A Biographical History of Philosophy, Volumen4Charles Knight & Company, 1853 |
Términos y frases comunes
Absolute Absolute Idealism abstract admit answer appears argument assumption Atheism Auguste Comte belief Berkeley Berkeley's called causation cause ceived certitude CHAP common sense conceive conception Condillac consciousness consequences declare denied Descartes doctrine Dugald Stewart endeavoured epoch error external world fact faculties Fichte Fichte's forced G. H. LEWES Germany given Hegel History human Hume Hume's ideal hypothesis Idee identity independent of experience inference instinct irresistible Kant Kant's knowledge laws ledge Locke Locke's Logic mankind metaphysical metaphysical stage Method mind moral nature negation never non-ego noumena noumenon Object and Subject ontology perceive perception phenomena Philos Philosophy Phrenology positive positive science principle produced proposition psychology pure question reader reality reason refutation Reid Reid's religion rience scepticism Schelling Schelling's sensation sensibility speculations Spinoza spirit SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM substance substratum supposed theory things thinkers thinking thought tion true truth understanding universal Vols word
Pasajes populares
Página 19 - ... all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind ; that their being is to be perceived or known ; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit...
Página 16 - Principles Of Human Knowledge 1. OBJECTS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.—It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either IDEAS actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Página 22 - Again, I ask whether those supposed originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.
Página 17 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Página 11 - I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.
Página 40 - We may well ask what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body; but 'tis in vain to ask whether there be body or not. That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.
Página 18 - ... that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived? 5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?
Página 11 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.
Página 41 - Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.
Página 15 - Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves — that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.