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Statement of the Case.

self of 1876; the judgment of 1881 in favor of his wife for $7500; the renunciation by his wife of her prior right of mortgage in favor of Nalle & Co.; and the execution of the mortgage to Nalle & Co. to secure the payment of his note for $1632.61, with interest at eight per cent until paid; and charged the renunciation to have been invalid. The rendition of decree in favor of Nalle & Co. against defendant for the foreclosure of their mortgage; the issue of final process in execution of the decree, and the proceedings and sale thereunder, were rehearsed at length, as in the intervening petition; and it was averred that his wife's mortgage was a first incumbrance, and that no sale or adjudication could be made to a purchaser for less than the amount of the mortgage. It was further alleged that the marshal in the second advertisement of the property for sale on twelve months' credit required the purchaser out of the price to deduct and pay in cash an amount for printing, marshal's fees, and clerk's fees, as well as taxes due on the property, and that much the largest amount required to be paid was claimed by Nalle & Co., or one of them, for taxes alleged to have been paid by them or him on the property, the legality of which was contested by defendant and by his wife; that this requirement was an oppressive and unjust act towards the mortgagor, and deterred a purchaser with whom defendant had arranged to buy; and other irregularities were set forth. As to the claim of the payment of taxes for the years 1882, 1883, 1884, and 1885, and as to the taxes pretended to be due for the year 1886, the payment of which the marshal made a condition precedent to the accepting of any bid, no taxes were due and no necessity existed for the payment thereof, and that Nalle & Co. acquired no rights by such payment and subrogation, and thereupon the grounds on which the illegality was charged were given at considerable length. Defendant prayed that the sale be not confirmed and be set aside; that his wife be made or allowed to become a party to the suit; that a reference be made to a master to settle the priority of liens; that the renunciation of his wife be declared invalid, and her mortgage for $7500 and interest be decreed the

Statement of the Case.

first lien on the property and prior in rank to Nalle & Co.; that the revenue acts of Louisiana for the years 1880, 1882, 1884, and 1886 be decreed unconstitutional, null, and void, and the inscription of the mortgage to secure the taxes be erased as a cloud, and for general relief. And he further prayed that, if it be determined that the sale was a valid sale, he might be allowed to redeem by paying to complainants the amount of the debt, interest, and costs, and such other sums as might be found to be legally due.

Defendant also filed what he styled a cross-bill against the marshal, Mrs. Mary Nalle, and her husband Golson, and Nalle & Co., alleging the sale of the property by the marshal and the acceptance of the bid of Mrs. Mary Nalle, notwithstanding a written protest by defendant against the acceptance of any bid not exceeding $7500, the amount of the prior incumbrance; that the marshal attempted to transfer the possession of the property to Nalle & Co., or Mrs. Mary Nalle for them, by giving complainants' solicitor an order to take such possession; and that the marshal and Mrs. Mary Nalle were now seeking to evict defendant from the possession of his property, and were trespassing thereon, all of which was without color of right; that the marshal had no power to pass the title to Mrs. Nalle until the oppositions to the sale had been tried and determined and the sale confirmed, and that, even if he had, the sale was absolutely null and void because the amount of the bid did not exceed the amount of the prior special mortgage; and prayed for an injunction, whereupon a restraining order was issued, and subsequently a writ of injunction.

Nalle & Co. demurred to the petition of intervention, and moved to dismiss the opposition and dissolve the injunction. The motion was denied and the demurrer overruled. Thereupon Nalle & Co. answered the intervening petition of Mrs. Young and the cross-bill and opposition to confirmation of sale of Wade R. Young, alleging that Mrs. Young was, at the time of the erasure and cancellation of her alleged mortgage, to wit, June 1, 1882, a citizen of the State of Mississippi, and as such sui juris in every respect, having, under the laws of said State, full capacity as a feme sole to make any contract

Opinion of the Court.

whatever; denying that Wade R. Young moved his family to the State of Mississippi in 1876 with the intention of retaining, or that he did retain, either an actual or constructive domicil in the State of Louisiana; averring that the alleged agreement between Mrs. B. F. Young and Mrs. Metcalfe and Wade R. Young, under date of December, 1876, was null and void for reasons given; and that Mrs. Young and Wade R. Young were in equity and good conscience estopped from setting up her alleged mortgage. Wade R. Young and his wife filed a replication to the answer of Nalle & Co. and others "to the cross-bill and intervening petition."

The case came on to be heard "upon the cross-bill and opposition to the confirmation of the sale and the intervening petition" and the various papers heretofore referred to were offered in evidence as well as sundry depositions, and "generally everything of record in the suit." On June 9, 1890, the court entered a decree, whereby it was "ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the sale of the mortgaged property made by the marshal, in pursuance and execution of the foreclosure decree, be set aside, cancelled, and avoided. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the attempted renunciation by the intervening petitioner, Mrs. Bethia F. Young, of her special mortgage on the property, was and is invalid and of no effect, and that said mortgage be recognized as the first mortgage on the property, superior in rank to the mortgage of the plaintiffs, E. Nalle & Co., and entitled to be paid by preference. And it is further ordered that the plaintiffs, E. Nalle & Co., pay the costs of the sale and of these proceedings." From this decree Nalle & Co. and Mrs. Mary Golson, as purchaser, appealed to this court.

Mr. Charles J. Boatner for appellants.

Mr. Wade R. Young for himself and Mrs. Young, defendants in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Opinion of the Court.

The proceedings in the state court were ordinary and not executory, and in the Circuit Court the petition stood as a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage. The decree of November 6, 1886, was a final decree, and the execution may be regarded as the equivalent of a direction to a master or commissioner to make sale in the enforcement thereof. Under the civil code and code of practice of Louisiana judicial sales are conducted by the sheriff or other public officer in the manner minutely described, and adjudicated to the purchaser, who thereupon becomes the owner of the article adjudged. Civil Code, Art. 2601 to Art. 2621; Code of Prac. 663 et seq. But in an equity foreclosure in a Circuit Court, while the requirements of the state law should be complied with and the forms of proceeding pursued as nearly as practicable, it is proper for the officer who makes the sale to make a report or return to the court for confirmation. Resistance to such confirmation may be made, under circumstances, and this sometimes results in the setting aside of the sale and an order for a resale. But the scope of these pleadings was much wider. To the confirmation of the sale the defendant, indeed, interposed objections, waiving any formal report for confirmation, but they were not passed upon by the Circuit Court independently of defendant's alleged cross-bill and the petition of Mrs. Young in intervention and these papers may all be considered together, as they were by the Circuit Court, and so treated they constituted in effect an independent suit brought by Young and his wife to set aside the sale and have the alleged mortgage of the wife declared the prior incumbrance and enforced; or for redemption.

The objections in respect of alleged irregularities in the conduct of the sale, or the invalidity of certain taxes and the requirement of their payment, need not be considered, as they are not sustained by the record, and mere informalities or irregularities in a judicial sale in Louisiana do not constitute a sufficient ground for setting it aside. Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 139 U. S. 176.

The principal objection to the sale was the insufficiency of the bid at which the property was disposed of, and that objection will be first examined.

Opinion of the Court.

Under Articles 679, 683, and 684 of the code of practice of Louisiana, when there exists a special conventional mortgage or privilege on the property put up for sale, the property is sold subject thereto, and the purchaser pays to the officer so much of the price as exceeds "the amount of the privileges and special mortgages to which such property is subject;" and, in case of sale on twelve months' credit, if there exist on the property any privileges or special mortgage, in favor of other persons than the judgment creditor, and who are preferred to him, the purchaser is entitled to retain in his hands out of the price the amount required to satisfy the privileged debts and special hypothecations to which the property sold was subject, but is bound to give his obligation for the surplus of the purchase money, if there be any, and subscribe his obligation at twelve months' credit, with security; but if the price offered is not sufficient to discharge the privileges and mortgages existing on the property, having a preference over the judgment creditor, there shall be no adjudication, and other property, if there be any, shall be seized.

If, therefore, the mortgage claimed by Mrs. Young was conventional or special, and had been properly recorded and not legally renounced, and it was prior to that of Nalle & Co., no sale of the mortgaged property could be made under the junior incumbrance of the latter, unless the price bid was sufficient to discharge the prior lien. But if the prior mortgage was legal or judicial, this requirement did not apply, and the property passed to the purchaser subject to the payment of the prior lien. Alford v. Montejo, 28 La. Ann. 593; Godchaux v. Dicharry's Succession, 34 La. Ann. 579.

The Circuit Court held that the mortgage asserted by Mrs. Young was a special mortgage, which took precedence over that of Nalle & Co.; that her renunciation was void, and, the price bid not being sufficient to discharge this prior special mortgage, that the sale could not be confirmed and must be set aside.

By the civil code, the partnership or community of acquets and gains exists between husband and wife by operation of law, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract. The separate

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