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Opinion of the Court.

ties are citizens of different States, the suit shall be brought in the district of which either party is an inhabitant. And it is established by the decisions of this court that, within the meaning of this act, a corporation cannot be considered a citizen, an inhabitant or a resident of a State in which it has not been incorporated; and, consequently, that a corporation incorporated in a State of the Union cannot be compelled to answer to a civil suit, at law or in equity, in a Circuit Court of the United States held in another State, even if the corporation has a usual place of business in that State. McCormick Co. v. Walthers, 134 U. S. 41, 43; Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202. Those cases, it is true, were of the class in which the jurisdiction is founded only upon the fact that the parties are citizens or corporations of different States. But the reasoning on which they proceeded is equally applicable to the other class, mentioned in the same section, of suits arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; and the only difference is that, by the very terms of the statute, a suit of this class is to be brought in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, and cannot, without the consent of the defendant, be brought in any other district, even in one of which the plaintiff is an inhabitant.

When the parties are citizens of different States, so that the case comes within the general grant of jurisdiction in the first part of the section, the defendant, by entering a general appearance in a suit brought against him in a district of which he is not an inhabitant, waives the right to object that it is brought in the wrong district. Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, ante, 217, and cases there cited. But a corporation, by doing business or appointing a general agent in a district other than that in which it is created, does not waive its right, if seasonably availed of, to insist that the suit should have been brought in the latter district. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co. and Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, above cited.

In the case of Hohorst, petitioner, 150 U. S. 653, on which the petitioner in this case principally relied, the decision was that the provision of the act of 1888, forbidding suits to be

Opinion of the Court.

brought in any other district than that of which the defendant is an inhabitant, had no application to an alien or a foreign corporation sued here, and especially in a suit for infringement of a patent right; and therefore such a firm or corporation might be so sued by a citizen of a State of the Union in any district in which valid service could be made on the defendant. That case is distinguishable from the one now before the court in two essential particulars: First. It was a suit against a foreign corporation, which, like an alien, is not a citizen or an inhabitant of any district within the United States; and was therefore not within the scope or intent of the provision requiring suit to be brought in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant. See Galveston &c. Railway v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496. Second. It was a suit for infringement of a patent right, exclusive jurisdiction of which had been granted to the Circuit Courts of the United States by section 629, cl. 9, and section 711, cl. 5, of the Revised Statutes, reënacting earlier acts of Congress; and was therefore not affected by general provisions regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, concurrent with that of the several States.

In United States v. Mooney, 116 U. S. 104, it was likewise held that the first section of the Judiciary Act of 1875 did not take away the exclusive jurisdiction, conferred by earlier statutes upon the District Courts of the United States, over suits for the recovery of penalties and forfeitures under the customs laws of the United States.

No such rule is applicable to a suit for infringement of a trade-mark under the act of 1881. That act, while conferring upon the courts of the United States, in general terms, jurisdiction over such suits, without regard to the amount in controversy, does not specify either the court or the district of the United States in which such suits shall be brought; nor does it assume to take away or impair the jurisdiction which the courts of the several States always had over suits for infringement of trade-marks.

This suit, then, assuming it to be maintainable under the act of 1881, is one of which the courts of the United States

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have jurisdiction concurrently with the courts of the several States. The only existing act of Congress, which enables it to be brought in the Circuit Court of the United States, is the act of 1888. The suit comes within the terms of that act, both as arising under a law of the United States, and as being between citizens of different States. In either aspect, by the provisions of the same act, the defendant cannot be compelled to answer in a district of which neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is an inhabitant. The objection, having been seasonably taken by the defendant corporation, appearing specially for the purpose, was rightly sustained by the Circuit Court.

Whether the provision in section 7 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1881, that the courts of the United States should have original jurisdiction in such cases, without regard to the amount in controversy, would control the pecuniary limit of jurisdiction in the subsequent act of 1888, as in the prior act of 1875, of which that act was an amendment, it is unnecessary to consider, because this bill distinctly alleges that the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2000.

Writ of mandamus denied.

WHITTEN v. TOMLINSON.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.

No. 619. Argued November 20, 1895. Decided December 16, 1895.

Under section 753 of the Revised Statutes, the courts of the United States have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of restraint of liberty of any person in jail, in custody under the authority of a State, in violation of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United States; but, except in cases of peculiar urgency, will not discharge the prisoner in advance of a final determination of his case in the courts of the State; and, even after such final

Statement of the Case.

determination in those courts, will generally leave the petitioner to his remedy by writ of error from this court.

In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, verified by oath, as required by Rev. Stat. § 754, only distinct and `unambiguous allegations of fact, not denied by the return, nor controlled by other evidence, can be assumed to be admitted.

A warrant of extradition of the Governor of a State, issued upon the requisition of the Governor of another State, accompanied by a copy of an indictment, is prima facie evidence, at least, that the accused had been indicted and was a fugitive from justice; and, when the court in which the indictment was found had jurisdiction of the offence, is sufficient to make it the duty of the courts of the United States to decline interposition by writ of habeas corpus, and to leave the question of the lawfulness of the detention of the prisoner, in the State in which he was indicted, to be inquired into and determined, in the first instance, by the courts of the State.

A prisoner in custody under authority of a State will not be discharged by a court of the United States by writ of habeas corpus, because an indictment against him lacked the words "a true bill," or was found by the grand jury by mistake or misconception; or because a mittimus issued by a justice of the peace, under a statute of the State, upon application of a surety on a recognizance, and affidavit that the principal intended to abscond, does not conform to that statute.

THIS was a petition, filed March 26, 1895, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, and addressed to the Honorable William K. Townsend, the District Judge, as a judge of the Circuit Court, for a writ of habeas corpus to the sheriff of the county of New Haven in the State of Connecticut. The petition was signed by the petitioner, and verified by his oath, and was as follows.:

"The petition of George E. Whitten respectfully shows to your honor that he is now a prisoner confined in the custody of Charles A. Tomlinson, sheriff of the county of New Haven, in the county jail in the city of New Haven in said county, for a supposed criminal offence, to wit, a crime of murder in the second degree.

"Your petitioner also shows that such confinement is by virtue of a warrant, a copy whereof is in the possession of said sheriff; and your petitioner avers that, to the best of his knowledge, he is not committed or detained by virtue of any process of law known to the courts of the United States or

Statement of the Case.

the several States, but he is now detained in violation of the Constitution of the United States, in violation of the laws of the United States, and in violation of the constitution and laws of the State of Connecticut; and that he is not held in confinement by virtue of any final judgment or decree of any competent court or tribunal of criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of any process issued upon such judgment or decree, but is held without due process of law.

"And your petitioner further says that at the time of his arrest, and for a long time prior thereto, he was a citizen of Massachusetts, and was extradited from Massachusetts for said alleged crime in January, 1895; and he says that he is advised by his counsel, William H. Baker, residing at Boston, and so believes, that his said imprisonment is illegal, and that said illegality consisted in this, to wit:

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That in August and September, 1893, this petitioner was tried before the local court sitting within and for the county of New Haven, State of Connecticut, upon a charge of murder in the second degree, being the same alleged charge for which he was extradited, and was after a full hearing thereof discharged from said court.

"That thereafterwards this petitioner remained in the city of New Haven, State of Connecticut, for a long time - during at least two sessions of the grand jury and then removed to Newton in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, some time early in the year 1894.

"That he was in January, 1895, while such citizen of Massachusetts, arrested and extradited from the State of Massachusetts upon a warrant issued by the Governor of Massachusetts, on demand and application of the Governor of Connecticut, alleging that an indictment had been found by the grand jury against him of murder within and for the county of New Haven, being the same charge on which he was tried as above. This petitioner was taken to the said city of New Haven by virtue thereof.

"This petitioner avers that no indictment was ever found against him by any grand jury sitting at any time within the State of Connecticut, nor no indictment as and for a true bill

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