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Opinion of the Court.
that claimant could not possibly have travelled from Mare Island to Washington and back, within the four days which elapsed between his discharge and his reënlistment, and hence, if he intended to reënlist, that he received there an allowance to which he was not justly entitled, and, as the second discharge is at the place of his original enlistment, he is not entitled to another mileage across the continent. It will, perhaps, not be just to say of the claimant that the interval which elapsed between his discharge as a drummer and his reënlistment as a private at Mare Island, was for the purpose of drawing transportation and subsistence to Washington, but the case at least suggests that possibility. Nor do we undertake to say that the paymaster was not fully justified in paying the claimant his transportation and subsistence when originally discharged at Mare Island, since it was manifestly impossible for him to know whether the claimant intended to reënlist or not; but under the circumstances we think the service should be treated as a continuous one. Indeed, it is somewhat doubtful whether this is not specially provided for by 1290, which allows transportation and subsistence from the place of his discharge "to the place of his enlistment, enrolment, or original muster into the service." If the word "original" preceded the word "enlistment" this construction would be freer from doubt, but the section as it reads certainly lends support to the theory that the allowances were not intended as a mere bounty.
Whether the claimant should be recharged, after his reënlistment, with the travel and subsistence allowed him on his first discharge raises a question which is not presented by the record in this case, and upon which we do not feel warranted in expressing an opinion. Other considerations may have a bearing upon this question, which do not enter into the pres ent controversy. If, for instance, the claimant did not intend. to reënlist when first discharged, but subsequently changed his mind, it does not necessarily follow that he should be recharged these allowances, if the government chose to reenlist him. The question at issue concerns only the propriety of the second claim and not of the first allowance. The case
Statement of the Case.
is a somewhat exceptional one, and all that we decide is that, where the service is practically a continuous one, and the soldier's second discharge occurs at the place of his original enlistment, he is not entitled to his commutation for travel and subsistence to the place of his second enlistment.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is, therefore,
Reversed, and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF GARNETT v. AYERS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 446. Submitted January 7, 1896. Decided January 27, 1896.
The single fact that the statutes of Kansas regulating the assessment and taxation of shares in national banks permit some debts to be deducted from some moneyed capital, but not from that which is invested in the shares of national banks, is not sufficient to show that the amount of moneyed capital in the State of Kansas from which debts may be deducted, as compared with the moneyed capital invested in shares of national banks, is so large and substantial as to amount to an illegal discrimination against national bank shareholders, in violation of the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5219.
THIS was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Kansas to review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the District Court of Anderson County, which was in favor of the defendants, and for costs against plaintiff. The action was brought to restrain the defendants from levying upon the property of the plaintiff in error for the purpose of collecting a warrant, issued for the collection of taxes upon the stockholders of the bank on the ground that certain deductions claimed on the part of some of the stockholders from the assessment upon their shares of stock were not allowed them, as they claimed they should have been, under the statutes of the United States.
The petition of the plaintiff in error stated the facts upon
Statement of the Case.
which it was alleged the cause of action arose, and the defendants voluntarily entered appearance in the cause, and thereupon an agreement was signed by the parties to the action setting forth the facts upon which the case was to be tried. The material portion of the agreement set forth that the plaintiff was a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, with its office at the city of Garnett, Anderson County, Kansas. The defendant Ayers was sheriff of the county of Anderson during all the time mentioned in the complaint, and the defendant Hargrave during such time was treasurer of that county. The plaintiff was a national bank with a capital stock of $75,000, divided into 750 shares of the par value of $100 each; the actual value of such shares of stock was $100 per share on the first day of March, 1890. On the day last named certain stockholders, named in the statement, were justly indebted and owed in good faith the several sums of money set opposite their respective names in plaintiff's petition. These debts were not owing to any person, company or corporation as depositors in any bank or banking association, or any person or firm engaged in the business of banking in Kansas or elsewhere, nor were they debts owing on account of any of the things named in the Kansas statute hereinafter alluded to. The stockholders owing such debts duly complied with the statutes of Kansas in asking to be allowed to deduct from the value of their stock the amount of the debts which they were justly owing in good faith, as above stated. This was refused by the proper authorities, and an assessment was made against the named stockholders of the plaintiff without allowing any such deductions as claimed, and the taxes so levied on the stock held by the stockholders amounted to the sum of about $2000. The debts of the stockholders were all of the kind and character that could be deducted from "credits" under the statutes of Kansas, and due and legal demand was made to have such debts deducted from the value of the stock, which was refused. The debts were justly due and owing on the first of March, 1890, and no part of them had been deducted from the "credits" at any time or place during that year. The plaintiff paid the taxes assessed against its stockholders who did not
Statement of the Case.
claim any deductions, and the only taxes remaining due were those assessed against the named stockholders who claimed deductions for their debts, as above stated. Other facts were agreed upon which it is not necessary to mention for the purpose of discussing the question involved in this case.
Several statutes of the State of Kansas are set forth, the first being the one which permits an action of this kind to be brought for the purpose of enjoining an illegal levy of any tax, charge, or assessment. Section 6847, General Statutes of Kansas, (to be found in vol. 2 of those laws,) defines the different terms used in the chapter on taxation. In this section the term "credit" is defined as follows: "The term 'credit' when used in this act shall mean and include every demand for money, labor, or other valuable thing, whether due or to become due, but not secured by lien on real estate." Section 6851 of the same General Statutes permits a deduction of debts from "credits." That part of the section bearing upon this subject is as follows:
"Debts owing in good faith by any person, company or corporation may be deducted from the gross amount of credits belonging to such person, company or corporation: Provided, Such debts are not owing to any person, company or corporation as depositors in any bank or banking association, or with any person or firm engaged in the business of banking in this State or elsewhere; and the person, company or corporation making out the statement of personal property to be given to the assessor, claiming deductions herein provided for, shall set forth both the amount and nature of the credits, and the amount and nature of his debts sought to be deducted; but no person, company or corporation shall be entitled to any deduction on account of any bond, note or obligation given to any mutual insurance company, or deferred payment, or loan for a policy of life insurance, nor on account of any unpaid subscription to any religious, literary, scientific or benevolent institution or society: Provided, That in deducting debts from credits no debt shall be deducted where said debt was created by a loan on government bonds or other taxable securities."
Statement of the Case.
Section 1, chapter 84, of the Session Laws of Kansas for 1891 provides for the taxation of bank stock, and is as follows:
"SECTION 1. That section 6868 of the General Statutes of 1889 be amended as follows: Sec. 6868. Stockholders in banks and banking associations and loan and investment companies, organized under the laws of this State or the United States, shall be assessed and taxed on the true value of their shares of stock in the city or township where such banks, banking associations, loan or investment companies are located; and the president, cashier or other managing officer thereof shall, under oath, return to the assessor on demand a list of the names of the stockholders and amount and value of stock held by each, together with the value of any undivided profit or surplus; and said banks, banking associations, loan or investment companies shall pay the tax assessed upon said stock and undivided profits or surplus, and shall have a lien thereon until the same is satisfied: Provided, That if from any causes the taxes levied upon the stock of any banking association, loan or investment company shall not be paid by said corporation, the property of the individual stockholders shall be held liable therefor: Provided further, That if any portion of the capital stock of any bank or banking association or loan or investment company shall be invested in real estate, and said corporation shall hold a title in fee simple thereto, the assessed value of said real estate shall be deducted from the original assessment of the paid-up capital stock of said corporation, and said real estate shall be assessed as other lands or lots: And provided further, That banking stock or loan and investment company stock or capital shall not be assessed at any higher rate than other property: And provided further, That the provisions of this act shall apply to all mutual, fire and life insurance companies or associations having assets, accumulations, money or credits, and doing business under the laws of this State: And provided further, That such assets, money, and credits, held and under the control of such mutual fire and life insurance companies or associations, shall be subject to assessment and taxation."