Ah! vain the thought, but yet as vain Who bids thee, Britain, treat for peace? Of yonder Eagle of the North- Nor grudge the cost at this late hour,- One way to peace, and only one Conducts.-Oh! sick'ning 'tis to dread Of blissful peace, for which the breast Of many a mother heaves a sigh, The lingering sigh of fear suppressed. LEITH, May 1855. R. H. LETTER ON ETERNAL PUNISHMENTS, IN REPLY TO THE PHILOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS OF A CRITICAL FRIEND. MY DEAR SIR,-After reading this paper, one is tempted, on the first impulse, to imagine that a throwing down of the gauntlet was designedly intended by the writer, a bravado of all-conquering scholarship which, after above fourteen years, stands out an unanswered challenge, -one I say, feels disposed to treat it as such, and deal with it accordingly. On second thoughts, however, the research displayed by the writer, evincing his desire for truth, and the honesty he has shown in stating the point where he desires more satisfaction, incline me to give that point a fair and impartial examination, and believing his object is truth not triumph, to reply to his difficulty in calm and unbiassed truthfulness of argument, disdaining to avail myself of small advantages to which his incaution has laid himself open, and though I touch on these as they bear on the question, nevertheless afford him ample, and I hope, valid reasons, to convince him he has taken up an untenable position. I may remark in setting out, that there is no term, on the true mean. ing and Scripture application of which, there are more abundant materials to the scholar than awr and avios, and instead of wasting time by plodding through the philology and lexicography of these terms, I would refer your friend to Schleusner's Lexicon to the Greek Testament, Titman's Synonyms, vol 1., and Schmidt's Concordance of the Greek Testament;-assuming that the writer of these remarks knows, or ought to know, the facts of the case on which he has taken a side. He opens, in rather a startling manner, by saying, "the word awv may be considered one of the most slippery in Greek, the meanings borne by it, whether in secular or sacred writers, being extremely various." I do not see any ground for this remark, any more than hundreds of similar words in all ancient languages. The word has a proper signification, and a derivative or contextual one, in the wide variety of subjects and connections in which it is used. Aristotle derives it from aét wv, and the proper signification of it is duration,-as for its extent, whether absolute or limited duration, that depends on the subject and connection,-as, to the duration of a thing, or the life-time of a person, or a definite period of time, and such like. And so likewise we fix the signification of the adjective awvios, by the significance of αιων. So far we are agreed,-but the writer proceeds to say: "In none of the three languages is there a term restricted to eternal, a fact very strange to us moderns." Now, this remark is either the expression of ignorance of the usage of language, or of prejudice to a theory, for even alwv has its etymon, by the authority of Aristotle, to a wv, that which always exists. But the assertion is false, that these three languages, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, have no term to express strict eternity. To adduce Facciolati's rendering of vincula sempiterna as proof, shows that the critic confounds the occasional usage, and the strict sense of the words, for both the Latin words, aeternus and sempiternus, properly signify illimitable duration, but in composition are determined by the nature of the subject of which they are predicated,so in Greek awvios and audios both strictly signify perpetuity ;— alotos implies strictly duration that is past and future, and which has not yet an end, while, in the New Testament Greek, awvios is used of duration, for duration through all future time, or for an indefinite period past or future,as in the phrases χρονοις αιωνίοις, Rom. xvi. 25, προ Xpóvwv aiwvwv, 2 Tim. i. 9, and Tit. i. 2,-signifying unmeasured time, that is xpovo periods that endure through the aiwv, in other words eternity, viewed á parte post,-for that is the conception, humano more, we form of what is eternal, whether we take our stand-point from created time, or look at it as a predicate of God. Isaiah xl. 28, Oeos alwvios, -the LXX. rendering of the Hebrew by—which is in statu constructo, rendered by the French "Ne sais tu-pas, et n'as-tu pas entendu, que le Dieu d'eternité est l'Eternal," which is the real sense of the words the God of hidden duration, and none can deny, when affirmed of God, it must signify strict absolute eternity. I would remind my learned friend that the Hebrew has also another word to signify eternity, as Psalm xiii. 1, How long shalt thou forget me? (shall it be) for ever? -properly eternity to come, from the piel root ny to overcome, so applied xar' egox to eternity, as that which overcomes all things in time. I would thank the gentleman, who states a fact he acknowledges so strange to us moderns, to give me his authority for such a palpable contradiction of fact. He appeals confidently to Passow's Lexicon, as if his using ebenslänglich as one signification of awv settled a fact to be determined by the united authorities competent to give full evidence on three learned languages of antiquity. But even assuming life-long to be the signification of awvios, or eternus, the life is according to the subject which lives or endures. Now, even Plato regarded the life of man, as a moral being, to be eternal and imperishable; so Xenophon makes Cyrus say on his death-bed, "for I, my sons, never could persuade myself that the soul was living while it continued in a mortal body, and died when dismissed from it." So Cicero says, in Somnium Scipionis, "Beati aevo sempiterno fruuntur," and a little farther on, he says, "Yes, indeed those do still live, who have escaped from the chains of bodies, in which they were confined as in a prison," &c. I only quote these sentiments of the ancients to show, that even in their limited conceptions, they would understand life-long, when predicated of a moral subject, as equivalent with endless duration for the time to come; and I beg leave to press on my learned friend, that, in neglecting this consideration, he has in reality lost sight of the true question, which is, What is the signification of these terms, as determined by the author who uses them, at different times, on different subjects, and different styles? But what follows is most amazing. The writer, instead of examining the passage, Matt. xxv. last verse, on the fair straightforward line of exposition, insinuates that the Greek term awvior cannot be made to mean the same thing in both clauses, and he tells us the Greeks had two terms plocě, and antanaclasis, for the repetition of the same word, in the same or adjoining sentence. This assertion I am at a loss to understand. I know the rhetoricians used these terms in teaching oratory,—for instance Quintilian, in 3d chapter of 8th book, speaks of a figure of speech, called antanaclasis, whereby the words of the speaker are not to be understood as he means them, but are to be taken in a different or contrary sense. But does the writer of these remarks reflect on the solemn responsibility of learned trifling with the words of the Son of God incarnate? I would fain hope he does not mean to say that Christ used ambiguous words, calculated to mislead the unlearned, who in no age of the world could understand figures of rhetoric. And if what he says be true, most assuredly 999 out of the 1000 have been deceived by his words; for of one that has in time past, or in the present day, taken up his words in Matt. xxv. last verse, as teaching that the punishment of the wicked is to be of a limited duration, while the happiness of the righteous is to be of unlimited duration, a thousand have understood the words to mean their co-extension. In the example of the rhetorical figure, in saying of an unhappy attempt at criticism, "some of the remarks betray partial learning, others the partial mind," we have a tropical sentence, for betray is only applied metaphorically to "remarks," so the word "partial" is used in a proper sense to the mind, but in an improper sense to learning,though in both cases the generic idea of defect is inherent in the proper signification, as appears from its etymon from the privative "in," and Latin "pars," so that the same general conception pervades both clauses, only modified by the subject of which it is affirmed; as the term learning is abstract, it requires that the signification of partial, predicated of it, means defective, or deficient in some respect; but as the usus loquendi has given as the proper signification of the word "being inclined to favour one party or side more than another," it must be used in its proper sense when affirmed of intelligent minds. Now, I would beg leave to remark, on reading this sentence, which is here given as an illustration of what the writer desiderates, that in examining the Holy Scripture, or indeed any other book, there is no necessity for having recourse to a rhetorical sense, when the literal proper sense of the word agrees logically with that of which it is affirmed; and another thing to be observed here is; there is not, in such instances, any new sense different in the one case from the other, but for gratification, to give variety, to add beauty and elegance to the style; hence such kind of composition abounds most with poets and orators, and usually also with persons of warm and vivid imaginations. Now, in order to make out the necessity for a tropical sense in the passage in question, it must be shewn that the proper sense has become obsolete, or, in other words, that the metaphorical sense has become the proper sense. The writer observes that tropes are very common in the Bible; yea, so numerously, that Glassius has filled an elaborate Latin volume with the figures of Scripture. Now, it is admitted on all hands, that the proper sense of Scripture is not to be given up without necessity, and some evident cause; -here lies the real difficulty,-for as the subjects in the Word of God are such as cannot be subjected to the senses, the metaphysical and dialectic tendency of the human mind gives rise to endless controversies and disputations; but there is one canon or rule which fixes the limit between the tropical and proper signification of a word, or sense of a proposition, when the subject and predicate are heterogeneous, for logical truth is the foundation of propriety of expression. I am, therefore, bound to call upon the writer of these remarks, to show proof, why in Matth. xxv. last verse, he demands a tropical signification in the one clause and not in the other, in as much as, in both cases, the subjects of both predicates are homogeneous, righteous and wicked being but the two classes of the same genus-man; and what is a fatal overlook, he has not referred to the important position that our Lord held when he uttered these words, as a teacher sent from God: it may not be amiss here to quote Ernesti's 10th canon on the Scriptural tropes :-" Legislators in their edicts, historians in their narratives, and finally, the teachers of any system, when their object is simply and directly to convey their dogmas, all these are in the habit of using proper diction, except those which from usage have acquired a proper sense.' "When two or more things are spoken of," it is further alleged, "that it is the rule in all languages to express the adjective only once, when the quality it expresses applies to both. But what of that, when repetitions of the same words occur in all languages for the sake of energy in expression, or to express deep feeling;-that such is the New Testament usage, see Stuart's Syntax of N. T. page 243. In answer to the criticism of the writer, I would briefly state what are the acknowledged principles of the Greek on the points at issue. An adjective qualifying any noun may be placed between the article and its noun, or after the noun, in which case, if the substantive has the article, the adjective must adopt it likewise; but when the adjective is the predicate of a sentence, it usually and naturally dispenses with the article (though there are numerous exceptions), and commonly (but not always) precedes the noun to which it bears a relation; but when the noun has the article and the adjective wants it, it is to be regarded as a predicate, after a verb or participle, expressed or understood, and is put in the neuter gender. Sometimes the position of the adjective has speciality of meaning attached to it, for example, when it is placed before the substantive, but to this there are numerous exceptions. I have thus presented, at one view, the main grammatical rules, which are acknowledged by the best critics, in reference to the present subject. I do not understand the meaning in this connection of an unemphatic epithet; there is no necessity for recourse to emphasis at all, unless it be meant that the greatness of the subject itself conveys emphasis. It appears beyond all doubt that, in the strictures here made, there is a false principle of interpretation adopted, and a foreing of the New Testament words to it, with the entire neglect of the usus loquendi of the sacred writers themselves. The process here adopted with aivov, is similar to that of the Talmudists, who assumed silly fancies as hermeneutical laws, or the theologians of the Kant and Fichte schools, who subjected the Scripture to their philosophy, and determined the sense by their own human judgment and preconceived speculative notions. At the conclusion of the paper, after throwing down the gauntlet, he says: "according to the old remark, a man is not bound to prove a negative, I deny that repetition of an adjective, in the same sense as above, is allowed by Greek practice." The boldress of this language is only equalled by its groundlessness. He has entrenched himself in a rhetorical conceit (for his famous fourteen years' unanswered challenge is no better), and sings victory over a phantom. No scholar can reply to such confusion of ideas as this jumble of tropical and proper sense. Now what does the formal challenge amount to, but simply an admission of what nobody denies, and what can be safely conceded, without affecting the question, for that perspicuity or effect constitutes a reason for the adjective being repeated in the same sense in both clauses, and the challenger, by his previous reasoning shows that he admits to be a valid one. It is impossible to produce from a Greek writer, or any other, an instance of an adjective being repeated in the same sense without a sufficient reason to attempt the proof were absurd, because it would be seeking a thing that does not exist in the nature of language;-the proof of a negative we do not ask-but we ask, what the denial of the above usage being according to Greek practice avails in such a case, where the practice of all language is to determine the sense of the words used according to the mind of, the speaker, the usage of the language in which he speaks, the subject of his discourse, in short, the spiritus interpres of the writer VOL. XIX. U ; |