testimony to the said Book of Discipline, that for the substance thereof it is that we have practiced and do believe."*

Thus the General Court, though exercising the dual functions of the Israelitish Theocracy, considered objections answered by Rev. Richard Mather before their approval of the Platform. Then the Court commended the Platform to the churches for examination, approval, or objection; sent the returned objections to Rev. John Cotton for answer; after which it gave the Platform "their testimony" "for the substance thereof." This is the highest authority the Cambridge Platform received at the time of its adoption. Since then our churches have reäffirmed said Platform only "substantially," or "for substance of doctrine."

Yet as "testimony" respecting the principles and usages of our polity, the Platform held the first place of authority both in our churches and in our civil courts. But, in the sense of binding the churches to the exact theories and practices set forth therein, the Platform never had any authority whatever. Its authority was that of testimony, not of command; for the substance thereof, not for every form of expression; in virtue of its conformity to the teachings of the New Testament, not in virtue of its adoption by the Synod and commendation by the General Court.

II. THE BOSTON PLATFORM.

1. Origin.-After a lapse of two hundred and seventeen years, another General Council of our churches met at Boston, in 1865. The defects of the Cambridge Platform were not the cause of its convening, but, instead, the problems arising from the civil war and the emancipation of the slaves. A committee, however, which had been previously appointed to report on "the expediency of issuing a statement of Congregational Polity," presented a report and two draughts of Platforms,a longer one prepared and read by Rev. Leonard Bacon, D.D., and an "epitome," prepared and read by Rev. A. H. Quint, D.D. The report was accepted, and the draughts referred to a large committee. This committee, after long deliberation,

*Mass. Records, iii. 235, 236, 240.

made their report, recommending "the following action on the part of the Council:"

"Resolved, That this Council, having received and duly examined the two statements of church polity presented to them, hereby express their approval of the general principles and scope of the same.

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Resolved, That these documents be referred to the committee reporting them, which committee shall be enlarged by the addition of twenty-four members. . . . who shall receive and publish the same under the following instructions:

"1. All members and ministers of Congregational churches. ... shall be invited by the committee . . to indicate such additions, emendations, and omissions as they may judge proper.

"2. The committee shall take into special and careful consideration the points to which attention is now called in this report, and in general shall be empowered to make such changes and additions to the documents in their charge as they may deem advisable, and as may not be inconsistent with he general principles now approved."

There were three more instructions: the third respecting the method of indicating differences in usage; the fourth, the setting forth of the origin and history of the documents in a preface; and the fifth, relating to an appendix of added documents.*

The motion to adopt this report, after an amendment defining three things "as distinctive of the Congregational Polity" had been unanimously adopted, was carried, thus making the resolutions and recommendations the order of the Council.

2. Authority. In adopting the report of the committee to which the Platforms were first referred, the Council declared: "We have a right to issue as complete and comprehensive a statement as we are able to secure, for the consideration of the churches whose representatives we are, so long as, in the language of Richard Mather, we claim no more authority for such statement 'than there is force in the reason of it.'" The right being undisputed, how did the Council exercise it? We have seen that, on the recommendation of the committee, the Council expressed "their approval of the general principles and scope" of the draughts presented and read; that they then referred the draughts to a new and large committee, "who shall revise and publish the same under instructions." The adoption of this made the revision and publication mandatory *Minutes, 427-430. + Ib., 463, 464. + Minutes, 427.

on the committee, not permissive. Besides, the committee were "empowered to make such changes and additions to the documents in their charge as they may deem advisable, and as may not be inconsistent with the general principles now approved."

A committee thus commanded and empowered by the Council to do a specified thing in a specified way, has, according to parliamentary rules, all the authority of the Council vested in them in the doing of that thing in the appointed way; and they could give to their work thus done whatever authority the Council itself possessed in such matters. Whatever that committee did within the limits of its instructions and command, the Council itself did. This no one would question, but for the following statement made in the report which contained said command and instructions, namely: "It would prevent much misconception and misrepresentation, if such a document, [namely, the Platform] after receiving the general approval of this Council, should go forth to the world with the full endorsement only of the gentlemen whose names shall be appended thereto. This mode of giving the document to the churches was presented as "the conclusion "reached by the committee, and the Council made it their own conclusion by adopting the report; but in the resolutions and instructions that followed, determining how the Platforin should be issued, the method above indicated was ignored, perhaps unintentionally, but still ignored. They, in fact, did not do what the conclusion marked out; but, instead, the Council ordered the committee to issue the document, and "empowered" it "to make additions and changes;" not in their own name, but necessarily in the name of the Council which endowed them with the requisite authority to do so.

Yet, granting that the Council intended only to approve of the Platform, in a general sense, and to have it issued with the full endorsement only of the committee of revision, the Platform still stands on an equality of authority with the Cambridge Platform. For the former, like the latter, was commended unto the churches, "that for the substance thereof it is that we have practiced and do believe." It stands as the "testi* Minutes, 428.

mony" of that Council respecting matters of polity as to principles and scope, and substantially as to details."

"It is little more than a truism to say that the National Council at Boston had no legislative power to ordain a new constitution for the churches, or to promulgate any new rules; and no judicial power to establish precedents which inferior courts must follow. All that any such Council can do is to inquire, to deliberate, and to testify. Whatever authority the Cambridge Platform has as testifying what was the way of the New England churches in 1648, just that authority a similar statement proceeding from the National Council of 1865 may have as testifying what American Congregationalism is in these latter years of the nineteenth century." These words from the Preface of the Boston Platform were used by the provisional committee reporting the draughts to the Council, and by the adoption of that report they became the words of the Council itself. Whatever view we take of the intent of the Council, the form of its action gives the same authority to the Boston Platform as the Cambridge possessed. We see no reason why the former should not have the same legal force as the latter once had. And since the committee were ordered to revise and issue it, the form in which they issued it to the churches is the authorized form. The Council, through its committee empowered to inquire, change, and publish the Platform, after seven years, presented it, in 1872, as our polity "for the substance thereof."

*

We conclude, therefore, that the Boston Platform has the same validity as a testimony respecting our principles and usages at the time of its adoption and publication, as the Cambridge Platform had, in 1648, respecting the principles and usages then held and practiced in our churches; and, consequently, that whatever legal value in courts of law the Cambridge Platform ever possessed, that value the Boston Platform now possesses. Both in our churches and in the civil courts the Boston Platform has superceded the Cambridge Platform as the authorized standard of our polity, so far as we can have such a standard.

* Minutes, 104, 133.

ARTICLE VIII.-THE ANALOGY OF SLAVERY AND INTEMPERANCE BEFORE THE LAW.

It is sometimes said: "Slavery was destroyed by law; why cannot intemperance be treated in the same radical way?" A constitutional amendment brought the former to a final end; let us take courage from our victory to make another amendment to destroy the traffic in intoxicating drink. Then make one more amendment to destroy polygamy, and we shall have disposed of the triple "relics of barbarism." Then shall the blessings of freedom, total abstinence, and monogamy go handin-hand through the south, the north, and the distant west. Thus argue many good people, and they are coming up to some of our western legislatures with petitions numerously signed asking that even all manufacture of intoxicating drink be forbidden, and that not merely by a law but by constitutional enactment. When told that the matter is too great to be thus managed, they fall back on the analogy of slavery. Slavery was great and ruled the nation; now it is dead beyond resurrection, for a constitutional amendment has been laid like a great rock over the door of its tomb; let us treat intemperance in the same thorough way. So, like Macbeth after the salutation of the witches, we stand possessed of the first part of the prophecy and wonder how we are to come by the rest. We find thus suggested to us the inquiry, what parallel is there in the position of slavery and intemperance before the law?

Belief

There is this first to be said that both slavery and intemperance are things that come within the view of the law. is free and a man may believe what he pleases on any subject, but these matters belong not only to belief but to relations and conduct, and so must come within the province of legislation. Personal habits and conduct are largely free but often transgress the boundaries of right and of statute. Slavery is a method of social relationship and can be dealt with as accurately as polygamy or partnership in business; intemperance involves manufacturing, imports and exports, sales and pur