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Current Space Posture

At this time there are three principal facets to the U. S. space program. It is likely in the relatively rapidly evolving space activities of the future, that this delineation will be altered; nevertheless, using our current perspective of these three facets provides a framework for discussion. The first facet covers the purely military and national security oriented systems, the second those programs for the advancement of space science, the third those programs which apply the uniqueness of space to national civilian needs. A special case in the third facet is the commercial application of communications satellites, special because of the existing operating organization and its quasi governmental nature. At any given time these three facets differ in size, budget, and accomplishment but in reality the technologies and many of the developmental elements of the three have much in common. It is, therefore, difficult to uniquely consider any one of these three facets in a stand-alone basis as a part of a comprehensive look at the future of the U. S. space program. In all of this the Space Transportation System is unique, in that it will eventually replace the expendible boosters of the programs of all three facets of our space program and, in time, should make possible certain new initiatives which are either technically infeasible or exceptionally expensive with today's means of getting useful hardware in space. The shuttle has to be considered on the basis of the whole U. S. space program since as a major investment, it only makes sense if all elements, defense, NASA and civilian applications, are served.

Future Technology

In a like vein, the technological advances the Space Transportation System will permit should not be precluded from benefiting any one of the three facets of the U. S. space program. Any consideration of future major space initiative in terms of their worth as national investments should carefully and candidly examine the issue of technology transfer and its value to all elements of the space program. Consider this issue in retrospect. Goals and use of communications satellites differ significantly in important aspects between military and commercial use. There has been useful and important transfer between the two. This has largely been accomplished by the industrial suppliers of such systems. With a highly competitive market place, new technology could well depend upon those few suppliers of new military comsats. It could be anticipated that they will perforce, be preoccupied technologically with military needs; e.g., electronic countermeasures and survivability. The civilian technology will either have to be supported by a NASA re-entry into communication satellite technology or have the COMSAT Corporation which, although operating under a government charter, has an international master, the Intelsat Consortium.

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Pending Policy Issues

The COMSAT Corporation represents an example of good government policy. Enabled by an act of Congress, it has been a successful commercial venture. Policy needs to be promulgated to guide other civilian applications. Questions such as who operates the programs and how is the data disseminated remain as unanswered now as they were when the promise of space application programs were first perceived several years ago. We are just starting to scratch the surface of resource evaluation and exploitation. In our society this is an area for private enterprise. Aggressive development beyond the technology sponsored by NASA in such important programs as LANDSAT and SEASAT must come from either publically-owned charters such as COMSAT Corporation was or by incentive means to encourage private investment. The absence of policy has led to some potential for role crossing. As an example, in the COMSAT 1976 Annual Report, mention is made of the fact that COMSAT General subsidiary was participating with the U. S. Geological Survey and Telesat Canada in a program to evaluate the use of satellites for the collection of water resources data from remote geographical areas. The conduct of such a study is very appropriate. From a policy point of view, is such a study appropriate to COMSAT's charter as established by the Communication Satellite Act of 1962, is it more appropriate to NASA, should it be done by the Interior Department as a major "user, or should it be performed by industry? Until we, as a nation, regularly look at the growing opportunities in space applications from the totality of their interactions; i.e., a system approach instead of considering the space segment as an end unto itself, we will be less than cost effective. The picture isn't totally dismal as more recent programs such as SEASAT have been planned on the appropriate broader base. While there are some aspects of SEASAT operational planning that are to be determined, the elements that require future resolution are recognized.

The Future with a Space Transportation System

The Space Transportation System was a programmatic entity whose time had come when it was approved. The push it received from both the technological imperative and the organizational imperative were considerable. As a very major undertaking, care must be given to assure that it is cost effectively exploited. Oversight needs to be undertaken to insure that this national capability is optimally used for all our programs, that the cost benefits be demonstrably realized, that the potential of the STS for broader space programs of national benefit be recognized and supported, and that our international obligations be discharged. All of this must be properly balanced, prioritized and scheduled since there never will be too many orbiters once the utility and availability is established in practice. Further, the risk of orbiter loss, as with any high performance airframe, cannot be treated as non-zero, at least for planning purposes.

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New Major Initiatives

A case can be made for allowing the STS to reach operational maturity before initiating from among the various candidates, another space program of similar magnitude. Other than a replacement for shuttle as a useful single stage-toorbit any major space program will require a mature STS for its accomplishment and until the specifics of that maturity have been demonstrated, it might be premature to initiate the next major space program at full funding. On the other hand, this nation faces an energy problem. Space provides an opportunity for contribution to the energy problem solution. Planning for a space power system (SPS) should be continued so that its competitive potential can be accurately assessed. The SPS is a logical program consideration. Because its initiation will require a mature STS, opportunity exists for allowing an evolutionary SPS program and at the same time provide for shuttle-on-orbit extended utility by means of such entities as the 25 kw power module. The ultimate role of an SPS must be as a coherent part of the nation's energy program. During this probable period between major program thrusts by NASA, attention should be given to the initiation of those science and applications programs not initiated due to lack of budget during the years when STS expenditures were a major segment of the NASA budget.

BERNARD M. OLIVER

VICE-PRESIDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY

1501 PAGE MILL ROAD

PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA 94304

20 January 1978

Dear Mr. Teague:

I am pleased to submit the enclosed statement for the
consideration of the House Committee on Science and
Technology in connection with its January 24, 25 and 26th
hearings on the space program.

I am proposing a very modest beginning program to
search for extraterrestrial intelligence. NASA seems
very timid about undertaking even a small scale effort
in this area. A little encouragement from this Com-
mittee might change the whole future of man.

Sincerely,

Banney Oliver
Ваши

B. M. Oliver

enclosures

The Honorable Olin E. Teague, Chairman
Committee on Science and Technology
U. S. House of Representatives, Suite 2321
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C., 20515

B. M. OLIVER

Bernard M. Oliver was born May 27, 1916, at Santa Cruz, California. He received the B. A. degree in electrical engineering from Stanford University in 1935, and the M. S. degree from the California Institute of Technology in 1936. Following a year of study in Germany under an exchange scholarship, he returned to the Institute where he received the Ph.D. degree, magna cum laude, in 1940.

From 1940 to 1952 he was employed at the Bell Telephone Laboratories in television research and radar development. He is now Vice President in charge of Research and Development at the HewlettPackard Company, and a member of its Board of Directors. He was elected a Fellow of the Institute of Radio Engineers in 1954 and served on its Board of Directors. In 1962 he was elected a Vice President for the newly formed Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and served as President of that organization in 1965. In 1966 he was appointed to the President's Commission on the Patent System. In April of the same year he was elected to the National Academy of Engineering and in 1973, to the National Academy of Sciences. He is Chairman of the Engineering Advisory Council at Stanford University.

24 March 1977

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