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Opinion of the Court.

Whether an instrument is under seal or not is a question for the court upon inspection; whether a mark or character shall be held to be a seal depends upon the intention of the executant, as shown by the paper. Hacker's Appeal, 121 Penn. St. 192; Pillow v. Roberts, ub. supra.

The defendant did not produce the original in order that it might be compared in the particular objected to with the copy and duplicate offered. The defendant's attorney, Mr. Buckman, was called, and testified that he was one of the attesting witnesses to the instrument offered, and that he, as a notary public, took the acknowledgment thereto of Alexander Wallace, that he executed the same for and in behalf of the company, and that the said lease was the act and deed of the defendant company for the uses and purposes therein expressed.

Whether, therefore, the instrument put in evidence was merely a copy, in which event it would not be expected that a wax or stamped seal of the company would appear upon it, but merely a scroll, representing the original seal, or whether the so-called copy was really the original paper, as certified by one of defendant's witnesses, would not, in our opinion, be material. The presumption would be, if the paper were a copy, that the original was duly sealed, or, if it were the original, that the scroll was adopted and used by the company as its seal, for the purpose of executing the contract in question.

As respects those portions of the objections that raised the question as to the authority of the president to execute the contract in question, there was, besides the presumption that would arise out of the signing, sealing, and delivering of the instrument, evidence that the company exercised acts of ownership and control over the demised premises, took charge of them by their superintendent, took an inventory of the property, rented the hotel portion to a third party, received money rent therefor, gave a receipt therefor under the seal of the company, opened a hotel account on their cash book, which showed receipts of rent from the tenant, and expenditures for moving the hotel and for making improvements therein, and

Opinion of the Court.

there was evidence adduced by the defendant itself of efforts to get the property insured in pursuance of their contract.

An exception was taken by the defendant to the action of the court in permitting Mrs. Roberts, the company's tenant, to testify to statements made to her by Alexander Wallace, the president of the company, the ground of objection being that Wallace was dead at the time of the trial. Statements made by the president, if relevant to the controversy, would be competent to affect the company, even if he were dead at the time of the trial. In the present case, it was relevant to show that the witness, when about to rent the hotel, was told by the president to go to Mr. Warriner, the secretary of the company, to whom she paid one month's rent, and who gave her a receipt therefor, with the corporate seal attached. The witness was not a party to nor interested in the suit, nor was the president or his executor or administrator. The admissions made by the president, subsequently, in a casual conversation, as to his ineffectual efforts to get the hotel insured, could scarcely be regarded as relevant and competent to affect the company. But the error, if such it were, in permitting such statements to be received, was rendered immaterial by the action of the company, in adducing affirmative evidence, in its own behalf, to the very same effect, namely, the efforts made by the company and its officers to procure insurance.

Complaint is made of the action of the court in rejecting the offer of the defendant's by-laws for the purpose of showing want of authority to make the lease sued on without the consent of the stockholders or board of directors, and the accompanying offer of the minutes, which did not disclose that any such authority had been granted.

In considering what weight should be given to the error assigned to the rejection of the by-laws, we have a right to advert to the copy of them contained in the bill of exceptions. There we learn that the powers conferred upon the president were in the following terms:

"The president shall preside at all meetings of the board of directors and of the company (of which he shall be president), and shall have the general management and supervision of the

Opinion of the Court.

operation of the lines of road of said company and the general business thereof; subject, however, at all times to the control of the board of directors. He shall, when so directed and empowered by the board of directors, execute and sign for and on behalf of said company all documents and writings authorized to be made and executed for and on its behalf. He shall draw and issue all warrants for the payment of moneys on the treasurer of said company when so ordered by the board, and sign the same. He shall make an annual report to said company of the condition thereof, with such suggestions and recommendations as he may deem proper, and to said board of directors whenever required by them; and shall do and perform such other duties as are consistent with said office, and others of a like nature pertaining thereto."

This by-law appears to describe the powers and duties usually possessed by presidents of railroad companies, and we are, therefore, relieved from considering what would have been the effect of an unusual restriction on the powers of such an officer, and whether those dealing with a railroad company would be obliged to take notice of such unusual restriction.

The question, therefore, we have to consider is whether the admission in evidence of the by-law would have affected the result reached by the court and jury in the case.

Assuming, for the present purposes of the discussion, that the subject-matter of the contract in question was within the legitimate scope of the company's powers, we think the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence disclose a case in which the company would be bound, notwithstanding there was no proof that the president was expressly authorized to make the contract by a previous resolution of the board. The evidence was undisputed that, after the execution of the lease, the company took possession of the demised premises, rented to a third party the hotel portion thereof, and received and receipted for rent of the hotel.

The case, in this particular, resembles and falls within the principle of Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co., 11 Wall. 488, 491, where the binding force of a contract was denied for alleged want of

Opinion of the Court.

authority of an agent to make the same, and this court, through Mr. Justice Miller, held:

"We are satisfied that the agreements set up in the bill are the valid contracts of the defendant. Though the plaintiff was unable to produce any resolution or order in writing by the trustees or board of directors of the defendant corporation, and though the seal used was the private seal of one of its officers, instead of the corporate seal, neither of these is essential to the validity of the contract. We entertain no doubt. that Rindge, the agent and one of the directors and treasurer of the Eureka company, was authorized to execute the agreement, and, if any doubt existed on that point, the report and payment for five hundred machines, the first month's use of the patent under the agreement, would remove the doubt. If it did not, it would very clearly amount to a ratification."

In Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 83, it was held that where a cashier was appointed, and permitted to act in his office, for a long time, under the sanction of the directors, it was not necessary that his official bond should be accepted as satisfactory by the directors, according to the terms of the charter, in order to enable him to enter legally on the duties of his office, or to make his sureties responsible for the nonperformance of their duties; that the charter and the by-laws are to be considered, in this respect, as directory to the board, and not as conditions precedent; and Mr. Justice Story, in discussing the subject, said: "A board may accept a contract, or approve a security, by a vote, or by a tacit and implied assent. The vote or assent may be more difficult of proof by parol evidence than if reduced in writing. But this is, surely, not a sufficient reason for declaring that the vote or assent is inoperative." See also Pittsburgh & Cincinnati Railway v.Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371, 138. As, then, the contract in question was, upon our present assumption, within the legitimate scope of the powers of the company, was executed by that officer of the company who by the by-laws was the proper agent to perform such function, and as the company went into possession of and received the rents and profits of the hotel, we conclude that the com

Opinion of the Court.

pany was bound thereby, even if the minutes of the company fail to disclose authority expressly given to the president to execute the contract.

It is, however, further claimed that the contract sued on was not within the legitimate powers of the company.

This is not a case in which, either by its charter, or by some statute binding upon it, the company is forbidden to make such a contract. Indeed, the public laws of Florida, referring to the powers of railroad companies, provide that every such corporation shall be empowered "to purchase, hold, and use all such real estate and other property as may be necessary for the construction and maintenance of its road and canal and the stations and other accommodations necessary to accomplish the objects of its incorporation, and to sell, lease, or buy any land or real estate not necessary for its use." McClell. Digest of the Laws of Florida, p. 276, sec. 10. They are likewise authorized "to erect and maintain all convenient buildings, wharves, docks, stations, fixtures, and machinery for the accommodation and use of their passengers and freight business."

Although the contract power of railroad companies is to be deemed restricted to the general purposes for which they are designed, yet there are many transactions which are incidental or auxiliary to its main business, or which may become useful in the care and management of the property which it is authorized to hold, and in the safety and comfort of the passengers whom it is its duty to transport.

Courts may be permitted, where there is no legislative prohibition shown, to put a favorable construction upon such exercise of power by a railroad company as is suitable to promote the success of the company, within its chartered powers, and to contribute to the comfort of those who travel thereon. To lease and maintain a summer hotel at the seaside terminus of a railroad might obviously increase the business of the company and the comfort of its passengers, and be within the provisions of the statute of Florida above cited, whereby a railroad company is authorized "to sell, lease, or buy any land or real estate not necessary for its use," and to "erect and maintain all

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