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Opinion of the Court.

of frauds, and render it capable of being enforced by a decree for specific performance. Similar cases of promises to convey property upon the consideration of support are frequent in the books. Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Missouri, 37; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Missouri, 101; Hiatt v. Williams, 72 Missouri, 214; Watson v. Mahan, 20 Indiana, 223; Twiss v. George, 33 Michigan, 253; Warren v. Warren, 105 Illinois, 568; Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns. 379.

The general principle to be extracted from the authorities is that if the plaintiff, with the knowledge and consent of the promisor, does acts pursuant to and in obvious reliance upon a verbal agreement, which so change the relations of the parties as to render a restoration of their former condition impracticable, it is a virtual fraud upon the part of the promisor to set up the statute in defence, and thus to receive to himself the benefit of the acts done by the plaintiff, while the latter is left to the chance of a suit at law for the reimbursement of his outlays, or to an action upon a quantum meruit for the value of his services. In discussing what are and what are not acts done in part performance, which will entitle the plaintiff to a decree in his favor, the entry into possession of the land and the making of valuable improvements thereon is treated by all the cases as one of the most satisfactory evidences of part performance, and entitling plaintiff to a decree in his favor. 3 Pomeroy Eq. Juris. § 1409; Fry on Spec. Perf. § 585. Wills v. Stradling, 3 Ves. Jr. 378; Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 My. & Cr. 167; Williams v. Evans, L. R. 19 Eq. 547.

Although there is no distinct allegation in this bill that the plaintiff entered into possession, there is an allegation that the land in question consisted of a lot 34 feet in width by 110 feet in depth, and that the plaintiff gave his personal attention to the selection and purchase of the materials for a dwellinghouse, and the erection of the same upon this lot, and paid $4000 in defraying the cost of the house-facts which are inconsistent with any other theory than that he took possession of the lot for the purpose of erecting the house. Whitsitt v. Trustees Presbyterian Church, 110 Illinois, 125. If he subsequently, and after the completion of the house, allowed Mrs.

Opinion of the Court.

Marvin to take possession of the lot, in view of the intimate relations between them, he lost no rights as against her which he obtained by his original entry, and the erection of the house. The possession thus taken was evidently in performance of and in reliance upon the original agreement with the owner, and, we think, taken in connection with the improvements made by him it makes a case of part performance sufficient to remove the bar of the statute. His subsequent relinquishment of such possession was evidently with no intention to abandon the interest he had already acquired in the property. Drum v. Stevens, 94 Indiana, 181.

3. We are also of opinion that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the bill is not open to the defence of laches. It is true the advances were made at sundry times from 1879 to 1884, and the bill was not filed until 1889, but the delay is sufficiently accounted for by the intimate personal relations that had always existed between the plaintiff and Mrs. Marvin, and the unlimited confidence he had reposed in her. It is alleged in this connection that they had long lived together in the same house; that she had treated him and spoken of him as a foster child; that from the time the services were rendered until her death he had repeatedly urged her to come to a settlement with him; that, whenever the subject was referred to, she acknowledged the justice of the claim, and assured him she had provided for him in her will, saying that she intended the house to be his when she was done with it, and that it should belong to them both while she lived; that on this account he had neglected to take measures for the enforcement of his rights; and that he did not know until her death that she had failed to carry out her promise to devise the entire property to him.

Dealing with a person who stood in this relation to him, and with whom he had always been upon friendly and even intimate terms, the same diligence could not be expected of him as would have been if he had been treating with a stranger. If, as he avers, she had promised to leave him the entire property at her death, he may have considered it to his advantage to await this contingency, rather than to pursue

Opinion of the Court.

her for half the property during her life. As she died in February, 1889, and the bill was filed in October of the same year, there can be no claim that, with reference to this event, he did not act with sufficient promptness. The only circumstance that occurred during the period of nine years from the time the contract was made which was calculated to excite his suspicion that she did not intend to carry out her alleged agreement, was the execution of a trust deed in favor of White, of which, however, there is nothing in the bill to indicate that he had actual notice. While the record of this trust deed would operate as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property, it is at least doubtful whether it would have the same effect as to one who stood in plaintiff's relation to the property. Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271; Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224; James v. Brown, 11 Michigan, 25; Cooper v. Bigly, 13 Michigan, 463; Idlehart v. Crane, 42 Illinois, 261; Doolittle v. Cook, 75 Illinois, 354.

The question of laches does not depend, as does the statute of limitation, upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under all the circumstances of the particular case, plaintiff is chargeable with a want of due diligence in failing to institute proceedings before he did. In this case, we think the delay is fully explained. Gunton v. Carroll, 101 U. S. 426. It is true that one of the parties to this alleged agreement has died, and that the court has lost the benefit of her testimony with regard to the alleged agreement. This, however, is a circumstance to be considered by the court in weighing the evidence, rather than as an obstacle to the maintenance of the bill upon demurrer.

There are doubtless circumstances in the case which indicate at least a difficulty of proof, if not to arouse a suspicion, that perhaps the plaintiff may have overstated his case, but the pleader in a bill in equity is not bound to state either the testimony or facts which militate against his theory, but only to present his case in the light most favorable to his own interests, and ask that, upon such presentation, the court shall decide upon the sufficiency of his bill.

Syllabus.

4. We do not think the bill is open to the charge of multifariousness. While the tenth paragraph sets out a verbal agreement to convey an interest in land, and the prayer is for the payment of a certain amount of money, the discrepancy is explained by the fact that, in view of the trust deed to White, a decree for a half interest in the land will fail to satisfy plaintiff's claim, and that his lien is claimed to extend not merely to the half interest but to the whole property, to satisfy her promise to convey to him a moiety of its unencumbered value. Of course, nothing that is here said can affect the rights of White.

The decree of the court below is therefore

Reversed and the case remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

BALLEW v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.

No. 547. Argued October 28, 1895.- Decided December 16, 1895.

A certificate by the Commissioner of Pensions that an accompanying paper "is truly copied from the original in the office of the Commissioner of Pensions," taken together with a certificate signed by the Secretary of the Interior and under the seal of that Department, certifying to the official character of the Commissioner of Pensions, is a substantial compliance with the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 882, and authorizes the paper so certified to be admitted in evidence.

For the committing of the offence under Rev. Stat. § 4786, (as amended by the act of July 4, 1884, c. 181, § 4, 23 Stat. 98, 101,) of wrongfully withholding from a pensioner the whole, or any part of the pension due him, an actual withholding of the money before it reaches the hands of the pensioner is essential; and it is not enough that it is fraudulently obtained from him, after it had reached his hands; and that act does not forbid or punish the act of obtaining the money from the pensioner by a false or fraudulent pretence.

A general verdict of guilty, where the indictment charges the commission of two crimes, imports of necessity a conviction as to each; and if it

Statement of the Case.

appears that there was error as to one and no error as to the other, the judgment below may be reversed here as to the first, and the cause remanded to that court with instructions to enter judgment upon the second count.

AT the October term, 1893, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia, an indictment was found against the plaintiff in error, embracing two counts, the first charging him with wrongfully withholding from a pensioner of the United States, one Lucy Burrell, part of a pension allowed and due her, and the second accusing him of demanding and receiving, as agent, a greater compensation for services in prosecuting the claim for pension than is provided by the title of the Revised Statutes pertaining to pensions.

The offences charged in the indictment are made punishable by the final paragraph of Rev. Stat. § 4786, as amended by the pension appropriation act of July 4, 1884, c. 181, § 4, 23 Stat. 98, 101.

On the trial of the case there was conflict in the testimony in many particulars as to the offence charged in the first count. The evidence tended to show that the check, issued for the payment of the pensioner, was received by the accused, a pension agent; that he went with the pensioner to a bank; that there in the presence of an officer of the bank the check was endorsed, and was presented to the paying teller, by whom the amount was paid over to or "put in the hat" of the pensioner who was shown to be an illiterate negro woman; that, either by the suggestion of the bank officer or of the accused, the money was deposited in the bank for account of the pensioner, a deposit slip being issued therefor. The proof, moreover, was that immediately after this deposit the pensioner went to an office in the vicinity, where a check for $1887.34, one-half of the amount of the pension check, was drawn by her, she making her mark, this check being payable to the order of Hurley Ballew, a son of the accused, by whom it was immediately collected. There was conflict as to whether the accused participated in the fraud by which the drawing of the check was brought about, or whether the amount enured to

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