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Opinion of the Court.

would be obnoxious to the general rule embodied in Rev. Stat. § 723, inhibiting the maintenance of a suit in equity where the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete.

The bill, however, in addition to the recovery of money, seeks to establish a trust in favor of the plaintiff, and to obtain a sale of the property to satisfy his claim. The prayer is, not for a reimbursement to the plaintiff of the sums advanced, but for the payment to him of a sum equal to one-half the value of the house and lot in which he claims an interest, and of the rents accrued thereon. Had it not been for the fact that, subsequent to the outlays made by the plaintiff in improving the property, Mrs. Marvin had encumbered it by a trust deed in favor of Amos White, in the sum of $10,000, an ordinary bill for a specific performance would have been the proper remedy; but as the court upon such a bill could only decree him one half the property subject to such mortgage, he claims in this bill the full moiety of the value of the property, as it stood when the disbursements were made, and before it was incumbered by the mortgage, and prays that such amount may be awarded him from the sale of the property; and that in respect to the residue, if any, he stand as a general creditor of her estate.

The case is not unlike that of Wylie v. Coxe, 15 How. 415, where a bill was filed to recover a contingent fee of five per cent out of a certain fund arising from the prosecution of a claim against the Republic of Mexico. It was held that the death of the owner of the fund did not dissolve the contract, but that the right to compensation constituted a lien upon the money when recovered, and that this was sufficient ground for jurisdiction in equity, inasmuch as the payment of the fund to the executrix in Mexico would place it probably beyond the reach of the complainant.

Still more nearly analogous in principle is the case of Seymour v. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 215. This suit was founded upon an agreement between Seymour and one Price, by which Price undertook to devote his time and judgment to the selection and purchase of land to a certain amount, with a stipulation that the lands should be sold within five years, and one-half

Opinion of the Court.

of the profits should be paid to Price and the other to Seymour. It was held that Seymour took the legal title in trust for the purpose specified, and to this extent Seymour was a trustee and Price the cestui qui trust; that the trust continued after the expiration of the five years, unless Price subsequently relinquished his claim, and that the land which was to be converted into money should be regarded and treated in equity as money. "The agreement," said Mr. Justice Swayne, "that the property should be sold, and half of the profits paid to Price, was a charge upon the property, and gave him a lien to the extent of the amount to which he should be found entitled upon the execution of the agreement, according to its terms." In reply to the contention that Price had a complete remedy at law, he further observed: "An action at law, sounding in damages, may undoubtedly be maintained in such cases for the breach of an express agreement by the trustee, but this in nowise affects the right to proceed in equity to enforce the trust and lien created by the contract. They are concurrent remedies. Either, which is preferred, may be selected. The remedy in equity is the better one. The right to resort to it under the circumstances of this case admits of no doubt, either upon principle or authority. Such, in our judgment, were the effect and consequences of the contract."

The earlier English cases held broadly that where a vendor of land had disabled himself from carrying out a contract to sell the land to the plaintiff, by a subsequent sale to another party, a court of equity would entertain a bill as for a specific performance, and award damages to the plaintiff. This was the distinct ruling in Denton v. Stewart, 1 Cox Ch. Cas. 258, where the court directed an inquiry as to what damages the plaintiff had sustained, and decreed that such damages should be paid by the defendant. A similar ruling was made in Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. 395, although the Master of Rolls indicated a doubt with regard to the soundness of the principle announced in Denton v. Stewart. In Gwillim v. Stone, 14 Ves. 128, the bill asserted from the first that defendant could not make a good title, and asked for compensation by reason of the failure of the contract, and a decree was

Opinion of the Court.

made for delivering up the contract, without prejudice to an action, instead of an inquiry before the master.

In Todd v. Gee, 17 Ves. 273, 279, the case of Denton v. Stewart was practically overruled by Lord Chancellor Eldon, who held that the plaintiff in a bill for specific performance was not entitled generally to satisfaction by way of damages for the non-performance, to be ascertained by an issue, or reference to a master, the court saying "that, except in very special cases, it is not the course of proceeding in equity to file a bill for specific performance of an agreement; praying in the alternative, if it cannot be performed, an issue or an inquiry before the master with a view to damages. The plaintiff must take that remedy, if he chooses it at law. Generally, I do not say universally, he cannot have it in equity, and this is not a case of exception." This case was followed in Ferguson v. Wilson, L. R. 2 Ch. 77, where the plaintiff prayed the specific performance of a resolution, passed by the board of directors of a railway company, under which he alleged that he was entitled to have a certain number of shares allotted to him; and also prayed that if it should appear that all the shares had been allotted to other shareholders, the directors might indemnify him out of their own shares, or might be charged with damages. All the shares having been allotted before the filing of the bill, it was held that, as no remedy by way of specific performance was possible, plaintiff's claim for damages failed also.

The principle of these cases was also adopted by Chancellor Kent in Kempshall v. Stone, 5 Johns. Ch. 193, which is strongly relied upon by the appellees in this connection. In that case, the defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to sell and convey him a lot of land, and, after the time of performance had elapsed, sold the land to a third person for a valuable consideration without notice of the agreement. Plaintiff filed his bill for a specific performance, which it was held could not be decreed, the lands having passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice, and the court further held that the plaintiff's remedy was at law for compensation in damages. In this case, as well as in the English

Opinion of the Court.

cases above cited, there was no possible lien upon the land, and no trust in favor of the plaintiff which the court could execute, and it was very properly held that his only remedy was at law.

But if the defendant has not wholly disabled himself from carrying out the contract, he may be decreed to perform specifically so much as he is still able to perform, and plaintiff may recover damages for the residue. Thus in Burrow v. Scammel, 19 Ch. D. 175, when the defendant's title came to be investigated it was found that she was possessed of only a moiety of the premises she had agreed to lease to the plaintiff, the other moiety being vested in her son, a minor. She was decreed to specifically perform so much of the contract as she was able to perform, with an abatement of half the rent, and an inquiry as to damages was refused only upon the ground that there was no evidence that plaintiff had sustained any damages. The American cases are also to the effect that, where the defendant has only partially disabled himself from carrying out the contract, the plaintiff may be entitled to a specific performance so far as it can be enforced, and may receive compensation in damages for the deficiency. 3 Pomeroy Eq. Juris. §§ 1405, 1407; Bostwick v. Beach, 103 N. Y. 414.

In the case under consideration, Mrs. Marvin had but partially disabled herself from carrying out her contract with the plaintiff according to its original terms, by incumbering the property with the trust deed in favor of White. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff might have filed a bill for a specific performance pro tanto, and obtained a decree for a conveyance of one half of the property to himself, subject to a moiety of the trust deed; but we think he also had the option of treating the whole property as subject to a lien in his favor, and praying that it be sold to satisfy his claim for half of its original value. He would doubtless have a remedy at law to recover the value of his services as well as the moneys disbursed by him. This, however, under the averments of his bill, would not be the amount to which he would be justly entitled. It is possible that, in an action at law, he might also recover a personal judgment against the estate for one

Opinion of the Court.

half the value of the property in question; but this is not the complete and adequate remedy which a bill to enforce a trust in his favor upon the property in dispute would afford to him, and we think it is not beyond the power of a court of equity to entertain a bill for this purpose. Sullivan v. O'Neal, 66 · Texas, 433.

2. Does the Statute of Frauds stand in the way of a decree in his favor? As there was no contract in writing, plaintiff must maintain his bill, if at all, upon the theory of a part performance. He must maintain it, too, upon the same principles and with the same cogency of proof as if it were in fact, as well as in substance, a bill for a specific performance. In this connection, the allegation is in effect that the plaintiff arranged with Mrs. Marvin to pay half the cost of the lot, and half the cost of erecting a dwelling thereon, he to purchase the materials and superintend the erection of the dwelling, and that each was to own half the property; that he performed his contract in full; that she not only never questioned that he had paid his half in full, but stated to him and to mutual friends that he had paid in full, and was jointly interested with her in the premises; that his ownership of half of the premises was never disputed by her, but was openly recognized, and that, when he requested a settlement and that she convey his half to him, she replied that she had provided for that in her will, by which she gave him the entire property.

Admitting to the fullest extent the proposition that a mere payment of the consideration in money is insufficient to remove the bar of the statute, there is no doubt that such payment, accompanied by an entry into possession under the contract, is such a part performance as will support the bill. This court so expressly decided in the case of Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1. And in Brown v. Sutton, 129 U. S. 238, it was held that, where the defendant's intestate bought certain property for the complainant, under a promise made orally that he would make over the title to her upon consideration that she should take care of him during the remainder of his life, as she had done in the past, there had been sufficient part performance of this parol contract to take it out of the operation of the statute

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