purchaser will have one of our standard ships, just as each automobile buyer gets one of a standard make of automobile. "But that doesn't mean that we are going to revolutionize the shipbuilding industry. There will always be ships made to order, and shipyards for making them, just as there always have been. There are plenty of people in the world who still buy their shoes and clothes made to order, but that hasn't prevented ready-made shoes and clothing from becoming immense American industries. There will always be a market, and a good market for ships built to order for certain trades, and in those trades those ships will probably prove more efficient than standardized ships not especially fitted to them. But you can have more than one style of standardized ships, just as you can have different styles and sizes of ready-made shoes, and there will be plenty of work for them to do in all-around work, the kind of work that has hitherto been done by the old-fashioned tramp, which constitutes the bulk of the carrying trade of the world." "But will standardization of itself bring with it increased cheapness and rapidity of construction sufficient to offset the handicap under which American shipyards have so long suffered, of higher wages and material costs? In the long run, will standardization and American manufacturing efficiency be sufficient, other things being left und keep our flag on the seas? "That is a very hard question. In the first place, the operating efficiency, after the war, of these ships we are building, will depend to LAYING THE FIRST KEEL AT NEWARK BAY On December 20, 1917, the first rivet was driven in the first keel to be laid at the new ship-building plant of the Submarine Boat Corporation. This was for a 5,000-ton steel fabricated steel cargo ship. This photograph shows General Manager Worden making his address. At his right stands Mr. John Hunter, Superintendent of Hull Construction of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. At his left is Mr. Henry R. Sutphen, Vice President of The Submarine Boat Corporation. In 76 days from the begin. ning of the work this new yard was 90 per cent completed, including fabricating shops, administration building, steel and concrete steel warehouses, power houses, draughting rooms, restaurant, a hotel and fifteen miles of railway siding capable of unloading 450 freight cars per day. It was necessary to drive 30,000 piles to support the 28 shipways that are said to make this the largest single yard in the world. a great extent upon the book value at which the Government carries them, or at which it turns them over to private firms for operation. They are being built under abnormal conditions, to meet an emergency for which speed of construction is far more important than cheapness of construction. Consequently, their building cost is not going to give any fair idea of what we may hope to do in the fututre. "Although I believe in the standardized ship and its future, I do not think standardization is any panacea, nor do I think it would be wise to trust, for the future of our merchant marine, to any one factor. It is only by the united effort of us all, and by the wise use of all practical means to our end, that we can accomplish all that we are setting out to do." T ONE OF UNCLE SAM'S LATEST SUBMARINES Influence of the Submarine on War By MARLEY F. HAY HE outbreak of the war in August, 1914, found the supreme naval power, Great Britain, in possession of the numerically strongest submarine fleet. It comprised 90 vessels ranging, with a few experimental exceptions, from 200 to 800 tons in displacement. The submarine at that time was admittedly and manifestly the weapon of the weaker power, inasmuch as it was presumably a weapon preeminently of defense and it was hardly deemed politic for secondary or lesser powers to entertain aggressive national policies. Moreover, the tremendous pecuniary burdens involved in the acquisition and maintenance of a fleet of capital ships reduced this policy of defense to a policy of necessity. So conclusively is this the case that certain of the smaller powers have conceded the principle that, militarily speaking, submarines should form the major part of their fleet with destroyers and auxiliaries only as supports. During the nineteenth century, Great Britain. has occupied the position of supreme naval power, hence all other powers have been comparatively and relatively in the position of * navally weaker powers. The logical result of this status should have caused the British Admiralty to discourage early efforts to establish the practicability of the submarine, and that the situation was thus appreciated is evidenced by the fact that Robert Fulton, the American inventor of an early type of submarine, was offered substantial remuneration by the Admiralty for the entire suppression of his patents and ideas. This occurred a century ago after his failure to obtain recognition in America and France. In 1914 Great Britain's numerical superiority in submarines was probably attributable to a belief in the suitability of submarines for coast and harbor defense, which had in fact been amply demonstrated by their success in the naval maneuvers of the preceding five years. The utilization of submarines for coast and harbor defense naturally released a certain. part of their fleet for other and possibly more important work. In a consideration of the effect of the war upon submarine policy, we are immediately concerned with the principal belligerents, and especially the central empires, whose sea An important paper read at the 25th general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. N-5, THE LATEST TYPE OF AMERICAN SUBMARINE Launched at Bridgeport, Conn., in March last. This new submarine lies at the left alongside an undersea craft of the M type. policy has brought submarines into such promi nence. On the allied side, France entered the world conflict with a heterogeneous assemblage of submarines, about fifty in number, with the widest range of variation, both in regard to displacement and military characteristics. The Russian submarine flotilla has played a very inconspicuous role in the operations that have taken place hitherto and can hardly be said to have influenced submarine policy, either technically or strategically. By and large, the same may be said of the other allied powers, and the comparatively late entrance of the United States as a belligerent, if nothing else, would account for the inactivity of American submarines as far as the major naval operations in the North Sea and in the waters surrounding the British Isles are concerned. It may fairly be assumed, however, that since April last this country has profited at least potentially by the previous war experience of the western allies. Paradoxical as it may seem in the light of later developments, the last of the great powers to admit the desirability of or necessity for submarines was Germany, and that conclusion was only reached under the pressure of actual war, when it was manifest that the rest of her fleet was of practically no use. If one believes that the German government has been preparing for many years in anticipation of the present. war, it seems incredible in view of the completeness of her preparedness in all other respects that the submarine arm of the naval service was neglected and discredited up to the day war broke out. It was assuredly no oversight on the part of the German authorities, for in several conversations the writer had with Admiral von Tirpitz in 1911 in regard to Germany's submarine policy the latter expressed emphatically as his opinion that he considered submarines to be in an experimental stage, of doubtful utility, and that the German government was not at all convinced that they would form an essential or conspicuous part This is the craft that suddenly appeared in Newport Harbor shortly before declaration of War-and since captured by the British. |