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Opinion of the Court.
property of the wife is that which she "brings into the marriage, or acquires during the marriage by inheritance or by donation made to her particularly," and "is divided into dotal and extra dotal. Dotal property is that which the wife brings to the husband to assist him in bearing the expenses of the marriage establishment. Extra dotal property, otherwise called paraphernal property, is that which forms no part of the dowry." Fleitas v. Richardson, No. 2, 147 U. S. 550. 553; Arts. 2332, 2399, 2334, 2335.
By Article 2337, "by dowry is meant the effects which the wife brings to the husband to support the expenses of the marriage."
Article 2383 declares: "All property, which is not declared to be brought in marriage by the wife, or to be given to her in consideration of the marriage or to belong to her at the time of the marriage, is paraphernal.”
Mrs. Young claimed an indebtedness on the part of her husband to her, arising from his having received the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of her father in her favor for $5000, and the additional sum of $2500, being an amount which came to her from her father's estate, and was received by him. This was paraphernal property. The wife has a legal mortgage on the property of her husband, "for the restitution or reimbursement of her paraphernal property." Art. 3319. "Conventional mortgage is that which depends on covenants. Legal mortgage is that which is created by operation of law. Judicial mortgage is that which results from judgments." Art. 3287. A legal mortgage results by operation of law, and "no legal mortgage shall exist, except in the cases determined by the present code." Arts. 3311, 3312.
Art. 2376 declares that the wife has a legal mortgage on the property of her husband for the restitution of her dowry as well as for the replacement of her dotal effects; and by Art. 2379 it is provided that, during the marriage, the husband may, with the consent of his wife, "be authorized by the judge, with the advice of five of the nearest relations of the wife, or friends, for want of relations, to mortgage, spe
Opinion of the Court.
cially for the preservation of his wife's rights, the immovables which he shall designate; and then, the surplus of his property shall be free from any legal mortgage in favor of his wife;" while Art. 2390 is as follows: "The wife may alienate her paraphernal property with the authorization of her husband, or in case of refusal or absence of the husband, with the authorization of the judge; but should it be proved that the husband has received the amount of the paraphernal property thus alienated by his wife, or otherwise disposed of the same for his individual interest, the wife shall have a legal mortgage on all the property of her husband for the reimbursing of the same. The husband may release the mass of his property from this legal mortgage, by executing a special mortgage in the manner required in the preceding section, for dotal effects." Thus it appears that a legal mortgage on all the husband's property exists until a special mortgage is executed according to the foregoing provisions, and the law does not contemplate a legal and a special mortgage existing at the same time. And the legal mortgage of the wife to affect third persons must be recorded in the office of mortgages for the parish where the property lies. Arts. 3342 to 3349.
Mrs. Young must either stand upon her legal mortgage resulting from the receipt of her paraphernal property, and recognized by the judgment of July 9, 1881, decreeing a separation of property, or a judicial mortgage arising from that judgment, or on the contract between herself and Mrs. Metcalfe, by which Mrs. Metcalfe purported to transfer to her an indebtedness due by Wade R. Young, secured on the property in controversy. If her mortgage be legal or judicial, its existence would not be a bar to the confirmation of a sale for an amount insufficient to satisfy it; and, moreover, it could not rank the special conventional mortgage of Nalle & Co., because it was not recorded until subsequently.
It is, indeed, insisted that it was altogether invalid under Art. 2428: "The separation of property, although decreed by a court of justice, is null, if it has not been executed by the payment of the rights and claims of the wife, made to appear
Opinion of the Court.
by an authentic act, as far as the estate of the husband can meet them, or at least by a bona fide non-interrupted suit to obtain payment." Chaffee v. Sheen, 34 La. Ann. 684, 690; Nachman v. Le Blanc, 28 La. Ann. 345, 346; Bertie v. Walker, 1 Rob. (La.) 431, 432. But this becomes immaterial, as whatever rights, if any, might be claimed under it, it could have no effect as against Nalle & Co. for want of record.
According to Arts. 3345 and 3349, all mortgages, whether conventional, legal or judicial, are required to be recorded as provided, and the preservation of the legal mortgage or privilege in favor of a married woman depends on the record of the evidence of her mortgage or privilege in the mortgage book of the parish where the property is situated; and that evidence, if not by written instrument, must consist of "a written statement, under oath, made by the married woman, or her husband, or any other person having knowledge of the facts, setting forth the amount due to the wife, and detailing all the facts and circumstances on which her claim is based." There was no such evidence as last named here, and no such inscription until after the mortgage to Nalle & Co. had been given and registered. Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U. S. 130, 149.
The transaction between Mrs. Metcalfe, Young, and Mrs. Young appears to have been that Mrs. Metcalfe being indebted to Young, and Young indebted to Mrs. Metcalfe, the respective debts were discharged by agreement and compensated each other, but that it was agreed that Young's indebtedness to Mrs. Metcalfe should be kept alive for the benefit of Mrs. Young, upon the consideration on Mrs. Young's part of the release of her paraphernal claims against her husband. Compensation had, however, taken place and the two debts were reciprocally extinguished. Arts. 2130, 2207, 2208.
This was the necessary effect by operation of law, and when the principal obligation was discharged the mortgage fell with it and would not be revived though the indebtedness were reacknowledged in favor of another. Smith v. Mc Waters, 22 La. Ann. 431, 432; Davidson v. Carroll, 20 La. Ann. 199; Schinkel v. Hanewinkel, 19 La. Ann. 260.
Again, contracts between husband and wife are forbidden.
Opinion of the Court.
in Louisiana except as specified. Contracts of sale between them "can take place only in the three following cases: 1. When one of the spouses makes a transfer of property to the other, who is judicially separated from him or her, in payment of his or her rights. 2. When the transfer made by the husband to his wife, even though not separated, as a legitimate cause, as the replacing of her dotal or other effects alienated. 3. When the wife makes a transfer of property to her husband, in payment of a sum promised to him as a dowry." Arts. 1790, 2446; Carroll v. Cockerham, 38 La. Ann. 813, 824.
This transaction was an attempt to extinguish the wife's general mortgage by the transfer of the special mortgage of a third party, satisfied by the act as between the immediate parties thereto, and if it could be done at all, it could only be when taking place in accordance with Articles 2379 and 2390, and recorded as required by Article 3345; and, as already seen, these articles were not complied with.
But were this otherwise, the judgment of 1881 did not recognize her alleged special mortgage, which recognition was evidently not prayed for, and recognized only her legal mortgage in complete disregard of her special mortgage if she had had any.
The rendition of judgment for all her paraphernal claims without any recognition of a special conventional mortgage to secure them would seem to have concluded the fact that none such then existed, or at least furnishes such persuasive proof thereof as must be controlling on this record. Nicolson v. Citizens' Bank, 27 La. Ann. 369.
Conceding, then, that the renunciation by Mrs. Young in favor of Nalle & Co. was ineffectual, her legal or judicial mortgage, if outstanding, was nevertheless subordinate to their mortgage and not entitled to precedence. In the jurisprudence of Louisiana, and under the statutes of that State, the right of redemption from a decree in foreclosure does not obtain. If a prior mortgage exists, the prior mortgagee is not a necessary party, and purchasers take subject to the prior lien. If there be a subsequent mortgage, the prior mortgage containing the pact de non alienando as Nalle & Co.'s mortgage
Statement of the Case.
did, the mortgagee therein need not be made a party, but must take notice of the proceedings to enforce the prior mortgage at his peril. He may, however, apply to set aside the sale on proper grounds. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Watson v. Bondurant, 21 Wall. 123; Carite v. Trotrot, 105 U. S. 751.
As heretofore noticed, Mrs. Young and her husband prayed for redemption, which is not, in any foreclosure case, allowable as such; while so far as their pleadings are regarded as seeking the setting aside of the sale and for a resale, we find no adequate grounds for according that relief.
The decree of June 9, 1890, is reversed with costs; and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court with instructions to enter a decree overruling the objections to the sale of July 30, 1887; dissolving the injunction; adjudicating the property to Mrs. Mary Nalle, wife of Eustis F. Golson, and ordering the delivery of possession to her.
GREGORY v. VAN EE.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST
No. 601. Submitted December 28, 1895. — Decided January 27, 1896.
If the decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals is final under the sixth section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, a decree upon an intervention in the same suit must be regarded as equally so; and even if the decree on such proceedings may be in itself independent of the controversy between the original parties, yet if the proceedings are entertained in the Circuit Court because of its possession of the subject of the ancillary or supplemental application, the disposition of the latter must partake of the finality of the main decree, and cannot be brought here on the theory that the Circuit Court exercised jurisdiction independently of the ground of jurisdiction which was originally invoked as giving cognizance to that court as a court of the United States.
GREGORY, a citizen of Illinois, filed his bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, December 16, 1884, against