 1893 completed, 1897.

Iowa laid down,

"Kearsarge and Kentucky. The superimposed turrets offer certain advantages in simplicity of working and saving of weight, but if the turning axis is displaced (or the thinner upper turret disabled) onehalf of the battery is out of action. The secondary battery is well protected and the speed is sufficient for a battle ship. Everything on this slightly modified Iowa has been installed in as simple and practical a manner as possible. The main battery has been reduced in favor of the secondary, which will perhaps be slightly restricted as to ares of fire. On the other hand, the protection has been considerably improved and the armor belt extends to the stem.'"

In

Alabama." If we compare this class with the preceding one, we see that much attention has been paid to the protection and that the gun positions will be habitable during action. Speed is not increased. America this is considered as a secondary factor for battle ships. The Alabama type is preferable to the Majestic from every point of view. While it has as much freeboard, it is on less draft and displacement. It has more armor and armament and a speed approximately equivalent."

*

NOTE. Majestic laid down February, 1894; Alabama laid down December, 1896.

Connecticut." These battle ships, which are a reply to the British King Edward VII, are better protected than the latter for the same displacement, and, in particular, are more heavily armed."

New York." This cruiser, which was a complete success, was in advance of all others built at the same time and still holds a good place among them."

Brooklyn." Her sponsons are excellently arranged and the forecastle at a height of 10 meters makes her superior to most cruisers now afloat. She could fight in any weather. Her protection is more than adequate."

Tennessee.- "These vessels, which much resemble the English Drake, as to their general arrangement, speed, and displacement, have, however, the advantage of a complete belt. Their main battery is just double that of the Drake and they have two more 6-inch guns and eight 3-inch. They are inferior to the English Duke of Edinburgh." Jane's Fighting Ships (ed. 1905-6, p. 380.)

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To the United States belongs the credit of being the first nation to sanction that battle ship with a uniform armament of big guns, which * has hovered on the horizon of the building programmes of most of naval powers. In large cruisers no departure is being made. The Washington, which is the most powerful armored cruiser afloat, is the standard model, so far as can be gathered. * No cruisers of moderate dimensions are contemplated, the American ideal that every ship is to be the best possible of its class being faithfully adhered to.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1907-Preface.

* *

Few, if any, ships are likely to be built in the future which can not use all guns on either broadside. America in the South Carolina led the way in this direction, and the ship of the future is bound to be some improved variation of her.

Certain tables upon page 433 are a new feature. These tables omit all ships projected under 1907-8 programmes. Such figures would slightly increase United States superiority in long-range attack. The extraordinary high figures for United States ships afford food for considerable thought, for both in ships with high-powered guns or impervious to vital injury at long range the United States fleet is superior to any other navy in the world. Even by the inclusion of 40 caliber (12-inch) of types extinct so far as new ships are concerned the United States of America is an extremely good second and the corresponding lead in invulnerability outside 7,000 yards is considerably increased.

EXTRACTS FROM TABLES REFERRED TO.

(a) Ships with high-powered guns. Number of ships able to attack outside 7,000 yards:

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The Dreadnought herself was found to have certain minor defects. Her nghting power has, however, probably been overestimated. There is very little reason to believe that she is "equal to two King Edwards," despite her undoubted belt superiority. extremely important point about a battle ship, recognized far more fully in the United States than anywhere else, is embodied in the following observations of Mr. Robinson, of the United States Constructional Board:

"The writer is of the opinion that at some periods in all services too much consideration has been given in design to the development of characteristics tending to efficiency in individual ship action to the detriment of a corresponding efficiency in squadron or fleet action. This has doubtless been due to lack of proper knowledge available as to squadron or fleet maneuvers, a knowledge recently much augmented by the naval maneuvers conducted by the different countries and by the experience gained in the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars. The attainment of the desired results in the South Carolina and Michigan could only be reached from a most careful consideration of all questions and the elimination of such features as were considered least tending to fighting efficiency under the conditions in which they might naturally be called upon to act. These considerations led to the arrangement of battery shown in the belief that broadside fire through a considerable are from bow to stern was of vastly more moment in fleet action than volume of fire ahead or astern. It seems to be generally conceded that this deduction is correct.' The merit or otherwise of the Dreadnought depends upon the sort of fleet unit that she makes. The United States 1906-7 programme embodied a development of the South Carolina and having ten of her 12-inch on the broadside should be considerably superior to the Dreadnought. * The South Carolina and Michigan characteristically American. There is room for considerable doubt as to whether the upper big guns can fire over the lower turrets without putting the latter temporarily out of action, but the ships have probably been unduly criticised because of this. Any arrangement that permits of all guns being used on either broadside is open to some kind of criticism. For broadside fire the American ships seem very well adapted, and that, rather than the four guns and on," was the chief thing aimed at by the designer. The alternative method of securing this result, as in the Inflexible type of cruiser, while superior for end-on fire on paper, is inferior in the matter of actual broadside discharge, since one turret has to fire over the decks, a thing for one or two reasons open to criticism. Discussing the paper of Mr. Robinson already referred to, the Engineer (London) said:

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Mr. Robinson begins with the Indiana and tells us, what few of us have realized before, that that ship was designed as a "coast defender pure and simple; hence, many of her obvious defects, when regarded as a battle ship of ordinary type. She is, as a matter of fact, merely a monitor of large size and large secondary armament. Iowa, says Mr. Robinson, was an attempt to turn the Indiana into a seagoing ship. Then he traces the course of the modern American Navy, with many candid admissions as to the difficulty before naval architects. Quite a formidable one, he says with emphasis, is the modern demand for increased comfort aboard, bathrooms, etc. Without any beating about the bush, the author describes these as peacetimes attributes and shows that on a given displacement every comfort means a corresponding loss of efficiency. These comforts are demanded and they must be supplied, but they have to be paid for somewhere in the total displacement. Of course this is a truism, but Mr. Robinson has been the first to tackle it boldly. The American board on construction apparently intend to oppose, so far as may be, the combined hotel and war ship ideal, which in some navies has made so much headway of late.

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It is not necessary to follow Mr. Robinson through his review the constant call upon naval except to here note architects to provide for fresh necessities, such as improving coaling facilities, storage of high explosives, and so on. As we have already mentioned, the popular idea is that in America they do not bother much over these things. After reading Mr. Robinson's paper, we are driven to suspect that no other nation bothers so much. Thence he proceeds to the South Carolina and Michigan, in which both cost and displacement were fixed before the naval architect commenced his labors. The point is one that all critics of these ships ignore. Without these limitations it is easy to design something better than the Dreadnought, but to design a Dreadnought of 2,000 tons less displacement is quite another matter.

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The aim has been to produce a ship suitable for fleet action, rather than a vessel for individual combat against something similar to herself. This has led to a strict elimination of features which may be described as "luxuries" rather than "necessaries." * There is some good reason to believe that, taking all things into consideration, the South Carolina type is the best all-big-gun ship yet put in hand. The extinction of the protected cruiser is in many ways remarkable. * Gazelles and scouts all suffer from their small size and small endurance. There are few more curious views in modern naval programmes than this ignoring of war needs. The U. s. S. Birmingham class scouts, with a considerable endurance, represents the realization of sound perceptions in the direction of protected cruisers, as in them alone of all small cruisers is there a sufficiency of coal.

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EXTRACTS FROM SOME FOREIGN PERIODICALS REGARDING DESIGNS OF UNITED STATES VESSELS.

says:

[Engineering, March 26, 1897.] Discussing Admiral Hichborn's paper on the Alabama, the editor The design of the ship differs materially from that of recent vessels of a similar class in the British navy; indeed, it is marked throughout by originality and boldness of arrangement, both in general features and matters of detail. The armored protection is very complete. It will be seen that the central portion of the ship is completely inclosed by armor, extending from 4 feet below the load-water line to the level of the upper deck, or a height of about 23 feet, the minimum thickness being 5 inches."

[The Engineer, June 14, 1901.]

"Some time ago the Engineer prophesied that casemates would be an exploded idea for new British battle ships. We hear that the new 18,000-ton battle ship will have continuous batteries like the Mikasa, Benedetto Brin, all modern American ships, and all save the latest French battle ships. Bearing in mind the progress of explosives, we can not but see that the Admiralty are wise in returning to the old broadside ironclad idea."

[The Engineer, July 12, 1901.]

"In conclusion we may give the broadsides of existing ships of the same type as the King Edward: King Edward, four 12-inch, two 9.2-inch, five 6-inch; Mikasa, four 12-inch, seven 6-inch; Tavritchesky, four 12-inch, eight 6-inch; Brin, four 12-inch, two 8-inch, six 6-inch; Wittlesbach, four 9.4-inch, nine 6-inch; American, four 12-inch, four 8-inch, four 6-inch. Reckoning an 8-inch as equal to one and onehalf 6-inch shell power, we get the totals: British, King Edward, 31 in a minute; Japanese, Mikasa, 29 in a minute; Russian, Kniaz P. Tavritchesky, 32; Italian, Benedetto Brin, 31; German, Wittlesbach, 29; American, New Jersey, 44. All these ships, except the Wittlesbach, are identical in design. The Wittlesbach is perhaps a rather superior design in defense, the guns being more scattered, though it is not clear how she will use her offense to the full without interference. In general she is, however, of the same type. The Russian ship completing for sea is of low freeboard, but otherwise identical with the King Edward in the placing of her guns. She is less seaworthy and rather less likely to be hit. The Brin has recently been launched. The American ship is still in the clouds and may be made more powerful. As she is, however, it will be seen that she is far and away the leader. For each ship "the best in the world" claim has been put forward, but on paper the 16,500-ton American seems to carry off the prize. In speed and armor she is equal to the King Edward."

NOTE. Instead of the figures given above, the New Jersey class on a displacement of 14,948, have six 8-inch and six 6-inch on the broadside, making a total of 49 points, instead of 44, as given above.

[The Engineer, December 27, 1905.]

"No war ships, perhaps, have had so many vicissitudes as the United States battle ships of the New Jersey class. Once again they have been definitely decided on, permanently, perhaps, now; but it need not be forgotten that earlier designs have been final also. There is no getting away from the fact that each new finality has been better than the preceding designs. As with each the displacement has gone up, this is not to be wondered at; but the great and essential point is this increase in displacement. In the past American ideals have tended to whip creation' with the minimum displacement; now obviously nautical influences can be seen at work, with the result that we observe an honest striving after a real best, in place of what, rightly or wrongly, has hitherto been under suspicion of being rather a paper best. In fine, America is now definitely settling to building American war ships to American needs.

Further along in the same editorial comment appears the following reference to the designs of the Connecticut class, full report upon which had been submitted to Congress a short time before. After inviting attention to various alleged defects, the editor makes the following comment:

*

* *

"We have drawn attention to these defects not in a carping spirit, but because in spite of them we still hold these 17,604-ton ships, so far as the meager details available allow, superior to any other battle-ship designs, not merely as ships, but per ton of displacement. "A very important feature * is the abolition of triple Screws, after which the Engineer in Chief is supposed to hanker. Executive officers seem to have formed the opposition, and they have carried the day on the grounds that however advantageous the triple System may be in coal economy it lacks the tactical advantage of the twin-screw system. Purely engineering disadvantages might also be alleged, but the primary question is one of fighting capacity. With two screws there is over 8,000 indicated horsepower available for assistance in a sudden turn; with triple screws considerably less power is available. This is the gist of the argument that has carried the day again with the United States Construction Board, and it argues a Sound appreciation of a war ship as a fighting machine before all else. This is the dominant note all through the report, from the specific reasons against wood sheathing-of which we shall have more to say on another occasion-the situation of magazines, and facility of ammunition supply. Never before do we remember to have seen American designs thought out with so single an eye to the practical in all things." NOTE. In the foregoing extracts the italicizing is not the author's.

[Scientific American, New York, Saturday, May 2, 1908.]

SIR WILLIAM WHITE ON THE AMERICAN NAVY.

In the course of a recent conversation with Sir William White, the editor of the Scientific American asked the distinguished naval architect for his estimate of the relative value of the ships of the United States Navy compared with those of the leading navies of the world. He replied that if a comparison were made of ships of the same date and the same type, he considered that the United States vessels were the equals of any war ships afloat.

What

Now, the value of this approval lies in the fact that Sir William has had a more intimate and extended experience in the design of modern war ships than any living naval architect. For a period of about twenty years he was the chief constructor of the British navy. Ericsson was to the low-freeboard, coast-defense monitor White is to the modern, high-freeboard seagoing battle ship; and in the Royal Sovereign he introduced a type which, for two decades, has formed, ing navies of the world. in most of its essential features, the standard battle ship' for the leadIn his active career he has designed a greater

number of battle ships and cruisers probably than any three naval archi

tects combined.

Sir William informed us that he had followed the Senate investigation of the supposed defects in our ships with much interest and that he disagreed with the charges as originally stated in the Reuterdahl article. Taking the case of the Dreadnought, which was cited as an instance of how our own ships should have been armored, but were not, he made the startling statement that whereas, at full load, the American ships are depressed on an average 27 inches below the nominal flotation line, the Dreadnought, when so loaded, was depressed from 4 to 4 fcet; and that whereas at full load the American ships show from 6 to 9 inches of the thick belt above the water, the English ship has the corresponding belt from a foot to a foot and a half below water! He further stated that whereas in the fully loaded condition the Dreadnought shows only 4 to 4 feet of 8-inch side armor, the Connecticut and class show from 15 to 16 feet of 7-inch side armor above the water. Therefore he considered, as well he may, that the Connecticut is better protected than the Dreadnought.

Even more disastrous to the critics of our Navy were the comments of Sir William on the question of the direct versus the interrupted hoist. Mr. Reuterdahl and others have stated, time and again, that the direct hoist, giving direct communication from the handling-room floor to the breech of the gun, is a type of construction peculiar to our own Navy, which is full of danger; and they have urged that it should have been abandoned long ago in favor of the interrupted hoist, which according to them was introduced in foreign navies to avoid the dangers inherent in the direct hoist. Thus, Mr. Reuterdahl in his recent letter to the New York Sun, referred to in another column, states that there is not in any foreign turret a hoist of the type we use. Now, upon this point no one is so qualified to speak as Sir William; for he informs us that it was he himself who designed the interrupted hoist nearly twenty years ago the critics have told us that this was a comparatively modern improvement, which our slow-moving Department has refused to adopt-and that he did not design it because the interrupted hoist was less dangerous, but because he believed it would secure a faster service of ammunition to the guns! He stated furthermore that the majority of the armored ships of the world make use of the direct hoist, and that it is in no sense peculiar to the United States Navy.

And thus once more are the fallacies and the absurd exaggerations of this ill-advised onslaught upon our Navy shown to be not only baseless, but positively absurd-this time by one who is at once the foremost naval architect of the day and an outside critic of unquestioned impartiality. Let us hope that with this final and truly comic pricking of the " open hoist turret bubble, the American public will be granted

a well-earned repose.

[From the Boston Transcript.]

SIR WILLIAM HENRY WHITE PAYS TRIBUTE.

Sir William Henry White, K. C. B., F. R. S., was in Boston yesterday, and last evening attended a dinner at the Tavern Club tendered him by Josiah B. Millet, at which prominent naval officers of Boston were present. Sir William was for nearly twenty years, or up to 1902, the responsible designer of all British warships, and in knowledge of naval construction he is not surpassed by any man in the world. He is also deeply interested in American naval affairs and naval officers. RearAdmiral F. T. Bowles, former Chief Constructor, United States Navy, and now president of the Fore River Engine Company, and Rear-Admiral Capps, present Chief Constructor, were both his pupils in naval construction. It was this interest in our naval programme that induced Sir William to reply at length to a reporter's questions regarding the faults in our Navy as outlined by Henry Reuterdahl in McClure's Magazine. He plunged at once in medias res:

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Reuterdahl says in his article that the American ships are greatly inferior to foreign ships. He says that the thick armor in the waterline region, called the armor belt, is the life of the ship, and that, in the American ships, is only 6 to 9 inches above water when they are loaded up for sea, while in foreign ships the corresponding belt armor is better placed. And he speaks of the British Dreadnought as being in every way superior, as far as belt-armor defense is concerned, to the American ships.

"Now, I say he is all wrong as to his facts. The American ships, when they are floating at what is called their normal water line in still water, and upright, have their belt armor about 2 to 3 feet above that water line. You see that is the hypothetical water line-when the ship has certain weights on board, not representing her full load. The American official reports show that when the ships of the American Navy are fully laden they are about 27 inches deeper than that. And then the thick armor belt in the region of that water line still is 6 to 9 inches above water. So far Reuterdahl is correct. But he is absolutely wrong in regard to the Dreadnought's thick armor belt. When the Dreadnought is fully laden she is drawing from 4 to 4 feet more than at her normal water line, and her thick armor belt is then a foot to 18 inches below water, and she is left with a height of armor only 4 to 4 feet above the surface in still water.

"The American ships when fully laden are about 27 inches deeper than at the normal line. The Dreadnought is 4 to 4 feet deeperabout twice. The American ships fully laden have their armor belt 6 to 9 inches still above water. The English ship has her corresponding thick armor a foot to 18 inches below water. And the English ship's defense on the sides is then restricted to armor that rises 4 to 4 feet above water and is only 8 inches thick. The American ships of the Connecticut class have on their sides, for a considerable portion of their length, a vertical armor corresponding to the 8-inch armor of the Dreadnought-it may be a little less than 8 inches-extending 16 feet above water. So that as far as the Dreadnought and the Connecticut are concerned, the Connecticut is better protected above the water line.

"Now, this belt armor, in my opinion, is only a fetich. If the ship is upright and at rest in still water, and you have that thick armor belt at the water line, that portion of the ship would be, of course, well protected. But that portion, as a matter of fact, is the most difficult to hit. If the shots fall ever so little short they will ricochet and turn up. If they are high in elevation, of course they will pass over the thick armor belt.

The water line is never the real water line when the ship is at sea. If the ship is moving, the waves formed by her motion in still water will bury that thick armor-that water line. If there are waves passing the ship, they rise above that thick armor. If the ship heels over ever so little, this belt goes under water, no matter where it is placed. "These considerations led me, twenty years ago, to recommend to the English Admiralty that they should abolish the thick armor. And my design, which was used exclusively for a period of sixteen years, made the armor a uniform thickness from the main deck down. "My first designs which were accepted had the thick water-line belt, but in 1888 I recommended the other course. In the Royal Sovereign

class the armor rose about 9 to 10 feet above the normal water line and about 5 feet below-that is to say, the side armor was 15 to 16 feet in width. Naval opinion of that day was exactly that which Reuterdahl now holds. And so we had armor at the water line 10 inches thick, and that went 3 feet above the water line. For the rest of the height it was 5 inches thick.

"Previously there was no armor above the belt. The armor was all at the water line. The Germans have built ships within the last twelve years like that-simply a belt and no side armor above.

"What I wanted to do was, instead of having a 10-inch armor belt at the water line and a 5-inch armor above that, to distribute that weight uniformly over the same areas, and in the Majestic class, which was the original of all modern battle ships and which I designed about 1893, I was allowed to make the armor on the hull uniformly 9 inches thick, and did so, so that there is a wall armor of the same depth as in the Royal Sovereign class and of the same weight, but it had a uniform thickness of 9 inches all the way up.

"We have followed that design in England until the Dreadnought was built, and of course with her I had nothing to do. In the Dreadnought they revert to the thick water-line belt, which, as I have said, at the normal line extends about 2 to 3 feet above still water, and when the ship is deep laden 1 to 1 feet under water-that is to say, they go back to the arrangement which was abandoned fifteen years ago.

This argument about the water-line belt being the life of the ship is all humbug, because you do not know where the water line is. Directly she burns out coal or uses up stores or does anything to diminish her draft that water line changes, and directly you put in water or the ship heels over or moves through the water it changes. "When you go to sea you may have the ship rolling, so that her armor comes wholly out of water. You never go to sea with the fleet without seeing large portions of the unarmored bottoms of the ships.

The fundamental error is in making such a fetich of the water-line belt. What you want to do is to get all the vertical height of armor you can on the side above the belt or water line, and then, when you have fixed on your limit of weight, this must also be considered. All experience proves that the chance of damage to the hull of the ship increases with its height above water.

In the battle of Tsushima it was not the armored sides of the Russian ships that suffered, but their superstructures. The ships were not sunk by perforation of their armor, but by the perforation of their thin sides above the armor and the entrance of water into the upper parts of the ships."

"If the armor of the Russian ships had been the same as the armor of the Connecticut, what would have been the result?"

"It would have been vastly better for the ships. This is the point: The Russian ships had a smaller armored area above the water than the Connecticut, therefore they could stand battering less, and the Dreadnought has less armored area above the water than the Connecticut, taking both ships at deep draft.

When the people talk, as Reuterdahl does, about the Dreadnought being such a superior vessel to the Connecticut in the defense, they ignore the small vertical height of armor when the ships are at deep

draft."

"Does not the Connecticut answer all Reuterdahl's requirements as expressed in his criticisms?"

No. What he says is that the life of the ship depends upon the water-line belt. If you admit that premise, then his argument is all right. He says a 6-inch armor above the water-line belt might be of some value, but would be quite secondary. I say that all experience proves that the increase in the vertical expansion above water of the side armor is of fundamental importance in enabling the ship to stand battering.

"There are plenty of instances in the case of the Russian ships in the war with Japan where the armor, according to all formulæ, should have been penetrated and was not penetrated, and the Russians, who may be supposed to know what happened, have in their later designs extended the area of the armor enormously and reduced the thickness. That has been their answer to it."

"What reasons were given by the British Admiralty for reverting to an abandoned type of armor in the case of the Dreadnought?" "They decided to have an armament of ten 12-inch guns. They had therefore to provide a great weight of armor for the redoubts in which these great guns and their turntables are placed. That was a necessity, you see, to protect the armament. Then they found that with a given size of ship, with a given total weight of armor available, they could not continue to protect so large an area on the side.

With the Connecticut or the King Edward arrangement your armor serves two purposes-it protects the battery in which you place your smaller guns and also serves to maintain buoyancy and stability by being on the side of the ship.

"If you have to put in 12-inch guns, you must protect with armor the towers in which they are placed. In the Connecticut or King Edward there are four 12-inch guns; therefore you have two towers. But when you get ten 12-inch guns, as in the Dreadnought or the North Dakota, you are obliged to take armor from the sides and put it on the towers. "The total depth of armor on the Dreadnought along the side is about 131 to 14 feet, a little less than before. And, again, the reversion to the thicker water-line belt means you have to concentrate weight therea thing to which I have always taken exception. I think that is going back to a fallacy; it is a mistake. And you know they have not continued to use the same thickness of belt line in the latter ships of the Dreadnought class. They have kept the 8 inches above, but have less than 11 inches below. In other words, the difference between the upper and belt armor is less in the later ships.

"There is another thing which Mr. Reuterdahl criticised, and that is the direct hoists from the magazines to the rear of the guns. Taking it as a matter of fact again, if you were to take all the armored ships of the world at the present time on the effective lists, you would find the very great majority of them with nothing but direct hoists. It is not peculiar to American ships at all.

Now, I have been reading the testimony given at that investigation in Washington, and from that it appears perfectly clear that the accidents that have happened are only indirectly associated with the direct hoist. The primary cause of accident has nothing to do with the hoist. "Having said that, I ought to say that I am the man who brought out the broken hoist-that is, lifting the ammunition up a certain height from the magazines into an ammunition room and there transferring it to another hoist not in a direct line. I did that nearly twenty years ago, but I did not do it because of the danger of the direct hoist. When you have a direct hoist from the magazine up to the rear of the guns, which may be 50 feet if the gun is placed high, it takes an appreciable amount of time to lift the charge from the magazine to the gun before

you can load. Now, I said if I could put in two stages-one that would bring the ammunition to within 6 or 7 feet of the gun, and then a second set of men, who had nothing to do with the first operation, to lift it the remaining distance to the gun-I could save considerable time. That is the reason I did that, and not because of any danger. "The inexperience of the men and the conditions of target practice are to blame. As long as you give the prize to the men who fire the most ammunition in a given time, or hit the target most frequently in a given time, they will play that game. But you will remember that the Japanese admirals, Fushimi and Togo, gave orders that that practice was not to be followed.

"In the battle of the 10th of August, outside Port Arthur, the Japanese fired away nearly all their ammunition, and were only saved by the merest good fortune. And they were not able to follow up the Russians, because they did not have reserve ammunition.

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Now, as to the freeboard and height of guns above water, all I need say about that is that the facts are again not in Mr. Reuterdahl's favor.

"It is quite true that in the swifter cruisers of the British navy I introduced a high forecastle, because they were going to drive hard and fast against the sea; but in the battle ships I kept along at a steady height of freeboard and of guns above water, and that was practically maintained all the time I was there, because it was proved to be enough by experience at sea.

"There are two requirements. There is the maintenance of speed; that demands a high bow, whether it is an Atlantic liner or a battle ship. Then there is the fighting power in a seaway; and of course there you never want to place your guns higher than you are obliged to, because by raising them you raise your center of gravity and reduce your stability accordingly. "Reuterdahl's contention is that the existing American ships are disadvantageously situated as compared with European vessels. I say that is not so. The cruisers in your Navy have not such a great height of freeboard forward as I have given to our cruisers, but in that respect it is not a question of power, but simply a question of the maintenance of speed at sea. "There is one thing more that I should like to say, and I think it is vital. I have known the American Navy from the start. It is not generally known that the modern American Navy started with the purchase of two of my designs from Armstrong's. That was in 1885. From those designs the Charleston and the Baltimore were built. "The first thing I want to say in this connection is that you have in those men naval architects as capable as any, in my judgment, in the world, because they have been properly trained, and besides they are picked men.

"The second thing I want to say is that your shipbuilding yards are quite equal to any we have in their equipment and management and all that. They have come later, and they have the advantage of all the accumulated experience we have had to go upon. And there is American ingenuity at the back of all that on the mechanical side.

ship, comparing the ships designed at a given date--and that is the only "And the result is that, in my opinion, you have a fleet that, ship for fair comparison-is equal to anything the world contains. And next to the British navy I think your Navy is the best in the world.

"These wholesale criticisms and severe condemnations are not justified. There is no shop that you can not criticise; but criticism to be of value must be the result of experience. No one would want to avoid that kind of criticism. But what I do say is that these are not subjects that can be properly discussed in the public press or in magazine articles. They must be dealt with dispassionately and quietly."

APPENDIX E.

[House Report No. 1398, Sixtieth Congress, first session.]

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. Foss, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the fol lowing report to accompany H. R. 20471: The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred so much of the President's annual message as relates to the naval establishment, together with the annual estimates of the Navy Department, submit herewith II. R. 20471, making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, with the following statement: The amount carried by this bill is $103,967,518.43. The estimates of the Department amounted to $125,041,349.80. The committee, after careful consideration of these estimates, made deductions to the amount of $22,518,831.37, and under "Increase of the Navy" recommend an appropriation of $1.000.000 toward the construction of submarine boats, and $445,000, within the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, for the construction of subsurface torpedo boats.

The following table gives a comparative statement of the appropriations for 1908 furnished by the Navy Department, the estimates for 1909, and the amounts recommended in this bill:

Naval establishment.

Pay of the Navy..
Pay, miscellaneous-
Contingent, Navy.
Naval station, Island of Guam:
Maintenance and care of lepers
and other special patients.
Bureau of Navigation..
Bureau of Ordnance.
Bureau of Equipment..
Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Public works, Bureau of Yards and
Docks..

Public works, Secretary of the Navy:
Naval Academy..

Public works, Bureau of Navigation: Naval training station, California...

Naval training station, Rhode
Island.

Naval training station, Great
Lakes..

Public works, Bureau of Orduance-
Public works, Bureau of Equipment.

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